

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1972

General Editor

JORGEN S. NIELSEN

Editor, U.N. and International Sections: JORGEN S. NIELSEN

Editor, Arab World Section: GEORGE K. NASRALLAH

Assistant Editors: ROSANNA SALBASHIAN AND ANITA VITULLO

Translations from Arabic: MERIC DOBSON

The Library
University of Petroleum & Minerals
Dahran, Saudi Arabia

THE INSTITUTE
FOR
PALESTINE STUDIES
BEIRUT

THE LIBRARY
KING FAHD UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & MINERALS
DHAHRAN, 31261, SAUDI ARABIA

THE UNIVERSITY
OF
KUWAIT
KUWAIT

1975

The Institute for Palestine Studies is an independent non-profit Arab research organization not affiliated to any government, political party or group, devoted to a better understanding of the Palestine problem. Books in the Institute series are published in the interest of public information. They represent the free expression of their authors and do not necessarily indicate the judgement or opinions of the Institute.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1972

*Copyright ©, 1975, by The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut
All rights reserved, including rights to produce this book or any portion
thereof in any form.*

3-
117
7
I 1611
1772
581007/529138

THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

FOUNDED 1963

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

H.E. Charles Helou

Former President of the Republic of Lebanon

Isam Aashour (Treasurer)

Chairman of the Board, Finance Bank, S.A.L.,
(Beirut)

Abdul Wahab Abdul Wase'

Minister of State (Saudi Arabia)

Najla Abou Izzedin

Author and Educator (Lebanon)

Omar A. Aggad

Managing Director, Saudi Plastic
Products Co., Ltd., Riyadh

Muhammad Marsi Ahmed

Former Minister of Higher Education
(Egypt); Secretary-General, Federation
of Arab Universities, Cairo

Sami Alami

General Manager, Arab Bank Limited (Beirut)

As'ad Al-As'ad

Assistant Secretary-General, League of Arab States

Ahmad Baha-Ed-Din

Chief Editor, *Al-Ahram* (Cairo)

Wadad Cortas

Principal, Ahliya Girls College (Beirut)

Burhan Dajani

Secretary-General, Union of Arab Chambers
of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (Beirut)

Pierre Eddé

Former Minister of Finance (Lebanon)

Abdel Latif Al-Hamad

President, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development

Said Himadeh

Former Minister of National Economy (Lebanon)

Adib Al-Jader

Engineer (Iraq)

Abdul-Muhsin Al-Kattan

Businessman (Beirut and Kuwait)

Walid Khalidi (Secretary)

Professor, Political Studies and Public
Administration, American University of Beirut

Hisham Nachabeh

Dean of Education, Makassed Association (Beirut)

Edmond Naim

President, Lebanese University

Edmond Rabbath

Lawyer and Professor, Lebanese University

Taher Radwan

Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia
at the League of Arab States

Farid Saad

Former Minister of Finance (Jordan)

Abdul Aziz Al-Hamad As-Saqr

President, Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and
Industry

Fuad Sarrouf

Chairman, Executive Board of UNESCO (Paris)

Ahmad Khalifa Al-Suweidi

Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates

Shams Ed-Din Wakil

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Egypt to UNESCO (Paris)

Abdel Hasan Zalzal

Ambassador of Iraq (Canada)

Constantine Zurayk (Chairman)

Distinguished Professor, American University of Beirut

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
PREFACE	ix
LIST OF SOURCES	xi
LIST OF DOCUMENTS	xv
DOCUMENTS	
UNITED NATIONS	1
INTERNATIONAL	97
ARAB WORLD	271
APPENDICES	382
INDEX	393

PREFACE

This is the sixth annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine* which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University. The purpose of the series is to put on record the policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict emanating from the international community as well as the states and organizations directly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (which includes Israel) and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Middle East as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports cover a period from the middle of 1971 to the middle of 1972. Important speeches by delegates before the General Assembly have been included in the International and Arab World sections.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material, written or oral, originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a lesser extent, from private individuals and institutions which represent large groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses. As opposed to the practice in previous years editorial comment in the Soviet and Chinese press has not been considered for the present volume.

In considering items for selection the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of general policy towards the area or in that they form an indirect record of the events of the year. Emphasis has been placed on questions relating to the continuing attempts to start Arab-Israeli negotiations, on developments in Arab and Palestinian policy and attitudes regarding the means and aims of confronting Israel, on Israeli policy regarding the occupied territories and future borders, and on the attitudes of other states, and especially the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., towards the conflict. Subjects that have specifically been excluded from consideration are Israeli internal and economic policy and material relating primarily to past events, in 1972 particularly the Israeli debate on whether that country's existence was threatened at the time of the June 1967 war.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries both in the International and Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions concerning those countries' involvement in and influence on events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the O.A.U.

The majority of the documents in the Arab World section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies, *Arab Documents on Palestine*.

When documents have been reproduced only in part, this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word *excerpt(s)* after the title of the document.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English the editors have, as far as was possible, used English translations published by journals or agencies of the country of origin. In such instances the footnote simply states "English text" with no reference to the original language. In cases where unofficial English translations have been used they have, when possible, been checked with the original. Other material has been translated especially for this volume. It should be noted that translations from Hebrew have, for technical reasons, been made through Arabic rather than directly into English.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in their original versions. In documents translated for this volume familiar Arabic names appear in the form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

Within the International and Arab World sections documents are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of "early", "mid" or "late" added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only U.N. documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization's internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

The Institute for Palestine Studies expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume. The Institute further expresses its gratitude to Dr. George J. Tomeh, presently General Consultant at the Institute for Palestine Studies, for his assistance and advice.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the staffs of the libraries of the American University of Beirut, the United Nations Information Center and UNESCO in Beirut for their co-operation.

In the compilation of the International section the editor was also assisted by Mary Johnson, Hazem Hussein and Helen Saad. Translations from French are by Rosanna Salbashian; from Spanish by Eileen Olmsted; and from German and Swedish by Jorgen Nielsen. Ghorra Frangieh and Mary Honain assisted in typing the manuscript and Helena Cobban in the proof-reading. The index was prepared by David Gilmour.

LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, annual reports, radio monitoring services, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their place of publication and frequency:

<i>AAUG Newsletter</i>	Washington, D.C.	irregular
<i>Action</i>	New York	weekly
<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Amal</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	daily
<i>American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism</i>	New York	irregular
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i>	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	bi-weekly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>BBC Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	London	daily
<i>Bemahane</i>	Tel Aviv	weekly
<i>al-Bilad</i>	Jidda	daily
<i>Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung</i>	Bonn	irregular
<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	bi-weekly
<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i>	Ottawa	irregular
<i>The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter</i>	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington D.C.	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i>	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
<i>Current Notes on International Affairs</i>	Canberra	monthly
<i>Dagens Nyheter</i>	Stockholm	daily
<i>Davar</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington D.C.	weekly
<i>Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy</i>	Stockholm	annual
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily

<i>al-Dustur</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	bi-weekly
<i>al-Fajr al-Jadid</i>	Tripoli	daily
<i>Fateh</i>	Damascus	weekly
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i>	Damascus	weekly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Washington D.C.	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i>	East Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>Haaretz</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hadaf</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i>	London	daily
<i>al-Haqiqah</i>	Benghazi	daily
<i>al-Hayat</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Hisad al-Asifa</i>	Beirut	irregular
<i>al-Hurriyya</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Ila al-Amam</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>India News</i>	Beirut	irregular
<i>Information Bulletin (RAKAH)</i>	Haifa	monthly
<i>International Affairs</i>	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Committee of the Red Cross</i>		
<i>Annual Report</i>	Geneva	annual
<i>International Perspectives</i>	Ottawa	monthly
<i>Israel at Peace</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Israel Digest</i>	Jerusalem	bi-weekly
<i>al-Ittihad</i>	Haifa	twice a week
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i>	New York	bi-weekly
<i>The Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i>	New York	monthly
<i>The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriya</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bristol	weekly
<i>Knesset Records</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Labour Weekly</i>	London	weekly

<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel Aviv	quarterly
<i>Middle East International</i>	London	monthly
<i>Middle East Journal</i>	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>al-Montada</i>	Beirut	monthly
<i>Moscow News</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i>	New York	monthly
<i>National News Agency Bulletin</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Near East Report</i>	Washington D.C.	weekly
<i>New Middle East</i>	London	monthly
<i>New Outlook</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>The New York Times</i>	New York	daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i>	Wellington	monthly
<i>Newsweek (International)</i>	New York	weekly
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Orient</i>	Hamburg	quarterly
<i>Palestine Digest</i>	Washington D.C.	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>La Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et Documents</i>	Paris	twice a year
<i>The Pope Speaks</i>	Washington D.C.	monthly
<i>al-Rai</i>	Amman	daily
<i>al-Rai al-Amm</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	bi-weekly
<i>Revista de Politica Internacional</i>	Madrid	quarterly
<i>Revue roumaine d'études internationales</i>	Bucarest	quarterly
<i>Saut Filastin</i>	Damascus	monthly
<i>al-Sayyad</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Schwarzwälder Bote</i>	Oberndorf am Neckar	daily
<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>South African Institute of International Affairs Newsletter</i>	Johannesburg	quarterly
<i>Soviet News</i>	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly

<i>Stern</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i>	London	monthly
<i>Survival</i>	London	monthly
<i>Tadmit Newsletter</i>	Tel Aviv	bi-weekly
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>Time</i> (International)	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>U.N. Documents Index</i>	New York	monthly
<i>U.N. Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	monthly
<i>USSR and Third World</i>	London	8 times a year
<i>Wafa</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>World Marxist Review Information Bulletin</i>	Toronto	monthly

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

UNITED NATIONS

Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

<i>No. of Doc.</i>		<i>Page</i>
1.	Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (Middle East section). August, 1972.....	3
2.	Report of the Security Council (Middle East section). November, 1972	22
3.	Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction). September 9, 1972.....	43
4.	Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. September 29, 1972	50

Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

5.	Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. October 9, 1972	51
6.	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation by Israel of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2792 E (XXVI) of December 6, 1971. September 13, 1972.....	75
7.	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation by Israel of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2792 C (XXVI) of December 6, 1971. September 15, 1972....	76

Reports Submitted to the Security Council

8.	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council's consensus of April 19, 1972, to increase the U.N. observer force on the Lebanon-Israel border. April 25, 1972	80
9.	Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East. September 15, 1972.....	81

Resolutions and Decisions

I. General Assembly

10.	General Assembly Resolution 2949 (XXVII) censuring Israel and calling on all states to avoid actions implying recognition of changes and annexations implemented by Israel. December 8, 1972	83
11.	General Assembly Resolution 2963 (XXVII) concerning the administration and finances of UNRWA, censuring Israeli action in the occupied territories, and reaffirming the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. December 13, 1972.	84

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 12. | General Assembly Resolution 2964 (XXVII) adopting the report of the Working Group on the financing of UNRWA. December 13, 1972 | 87 |
| 13. | General Assembly Resolution 3005 (XXVII) calling on Israel to desist from policies violating the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and requesting the continuation of the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices. December 15, 1972 | 87 |

II. Security Council

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 14. | Security Council Resolution 313 (1972) demanding immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. February 28, 1972 | 89 |
| 15. | Consensus of the Security Council deciding to accede to Lebanon's request for an increase in the U.N. observer force stationed on the border with Israel. April 19, 1972 | 89 |
| 16. | Security Council Resolution 316 (1972) condemning Israeli attacks on Lebanon and calling for the release of abducted Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel. June 26, 1972 | 91 |
| 17. | Security Council Resolution 317 (1972) reaffirming Resolution 316 (1972) and deploring Israel's failure to implement it. July 21, 1972 | 91 |

III. Commission on Human Rights

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 18. | Commission on Human Rights Resolution 3 (XXVIII) deploring Israel's disregard of human rights in the occupied territories and calling on Israel to respect those rights. March 22, 1972 | 92 |
|-----|---|----|

IV. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 19. | UNESCO Executive Board Decision 89 EX/4.4.1 deploring the continuation of Israeli archaeological excavations in Jerusalem. July 6, 1972 | 93 |
| 20. | UNESCO Executive Board Decision 90 EX/4.3.1 submitting the problem of Israeli excavations in Jerusalem to the General Conference. October 12, 1972 | 94 |
| 21. | UNESCO General Conference Resolution 17C 3.422 calling on Israel to desist from altering the features of Jerusalem and from archaeological excavations. November 17, 1972 | 94 |

V. World Health Organization

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 22. | World Health Assembly Resolution WHA25.54 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East. May 25, 1972 | 95 |
|-----|---|----|

INTERNATIONAL

23.	Television interview statement by U.S. President Nixon confirming agreement in principle to sell more Phantom jets to Israel. Washington, January 2, 1972	99
24.	Statement by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China expressing support for the Arabs, made during a dinner in honour of a visiting Iraq government delegation. Peking, early January, 1972	99
25.	Radio interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili explaining the reasons for and Israeli reaction to the resumption of U.S. supplies of military aircraft. January 3, 1972	99
26.	Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the role of the U.S. in maintaining political and military stability in the Middle East. Washington, January 4, 1972	100
27.	Press interview statements by Israel Deputy Minister of Health Zu'bi regretting the lack of a Palestinian consensus and the forthcoming West Bank elections. Early January, 1972	102
28.	Radio interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili commenting on President Sadat of Egypt's speech of January 13. January 14, 1972	103
29.	Press interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel on possible moves towards negotiations with Egypt. Mid-January, 1972	104
30.	Recommendation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to improve the situation of UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees. Strasbourg, January 20, 1972 ...	106
31.	Radio interview statements by Israel Defence Minister Dayan commenting on the reduced defence budget. January 22, 1972	106
32.	Television interview statements by Israel Minister of Transport and Communications Peres explaining Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Jerusalem, January 24, 1972 ...	107
33.	Recommendations to the Twenty-eighth Zionist Congress by its Committees. Jerusalem, late January, 1972	108
34.	Press interview statements by Israel Prime Minister Meir on the form and subjects of negotiations with the Arab states. Jerusalem, January 28, 1972	130
35.	Radio interview statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon commenting on the prospects for a settlement in view of the situation in Egypt. January 29, 1972	132
36.	Statement by President Zhivkov of Bulgaria reiterating support for Syria and the Palestine Resistance. Damascus, February 1, 1972	133
37.	Statements by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Noyes at a Congressional hearing outlining the military balance and detailing U.S. involvement in Israeli arms manufacture. Washington, February 2, 1972	133
38.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts). Moscow, February 4, 1972	135
39.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Sadat of Egypt. Belgrade, February 5, 1972	136
40.	Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the prospects for negotiations in view of the sale of Phantom jets to Israel. Washington, February 6, 1972	136

41.	Address by U.S. Senator Humphrey (Dem.) calling for the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, continued arms supplies to Israel, and urging the U.S. government to work for increased emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews. Miami Beach, February 6, 1972.....	137
42.	Television interview statements by Israel Minister of Defence Dayan considering the role of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East, the attitudes of Jordan and Egypt towards Israel, possible future borders, and pointing out the dangers to both sides of war. Tel Aviv, early February, 1972.....	139
43.	Report by U.S. President Nixon to Congress on U.S. foreign policy (excerpts). Washington, February 9, 1972.....	140
44.	Statement by Chairman Hamilton (Dem.) of the U.S. House Subcommittee on the Near East suggesting new approaches to peace in the Middle East. Bloomington, Indiana, February 13, 1972.....	144
45.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Vice-Chairman Hussein of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq (excerpts). Moscow, February 17, 1972.....	146
46.	Press interview statements by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany outlining relations with Israel. Mid-February, 1972.....	147
47.	Radio interview statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon expressing hope for a partial settlement, regretting deteriorating relations with Uganda, and discussing plans for the occupied West Bank. February 19, 1972.....	148
48.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of U.S.S.R. Minister of Defence Grechko. Cairo, February 21, 1972.....	150
49.	Statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon asserting the right of the Israeli army to take action in South Lebanon. February 25, 1972.....	151
50.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of a government delegation from the U.S.S.R. (excerpts). Damascus, February 26, 1972.....	151
51.	Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. Jidda, early March, 1972.....	153
52.	Annual report to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel (excerpts). Jerusalem, March 7, 1972.....	153
53.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of a government delegation from Libya (excerpts). Moscow, March 8, 1972.....	154
54.	Introductory comment by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers to his report on U.S. foreign policy in 1971 presented to Congress (excerpt). Washington, March 8, 1972.....	155
55.	Press interview statement by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany discussing the desirability of a joint European policy on the Middle East. Bonn, early March, 1972.....	155
56.	Statement of policy on the Middle East adopted by the Socialist Party of France. Paris, March 12, 1972.....	156
57.	Statement by Chairman Zadok of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee commenting on King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. March 15, 1972.....	156
58.	Statement to the Knesset by Israel Prime Minister Meir rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Jerusalem, March 16, 1972.....	157
59.	Resolution adopted by the Israel Knesset rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Jerusalem, March 16, 1972.....	159
60.	Statement of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH) protesting the Knesset's claim of Jewish historical rights to Palestine. Tel Aviv, March 17, 1972.....	159

61.	Statement on the Middle East situation made by General Secretary Brezhnev of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in a speech to the Fifteenth Congress of the Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. Moscow, March 20, 1972	160
62.	Statement by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China denouncing King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan and reiterating China's support for the Arabs, made during a dinner in honour of a visiting Egyptian government delegation. Peking, March 22, 1972	160
63.	Statements by United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home discussing ways towards peace in the Middle East. Jerusalem, March 22, 1972	161
64.	Statement to the Knesset by Minister without Portfolio Galili of Israel discussing the reasons for and the progress of the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories. Jerusalem, March 27, 1972	162
65.	Press interview statements by Israel Chief of Staff Elazar defining "secure borders". Late March, 1972	163
66.	Statement issued by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Moscow, March 29, 1972	163
67.	Statement by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei of China affirming China's support for the Palestinian people, made during a dinner in honour of a visiting P.L.O. delegation. Peking, March 30, 1972	164
68.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of the P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat. Belgrade, March 30, 1972	165
69.	Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Schumann of France explaining France's attitude to the Middle East conflict and deploring Israel's annexationist policy. Paris, March 31, 1972	166
70.	Statement by Permanent U.N. Representative Huang Hua of China expressing reservations over the terms of the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949 and the effectiveness of observers in preventing aggression. Early April, 1972	167
71.	Message from Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China to the P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat at the opening of the Palestine National Council, reaffirming China's support for the Palestine cause. Peking, April 6, 1972	167
72.	Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Iraq. Baghdad, April 9, 1972	168
73.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. (excerpts). Baghdad, April 10, 1972	170
74.	Statement by the U.S. Department of State justifying its allocation of supporting assistance to Israel. Washington, mid-April, 1972	170
75.	Statement by the U.S. Department of State justifying its allocation of supporting assistance to Jordan. Washington, mid-April, 1972	171
76.	Press interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili explaining the distinction between annexation and Israel's plans in the occupied territories. Mid-April, 1972	172
77.	Statement by Director Armitage, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, explaining the United States' interest in continuing support for UNRWA. Washington, April 19, 1972	174
78.	Resolutions of the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) rejecting Israeli annexation of occupied territory and demanding equal rights for Arabs in Israel. Tel Aviv, April 22, 1972	175

79.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts). Moscow, April 29, 1972	176
80.	Statement issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross explaining its role in the Sabena hijacking incident. Geneva, May 10, 1972	177
81.	Statement by Prime Minister Maurer of Rumania expressing support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, made during a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Meir of Israel. Bucharest, May 4, 1972	178
82.	Speech by U.S. Senator McGovern (Dem.) defining his attitude to Israel and the Middle East. Columbia, Md., May 13, 1972	178
83.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of U.S.S.R. Defence Minister Grechko. Cairo, May 18, 1972	181
84.	Press conference statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the place of the Middle East in the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow. Washington, May 19, 1972	181
85.	Section on the Israeli-Arab conflict from a report on Europe and the Mediterranean adopted by the Eighteenth Assembly of the Western European Union. May 23, 1972	182
86.	Press interview statement by Deputy Prime Minister Allon of Israel assessing the security, demographic and historical factors in border demarcation. Late May, 1972	183
87.	Message from the World Peace Council on the fifth anniversary of the June war of 1967. Brussels, May 25, 1972	184
88.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Nixon of the U.S.A. (excerpts). Moscow, May 29, 1972	185
89.	Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel calling for tighter security measures and international action against states giving aid to "terrorists" after the Lod Airport attack. Jerusalem, May 31, 1972	186
90.	Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the CENTO Council of Ministers (excerpt). London, June 2, 1972	187
91.	Letter from Prime Minister Sato of Japan to Prime Minister Meir of Israel apologizing for the Lod incident. Tokyo, early June, 1972	188
92.	Press interview statements by Minister of Defence Dayan of Israel on conditions in and the future of the West Bank and the form of the next confrontation. June 5, 1972	188
93.	Statement by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs de Lipkowski of France denying that Mirage jets have gone to Egypt. Paris, June 6, 1972	189
94.	Press interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban explaining his dissatisfaction with U.N. Special Representative Jarring and reiterating Israel's interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242. Stockholm, early June, 1972	190
95.	Statement by former ARAMCO chairman Brougham at a Congressional hearing warning of the possible use by the Arabs of oil as a political weapon. Washington, June 7, 1972	190
96.	Interview with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco on American attitudes to a Middle East settlement and support for an interim agreement. Washington, June 8, 1972	191
97.	Radio interview statement by Israel's Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin on Israel's attitude to the U.S. Presidential candidates. Washington, June 10, 1972	194
98.	Resolution on Israeli aggression against Egypt adopted by the Organization of African Unity. Rabat, June 14, 1972	195
99.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain (excerpts). Amman, June 22, 1972	196

100.	Radio interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel justifying military action against Lebanon, and discussing her recent visit to Rumania and Israel's mistrust of the U.S.S.R. Vienna, June 23, 1972	196
101.	Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on the U.N. Security Council debate and its Resolution 316 of June 26, 1972. June 27, 1972	197
102.	Letter from Afghanistan Foreign Minister Shafiq to Prime Minister Salam of Lebanon condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon. Kabul, late June, 1972	198
103.	Press interview statements by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco reviewing the prospect for negotiations and the possible extent of U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvement in talks. Washington, June 30, 1972	198
104.	Statement by Uganda's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Ondoga outlining Uganda's attitude to the Middle East crisis. Moscow, early July, 1972	200
105.	Statement by U.K. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Godber justifying the U.K. vote for U.N. Security Council Resolution 316 in response to a Parliamentary question. London, July 3, 1972	200
106.	Statement of support for the Arabs made by President Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. at a dinner in honour of visiting President Assad of Syria. Moscow, July 6, 1972	201
107.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Assad of Syria (excerpts). Moscow, July 8, 1972	201
108.	Middle East section of the platform adopted at the National Convention of the U.S. Democratic Party. Miami Beach, July 12, 1972	202
109.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt (excerpts). Moscow, July 14, 1972	203
110.	Statement on the Middle East by President Ceausescu of Rumania, made in his report to the National Conference of the Communist Party of Rumania. Bucharest, mid-July, 1972	203
111.	Communiqué announcing the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Egypt, released by the U.S.S.R. news agency TASS. Moscow, July 19, 1972	204
112.	Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel in reaction to the expulsion of Soviet advisers by Egypt (excerpt). Jerusalem, July 26, 1972	204
113.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. Moscow, July 27, 1972	208
114.	Resolutions adopted by the third session of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) Central Committee calling for comprehensive political initiatives and demanding that the Bir'im and Ikrit villagers be allowed to return home. July 29, 1972	208
115.	Radio interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili asserting the continuation of Israeli settlement in the Golan Heights. August 1, 1972	211
116.	Article by Deputy Prime Minister Allon of Israel outlining the strength of Israel's current position (excerpts). Early August, 1972	211
117.	Radio interview statements by Israel's Ambassador to France Ben Natan on France's arms embargo in view of the proposed merger between Egypt and Libya. Lod Airport, August 10, 1972	212
118.	Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries (excerpts). Georgetown, August 11, 1972	213
119.	Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries. Georgetown, August 11, 1972	214

120.	Resolution on the kidnapping by Israel of Syrian and Lebanese military personnel adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries. Georgetown, August 11, 1972.....	215
121.	Press conference statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the Middle East situation after the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt. Washington, August 11, 1972	215
122.	Statement by Israel Minister of Defence Dayan emphasizing Israel's demands for "secure borders," made during an address at a Command and Staff School graduation ceremony. Tel Aviv, August 17, 1972.....	216
123.	Address by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco: The Step-by-Step Approach to Peace in the Middle East. Houston, August 19, 1972	217
124.	Statement of support for Israel contained in the policy platform of the U.S. Republican Party as adopted at its Thirtieth National Convention. Miami Beach, August 22, 1972.....	220
125.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to India of Foreign Minister Abd al-Baqi of Iraq (excerpts). New Delhi, August 26, 1972.....	221
126.	Communiqué issued after the meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers (excerpt). Helsinki, September 2, 1972	221
127.	Statement by the Israel Cabinet issued in reaction to the Munich incident. Jerusalem, September 6, 1972	221
128.	Radio interview statements by Israel Herut Party Chairman Weizman placing the responsibility for the Munich incident on Egypt and Syria. September 6, 1972	222
129.	Resolution condemning the Black September action in Munich adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, September 6, 1972.....	223
130.	Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Scheel of West Germany, commenting on responsibility for "terrorism" and reasserting his government's balanced policy towards the Middle East. Bonn, September 8, 1972	223
131.	Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel reporting on the Munich incident. Jerusalem, September 12, 1972	224
132.	Resolution passed by Israel's Knesset after debate on the Munich incident. Jerusalem, September 12, 1972	228
133.	Statement by U.S.S.R. President Podgorny expressing disapproval of the Munich incident and support for Arab unity in the face of the alliance of Zionism and imperialism, made during a dinner in honour of visiting President Bakr of Iraq. Moscow, September 14, 1972.....	228
134.	Appeal to Christians issued by the Second World Conference of Christians for Palestine—"The Canterbury Message." Canterbury, mid-September, 1972	229
135.	Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban on Israel's foreign policy in the context of Palestine guerrilla activity. September 16, 1972.....	230
136.	U.S.S.R. government statement warning of the dangers arising from Israeli raids on Syria and Lebanon and calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Moscow, September 17, 1972.....	231
137.	Speech by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home deploring violence in the Middle East and stressing the role of Security Council Resolution 242 in the search for a settlement, made at a luncheon in honour of visiting Foreign Minister Zayyat of Egypt. London, September 18, 1972	232

138.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Bakr of Iraq (excerpts). Moscow, September 19, 1972.....	233
139.	Press interview statement by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel outlining the limitations to the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Late September, 1972	234
140.	Press conference statement by President Pompidou of France deploring Palestinian "terrorism" and asserting that only a solution to the Palestine problem will stop it. Paris, September 21, 1972.....	235
141.	Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird expressing concern over increased Soviet military involvement in Syria. Washington, September 24, 1972.....	235
142.	Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on possible ways towards a solution of the Middle East conflict, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, September 25, 1972.....	236
143.	Statement by Japan Permanent U.N. Representative Nakagawa on the Middle East conflict, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, September 27, 1972.....	237
144.	Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel surveying the Middle East situation, rejecting the need for a new Palestinian state, and describing the conditions of the Palestinians under Israeli rule, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, September 28, 1972	237
145.	Resolution on the situation in the Middle East adopted by the Sixtieth Inter-Parliamentary Conference. Rome, late September, 1972.....	240
146.	Statement by Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua of China denouncing great power involvement in the Middle East and expressing support for the Arabs, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, October 3, 1972.....	240
147.	Statement issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of West Germany concerning the prohibition of Palestinian student and labour unions. Bonn, October 4, 1972	241
148.	Statement by Prime Minister Meir of Israel doubting whether peace is possible. Mid-October, 1972	242
149.	Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers outlining U.S. moves to combat "terrorism." Washington, October 15, 1972	242
150.	Statement by U.S.S.R. Prime Minister Kosygin affirming full support for Egypt's policy, made during a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt. Moscow, October 16, 1972	243
151.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt (excerpts). Moscow, October 18, 1972	244
152.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran (excerpts). Moscow, October 21, 1972	245
153.	Recommendation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe calling for coordinated action against "terrorism." Strasbourg, October 23, 1972.....	246
154.	Press release issued by the Foreign Ministry of West Germany, reporting Germany's protest to Ambassador Daghily of Libya after the hijacking of a German airliner. Bonn, October 31, 1972	246
155.	Radio interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel detailing Israel's attitude to Egypt, Jordan and Libya. November 11, 1972	247
156.	Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel confirming that the villagers of Ikrit and Bir'im will not be allowed to return to their villages, made in response to a question by Knesset Member Avneri. Jerusalem, November 13, 1972	249

157. Statement by Foreign Minister Schumann of France confirming the arms embargo on belligerents in the Middle East conflict, noting Europe's growing support for French Middle East policy, and emphasizing U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as the basis for a solution. Paris, November 16, 1972 250
158. Statement by President Senghor of Senegal in support of Security Council Resolution 242, made during a dinner in honour of visiting King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Dakar, November 21, 1972 250
159. Telegram from Foreign Minister Winzer of East Germany to the President of the Twenty-seventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly, stating East Germany's attitude to the Middle East crisis. East Berlin, November 30, 1972 251
160. Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on the current U.N. General Assembly and looking forward to 1973. December 2, 1972 251
161. Statement by Permanent U.N. Representative Huang Hua of China confirming China's full support for the Arabs, made before the U.N. General Assembly. New York, December 5, 1972 253
162. Statement by Permanent U.N. Representative Malik of the U.S.S.R. suggesting that continued Israeli disregard of U.N. decisions should be met with sanctions and expulsion, made before the U.N. General Assembly. New York, December 5, 1972 253
163. Statement by Foreign Minister Singh of India on the Middle East, made in his foreign policy speech to the Lok Sabha. New Delhi, December 7, 1972 254
164. Press conference statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers reiterating U.S. hope for negotiations towards an interim settlement in the Middle East. Brussels, December 8, 1972..... 254
165. Press interview statements by Israel Absorption Minister Peled discussing the current and future pattern of Jewish immigration to Israel. Mid-December, 1972 255
166. Statement on the Middle East made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Horne during his introduction to the House of Commons foreign affairs debate. December 14, 1972 255
167. Statement on the Middle East made by General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Brezhnev in his report to the joint meeting of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the Supreme Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and the Russian S.S.R. on the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.S.R. Moscow, December 21, 1972 256
168. Statement by Pope Paul VI regretting that the ceasefire has not been strengthened by moves towards a permanent peace in the Middle East. Vatican City, December 22, 1972..... 256
169. Statement by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH) protesting the demolition by Israel of parts of Arab refugee camps in Gaza. Tel Aviv, December 24, 1972 257
170. Statement by U.K. Labour Party leader Wilson supporting Israel's interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242. Tel Aviv, December 27, 1972 258
171. Proposed principles for peace negotiations adopted by the sixth convention of the United Labour Party of Israel (Mapam). Tel Aviv, late December, 1972 258
172. Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on the Bangkok incident. December 30, 1972 261
173. Section of the Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross relating to the Middle East conflict in 1972. Geneva, 1972 262

ARAB WORLD

174.	Press interview statements by President Numairi of Sudan concerning his country's commitment to the Arab confrontation with Israel. Khartoum, early January, 1972	273
175.	Resolution of the Third Conference of the Lebanese Communist Party on the Palestine problem (excerpts). Beirut, January 10, 1972	273
176.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt surveying recent attempts at negotiations, explaining the cancellation of the "year of decision" and stressing the significance of the Federation of Arab States (excerpts). Cairo, January 13, 1972	274
177.	Statement by the Popular Resistance Front in the West Bank on the municipal elections to be held by the Israeli Military Administration in the occupied territory. Mid-January, 1972	276
178.	Statement by the government of Egypt on a U.S.-Israel agreement for the production of arms. Cairo, January 17, 1972	277
179.	Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya warning of the possible use of oil as a political weapon and discussing Libya's relations with West Germany. Benghazi, late January, 1972	278
180.	Statement by spokesman for the P.L.O. Executive Committee Nasir on the subjects discussed during recent Executive Committee meetings. February 10, 1972	279
181.	Resolutions adopted by the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt (excerpt). Cairo, February 18, 1972	280
182.	Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt warning that U.S. policy is forcing Egypt towards a military solution and reviewing the state of negotiations and relations with the U.S.S.R. Cairo, late February, 1972	282
183.	Speech by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia at the opening of the Third Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (excerpt). Jidda, February 29, 1972	285
184.	Speech by Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia at the opening of the Third Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (excerpt). Jidda, February 29, 1972	285
185.	Charter of the National Progressive Front of the Syrian Arab Republic (excerpt). Damascus, March 7, 1972	286
186.	Press conference statements by General Secretary Habash of the P.F.L.P. outlining the conclusions of the Front's Third National Conference and discussing the strategy of "revolutionary violence." Beirut, March 14, 1972	287
187.	Speech by King Hussein of Jordan announcing his plan for a United Arab Kingdom. Amman, March 15, 1972	289
188.	Statement by the National and Regional Commands of the Baath Party and the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Baghdad, March 15, 1972	293
189.	Statement by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan (excerpts). March 16, 1972	294
190.	Statement by the National Command of the Syrian Baath Party rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan (excerpts). Damascus, March 18, 1972	296
191.	Statement by the Presidential Council of the Federation of Arab Republics rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Cairo, March 18, 1972	297
192.	Statement by President Bakr of Iraq on the proposed union with Syria and Egypt. Baghdad, March 20, 1972	299

193.	Statement by Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Hussein of Kuwait on his government's rejection of King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan. Kuwait, March 22, 1972 . . .	300
194.	Television interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan commenting on his United Arab Kingdom plan and on possible future relations with Israel. Washington. April 2, 1972	301
195.	Letter from Palestinian personalities in the East Bank repudiating King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan, sent to the extraordinary Tenth Session of the Palestine National Council (excerpts). Amman, April 3, 1972	304
196.	Press interview statements by General Secretary Hawatma of the P.D.F.L.P. discussing King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan and relations with Jordan in general. Beirut, early April, 1972	305
197.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan and announcing the severance of all relations with Jordan, made at the opening session of the Palestine People's Conference (excerpt). Cairo, April 6, 1972	306
198.	Speech by President Assad of Syria warning of Israel's plans to liquidate the Palestine resistance movement, made on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Baath Party (excerpts). Damascus, April 7, 1972	307
199.	Press interview statements by Vice-Chairman Hussein of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council, reiterating Iraqi rejection of U.N. Resolution 242 and of King Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom. Baghdad, April 10, 1972	308
200.	Programme for National Unity recommended by the National Unity Committee of the Palestine People's Conference. Cairo, April 10, 1972	309
201.	Political programme adopted by the Palestine National Council calling for the overthrow of Jordan's Hashemite regime (excerpts). Cairo, April 10, 1972	310
202.	Resolutions of the Palestine People's Conference repudiating the United Arab Kingdom plan and condemning the West Bank municipal elections. Cairo, April 10, 1972	311
203.	Statement by the Palestine People's Conference affirming the unity of the Arab and Palestine liberation movements and urging the Arab states to sever relations with Jordan. Cairo, April 10, 1972	314
204.	Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon emphasizing the importance of the approval of Lebanon's request to the U.N. Security Council to strengthen the U.N. observer force on the Lebanon-Israel border, based on the 1949 Armistice Agreement. Beirut, April 20, 1972	317
205.	Speech by President Bourguiba of Tunisia criticizing the use of classical warfare in the Arab struggle with Israel, made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Boumedienne of Algeria (excerpt). Carthage, April 20, 1972	318
206.	Interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt defending U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations and France's Middle East policy and criticizing Jordan's actions on the "Eastern Front." Cairo, April 24, 1972	318
207.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the meeting of Presidents Boumedienne of Algeria, Sadat of Egypt and Qadhafi of Libya to discuss problems facing the Arab world (excerpts). Algeria, May 6, 1972	320
208.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the United Arab Emirates of Foreign Minister Abd al-Baqi of Iraq (excerpt). Abu Dhabi, May 7, 1972	322
209.	Communiqué issued after a meeting of representatives of various Arab political parties and organizations calling for an Arab people's conference for the support of the Palestine revolution. Beirut, May 11, 1972	323
210.	Memorandum issued by the P.L.O. regarding the Lod Airport incident. Early June, 1972	323

211.	Statement by Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt commenting on the Lod Airport incident. Cairo, June 1, 1972	324
212.	Statement by President Franjieh of Lebanon deploring the Lod Airport incident but denying responsibility for it, and expressing sympathy for the Palestinian position. Beirut, June 2, 1972	325
213.	Petition from the people of the Jiftlik District to the Israel occupation authorities protesting the seizure of their land and destruction of their property without compensation. Early June, 1972	326
214.	Press interview statements by President Bourguiba of Tunisia suggesting that the Arab countries party to the 1967 war would abandon conflict with Israel after recovery of their occupied territories and expressing concern about increasing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. Tunis, mid-June, 1972	327
215.	Press statement by Prime Minister Salam of Lebanon describing Lebanon-Palestinian relations following Israel's aggressions against Lebanon. Beirut, June 24, 1972	328
216.	Statement by Minister of Information Babikian of Lebanon commenting on a call by Israel for a separate peace with Lebanon. Beirut, June 30, 1972	329
217.	Speech by President Boumedienne of Algeria stressing the need for active struggle to recover Palestine and Palestinian rights (excerpt). Algiers, July 5, 1972	329
218.	Statement by P.L.O. spokesman Nasir emphasizing the importance of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of a P.L.O. delegation. Beirut, July 17, 1972	330
219.	Communiqué reporting President Sadat of Egypt's speech before the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union announcing and explaining the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Egypt. Cairo, July 18, 1972	330
220.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations, made on the twentieth anniversary of the July Revolution (excerpts). Cairo, July 24, 1972	333
221.	Press interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan reviewing his relations with other Arab states. Amman, August 15, 1972	336
222.	Press interview statements by government spokesman Zayyat of Egypt commenting on U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations. Cairo, September 5, 1972	339
223.	Television interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan deploring the Munich incident. Amman, September 6, 1972	340
224.	Statement issued by the Black September organization explaining the Munich attack. September 7, 1972	341
225.	Statement by President Franjieh of Lebanon deploring the Munich incident and condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon. Beirut, September 11, 1972	343
226.	Speech by President Bakr of Iraq expressing the need for stronger U.S.S.R.-Arab relations, made at a dinner on the occasion of his visit to the U.S.S.R. (excerpt). Moscow, September 14, 1972	344
227.	Statement by Prime Minister Lawzi of Jordan emphasizing the primacy of Jordan's security and sovereignty while reaffirming Jordan's commitment to the West Bank. Amman, September 14, 1972	344
228.	Press interview statement by Prime Minister Husaini of South Yemen explaining his government's attitude to the Palestine problem. Aden, mid-September, 1972	345
229.	Speech by President Assad of Syria reaffirming Arab support for the Palestine revolution in the face of "Israel's arrogance," made at the opening session of the Seventeenth Conference of the General Federation of Workers' Unions (excerpt). Damascus, September 21, 1972	345

230.	Statement by head of the Phalangist Party of Lebanon Gemayyel on Lebanon's commitment to the Palestine Resistance, made at the opening of the Party's fifteenth annual conference (excerpts). Chtoura, September 22, 1972	346
231.	Letter from London P.L.O. representative Hammami to "The Times" explaining the background to Black September action. London, September 26, 1972	347
232.	Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon on the Middle East conflict and Israeli-Lebanese relations, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, September 26, 1972	348
233.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt commenting on the Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and calling for a Palestine government-in-exile, made to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (excerpts). Cairo, September 28, 1972	352
234.	Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Zaid of Jordan blaming Israel for the lack of progress towards peace, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, October 4, 1972	354
235.	Statement by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria discussing Israeli actions in the Middle East and drawing attention to the causes of terrorism, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, October 9, 1972	357
236.	Statement by Foreign Minister Zayyat of Egypt on the Middle East situation, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. New York, October 11, 1972	362
237.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing Egypt's foreign relations, made at the opening of the new session of the National Assembly (excerpt). Cairo, October 15, 1972 ..	366
238.	Speech by Emir Sabah of Kuwait to the Kuwaiti National Assembly reaffirming Kuwait's support of the Palestine revolution, made on the occasion of the opening of the new session (excerpt). Kuwait, October 24, 1972	368
239.	Statement by Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt on U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations made at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union and the Parliamentary Committee of the National Assembly. Cairo, October 25, 1972	369
240.	Speech by King Hussein of Jordan defending Jordan's role and actions in settling the Palestine problem, made at the opening of the new session of the National Assembly (excerpt). Amman, November 1, 1972	372
241.	Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Kikhya of Libya emphasizing Libya's full support for Palestinian commando activities. Tripoli, early November, 1972	373
242.	Interview statement by Shaikh Jabir, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, criticizing the Arab acceptance of the status quo and urging collective Arab confrontation with Israel. Kuwait, mid-November, 1972	373
243.	Address by member of the Central Committee of Fateh Najjar (Abu Yusif), made at a ceremony on the occasion of the second anniversary of President Assad of Syria's presidency (excerpt). Beirut, November 19, 1972	374
244.	Speech by P.L.O. spokesman Nasir affirming the unity of the Palestine and Arab liberation movements and rejecting any means of liberation other than armed struggle (excerpts). Beirut, November 27, 1972	374
245.	Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya emphasizing the anti-colonialist role of the Arab struggle and denouncing the idea of a Jewish "nation" (excerpts). Tripoli, December 4, 1972	376
246.	Cable from the National Assembly of Egypt to the Chamber of Deputies of Lebanon appealing to Lebanon to protect commando action. Cairo, December 10, 1972	377

247.	Speech by President Assad of Syria criticizing Israel's expansion on the "pretext of security" and urging the Arab states to form a united front (excerpt). Damascus, December 14, 1972	377
248.	Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya explaining the basis of Arab unity and the Arab policy of non-alignment, made on the occasion of his visit to Tunisia (excerpts). Tunis, December 16, 1972	379
249.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt stressing the need to prepare for a renewed outbreak of fighting (excerpts). Cairo, December 28, 1972	380

APPENDICES

A.	Egypt's Cabinet in 1972	385
B.	Israel's Cabinet in 1972	387
C.	Jordan's Cabinet in 1972	388
D.	Syria's Cabinet in 1972	390
E.	Palestine Liberation Organization, Executive Committee in 1972	393
F.	Voting on U.N. General Assembly resolutions, 27th session	394

United Nations

Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

1

Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (Middle East section)¹

August, 1972

A. Activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East

[This section consists of a summary of the Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative of the Middle East, presented to the Security Council in November, 1971, and printed as document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.]

B. Consideration by the General Assembly

On 25 September 1971, the General Assembly included the item "The situation in the Middle East" in its agenda and decided that it should be discussed in plenary meetings. The item was discussed at 14 meetings, held between 3 and 14 December 1971.

Opening the debate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt stated that his Government had asked the General Assembly to consider Israel's continued aggression and expansionist policy. The expulsion of inhabitants of the occupied territories, the destruction of villages, houses and refugee camps and the establishment of Israeli colonies were examples of such a policy. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) had clearly emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That principle, which was based on the Charter of the United Nations, should apply fully to all the occupied territories and could not be fragmented. Israel had not only refused to implement resolution 242 (1967) but had attempted to distort the provisions of the resolution. Thus, it had selected from paragraph 1 the words "secure and recognized boundaries" and used them to try

to justify its policy of territorial expansion. But the resolution referred to all States in the area and not only to Israel. Security could rest only on respect for territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty. It could be reinforced by a system of guarantees under the auspices of the Security Council, but Israel had rejected all proposals on security measures.

Outlining the initiatives and endeavours of four years to achieve the peaceful settlement embodied in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), including the mission of heads of African States, the representative of Egypt declared that Israel had employed manoeuvres and delaying tactics to undermine every opportunity for a peaceful settlement. The latest of such tactics was its declaration that it was ready to resume talks with Ambassador Jarring without pre-conditions. The fact was that the Jarring memorandum of 8 February 1971 contained no pre-conditions that would not be met if Israel considered itself bound by the Charter, by resolution 242 (1967) and by the principles and norms of the international legal order.

He said that opposition to Israel's policy of territorial expansion was universal. However, in the case of the United States, there was a basic contradiction between its declared commitment to support the territorial integrity of all the States in the Middle East and its policy of providing military and economic aid to Israel. Nothing had enabled Israel to evade its obligations more than its reliance on American support. By its aggression against three Arab States and by its failure to meet its obligations under resolution 242 (1967), Israel had violated the Charter. The enforcement measures of Chapter VII had been put in the Charter specifically to meet such a situation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated that the urgent task was to strengthen the cease-fire, to begin detailed and concrete negotiations and to show directions in which a final peace could be approached. The Middle East was in turmoil largely because the Arab Governments had never had a true perception of Israel's purpose or identity. Contrary to the assertion of the Foreign Minister

¹ Excerpted from Part One of *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1971—15 June 1972, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1* (U.N. doc. no. A/8701), pp. 3–17.

of Egypt that Israel was an expansionist, imperialist country, imposing its power on the Arab world, his country, the Foreign Minister said, was a small nation fighting for its own peace, freedom and security. Since the war of June 1967 Egypt had refused to meet Israel at the conference table and had declined all negotiations unless its terms were accepted in advance. Israel, on the other hand, sought negotiation, agreement and peace with Egypt. Maintenance of the cease-fire was the essential condition for progress towards peace.

Egypt, he said, had refused to co-operate with the United States in seeking a Suez Canal agreement, although the opening of the Canal, with a withdrawal of Israeli forces to an agreed distance from the cease-fire lines, would carry tangible advantages to Egypt and would weaken Israel's position strategically. Israel was prepared to make those concessions, provided that compensating conditions for its security were ensured in accordance with the Israeli memorandum submitted to the United States in April 1971. Israel would undertake that the Canal agreement would not affect or annul the agreement of August 1970 by which Israel and Egypt would hold discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in conformity with his mandate under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) to promote agreement on a final peace settlement. When agreement on a final boundary had been reached, in the framework of the peace settlement, Israeli forces would withdraw to it. Israel's position was fully in accordance with international law, with the established precedents of peace-making and with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

With regard to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, the assertion that Egypt had made a positive response while Israel had given a negative reply or none at all was not true. Egypt had replied to nearly all the points in the aide-mémoire not with a straightforward acceptance but with a counterproposal. The Egyptian reply differed from the Jarring aide-mémoire on many points. Israel had also replied to Ambassador Jarring's proposals, sometimes in general acceptance, and in some cases with counterproposals. Its reply was in full accord with the Charter and with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Each party was within its right in stating its basic position in its reply. Now that the parties had done that, they should pursue their negotiations in a de-

tailed and concrete manner, without prior conditions, and with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

Israel had also welcomed the initiative taken by the heads of African States and had replied positively to their proposals aimed at resolving the deadlock without prior surrender of its position by either party. The main virtue of the proposals was that they placed the renewal of Ambassador Jarring's mission strictly within the terms of resolution 242 (1967) and did not attempt to specify the conclusions which the negotiations should reach.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal said that the purpose of the OAU mission had been to establish contacts with the parties in order to help towards the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission under Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The main concern of OAU was the implementation of that resolution. At the talks with the parties some positive elements had emerged. Egypt had accepted the resumption of negotiations under Ambassador Jarring; it had maintained its proposal for an interim Suez Canal agreement to enable the Special Representative to establish a time-table for implementing resolution 242 (1967). Israel had confirmed its acceptance of resolution 242 (1967) and, although it preferred direct negotiations, was prepared to undertake indirect negotiations through Ambassador Jarring. Israel had also agreed to the conclusion of an interim agreement on the reopening of the Suez Canal, provided that such agreement was not linked to resolution 242 (1967). The remaining obstacles, the Foreign Minister said, were the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the concept of secure and recognized boundaries, which Israel based on security considerations. He pointed out that no State could invoke security reasons to seize or annex territories of other States. That principle, he added, should be reaffirmed in order to enable Ambassador Jarring to resume his mission.

The Secretary-General received communications from Israel, on 9 December 1971, and from Egypt, on 10 December 1971, containing the texts of the respective replies which those Governments had given to the OAU mission in response to its proposals.

In the course of the discussion in the Assembly, the representative of China said that the essence

of the Middle East question was the aggression of the Israeli Zionists against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, with the support of the United States Government. It was because of the arms provided by the United States to Israel that the Palestinian peoples and other Arab countries had failed in their efforts to recover the lost territories. Under the control and manipulation of the super-Powers, the United Nations had also ignored the just demands of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and had adopted resolutions that were unjust to the Arabs and in contravention of the United Nations Charter. The theory of so-called secure boundaries advanced by Israel was only an excuse to perpetuate the occupation of the territories seized; to accept it would be tantamount to recognizing as legal the aggression and expansion of Israeli Zionism. His Government maintained that Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories they had occupied and that the legitimate right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland and to national existence must be restored.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the key to the restoration of peace in the Middle East was the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories. The United Nations had taken a definite stand against Israeli occupation in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV) on the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) on the Middle East. Israel had defied those decisions and, with the support of the United States, had paralysed Ambassador Jarring's mission. Moreover, the United States had blocked the work of the consultative meetings of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Middle East, making it impossible to reach agreed decisions. It had instead undertaken a unilateral, one-sided mediation that had proved a total fiasco. It was time to return to the collective diplomacy of the United Nations through the Jarring mission, the representative of the USSR said, with consultations among the permanent members and the participation of the Security Council and the General Assembly in a Middle East settlement. The General Assembly could effectively contribute to a solution of the problem if it displayed determination to curb the aggressor. It should call upon the

United States not to hinder or supplant Ambassador Jarring's mission by mediation efforts not authorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Soviet Union was prepared to participate, together with other States, in establishing international guarantees for a political settlement and for security in the Middle East.

The representative of the United States said that his country had supported all United Nations efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict; it favoured a peaceful settlement based on agreement among the parties within the framework of the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Regrettably, efforts towards an over-all peace settlement had not yielded the expected results. The most promising avenue of progress since February 1971 had been the possibility of an agreement on interim measures, involving partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and a reopening of the Suez Canal as a step towards final peace. Both Egypt and Israel had expressed interest in the matter and had asked the United States to assist them in pursuing negotiations towards such agreement. However, a major difficulty had been that the parties had sought to introduce complex issues that belonged in an over-all settlement. The merit of an interim agreement was precisely that it offered a prospect for practical progress, while leaving some of the most difficult problems for further negotiations at a subsequent stage. Although the negotiations on an interim agreement were temporarily suspended, his Government would review the situation after the General Assembly debate. A basic problem, he said, was to find ways to help both parties overcome their mutual suspicion and distrust. The initiative undertaken by the OAU mission to promote a narrowing of the difficulties between the parties was highly commendable.

The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that almost all Member States, including the main parties to the conflict, agreed that any Middle East settlement should be based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967); disagreement arose with regard to the means to achieve that end. His Government had whole-heartedly supported the three main attempts made over the previous year to bring about a settlement in accordance with that resolution. It believed that an interim agreement on the reopening of the Suez Canal, if success-

fully concluded, would result in a certain deconfrontation that might pave the way for a comprehensive settlement. The mission of the four African heads of State was also a valuable initiative, intended to get the Jarring mission out of the impasse it was in. The most important development in Ambassador Jarring's mission had been his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971. Although Israel had not replied directly to the aide-mémoire, it had made it clear on a number of occasions that its main concern was not with territory but with security. If Israel were able, in the context of the correspondence with Ambassador Jarring, to say that it had no desire to incorporate any Egyptian territory into the State of Israel, that might be the response that Ambassador Jarring needed to resume the search for a peaceful settlement. Dialogue must supplant confrontation. His delegation hoped that, at an early stage after the resumption of the mission, it would be possible to arrange some closer form of contact between the Egyptian and Israeli Governments under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, to agree on the basis of a settlement. A similar procedure might then be followed in the case of the other parties concerned.

The representative of France stated that the first obstacle to peace in the Middle East was the scope and multiplicity of the problems, which could be resolved only within the framework of an over-all settlement. That was the essence of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The second obstacle resulted from the interpretation of the concept of withdrawal in relation to commitments to peace, a question that must be settled in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. The third obstacle resulted from deep divergencies concerning the solution of the painful problem of the Palestinian people. Without a solution to that problem any settlement might be jeopardized. The General Assembly could make a useful contribution to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East by reaffirming the necessary principles and by supporting the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to secure their implementation.

Representatives of Arab States said that the moral aspects and legal implications of the Middle East problem had been debated exhaustively in the United Nations and many resolutions had been adopted; but the time had come for the

General Assembly to take concrete action to end Israel's occupation of Arab territories and to ensure respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians.

Several Arab representatives, in particular those of Algeria, Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, declared that any political solution to the problem of Palestine that was based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) would not be practical; that resolution had addressed itself only to the situation created by the 1967 Israeli aggression. The representative of Algeria said that the alleged balance of the resolution rested, above all, on a flagrant injustice to the Palestinians and constituted one of the most vexing and dangerous precedents for future aggression. Any solution that disregarded the reality of the existence of the Palestinian people would fail.

Many Arab representatives deplored the United States military assistance to Israel, which, they believed, had helped Israel in its aggression and its continued defiance of United Nations decisions.

The majority of speakers, including representatives from Africa, Asia and the socialist States, shared the view that the General Assembly should demand a positive and definitive answer from Israel to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 concerning the complete withdrawal of its forces from the occupied Arab territories.

Many representatives praised the OAU mission for its conciliation efforts and felt that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) provided the basis for a political solution. They said that Ambassador Jarring's mission should be reactivated and that the parties should cooperate in good faith to facilitate continuation of the search for a peaceful settlement.

On 9 December 1971, a draft resolution was submitted, sponsored by Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Somalia, Spain, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia and subsequently also by India, Iran and Pakistan. By the draft resolution, as submitted in revised form of 13 December following the acceptance by the sponsors of amendments proposed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the Assembly would (1) reaffirm that the acquisition of territories by force

was inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored; (2) reaffirm that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of the two following principles: *(a)* withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; *(b)* termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; (3) request the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971; (4) express its full support for all the efforts of the Special Representative to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967); (5) note with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative's initiative for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; (6) call upon Israel to respond favourably to the Special Representative's peace initiative of 8 February 1971; (7) further invite the parties to the Middle East conflict to give their full co-operation to the Special Representative in order to work out practical measures for *(a)* guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, *(b)* achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, and *(c)* guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area; (8) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress made by the Special Representative in the implementation of the resolution and of Security Council resolution 242 (1967); (9) request the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the United Nations Charter, in regard to the implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

On 10 December Barbados submitted a draft resolution, which was subsequently sponsored also by Ghana. By this draft resolution the General Assembly would (1) express its support for the following proposals submitted by the Committee of Heads of State of OAU for the consideration

of the two parties: *(a)* resumption of indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring and within the terms of resolution 242 (1967); *(b)* an interim agreement for the opening of the Suez Canal and the stationing, on the eastern bank of the Canal, of United Nations forces between the Egyptian and Israeli lines; *(c)* determination of "secure and recognized boundaries" in the peace agreement; *(d)* a solution to security problems, to be found in United Nations guarantees, in the creation of demilitarized zones, and in the presence of international forces at some strategic points; *(e)* embodiment in the peace agreement of the terms of withdrawal from occupied territories; and *(f)* a guarantee of freedom of navigation of all ships through the Straits of Tiran by the stationing of international forces at Sharm el Sheikh; (2) take note of the response of the parties to the aforesaid proposals; (3) call on the Secretary-General to reactivate the mission of his Special Representative to the Middle East in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967); and (4) call on the parties to resume immediately the conversations under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

On 13 December Uruguay and Costa Rica submitted a draft resolution, a revised version of which was subsequently submitted by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti and Uruguay. Under the operative part the General Assembly would (1) express its gratitude for the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East and of the Committee of Heads of African States to achieve peace in the Middle East; (2) request the Special Representative to redouble his efforts to induce the parties to renew negotiations through him; (3) request the parties to agree to renew negotiations through the Special Representative and to do their utmost to make possible the agreements necessary for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) taken as a single whole; (4) urge the parties to study the conciliation proposals of the Committee of Heads of African States, which might constitute practical measures towards the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); (5) appeal to all Member States to help to create an atmosphere favourable to a peaceful, just and definitive solution; (6) decide to retain the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" on the agenda of the General Assembly

until a peaceful, just and definitive solution had been achieved.

On the same day, several amendments to the 21-Power draft resolution were submitted.

Barbados and Ghana submitted two amendments, of which the first would add a new preambular paragraph and the second would substitute operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the draft resolution sponsored by Barbados and Ghana for operative paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the revised 21-Power draft resolution.

Senegal submitted three amendments: under the first, the words "and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored" would be deleted from operative paragraph 1; under the second, operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the revised 21-Power draft resolution would be replaced by a new paragraph by which the Assembly would note with satisfaction the replies given by Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Committee of African Heads of State and consider them sufficiently positive to make possible a resumption of the Special Representative's mission; under the third, operative paragraph 9 would be deleted.

On 13 December the General Assembly voted on the three draft resolutions and the amendments before it. The amendments submitted by Barbados and Ghana, which were voted upon paragraph by paragraph, were rejected.

The Senegalese amendments were also rejected.

The 21-Power revised draft resolution was adopted by 79 votes to 7, with 36 abstentions, as resolution 2799 (XXVI).²

The four-Power draft resolution was rejected by 56 votes to 18, with 47 abstentions.

The draft resolution of Barbados and Ghana was withdrawn.

C. Status of the cease-fire

1. ISRAEL-LEBANON SECTOR

COMPLAINTS BY THE PARTIES

During the period under review, the Security Council received from Lebanon and Israel a number of complaints related to violations of the cease-fire.

In letters to the Security Council dated 16 and 23 June and 1 July 1971, Lebanon charged that during the period between 3 May and 30 June 1971 Israeli

forces, in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon and in defiance of relevant Security Council resolutions, had, on different occasions and at different places, crossed the border and attacked Lebanese villages, destroying some houses and causing casualties among the population. During the same period, Israeli artillery had repeatedly shelled military posts and areas around Lebanese villages. Those acts of aggression, Lebanon said, were aimed at maintaining tension and instability in southern Lebanon.

In letters dated 21 and 30 June, Israel denied the charges and stated that Lebanon could not conceal its responsibility for the incidents that continued to occur along the Israel-Lebanon cease-fire line. Quoting from Lebanese newspapers, Israel said that terrorist organizations were using southern Lebanon as a base for attacks against Israel and that the terrorists had the support and co-operation of the Lebanese Government. In the letters, Israel listed a number of terrorist attacks carried out in the period between 12 May and 29 June 1972 against Israeli villages and properties from bases in Lebanon. Reserving its right to self defence, Israel stated that its policy was scrupulous observance of the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity, which entailed Lebanon's obligation to prevent armed attacks from its territory against Israel.

In letters dated 10 August and 4 and 20 September, Lebanon charged that Israeli armed forces had again shelled Lebanese villages, wounding a civilian and causing damage to houses and crops. An attack on the village of Ramia, on 18 September, had resulted in the death of two civilians.

By letters dated 12 August and 7 and 24 September, Israel reiterated that responsibility for incidents along the Israel-Lebanon cease-fire line rested with Lebanon, which continued to lend its support to terror organizations using Lebanese territory as a base for attacks against Israel. One such attack had resulted in the incident on 18 September mentioned by Lebanon in which an Israeli patrol had intercepted a squad of armed saboteurs attempting to cross into Israel with Katyusha rockets.

On 11 January 1972, Lebanon charged that Israeli military raids and artillery attacks on its territory on 10 and 11 January had caused the death of a Lebanese woman and the destruction of a number of houses. Lebanon stated that those attacks were premeditated acts of aggression.

² Printed as Document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

On 12 and 13 January, Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to a new series of armed attacks from Lebanese territory that were directed in particular against Israel's civilians, resulting in casualties and property damage. The terror organizations, Israel said, admitted, in communiqués issued in Beirut, conducting those operations from bases in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Government was ignoring its obligations by not putting an immediate end to those activities.

On 14 January Lebanon charged that a detachment of Israeli commandos had attacked a Lebanese village and destroyed four houses. It added that Israel was threatening Lebanon with large-scale military operations in southern Lebanon.

On 24 February Israel complained that on 23 February a terror squad had penetrated into Israel and attacked a village, killing two Israeli civilians.

On 25 February Lebanon charged that Israel had that morning undertaken a large-scale air and ground attack against Lebanon. In view of the gravity of the situation, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

On the same day, Israel charged that terrorists who had penetrated from Lebanon had opened fire against an Israeli border police patrol, wounding eight Israelis, one of whom had died. It added that in the face of the numerous attacks against its territory, Israel had been compelled to take self-defence action on 25 February against encampments of terrorists on Lebanese territory. An urgent meeting of the Security Council was requested by Israel.

MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN FEBRUARY 1972

On 26 February the Security Council included the complaints of Lebanon and Israel in its agenda and invited their representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Subsequently, the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia were also invited.

The representative of Lebanon stated that on the morning of 25 February a battalion of the Israeli armed forces composed of 60 tanks and armoured cars had entered the region of Aytarun and Bint Jbail under heavy air force cover and attacked four Lebanese villages. At noon, the Israeli air force had bombed two other villages. The ag-

gression was continuing. According to information he had received, Israeli artillery and planes had, on the morning of 26 February, bombarded the area of Al Habbariya, and Israeli bulldozers were opening roads in Lebanese territory for further military operations. Israel's aggression of 25 February had resulted in two Lebanese being killed and three wounded, in addition to the destruction of 32 houses.

The representative of Lebanon went on to say that his country had hoped that resolutions adopted by the Security Council condemning Israel for its attacks against Lebanon in 1968, 1969 and 1970 would deter Israel from committing further incursions into Lebanon. In defiance of those resolutions, Israel had launched an aggression against Lebanon completely out of proportion to the alleged activities attributed to the *fedayeen*. His Government categorically rejected Israel's allegations that the incidents that had occurred on Israeli-held territory had originated from Lebanon. The areas adjacent to Lebanon were no exception, he said, to the active resistance that had spread throughout Israeli-held territory against the occupier. Furthermore, had Israel not paralysed the Mixed Armistice Commission, international observers would have been in a position to determine the origin of the incidents.

In the circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Security Council to take concrete measures to prevent Israel from resorting to its chronic acts of aggression against Lebanon or against any Arab State. Those acts constituted a breach of international peace and security, and the sanctions provided under Chapter VII of the Charter should be imposed on Israel.

The representative of Israel stated that the Government of Lebanon, contrary to its obligations under international law and the cease-fire established by the Security Council on 31 July 1967, had allowed terrorist organizations to establish bases and encampments, some inside Lebanese villages or in their vicinity, from which they undertook armed attacks against Israel. That had been done under the Cairo agreement of 3 November 1969 between Lebanon and a leader of the terrorist organizations. Although his Government had on many occasions brought to the attention of the Council the hundreds of attacks by terrorists operating from Lebanese territory against Israeli towns, villages, civilian population and

military personnel, nothing had been done by the Council to impress upon Lebanon that it could not co-operate with the terrorists and at the same time expect Israel to refrain from protecting its citizens and property. In the face of the continuous attacks from Lebanese territory, his Government had been compelled to exercise its right of self-defence. The action taken had been directed only against terrorists and their encampments, and the Israeli forces, he said, had returned to their bases after the operation. In conclusion, the representative of Israel declared that so long as Lebanon was unwilling or unable to prevent attacks from its territory against Israel, it could not complain of action taken in self-defence. Lebanon, he added, must not be given encouragement by resolutions that disregarded the factual and legal situation. It should be condemned for violating the cease-fire and should be ordered to take immediate action to stop all terrorist activities from its territory against Israel.

In the debate that ensued, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the large-scale armed attack perpetrated by Israel against Lebanon was part of Israel's continued attempts to thwart a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict so that it could retain control of the Arab territory it had seized and consolidate its position. The attack had been carried out on the very day the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, had arrived in Israel to hold talks with Israeli leaders on a settlement in the Middle East within the framework of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971.

The representative of Israel had referred to what was being done by Arab partisans in the Israeli-occupied territories. Those activities, the representative of the USSR said, were the natural reaction of the population of an occupied territory towards alien usurpers, and only the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the illegally seized Arab territories could open the way to peace and security in the Middle East. The Security Council should condemn Israel more severely than ever for its new armed attack against Lebanon and should take effective measures to restrain the Israeli aggression and put into effect its previous decisions by applying the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

The representative of France recalled that since

1968 the Security Council had adopted five resolutions denouncing Israeli military interventions in Lebanon. However, the current military action by Israel went beyond previous ones. His delegation had no doubt that Lebanon was doing all it could to control the activities of the *fedayeen* in its territory, but it could not be held responsible for what happened in Israeli territory. He further stated that Israel's military actions should end and its troops should immediately withdraw from Lebanese territory.

The representative of China, stating that Israel's action was naked aggression, asked the Council to condemn Israel and demand that it cease its armed operations and withdraw its forces.

Other members of the Council expressed the view that, although acts of violence were to be deplored regardless of their origin, Israel's military action had by far exceeded the events that had allegedly prompted it and that Israel should stop the attacks and withdraw its forces. Some members noted the lack of United Nations presence in the area and recalled a proposal made by the Secretary-General in August 1968 that observers should be stationed on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.

On the evening of 27 February, the Council met again at the request of the representative of Lebanon, who had informed the President of new Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory carried out during the day.

The representative of Lebanon stated that on that morning squadrons of the Israeli air force and heavy artillery units had bombarded areas of southern and south-eastern Lebanon. At noon, Israeli armoured units had crossed the border and had been engaged by Lebanese forces. At 3.15 p.m. Israeli Skyhawk jets had bombarded a Palestinian refugee camp, killing 10 persons and wounding 30, most of them children. The invading forces, the representative of Lebanon said, had occupied several towns and the population of the area had begun a large-scale exodus towards the central and northern parts of Lebanon. The time had come for the Council to act swiftly in order to force the aggressor to withdraw its troops immediately from Lebanese territory.

The representative of Israel said that Israeli troops had withdrawn from Lebanon on 26 February. However, on the following morning terrorists based in Lebanon had opened fire against

Israeli troops outside that country. The fire had been returned and appropriate action had been taken in exercise of Israel's right of self-defence. He regretted if the fighting had resulted, as alleged, in civilian casualties; the responsibility fell on the terrorists who placed their military positions in and near Lebanese villages. All possible precautions were taken by Israeli forces to avoid civilian casualties. As a sovereign State and as a Member of the United Nations, Lebanon had the obligation to take all necessary steps to prevent the use of its territory by irregular or any other forces for aggression against another Member State.

Many speakers condemned Israel for its new attacks on Lebanon and urged the Council to take prompt and effective measures to stop the Israeli aggression. Several representatives deplored the loss of life on both sides and pointed out that the continuation of attacks by guerrilla infiltrators, which had precipitated the Israeli attack, did not serve the interest of the people in the area and only delayed the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

At the same meeting, the representative of Italy introduced a draft resolution sponsored by Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which, he said, represented the minimum action the Council could take. Under the draft resolution, the Security Council, after deploring all actions which had resulted in the loss of innocent lives, would demand that Israel immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese territory. Oral amendments were proposed concerning the preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, including a suggestion by Yugoslavia, supported by the USSR and China, that the preambular paragraph be deleted.

Speaking on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of Italy stated that after holding consultations on the suggestions made, they felt that it would be difficult for them to accede to the suggestion that the preambular paragraph should be deleted. However, they did suggest that the preambular and operative paragraphs of the draft resolution should be voted on separately. It was so agreed.

The vote on the preambular paragraph was 8 in favour, 2 against and 3 abstentions; having failed to obtain the required majority, the paragraph was not adopted.

The draft resolution, as modified by the deletion

of the preambular paragraph, was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously, as resolution 313 (1972).³

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS OF 19 APRIL

On 19 April 1972, the Security Council issued the text of a consensus reached by its members on the question of increasing the number of United Nations observers in the Lebanon-Israel sector in response to a request of Lebanon.⁴

The consensus stated that the President of the Council had held a number of consultations with the members of the Council concerning a request by Lebanon that the Council take the necessary action to station additional United Nations observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector. The President had also consulted the Secretary-General. Exceptionally, a formal meeting of the Council had not been considered necessary.

In the course of the consultations, the members of the Security Council had reached without objection a consensus on the action to be taken and had invited the Secretary-General to proceed in the manner outlined in the memorandum he had addressed to the President of the Council on 4 April 1972. The members of the Council had further invited the Secretary-General to consult with the Lebanese authorities on the implementation of the arrangements referred to in that memorandum and had invited him to report periodically to the Council his views on the need for the continuance of the measures taken and on their scale.

The Secretary-General's memorandum of 4 April was annexed to the text of the consensus. In it he referred to the request of 29 March by Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council, which had stated that because of repeated Israeli aggression against Lebanon and because the work of the Mixed Armistice Commission had been paralysed since 1967, the Lebanese Government wished the Security Council to take the necessary action to strengthen United Nations machinery in the Lebanon-Israel sector by increasing the number of observers, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1949.

The Secretary-General had instructed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to initiate informal

³ Printed as document no. 14 below.

⁴ Printed as document no. 15 below.

consultations with the authorities concerned and to submit recommendations. On 3 April the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had informed the Secretary-General that the Lebanese authorities had indicated their preference for the establishment of three static observation posts, to be located at designated sites, that the number of observers assigned to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission would have to be increased from 7 to 21, in the initial stages, and that they could be provided from existing UNTSO manpower. The Chief of Staff had also enumerated the required additional services and equipment and had stated that the approximate financial implications of the envisaged arrangements totalled \$272,600. Further, he had pointed out that the three observation posts proposed by Lebanon could not provide comprehensive coverage of the armistice demarcation line and that they must be considered as a limited United Nations presence on one side of the line. That would provide only a measure of observation and a somewhat more rapid flow of information from UNTSO sources than existed at present.

The Secretary-General's memorandum concluded with the statement that on 3 April he had had a conversation with the Permanent Representative of Israel, who had objected to strengthening the observation system.

On 19 April the representative of China requested, with reference to the consensus, that a statement he had made during the consultations among Council members be circulated as a Security Council document.⁵ In the statement, the representative of China said that his Government firmly supported Lebanon and other Arab countries in resisting aggression and that, although his Government could not at that time make an over-all appraisal of the Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel, it was of the opinion that that Agreement had been signed in circumstances unfavourable to the Arab and Palestinian people. The Agreement, he added, did not distinguish between the victim of the aggression and the aggressor nor did it mention the rights of the Palestinian people. In the view of his delegation, strengthening the United Nations machinery of observers was not an effective method for preventing Israeli aggression. However, China would

not oppose the Council's agreement to the Lebanese request.

REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On 25 April the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report on the implementation of the consensus of 19 April,⁶ in which he stated that, following discussions between the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army, the sites of the proposed observation posts had been selected and full agreement had been reached with the Lebanese authorities on various arrangements for ensuring the effective functioning of the extended Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission operation and the security of UNTSO personnel. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO had informed the Israeli authorities of the arrangements made for the three observation posts, their location and the date they would become operational. The posts had begun operations on 24 April, and relevant information based on the observers' reports would be circulated to the Security Council as occasion required. In addition, the Secretary-General would report periodically to the Council on the need for the continuance of the measures taken in implementation of the consensus and on their scale.

On 25 April the Secretary-General issued supplemental information listing the new observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector and bringing up to date the locations of the observation posts and control centres in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors.

From 25 April onwards, the Secretary-General issued supplemental information concerning incidents observed by United Nations observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector. By those reports the observers also transmitted complaints by Lebanon covering incursions by Israeli soldiers into Lebanese territory and overflight of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft.

During the month of May and up to 15 June 1972, the observers reported on a variety of aerial and ground activities and transmitted complaints filed by Lebanon regarding violations of Lebanon's air space and territorial waters as well as border crossings by Israeli forces. Some of the complaints had not been confirmed because, as the reports indicated, the incidents had occurred outside the observation range of the posts.

⁵ Printed as document no. 70 below.

⁶ Printed as document no. 8 below.

2. ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTOR

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PARTIES AND REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

During the period under review, the Secretary-General continued to transmit to the Security Council reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on the cease-fire situation in the Israel-Syria sector. These reports related to cases of firing, most of them by Israeli forces and involving light weapons. They also dealt with aerial activity over the sector, in most cases crossing of the cease-fire line by Israeli aircraft. The reports also contained complaints by the parties of cease-fire violations.

On 17 January Israel, in a letter to the Secretary-General, charged that since 1 January 1972, 11 violations of the cease-fire had been committed from Syrian territory, resulting in the death of two civilians. In the course of 1971 there had been 149 violations of the cease-fire from Syrian territory by shelling, shooting, laying of mines and aerial intrusions, for which, it said, the Syrian Government was responsible in view of the support it had given to the terror organizations.

On 21 January the Syrian Arab Republic replied that it was a matter of record that Israeli forces had in 1971 committed 1,491 violations of the cease-fire, which were all confirmed by United Nations military observers. With regard to Israel's allegation of violations of the cease-fire by Syria, it stated that the reports of the Chief of Staff between 3 and 20 January 1972 had indicated that Israeli forces had continuously violated the cease-fire and that all complaints submitted by Israel to UNTSO had not been confirmed by United Nations observers, while those submitted by Syria had been confirmed.

3. ISRAEL-JORDAN AND SUEZ CANAL SECTORS

During the period covered by this report, the situation in the Israel-Jordan sector continued to be quiet, and the parties did not submit to the Security Council any complaints of cease-fire violations.

In the Suez Canal sector, the situation also remained calm, except for a few minor incidents on the ground and some air activity reported by the Secretary-General on the basis of reports he received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. In those reports, the observers had indicated that there had been flights by both Egyptian and Israeli air-

craft over the sector, and on occasion over each other's positions on the Canal. Charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations were lodged by both parties and were reported to the Council by the Secretary-General.

D. Treatment of civilian populations in Israeli-occupied territories and related matters

During the period under review the Security Council received a number of communications from Arab States complaining about the treatment of civilians in territories occupied by Israel and communications from Israel containing countercharges and replies.

On 17 June Israel, after referring to its letter of 10 June and the Syrian Arab Republic's letter of 15 June 1971, stated that Syria, which had rejected Security Council resolution 242 (1967), continued to wage terror warfare against Israel. With regard to the reference in the Syrian letter of 15 June to resolution 9 (XXVII) of the Commission on Human Rights,⁷ alleging violation of human rights in Israeli-controlled territory, it was to be noted that the majority of the members of the Commission had refused to support that resolution and that only representatives of Arab, Soviet and Moslem States and their traditional followers had voted for it. Resolutions cited in Syrian letters clearly demonstrated the impossibility of dealing with the Middle East situation equitably and effectively by means of United Nations resolutions that were not based on agreement of the parties to the conflict.

On 21 June the Syrian Arab Republic, replying to Israel's letter, recalled a series of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions relating to the Israeli-Arab conflict and said that Israel defied and violated even resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority or unanimously.

On 23 June Israel charged that the Syrian Arab Republic attempted to employ one-sided resolutions that were the result of proposals initiated by Arab States in order to avoid seeking a settlement of the Middle East conflict by negotiations with Israel.

On 25 June Iraq transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of an interview, published in the French magazine *Témoignage Chrétien*, with an

⁷ Printed as document no. 433 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

Israeli professor, the President of the Israeli League of Human Rights, who expressed his concern about and protested Israel's policies towards the Arabs in occupied territories.

On 21 July Israel replied that the interview in question contained falsehoods and distortions of fact and that the professor concerned was known to speak for a handful of avowed supporters of Arab belligerency against Israel.

On 20 July Israel, in a letter to the Secretary-General regarding the activities of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, stated that that Committee continued to serve as a tool of Arab propaganda and a means of dissemination of falsehoods regarding the situation in the Israeli-held territories. However, Israel considered that, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs had said in the Knesset on 19 July, the hundreds of prominent visitors to Israel were the best eyewitnesses of the true situation in those territories.

The report of that Committee was the subject of a statement issued by Jordan's mission to the United Nations on 21 October, commending the members of the Committee for carrying out a difficult assignment, which was made more difficult by Israel's refusal to permit the Committee to carry out its task on the scene of the tragedy of thousands of innocent victims imprisoned by Israel.

On 16 August Egypt drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the situation in Gaza, which it said was deteriorating following Israel's measures of expulsion and the destruction of homes in order to depopulate the area, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The letter stated that, in view of the gravity of the situation, the United Nations should take the necessary steps to end Israel's breach of law, morality and international peace and security.

In reply, Israel stated on 19 August that, following a terrorist campaign supported by Egypt and other Arab States, there had been many violent acts aimed at spreading insecurity among the local population, which had resulted in the death of many local Arab inhabitants. Consequently, Israel had been compelled to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of the inhabitants, which had required the construction of access roads within the refugee camps, involving in certain

places the demolition of houses. However, substitute housing had been provided and the evacuees had been given compensation for any expenses incurred in the process of the transfer to new houses.

On 6 January Iraq transmitted a petition signed by 251 Palestinian Arabs in exile urging the Secretary-General to persevere in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which called for the return of the refugees to their homes and compensation to be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.

During March and April 1972, the Security Council received a number of communications from Egypt and Israel regarding the conditions of the civilian population in Gaza and Sinai. On 15 March Egypt charged that, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention and of many Security Council resolutions, Israel had deported more than 10,000 Egyptian citizens inhabiting Sinai and had transferred them to other areas. Israel had also destroyed many homes and had expropriated lands in the Rafah area. Under the circumstances, it was the responsibility of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, to take the necessary measures to protect the basic rights of the population of the occupied territories. In reply, Israel stated on 21 March that its policy and actions in the Gaza and Sinai areas, under Security Council resolution 237 (1967), had always aimed at ensuring the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the area, and that in view of a terror campaign, fomented by Egypt and other Arab States, aimed at undermining normal civilian life, Israel had had to take security measures in conformity with its international obligations. Egypt reiterated its charges against Israel on 29 March and 6 April and in their support quoted from official statements and the 1949 Geneva Convention. Israel again denied the charges, stating that they were falsehoods and fabrications.

On 20 April Egypt charged that according to an Israeli military communiqué reported by the press, Israeli troops had fired on Egyptian prisoners of war, killing one of them. After referring to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, which made the detaining Power responsible for the treatment given to prisoners, Egypt protested the new breach of the Convention and requested the Secretary-General to investigate the conditions under which the incident had occurred, as well as the conditions

under which the Egyptian prisoners of war were detained, and to ensure full compliance by Israel with the Convention. On 2 May Israel replied that during a search for hidden weapons in the prisoner-of-war camp the men had attacked the military police, wounding two Israeli officers, then had set fire to their quarters and tried to break out. After the prisoners had refused to obey the military police, warning shots had been fired in the air. A bullet had ricocheted off a wall and wounded a prisoner, who had subsequently died. The authorities had established a commission of inquiry to investigate the incident and the International Committee of the Red Cross had been informed of the occurrence. After noting that representatives of the Red Cross made periodic visits to the prisoners of war and that their reports had established that Israel observed the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Israel stated that the exchange of all prisoners of war between Egypt and Israel would be the most humanitarian solution of the problem. Israel therefore reiterated the proposal to that effect which it had made to Egypt on numerous occasions.

E. The situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places

On 20 August the Secretary-General, further to his reports of 18 February and 20 April 1971 and pursuant to Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), issued a report containing a further exchange of communications between the representative of Israel and the Secretary-General concerning the United Nations premises at Government House in Jerusalem. On 18 August Israel, after referring to the Secretary-General's note of 12 April 1971, in which he had reiterated the request made on 24 January for the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises, had informed him that no changes were contemplated with regard to the situation that had ensued from the exchange of letters of August 1967. On the following day, the Secretary-General had stated that he understood Israel's letter to mean that the Government of that country, having already discontinued all construction and other work within the area of the United Nations premises at Government House, would refrain from reinitiating such construction until the difference of opinion reflected in the 1967 exchange of letters had been satisfactorily

resolved. The Secretary-General said that, if his understanding was incorrect, he would reiterate that one way of resolving any differences arising would be to have resort to the procedure for settlement laid down in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SEPTEMBER 1971

On 13 September 1971, the representative of Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the question of Jerusalem in the light of illegal measures taken by Israel in defiance of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969).

Jordan's request and a request from the Syrian Arab Republic to include in the agenda the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem were considered by the Council at four meetings, held between 16 and 25 September 1971. The representatives of Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

On 16 September the representative of Jordan stated that Israel's measures in Jerusalem were designed to change the status and character of the Holy City and were at the same time aimed at preventing the conclusion of a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, in the hope that the cease-fire lines would ultimately become its new borders. Israel had already contemplated new legislation to extend the borders of Jerusalem to new Arab areas; it envisioned the annexation of three Arab towns and 27 villages over and above what had already been unilaterally and illegally annexed in June 1967. He stated that Israeli legislative and administrative measures in Jerusalem were in disregard of article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many General Assembly and Security Council resolutions deplored measures of annexation and called on Israel to rescind such measures and to desist from taking action that would alter the status of Jerusalem. However, Israel had disregarded those resolutions and furthermore had declined, he said, to supply the Secretary-General with any details or satisfactory information on the "master plan", which envisaged, among other

things, development that would affect the premises of Government House, belonging to the United Nations. Israel's determination to Judaize Arab Jerusalem had been manifested in legislative, fiscal and urban measures that were impressing on the city an ever more special character at the expense of the non-Jewish population. In the light of Israel's disregard for General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and to ensure Israel's respect for them, the Council should invoke whatever sanctions it deemed fit under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The representative of Israel stated that Jordan's complaint was a manoeuvre to divert attention from its internal difficulties. Jordan, which had invaded Jerusalem in 1948 and seized its eastern sector, was now trying to infringe upon the city's right to normal existence and development. The General Assembly and the Security Council had displayed singular disinterest in Jerusalem's welfare at the most trying and crucial moments. Now that the city was united, the Security Council was mobilized in an attempt to advise Jerusalem to retard progress and to stifle growth. With regard to construction work, he noted that city planning was a normal and indispensable element in the development of Jerusalem. Building activities in the eastern sector constituted slum clearance, the reconstruction of the Jewish quarter, the Hebrew University campus and the Hadassah hospital and the building of houses for Arab and Jewish residents who had lived in slums before. In order to accommodate the growth of the city's population, Jews as well as Arabs, land had been acquired and landowners, both Arabs and Jews, were being fully compensated, contrary to Jordanian allegations. He said there was no "master plan". However, in view of the universal interest in the city, the Mayor of Jerusalem had invited an international group of outstanding individuals to form an advisory board to aid the Municipality. The Israeli authorities, he concluded, had ensured and would ensure the sanctity of the Holy Places, freedom of access to them and the jurisdiction of the various religious communities over them.

Arab representatives indicated that in the face of Israel's defiance of Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem the Council should adopt further measures to guarantee the implementation of those resolutions, including the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. The representative of Morocco expressed the hope that the Council would decide to dispatch

a representative or a mission to determine whether or not Israel was complying with resolutions adopted on Jerusalem. The idea of sending a mission was supported by several speakers, including the representatives of Belgium, Japan and the Soviet Union.

The majority of representatives shared the view that Jerusalem was only one aspect of the Middle East conflict and that any measure infringing upon relevant United Nations resolutions would hinder negotiations for a peaceful settlement. They expressed the hope that Israel would abrogate measures aimed at changing the status of the Holy City and felt that the Council should reaffirm once again its position on Jerusalem.

On 25 September the representative of Somalia submitted a draft resolution under which the Security Council would (1) reaffirm its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969); (2) deplore the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem; (3) confirm in the clearest possible terms that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, were totally invalid and could not change that status; (4) urgently call upon Israel to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which might purport to change the status of the city or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace; (5) request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he might choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate, and in any event within 60 days, on the implementation of the resolution.

At the same meeting, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic submitted amendments to the Somali draft resolution. The first would have the effect of adding, in operative paragraph 4, the words "to rescind all previous measures and actions and" after the words "calls upon Israel". The second and third related to operative paragraph 5 and would result in the Secretary-General's being requested to report within 30 days, instead of 60. The last amendment would add a new operative paragraph 6 by which the Council would decide to reconvene

without delay to consider the report referred to in operative paragraph 5 and what further action should be taken under the Charter.

In response to appeals made by the representatives of France and the United States, and subsequently by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Somalia and Italy, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic withdrew the last three of his amendments and requested a vote on the first. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

The Syrian amendment was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. Paragraph 5 was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. The draft resolution, as amended, was then put to the vote as a whole and was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention, as resolution 298 (1971).⁸ Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General transmitted its text to the Israeli Government.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In a report dated 19 November⁹ submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 298 (1971), the Secretary-General stated that he had had consultations with the President of the Security Council and that after carefully considering resolution 298 (1971), and taking into account the lack of means to obtain the first-hand information needed to fulfil his reporting responsibilities under paragraph 5 of the resolution, he and the Council's President had concluded that the best way of fulfilling those responsibilities would be through a mission composed of three members of the Security Council. Accordingly, by a letter of 28 September he had informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel of his intention to nominate such a mission with a view to enabling him to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit specified in the resolution.

On 18 October, after further consultations with the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General had addressed another letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel informing him that the

representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone had signified their willingness to serve on the mission. On 19 October and again on 27 October, the Secretary-General had met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss his reporting responsibilities under the above resolution. Immediately thereafter he had seen the representative of Israel and discussed the matter with him. On 28 October, having received no reply from Israel, he had addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, drawing his attention to the fact that a month had elapsed since the adoption of resolution 298 (1971), under which he was expected to report on its implementation within 60 days.

On 11 November, following consultations with the President of the Security Council and with the three delegations nominated for the mission, an oral message had been conveyed by the President of the Security Council to the representative of Israel expressing concern over the absence of a reply from the Government of Israel on the question. On 15 November the representative of Israel had transmitted to the Secretary-General a letter containing his Government's views concerning paragraph 4 of the resolution. On 16 November the Secretary-General had addressed a letter to the representative of Israel in which, after noting that the reply of the Israeli Government had neither referred to paragraph 5 of the resolution nor to his letter of 28 September regarding the proposed mission, he had stated that, since the time-limit for the submission of his report was to expire on 24 November, he had no alternative but to submit his report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the proposed mission.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that the correspondence exchanged with Israel did not indicate that country's willingness to comply with resolution 298 (1971) and that consequently he had been unable to fulfil his mandate under that resolution.

The correspondence to which the Secretary-General referred in his report was annexed to the report.

The letter of 15 November from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General stated that if the "status" of the city referred to in resolution 298 (1971) meant the situation existing before 5 June 1967, the renewal of that status would involve rescinding the existing unity, peace and

⁸ Printed as document no. 431 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1971.

⁹ Printed as document no. 414 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1971.

sanctity of Jerusalem in order to restore the divisions, conflict and sacrilege that had made the period 1948–1967 one of the darkest in Jerusalem's history. Israel did not think that the Security Council would wish to restore that situation; therefore, Israel assumed that the concern expressed by the Council was for the status of the ethnic and religious communities in Jerusalem. In that connexion, the assertions that had been made in some quarters that Israel was planning action to change the present heterogeneous character of the population were groundless. Since 1967 the flight of Christian Arabs from Jerusalem under Jordanian occupation had been stemmed. There were currently 11,500 Christian Arabs, 61,600 Moslems and 215,500 Jews in Jerusalem, and there was nothing to indicate that those proportions were likely to be substantially changed in the coming years. The rights of the inhabitants, whether Jews, Arabs or Moslems, included the right to administer their own city, to develop it and to repair the havoc of war. Their rights had been fully respected and indeed advanced since 1967. With reference to the interests of the international community, the letter stated that the protection of the Holy Places was ensured by law and that there was freedom to visit and pray at the Holy Places of the three great faiths. Furthermore, the measures taken to ensure the protection of the Holy Places were only a part of Israel's efforts to ensure respect for universal interests in Jerusalem. Israel, the letter said, had forthwith ensured that the Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam should be administered under the responsibility of the religions that held them sacred. While its previous division had brought only conflict and hostility, Jerusalem was for the first time since 1948 a city in which Jews and Arabs lived together in peace. It was Israel's policy to promote the rights of the inhabitants of Jerusalem in order to advance the interests of the international community and thus contribute to the promotion of a just and lasting peace.

By a letter dated 20 January 1972, the representative of Jordan transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement of the Jordanian Mission to the United Nations conveying its views and comments on Israel's letter of 15 November 1971. According to the statement, Israeli occupation in 1967 was only part of a plan for the demise of Jerusalem, a predominantly Arab city, in violation of all international conventions and United Nations resolutions. Israel's main objective was to obliterate

Arab Jerusalem rather than coexist with it; the measures and actions that Israel had taken, which had been discussed at length in the Security Council, proved that. One of the first steps Israel had taken in the process of annexing the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem had been the abolition of its duly elected municipal council and the deportation of the elected mayor of that sector. To the question raised by Israel of whether the Security Council by its resolution intended to restore the city's division, Jordan stated that Jerusalem was an integral part of the problem of terminating Israeli occupation of all Arab territories. Jordan denied Israel's charges that it had desecrated the Jewish holy shrines and said that it had always accorded them the same deference it had accorded to Moslem and Christian shrines. Concerning Israel's claim that it had enacted laws for the protection of the Holy Places, Jordan stated that no one should arrogate to himself the privilege of reducing to capsule-like form legislation carrying 2,000 years of history, traditions and rights. For generations Jerusalem had been governed under a *status quo* which it would be impossible to emulate, improve on or surpass. As to Israel's assertion that the previous division of Jerusalem had not brought peace to the Middle East, Jordan stated that if there was any factor destined to keep the Middle East in constant ferment, it was Israel's claim to exclusive domination over Jerusalem. In conclusion, Jordan said that, no matter how Israel tried to justify its annexation of Jerusalem, the measures it had taken to change the status and character of the city were contrary to all international conventions and in contravention of the United Nations Charter and resolutions. The Security Council should assume its responsibilities and ensure that a life in freedom, peace, dignity and harmony was assured for all in Jerusalem.

F. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

During the year under review the Security Council received a number of communications relating to the situation in the Middle East, which are briefly noted below.

By a letter dated 21 July 1971, the Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity in New York transmitted the text of resolutions adopted by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Govern-

ment at its eighth session, held at Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 June 1971. In one of those resolutions, the Assembly called for immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories and expressed its full support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his efforts to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It also called upon Israel to make a positive reply to the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.¹⁰

In a letter dated 13 August, the Syrian Arab Republic, after referring to a reported decision by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to grant Israel a loan of \$30 million to expand and improve its highway network, stated that the loan in question was all the more shocking in view of Israel's disregard and defiance for all the United Nations resolutions adopted on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to the fact that Israel had taken by force more than two thousand million dollars' worth of Arab property in Palestine in 1948, thousands of millions of American dollars had poured into Israel, giving the settlers a privileged status in relation to that of the region as a whole. Even after the aggression of 1967, the United States military and economic assistance had run into the thousands of millions, despite the severe indictment of Israel by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

On 24 August Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to a joint declaration made in Damascus on 20 August by the Presidents of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab Republic to mark the signing by the three States of the Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics. It said that the declaration, which constituted a policy against peace with Israel, had been made in violation of the United Nations Charter and in defiance of the obligation to attain peace in the Middle East through agreement between Israel and the Arab States, as called for by Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

By a letter dated 26 August, the Syrian Arab Republic drew the attention of the Secretary-General to a reported official statement according to which the Israeli population in the occupied Golan Heights would reach 15,000 in seven years, and that in the next two years five more settlements would be established there. That statement, together with

statements made by Israeli officials, constituted new proof of Israel's expansionist and annexationist policy in the Middle East.

By a letter dated 26 May 1972, 26 Member States transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a resolution on the Middle East problem which had been adopted at the Third Islamic Conference held at Jeddah from 29 February to 3 March 1972.¹¹ In that resolution the Conference insisted on the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories and requested the big Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, to take all appropriate measures to bring Israel to withdraw from those territories and refrain from providing it with any military or economic aid so that Israel might not persist in its refusal to withdraw from those territories.

On 13 June the Syrian Arab Republic stated that in order to justify military action against the Arab States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel was using the situation of the Jews in Syria as an excuse for intervention. According to a recent Israeli official statement, Israel would act in an organized and bold manner to save the Jews in Syria. That was part of a world-wide campaign to have the Jews from all the world emigrate to Israel because of alleged persecution and anti-Semitism. After rejecting charges that the Jews in Syria had special identification cards and saying that all Syrian citizens carried such cards showing their religious affiliation, the Syrian Arab Republic countercharged that the Arabs in Israel carried special numbers to identify them as Arabs. It added that against four Syrian Jews jailed in Syria there were 4,000 Arabs rotting in Israeli jails and recalled that since 1967 the United Nations had condemned Israel about 16 times for its violations of Arab human rights.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING HIJACKING OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT AND RELATED INCIDENTS

On 8 October 1971, Israel transmitted a letter it had addressed on 30 September to the International Civil Aviation Organization in which it was stated that between 23 August and 3 September 1971, two Arab terrorists had attempted to bring about the destruction in flight of an aircraft belonging to El Al, the national airline of Israel. The Government of Israel believed that further acts of sabotage were contemplated and therefore it was urging

¹⁰ For the text of this resolution, see document no. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹¹ Printed as document no. 51 below.

ICAO to take the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of acts of violence against international civil aviation that would jeopardize the safety of persons and property and would gravely affect the operation of international air services.

On 11 May 1972, Israeli informed the Secretary-General that on 8 May armed agents of the terror organization called "Black September" had captured a civilian aircraft of the Sabena Belgian airline during its flight from Belgium to Israel, and that after its landing at Lod airport in Israel the hijackers had demanded the release of members of Arab terror organizations detained in Israel, threatening to blow up the aircraft with its passengers and crew if their demand was not met. The following day a unit of Israeli forces had been able to gain control of the aircraft and had freed all the passengers, killing in the process two of the hijackers and capturing two others. Israel stated that the reaction of the Arab Governments and of Arab media of information had indicated support for the hijackers and that the terror organizations, including the organization responsible for the hijacking, continued to enjoy the support of the Arab Governments and to have bases on their territories, where they received military assistance and training. That act of air piracy, Israel concluded, reflected the criminality of the activities of terror organizations, as well as the responsibility of the Arab Governments. The international community could not permit the continuation of such activities.

On 31 May Israel informed the President of the Security Council that on the previous day three men who had just arrived at Lod airport had entered the lounge and opened fire on the crowd, killing 25 persons and wounding 70. Two of the assailants had been killed and the third, who had been captured, had declared that he and his colleagues were Japanese nationals hired to commit that crime by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had supervised their training in Lebanon. The organization in question had thereafter claimed responsibility for the mass murder. The act, Israel said, was part of a campaign of mass murders waged by Arab terror organizations and was reminiscent of the blowing up in 1970 by Arab terror agents of a Swissair aircraft in which 47 passengers had lost their lives. After recalling that Israel had drawn attention to the responsibility of Arab Governments, including Lebanon, for the criminal operations of Arab terror organizations, Israel charged that those

organizations maintained offices in Lebanon and noted that, though Israel had repeatedly called for the termination of their criminal activities, Lebanon and other Arab States had continued to harbour them on their soil and to give them support. In conclusion, Israel requested that the Arab Governments, and especially Lebanon, put an immediate end to those activities.

On the same day Lebanon replied that in several statements Israel had attributed the incident at Lod airport to a Palestinian organization having its headquarters in Beirut and that it was evident from those statements that it was Israel's intention to place the responsibility for the incident on Lebanon. After having condemned all acts of violence against innocent civilians and declaring that it was not implicated in that incident, Lebanon rejected as unfounded the accusations made against it.

On 1 June Israel replied that Lebanon did not deny that Beirut was the location of the headquarters of the organization responsible for the incident and reiterated that Lebanon was fully responsible for harbouring organizations engaged in the murder of innocent civilians and was failing in its international obligations to put an end to their activities.

On 31 May the representative of Israel transmitted excerpts from a statement made by Israel's Prime Minister in which, after deploring the incident and expressing condolences to those who had suffered from it, she recalled that dozens of air incidents had taken place since the Swissair disaster two years earlier. She emphasized Lebanon's responsibility for supporting and harbouring the terrorist organizations responsible for those incidents and warned that Israel would not be their only target. She then appealed to all Governments and airlines to co-operate and to take the necessary measures to keep the hijacking plague from spreading.

On 2 June the representative of Lebanon transmitted the text of a statement made by the President of Lebanon on the incident. He denied his country's responsibility and asked how Lebanon could be responsible for the action of foreign commandos transported to Israel from a foreign capital by foreign enterprises. The fact that a communiqué had been issued at Beirut by a Palestinian organization claiming responsibility for the incident meant only that Beirut was a centre for world-wide dissemination of information. However, Lebanon, in line

with its efforts to counter the operational activities of the organization in question, had taken new measures to prevent Lebanon from being a centre of its information activities. After saying that Lebanon could not be held responsible for the outcome of tragic incidents caused by the Palestinian problem, he reiterated that, as it had in the past condemned the barbarous acts committed by Zionism, it condemned the attack at Lod airport which had resulted in innocent civilians being killed or wounded.

On 6 June Israel, referring to the statement of the President of Lebanon, said that the south-eastern part of Lebanon had become the base for 5,000 members of terror organizations and reiterated that Beirut was the seat of those organizations, where attacks were initiated, planned and directed, as had been the massacre at Lod airport. Therefore, to claim that Lebanon was not involved in the incident was only an attempt to misconstrue facts and evade Lebanon's obligation to put an end to terror organizations. After quoting statements made in 1969 by the former President of Lebanon and in January 1972 by its Prime Minister, to the effect that Lebanon was supporting terror warfare against Israel, Israel added that by invoking the refugee problem as an excuse for terror operations while being responsible, with the other Arab States, for the continued existence of that problem, Lebanon was merely confirming its desire to find any possible pretext to justify its support for terror warfare. Lebanon's duty was to prevent the use of its territory for criminal activities; if it did not take measures to eliminate those activities, it must be considered as violating the obligations incumbent on it.

On 8 June Lebanon replied that the former President of Lebanon had made no statement such as that attributed to him by Israel. Furthermore, the reference to the statement by the Prime Minister of Lebanon consisted of an inaccurate quotation, taken out of context so that the meaning was distorted. Lebanon charged that Israel continued to defy United Nations resolutions, both those concerning the refugees and those concerning the occupied territories; Israel was the cause of the violence and should be held responsible for the inevitable chain reaction it produced.

On 2 June Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to a statement by the Prime Minister of Egypt, by which Israel claimed he had given his official approval to the incident at Lod airport, thus showing Egypt's support for the

activities of Arab terror organizations. Israel stated that Egypt's involvement in and identification with the operations of the terror organizations had reached new depths of criminality in its support of the attack at Lod airport and that Egypt's responsibility was clear.

On 8 June Egypt stated that in recent days there had been official declarations emanating from Israel that tried to shift the responsibility of the Lod airport incident to a number of Governments and authorities and voiced threats of vengeance and reprisals. Such pronouncements were designed to consolidate Israel's aggression against the Palestinian people and the negation of their inalienable rights, in addition to furthering its expansionist plans and aggression against the Arab States in the area. Terror action had been introduced to the Middle East by Zionist terror organizations, which had been responsible for many massacres of innocent people. Because of those declarations and threats, Israel must be held responsible for the consequences of any action that it might undertake.

In response to the letters from Lebanon and Egypt of 8 June, Israel stated on 9 June that neither of those countries denied that innocent civilians had been massacred at Lod airport by Arab terror organizations operating from Lebanon and enjoying the support of the two Governments. Furthermore, neither country had abjured its negation of the Israeli people's right to independence and sovereignty, and they both continued to support terror organizations intent on the destruction of Israel. Moreover they had taken no measures to put an end to the activities of those organizations. Since the agreement in 1969 between Lebanon and those organizations, 548 attacks had been perpetrated from Lebanese territory, resulting in a large number of Israelis being killed or wounded.

In reply to Israel's letter, Lebanon on 12 June stated that Israel had again unsuccessfully tried to implicate Lebanon in the airport incident, citing allegations and accusations that had been dismissed by the Security Council on several occasions. Since Israel's attack on the Beirut airport in 1968, Israel had committed hundreds of acts of aggression against Lebanon, killing a large number of civilians and military personnel. Instead of making false charges against Lebanon, Israel should implement United Nations resolutions aimed at establishing peace based on justice in the Middle East.

On 13 June Israel replied that the measures taken

by Israel had been in self-defence in order to bring the attacks of terrorists based in Lebanon to an end. Lebanon had failed to take measures against terror organizations operating from its territory and did not address itself to its international obligations. It should realize that it was its duty to put an immediate and effective end to that situation.

By a letter dated 7 June, the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic transmitted to the Security Council the text of a memorandum issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization in connexion with the incident at Lydda airport.¹² According to the memorandum, the incident should be viewed as part of a conflict that had resulted from the usurpation of the land of Palestine and the denial of the rights of the Palestinians. The violence practised by the Zionist movement and, later, by the State of Israel, to which the Palestinian response had been armed resistance, had been directly responsible for the continuing state of tension in the area. Many acts of violence had been carried out by Zionist terrorist groups and, after the establishment of the State of Israel, by Israeli armed forces, including the attack on Beirut airport in 1968 and the raids on civilian installations in Egypt in 1970, which had resulted in the death or injury of hundreds of civilians. The purpose of those acts had always been to consolidate the spoils of earlier aggression and to extend the aggressions further in the Arab world. Thus the responsibility of the Lydda airport incident did not lie with any Arab State but with the Zionist movement and Israel. While regretting the loss of innocent civilian lives, the Palestine Liberation Organization considered that the Middle East was in a state of war and that, as in any zone of war, travellers entered at their own risk.

Responding to the above letter, Israel stated on 8 June that the Palestine Liberation Organization was the roof organization of Arab terror groups openly engaged in acts of murder directed against civilians. While the civilized world had been shocked by the attack on the Lod airport, there had been jubilation and attempts to whitewash the crime in the Arab States. Furthermore, the letter of the Libyan Arab Republic showed the Arab Governments' identification with terror organizations and proved their responsibility for the murderous acts committed by those organizations.

On 13 June the Libyan Arab Republic, noting that the representative of Israel had avoided in his letter the substance of the memorandum by the Palestine Liberation Organization, reiterated Israel's responsibility for the continuing violence in the Middle East and said that the policy of the Libyan Arab Republic was to support the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their national rights. The issue was not that policy but the history of Israel's use of terror in the subjugation and dispersion of the Palestinian people.

2

Report of the Security Council (Middle East section)¹³

November, 1972

A. *Communications, reports of the Secretary-General and discussion by the Council concerning the status of the cease-fire*

1. COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL

104. During the period covered by this report, no complaints were received from Jordan or Israel concerning violations of the cease-fire in that area, and no meetings of the Security Council were held in that connexion.

2. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

105. With regard to the situation in the Suez Canal sector, no complaints were submitted to the Security Council by Egypt or Israel regarding cease-fire violations. However, the Secretary-General continued to issue supplemental information on the basis of reports he received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Those reports (S/7930/Add.1227, 1230, 1232, 1235, 1238, 1244, 1250, 1252, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1262, 1264, 1268, 1270, 1277, 1281, 1286, 1289, 1292, 1294 and Corr.1, 1300, 1307, 1311, 1314, 1315, 1319, 1321, 1325, 1329, 1331, 1334, 1337, 1341, 1344, 1348, 1351, 1353, 1363, 1368, 1375, 1378, 1381, 1386, 1388,

¹² Printed as document no. below.

¹³ Chapter 3 of *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1971—15 June 1972, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 2* (U.N. doc. no. A/8702), pp. 14–28.

1390, 1393, 1397, 1400, 1407, 1414, 1416, 1422, 1426, 1437, 1441, 1451, 1459, 1504, 1515, 1524, 1539, 1596, 1598, 1605, 1620, 1626, 1631 and 1633) indicated that there had been flights by both Egyptian and Israel jet aircraft over the sector. On occasion, those flights had taken place over the positions of one party or the other, concerning which charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations were filed with UNTSO.

106. In supplemental information dated 8 May 1972 (S/7930/Add. 1596), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that he had received a complaint from Israel, which had not been confirmed by the United Nations military observers, that an Egyptian vessel had approached the coast near the cease-fire line.

3. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) *Communications to the Council between 16 June 1971 and 25 February 1972 and requests for a meeting*

107. In letters dated 16 and 23 June, 1 July, 10 August and 4 and 20 September 1971 (S/10226, S/10235, S/10247, S/10286, S/10305 and S/10329), Lebanon submitted complaints that on several occasions Israel forces had used artillery and mortars to shell border villages in southern Lebanon and had crossed the borders at several points in order to carry out the destruction of Lebanese houses, civilian property and crops. As a result, many civilians had been killed, wounded or abducted. Lebanon charged that Israel, by its attacks, was violating the Charter of the United Nations and the Armistice Agreement and was trying to undermine all efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Lebanon protested Israel's violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, its disregard of the Charter of the United Nations and disrespect for the pertinent Security Council resolutions.

108. In letters dated 21 and 30 June, 12 August and 7 and 24 September (S/10231, S/10244, S/10289, S/10307 and S/10335), Israel submitted counter-complaints that terror squads coming from Lebanese territory had attacked civilian installations and villages in Israeli territory on several occasions, causing casualties among the population and property damage. The letters stated that it was a matter of common knowledge that bases from which acts of aggression were

launched against Israel were located on Lebanese territory and that those acts had taken place with the knowledge and consent of the Government of Lebanon, as indicated by several press reports and official statements in Lebanon. Israel, which had the right to defend and protect its territory and citizens, pursued a policy based on the reciprocal observance of the cease-fire, which entailed the obligation of Lebanon to prevent armed attacks from its territory against Israel.

109. In a letter dated 11 January 1972 (S/10502), Lebanon charged that on 10 and 11 January Israel forces had twice penetrated into Lebanese territory and destroyed several houses and that artillery fire from Israel had destroyed other houses and wounded Lebanese citizens. Israel replied to Lebanon's charges in letters dated 12 and 13 January (S/10505 and S/10507), stating that in recent weeks there had been a marked increase in acts of terror from Lebanese territory against Israel. It listed a number of incidents that had taken place between 10 December 1971 and 11 January 1972 in which civilian installations had been attacked from Lebanese territory. Israel could not acquiesce in acts of armed aggression against its territory and population and was duty-bound to take all necessary measures of self-defence, and the Government of Lebanon was obliged to put an immediate end to such armed attacks or be held responsible for violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the 1967 cease-fire.

110. In a letter dated 14 January (S/10508), Lebanon charged that a detachment of Israel commandos had entered the Lebanese village of Kafra, 9 kilometres inside the border, and had destroyed four houses. It added that, according to reliable reports, Israel had undertaken military preparations on the Lebanese border and was threatening to undertake large-scale military operations in southern Lebanon, thus endangering the peace and security not only of Lebanon but of the entire Middle East.

111. In another letter of 14 January (S/10509), Lebanon informed the President of the Security Council that Israel had delivered to the Lebanese representatives in the Lebanon-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission a "severe warning" that if terrorist activity from Lebanon against Israel was not stopped, Israel might stay permanently in the region in one form or in another, which might force the Lebanese people to leave the area.

Lebanon protested Israel's threats, which gravely endangered international peace and security, and considered that if Israel followed that course, it must assume full responsibility for its acts. Unless Israel desisted forthwith from pursuing those threats, the Security Council would be duty-bound to assume its responsibilities.

112. In a letter dated 24 February (S/10543) Israel charged that two Israeli civilians had been killed by a rocket fired by a terror squad that had entered Israel from Lebanese territory and reiterated that it was the duty of Lebanon to end such armed attacks from its territory.

113. In a letter dated 25 February (S/10546), Lebanon complained to the President of the Council about Israel's persistent acts of aggression against Lebanese territory and stated that such acts had culminated in a large-scale air and ground attack, which had taken place on the morning of the same day. In view of the extreme gravity of the situation endangering the peace and security of Lebanon, the representative of Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

114. In a letter dated 25 February (S/10550), Israel, after referring to its complaint communicated to the Council on 24 February (S/10543) about attacks by terrorists from Lebanese territory against its villages, stated that on the previous day three terrorists had entered Israel from Lebanese territory. During a clash between them and an Israeli patrol, eight Israelis had been wounded, one of them fatally. In the face of those attacks by terrorists, who had acknowledged that they had perpetrated still another attack, Israel had been compelled to take self-defence measures against the terrorists' encampments on 25 February. In view of the gravity of those attacks, the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

(b) *Consideration at the 1643rd and 1644th meetings
(26 and 27 February 1972)*

115. At its 1643rd meeting, on 26 February 1972, the Council included the complaints by Lebanon (S/10546) and Israel (S/10550) in its agenda, listing each of them separately under the item "The situation in the Middle East". The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and subsequently those of the Syrian Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, were invited, at their request, to

participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

116. The representative of Lebanon charged that on 25 February, an Israel force, consisting of 60 tanks and armoured cars, had crossed the border under heavy air cover and attacked several Lebanese villages. In the meantime, Israel aircraft had bombarded other Lebanese villages and caused death and destruction. Moreover, on the same day, Israel had delivered to Lebanon, through the Mixed Armistice Commission, a warning that the action of the Israel forces was against terrorists who had come from and returned to Lebanon and that Israel would continue its incursions into Lebanon if the terrorist activities did not stop. The representative of Lebanon stated that, in addition to the ground and air attacks, Israel bulldozers were opening roads inside Lebanese territory and paving the way for further military operations. Recalling the Council's previous resolutions condemning Israel for its attacks against Lebanon in 1968, 1969 and 1970, he said that Lebanon had hoped that those resolutions would deter Israel from any further attacks. However, Israel had disregarded them and defied the Council's authority. He denied Israel's allegations that the incidents on Israel-held territory had originated from Lebanon and added that if Israel had not paralysed the Mixed Armistice Commission, the international observers would have been able to determine the origin of the incidents. In the circumstances, his delegation asked the Council to take positive and decisive measures against Israel that would prevent it from further acts of aggression against Lebanon, including the application of the appropriate sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

117. The representative of Israel stated that for a long time and contrary to its international obligations, the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council cease-fire, Lebanon had permitted terrorist organizations to establish bases on its territory from which to carry out attacks against Israel, causing damage to property and inflicting casualties. The Government of Lebanon, which had entered into agreement with the terror organizations, had failed to put an end to their activities and, instead, had given them its support. His Government had brought to the attention of the Council hundreds of attacks by terrorists operating from Lebanese territory against Israeli

towns, villages, civilian population and military personnel. However, nothing had been done by the Council to impress upon Lebanon that it could not co-operate with the terrorists and, at the same time, expect Israel to refrain from protecting its citizens and property. In late January, Israel also had drawn the Council's attention to new acts of terror, and in late February, those acts had resulted in the death of two civilians. About the same time, in an incident involving Israel border police and terrorists, eight men had been wounded, two of whom died later. In protecting its citizens, Israel had taken action that had been directed only against terrorists and their encampments, and its forces had returned to their bases after the operation. So long as Lebanon was unwilling or unable to prevent attacks from its territory against Israel, it could not complain against action taken in self-defence. Any resolution by the Council, he concluded, should not give encouragement and comfort to Lebanon but should request it to stop all terrorist activities from its territory against Israel.

118. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the new attack and several other acts of aggression against Lebanon were links in the chain of Israel's continued attempt to thwart efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. It should be noted, he said, that the new attack had been carried out on the day when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had been in Israel to hold talks with the leaders of that country on a settlement in the Middle East. By that attack, Israel had trampled under foot the resolutions by which the Security Council had condemned Israel for its aggression against Lebanon and warned it that further steps in accordance with the Charter would be taken if those acts of aggression continued. The interests of international peace and security, he said, required that the Council condemn and punish Israel under the provisions of the Charter, including Chapter VII.

119. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that Lebanon was a small country that had never committed aggression in modern times. It was the frustrated Palestinians who, in trying to regain their country, had to resort, unfortunately, to killing those who had robbed them of their homeland. Since those killings had taken place on Israeli territory, premeditated action had been launched against Lebanon in hot pursuit of the alleged

culprits. After recalling the futility of Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions, he noted that the only way to stop Israel from pursuing its aggressive policy was for the United States to stop providing it with arms.

120. The representative of France said that since Israel's attack on Beirut International Airport in 1968, the Council had adopted five resolutions condemning Israel military intervention in Lebanon. However, the new attack, because of its scope and violence, went beyond what had occurred previously, and the threats made on 14 January endangered the territorial integrity of Lebanon. He had no doubt that Lebanon was doing everything it could to control the activities of the *fedayeen*, and it could not be held responsible for what happened on Israel territory. If Israel had given the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations observers the means to fulfil their mission, it would have been easier to ascertain the actual situation. His Government, he indicated, had informed Israel that it opposed reprisals against any State and felt that the Council should regard Lebanon as a victim of the reprisal measures and give it the necessary assistance.

121. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Council should be more serious than ever and should take effective measures to prevent the repetition of Israel attacks against Lebanon.

122. The representative of Japan recalled the proposal made by the Secretary-General on 18 August 1969 to both Israel and Lebanon to station United Nations observers on each side of the border to observe and maintain the Security Council cease-fire and to improve the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector. Had that proposal been accepted, it would have prevented the recurrence of tragic border incidents.

123. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that his delegation deplored acts of murder and terrorism perpetrated in Israel by elements of the *fedayeen*. However, his Government considered that the large-scale military action by Israel land and air forces against Lebanon was unjustifiable. His delegation hoped that Israel would desist from taking such action. The biggest contribution to the ending of those incidents would be a common support to Ambassador Jarring in his mission and the settlement of the problems of the Middle East in accordance with resolution 242 (1967).

124. The representative of Italy stated that his delegation was distressed by Lebanon's complaint, because of the losses inflicted in Lebanon by the Israeli attacks and because a military operation had been carried out at a time when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had been making efforts with the parties to resume his mission of peace. At the same time, the Italian delegation deplored any acts of violence, regardless of its source, and would support any Council decision to prevent the repetition of such tragic events.

125. The representative of Belgium recalled that his Government had appealed to all countries in the Middle East to comply with the cease-fire and was again appealing for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in the area. Recalling that Israel had been warned repeatedly by the Council not to carry out any attack against Lebanon, he urged that it refrain from any further attacks. He also asked Lebanon to prevent Palestinians from taking advantage of the hospitality offered them to carry out attacks within Israeli territory. Because of the grave situation in the area, he felt that the international control organ established under the Armistice Agreement of 1949 should function without delay with the participation of Israel.

126. The representative of China said that Israel's large-scale naked armed aggression against Lebanon constituted a grave violation of the United Nations Charter. The Chinese Government and people felt great indignation at the renewed naked armed aggression launched by the Israeli Zionists against Lebanon. The Chinese delegation maintained that the Security Council must condemn most sternly Israel's acts of aggression and call upon Israel to immediately stop its armed aggression against Lebanon, withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanese territory and refrain from the repetition of such acts of aggression.

127. The representative of Somalia stated that the Council should decide at once to call on Israel to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to desist from any military action against that country. Only after such a resolution was adopted should the Council look into the historical and political complaints by the parties.

128. At the 1644th meeting, on 27 February, the representative of Lebanon said that he had again

requested an urgent meeting of the Council because of a new Israeli attack of a massive character against Lebanon. Although technically the Israeli forces had been withdrawn for a few moments outside the Lebanese borders, Israel's aggression was continuing, and its air force and artillery were bombarding areas of southern and south-eastern Lebanon. Units of Israel forces had again crossed the border and been engaged by Lebanese forces. As a result of the new aggression, 10 people had been killed and 30 wounded, most of them children, and there had been mass destruction of houses. Furthermore, the population of the area had left their homes in panic and moved towards the central and northern parts of the country. Recalling that on 14 January he had informed the Council of the warning delivered by Israel to the Lebanese authorities through the Mixed Armistice Commission, he said that, in view of the Council's repeated warnings that further steps would be taken if Israel aggression against Lebanon continued, it was incumbent on the Council to take measures to force the invader to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory and to forestall any future aggression.

129. The representative of Argentina said that the Israeli attack on Lebanon was out of proportion in scale and duration and that rather than legitimate self-defence, it constituted a punitive expedition inconsistent with the Charter. The reports of the continued attacks were alarming, as shells fired by planes or artillery could make no distinction between *fedayeen* and peaceful citizens. In that difficult crisis, it was obvious that time was not working in favour of peace and of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring, whose presence in Israel had been greeted by hostilities. In his view, the Council should request Israel to cease military operations on Lebanese territory and to withdraw its forces immediately.

130. The representative of Guinea thought that the explosive situation in the Middle East was the direct result of Israeli occupation of Arab territories. The least the Council could do would be to demand the immediate cessation of Israel's aggression against Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. At a subsequent stage, the Council should consider imposing sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter.

131. The representative of Israel said that Israel troops had withdrawn from Lebanon on the

previous day. However, terrorists based in Lebanon had opened fire again that morning against Israel troops outside Lebanon, compelling the Israel forces to return the fire and to take action against terror bases in Lebanon in self-defence. Contrary to what had been suggested by some, the forces employed by Israel were commensurate with the large number of terrorists and the terrain in question. He regretted that the fighting might have resulted in civilian casualties, which, he said, could not be prevented, despite all the precaution taken by the Israel forces. He reiterated that it was Lebanon's obligation to end the activities of terror organizations on its own territory. Lebanon was not being requested to favour Israel's interests but was obliged as a Member of the United Nations to prevent the use of its territory by irregular or any forces for aggression against another Member State.

132. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, contrary to what the representative of Israel had said in the previous meeting, the aggression against Lebanon had not ended. In fact, the invasion was the most flagrant act of aggression by Israel since 1967. After recalling the need to condemn the new aggression and demand the withdrawal of Israel's forces, he noted that the policy of reprisals had been rejected and condemned by the majority of the Council. It was important that the Council not only condemn the aggressor but reject the argument of reprisal, as it had done in the case of the Portuguese attacks on Guinea. Moreover, the Council had reason to impose sanctions and even give consideration to expelling Israel from the United Nations as an aggressor and violator of the Charter.

133. The representative of Italy said that he was introducing a draft resolution sponsored by Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom (S/10552), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Deploring all actions which have resulted in the loss of innocent lives,

"Demands that Israel immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese territory."

In introducing the draft resolution, he said that the sponsors believed that the draft was the minimum action that should be taken at that stage. Because swift action was required to stop military clashes, they hoped that members of the Council would

refrain from introducing amendments, so that the voting could take place promptly.

134. The representative of India stated that the starting point in the discussions by the Council on the Middle East conflict had always been resolution 242 (1967), which remained unimplemented, although it contained indications as to how the problems should be solved. No one would object to Israel taking action within its own territory, but when it claimed the right to do so against Lebanon or any other State in order to maintain its hold on lands which did not belong to it, it was clearly in the wrong. That was the moral issue facing the Council. It was necessary that the Council not only take immediate action on the current complaint but decide on how to give effect to resolution 242 (1967).

135. The representative of the United States of America stated that his country viewed with deep concern the events on the Lebanese border and could not condone Israel's prolonged and extensive attacks. His country supported the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and considered that the Council should call for the immediate withdrawal of Israel forces. At the same time, his delegation deeply regretted the loss of lives on both sides and felt that the attacks by guerrilla infiltrators could only delay peace. Unless Lebanon took more effective measures to seal its borders, Israel would continue to feel compelled to take further retaliatory action in self-defence. The United States urged the parties to co-operate and to make more frequent use of the international machinery for the exchange of information and consultations to end the cross-border attacks and terrorism. Concerned as it was for the loss of innocent life, his delegation would propose the inclusion of the words "on both sides" in the preamble of the draft resolution, which would then read: "Deploring all actions which have resulted in the loss of innocent lives on both sides".

136. Following statements by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, the representative of the United States said that he would not press his amendment.

137. The representative of China stated that the preambular paragraph gave the impression that it confused aggression with the victim of aggression. His delegation proposed that the paragraph condemn Israel's aggression or, failing that, that the preambular paragraph be deleted.

138. The representative of Somalia said the draft resolution did not meet the demands of the situation. There should be a specific reference to innocent civilian life, and he proposed to amend the draft resolution in that sense. Furthermore, it had been said repeatedly that the history of the Israel-Lebanon relationship was replete with violation by Israel of Lebanese territory in complete disregard of international law and the United Nations Charter; therefore, Israel should be subject to the penalties under the Charter. Although he was not calling for sanctions at that stage, their imposition should not be ruled out as a form of action by the Council, if Israel continued to violate the territory of its neighbours.

139. Following a recess, the President, speaking as the representative of Sudan, said that the international community had always condemned aggression against Lebanon by Israel as a violation of the Charter. The Council must be decisive and should take punitive action against Israel under the Charter.

140. The representative of Italy said that, after consultations, the sponsors of the draft resolution had come to the conclusion that it would be difficult for them to agree to deletion of the preamble. However, they had agreed that separate votes should be taken on the preambular and operative paragraphs.

Decisions: *At the 164th meeting, on 27th February 1972, the preambular paragraph of the draft resolution (S/10552) received 8 votes in favour to 4 against (China, Guinea, Sudan and Yugoslavia), with 3 abstentions (India, Somalia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), and was not adopted, having failed to receive the required majority of votes. The remainder of the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 313 (1972).¹⁴*

141. After the vote, the representative of the United States said that his vote for the resolution was in no way a condonation of the acts that had led to Israel's action.

142. The representative of Argentina said that he had voted for the preambular paragraph because it was closely linked to the operative paragraph.

143. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation opposed equal treatment for the aggressor and the victims. He was in favour of continuing the discussion of the

items, so that more severe measures could be taken against Israel.

144. The representative of Somalia said that the preamble was ambiguous and did not address itself to the issue of the attacks on the population of Lebanon.

145. The representative of Guinea also said that the preamble had been worded ambiguously and that his delegation did not want the aggressor put on the same footing as the victims.

146. The representative of Yugoslavia thought also that the preamble had confused the victims with the aggressor, and therefore he had voted against it.

147. The representative of Lebanon thanked the members of the Council, including the sponsors of the resolution, for their unanimous vote. He felt that inasmuch as the resolution just adopted was an interim measure, the Council should go deeper into the matter and take the action that Lebanon had called for.

148. The representative of Israel regretted that the Council's resolution failed to mention the root cause, namely, the failure of Lebanon to put an end to terrorist attacks against Israel. With regard to the preamble, it was with a sense of sorrow that his delegation had seen it defeated.

(c) *Consensus of the members of the Security Council*

149. A consensus of the members of the Security Council was issued on 19 April (S/10611) which read as follows:

[Printed separately as document no. 15 below, here without the Annex.]

150. During the consultations on the above question, the Chinese delegation had made the following statement which was circulated in a note by the President of the Security Council (S/10612).

[Printed separately as document no. 70 below, here without the introductory paragraph.]

151. In the Secretary-General's memorandum of 4 April, published as an annex to the document setting forth the consensus of the Security Council, it was stated that, on 29 March, the President of the Council had received from Lebanon a request that the Security Council take the necessary action to increase the number of observers in the Lebanon-Israel sector, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, in view of the repeated Israeli aggression against Lebanon. On 31 March, the President of the Council had informed the Secretary-General that it was the members' view that

¹⁴ Printed as document no. 14 below.

the request of Lebanon should be met, and, pending a final decision, he had asked the Secretary-General to determine the number of additional observers required for the Israel-Lebanon sector. Accordingly, the Secretary-General had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to recommend to him what arrangements should be made in that respect and had made it clear that the action requested was of a preliminary nature for the sole purpose of informing the Council before a final decision was taken on the matter. On 3 April, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had informed the Secretary-General that Lebanon had proposed the establishment of three observation posts at Naqoura, Bent Jbail and Marjayoun. In that connexion, the Chief of Staff had proposed that, at the initial stage, the number of new observers needed, in addition to the existing 7, would be 14, with 8 more observers to be added, if it became necessary. He had indicated further that the proposed observation posts could be set up at short notice providing all the required personnel and equipment from existing UNTSO resources. He had pointed out that the proposed observation posts must be considered as a limited United Nations presence on one side of the line, which would provide only a measure of observation and a somewhat more rapid supply of information from UNTSO sources than that currently provided.

(d) *Subsequent communications and reports*

152. On 13 March, the President of the Security Council circulated a telegram dated 6 March (S/10563) from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, charging Israel with flagrant aggression against its Arab neighbouring States in violation of international law and the United Nations Charter and condemning those actions that endangered peace and security of the peoples in the area. It was time, the telegram added, to take effective measures in line with the United Nations Charter to prevent new crimes by Israel.

153. In a report dated 25 April (S/10617) on the implementation of the consensus of the Security Council of 19 April, the Secretary-General stated that he had instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to implement the arrangements envisaged in his memorandum of 4 April annexed to document S/10611.¹⁵ Following discussions with Lebanese

military authorities between 20 and 22 April, the Chief of Staff had informed him that the sites of the proposed observation posts had been selected and full agreement had been reached on various arrangements regarding the functioning of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission operations.

154. Furthermore, the two new observation posts at El-Khiam and at Maroun Er-Ras, respectively designated OP Khiam and OP Ras, although located at some distance from the armistice demarcation line (ADL), were situated on high ground and provided extensive observation over various portions of that line. The existing UNTSO post at Naqoura, designated OP Naq, would become the third observation post. On 24 April, the three observation posts had become operational, and the Chief of Staff had informed Israel authorities of the arrangements made regarding their location and the initial date of their operation.

155. The Secretary-General noted that the strength of observers was being increased from 7 to 21 from existing UNTSO resources and also that the supplies and equipment needed for their operation were being drawn from UNTSO stock. He also remarked that the UNTSO logistic convoy from UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem had crossed smoothly and without delay both the Israel and Lebanese check-points in the early hours of 24 April. From 25 April, he would circulate relevant information based on the observers' reports and would report to the Council periodically on the need for continuing the above measures and on their scope.

156. Accordingly, beginning on 25 April, the Secretary-General proceeded to issue reports on incidents in the Israel-Lebanon sector, which were included in the supplemental information issued on the situation in the Syria-Israel and Suez Canal sectors. In those reports (S/7930/Add.1582, 1584, 1585, 1587, 1588 and 1593), the observers operating in the new observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector transmitted complaints by Lebanon that a number of Israeli soldiers had crossed and recrossed the borders on 25, 26 and 28 April. They also reported occasional flights by Israel aircraft, which had crossed the armistice demarcation line for brief periods. In a supplemental information dated 26 April (S/7930/Add.1583), the Secretary-General listed the new observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector, as well

¹⁵ For the text of this report, see document no. 8 below.

as updated lists of the observation posts and control centres in both the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors.

157. During the month of May and until 15 June 1972, the observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector submitted further reports (S/7930/Add. 1595-1601, 1603-1604, 1610, 1611, 1613-1622, 1624-1628, 1630, 1632-1633) concerning a variety of aerial and ground activities and transmitted complaints submitted by Lebanon regarding violations of Lebanon's air space and territorial waters, as well as border crossing by Israel forces into Lebanese territory. The observers reported frequent flights by Israel jet aircraft over Lebanese territory, some of which were over the city of Beirut. In the latter part of that period, the Lebanese authorities complained, and the observers confirmed, that Israel warships had entered Lebanese territorial waters and that, after remaining there for periods of from two to three hours, they had withdrawn to Israel waters. Lebanon also complained that Israeli soldiers had frequently crossed the borders to undertake patrols and observation. On other occasions, Israel trucks and bulldozers had crossed the border to dig positions in Lebanese territory. They had withdrawn carrying back earth to Israel territory. Some of the complaints had not been confirmed by the observers, because, as the reports indicated, the locations of the incidents referred to in those complaints were outside the observation range of the observation posts.

158. In a report dated 5 June (S/7930/Add. 1624), it was stated that Lebanon had complained that a Lebanese civilian had been found dead on 3 June near the southern border and that 10 metres from the body a hand grenade of Israel manufacture had been found, as well as vehicle tracks leading towards the border. However, the Lebanese complaint had not been confirmed by the United Nations observers because the location of the incidents referred to in the complaint was outside the observation range of the observation posts.

159. In a letter dated 5 June (S/10679), Lebanon charged that, on that date, 11 Israeli military planes had violated Lebanese air space and flown over towns situated in southern Lebanon. The letter drew attention to the numerous earlier complaints of similar nature that Lebanon had filed with UNTSO, which had been reported in the supplementary information issued by the

Secretary-General since 26 April. Israel, it stated, had intensified its violations of Lebanese air space and was continuing its campaign of threats against Lebanon, which the Lebanese Government strongly protested.

4. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire from 16 June 1971 to 15 June 1972

160. During the period covered by this report, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information containing reports he received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO regarding the cease-fire situation in the Israel-Syria sector (S/7930/Add.1223-1226, 1228, 1229, 1231, 1233, 1234, 1236, 1237, 1239-1243, 1245-1249, 1251, 1253-1255, 1258, 1260, 1261, 1263, 1265-1267, 1269, 1271-1276, 1278-1280, 1282-1285, 1287, 1288, 1290, 1291, 1293, 1295-1299, 1301-1306, 1308-1310, 1312, 1313, 1316-1318, 1320 and Corr.1, 1322-1324, 1326-1328, 1330, 1332, 1333, 1335, 1336, 1338-1340, 1342, 1343, 1345-1347, 1349, 1350 and Corr.1, 1354-1362, 1364-1367, 1369-1374, 1376, 1377, 1379, 1380, 1382-1385, 1387, 1389, 1391, 1392, 1394-1396, 1398, 1399, 1401-1405 and Corr.1, 1406, 1408-1413, 1415, 1417-1421, 1423-1425, 1427-1436, 1438-1440, 1442-1450, 1452-1458, 1460-1503, 1505-1514, 1516-1523, 1525-1532 and Corr.1, 1533-1538, 1540-1582, 1584-1592, 1594, 1596-1615, 1618-1623, 1625-1634). Those reports related to firing incidents in which tanks, light arms, artillery and heavy weapons had been used. They also related to some aerial activity, indicating in most cases that Israel jet aircraft had crossed the cease-fire line to attack Syrian military positions and that, on occasion, there had been some anti-aircraft fire by Syrian forces. The Chief of Staff included in those reports complaints submitted by both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission regarding cease-fire violations. In their complaints, the parties requested that necessary measures be taken to prevent future violations.

161. In supplemental information issued in late June and early July 1971 (S/7930/Add.1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1245 and 1246), the Chief of Staff reported that Israel forces had crossed the limits of the

Israel forward defended localities and, after having penetrated about 800 to 1,000 metres inside Syrian territory, recrossed the cease-fire line. In supplemental information dated 22 July (S/7930/Add. 1273), the Chief of Staff stated that the Israel Liaison Officer had objected to those reports as incorrect. Following verification inquiries conducted by UNTSO into the Israel complaint, the general conclusion was that, although verbal and documentary evidence confirmed the accuracy of the observers' reports, no physical evidence could be found of the reported incursions.

162. In a letter dated 17 January 1972 (S/10511), Israel charged that since 1 January 1972, 11 violations of the cease-fire had been committed from Syrian territory, resulting in the death of two civilians, and that, in the course of 1971, there had been 149 violations of the cease-fire from Syrian territory by shelling, shooting, laying of mines and aerial intrusions, for which the Syrian Government was responsible in view of the support it had given to the terrorist organizations.

163. In a letter dated 21 January (S/10518), the Syrian Arab Republic replied that it was a matter of record that in 1971 Israel forces had committed 1,491 violations of the cease-fire, which had all been confirmed by United Nations military observers. With regard to the allegations that it had committed 11 violations of the cease-fire since 1 January 1972, the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that the reports of the Chief of Staff between 3 and 20 January had made it clear that Israel forces had continuously violated the cease-fire and that the complaints submitted by Israel to UNTSO had not been confirmed by the United Nations observers, while those submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic had.

B. Questions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories and related matters

Communications to the Council from 16 June 1971 to 15 June 1972

164. In a letter dated 17 June (S/10228), Israel, after referring to its letter of 10 June (S/10220) and the reply of the Syrian Arab Republic of 15 June (S/10224), stated that the latter's reply was a reflection of that Government's warfare against the right of the Jewish people to equality with other nations. The Syrian Arab Republic had rejected Security

Council resolution 242 (1967), calling for peace with Israel, and had refused to participate in the efforts made for that purpose under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Referring to the quotations in the Syrian letter of resolution 9 (XXVII) of the Commission on Human Rights, alleging violations of human rights in Israel-controlled territory, he pointed out that the majority of the members of the Commission had refused to support that resolution and that only representatives of Arab, Soviet and Moslem States and their traditional followers had voted for it. Such resolutions, Israel added, clearly demonstrated the impossibility of dealing with the Middle East equitably and effectively by means of United Nations resolutions that were not based on agreement of the parties to the conflict.

165. In letters dated 21 and 25 June (S/10232 S/10238 and Corr.1), the Syrian Arab Republic stated that Israel was contemptuous of the World Organization, rejecting and violating a number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on various aspects of the Israel-Arab conflict. Israel replied on 23 June (S/10234) that Syria had always attempted to employ one-sided resolutions in order to avoid the need to seek settlement of the Middle East conflict by negotiating with Israel.

166. By a letter dated 25 June (S/10256), Iraq transmitted the text of an interview in the French magazine *Témoignage Chrétien* with an Israeli professor who protested Israel's policies towards the Arabs in occupied territories, in particular, the alleged policies of collective punishment, destruction of houses, ill-treatment of prisoners and administrative detention. In a letter dated 20 July (S/10271), Israel replied that the interview in question contained falsehoods and distortions of fact and that the said professor was known to speak for a handful of avowed supporters of Arab belligerency against Israel. Iraq rejected the arguments of Israel in a letter dated 30 July (S/10278), stating that as it was unable to deny the specific charges, Israel had turned to personal attack.

167. In a letter dated 20 July (S/10270) regarding the activities of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, Israel stated that that Committee had continued to serve as a tool of Arab propaganda

and a means of disseminating falsehoods regarding the situation in Israeli-held territories. The letter quoted from a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Israel's Knesset to the effect that the Committee was gathering false testimony on Israel's alleged misdeeds against its Arab inhabitants but that the hundreds of visitors to Israel were the best witnesses to the true picture.

168. In letters dated 25 August 1971 and 5 January 1972 (S/10300 and S/10495), the Syrian Arab Republic drew attention to Israel's expansionist policy and quoted a report from a Jewish Telegraphic Agency bulletin to the effect that the Israeli population in the Golan Heights would number 15,000 persons in seven years. It also quoted several reportedly official statements to support the charge that Israel was following a policy of expansion and annexation by establishing new settlements in the occupied territories in violation of United Nations resolutions.

169. In a letter dated 16 August (S/10293), Egypt complained that the situation in Gaza was deteriorating as a result of Israel's measures of expulsion and destruction of homes in order to depopulate the area, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. In view of the gravity of that situation, it requested that the United Nations take the necessary steps to end Israel's breach of law, morality and international peace and security.

170. In a letter dated 19 August (S/10295), Israel replied that, following a terrorist campaign supported by Egypt and other Arab States, there had been many violent acts that had caused the death of many local inhabitants in the area. Consequently, Israel had been compelled to take the required measures to ensure the safety and security of the inhabitants. Those measures had required the construction of access roads within the refugee camps and, in certain cases, the demolition of some houses. However, alternate housing had been provided, and the evacuees had been given compensation for any expenses they had had to face in the process of their transfer to new houses.

171. By a letter dated 18 September (S/10328), Egypt transmitted the text of a telegram to the Secretary-General from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, protesting against measures taken by Israel in Gaza on the pretexts of security and town planning and requesting that Israel be made to cease all forcible transfer of population and killing innocent people. It

further requested that the United Nations dispatch an investigating committee to look into the situation in Gaza and order Israel to cease immediately its policy of terror and oppression against the population there.

172. By a letter dated 3 January 1972 (S/10496), Iraq transmitted a petition signed by Palestinian Arabs in exile, urging the Secretary-General to persevere in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

173. In letters dated 15 and 29 March, 6 April, 23 May and 12 June (S/10565, S/10582, S/10590, S/10663 and S/10694), Egypt charged that, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention, several Security Council resolutions and its obligations under international law, Israel had deported thousands of Egyptian citizens inhabiting Sinai and had transferred them to other areas. It had also destroyed many homes and expropriated lands in the Rafah area. The letter charged that Israel was pursuing a systematic and premeditated policy to depopulate the occupied territories in order to fit them into its expansionist plans and ultimately annex them. To that end Israel had reinforced its military control over the Gaza Strip and had established many Jewish settlements there. The Palestinian population had been displaced and deported and had been replaced by Jewish immigrants. In view of Israel's grave violations of the United Nations Charter and its total disregard of United Nations resolutions, the United Nations should take the appropriate measures to uphold the Charter and the relevant resolutions.

174. In letters dated 21 March, 3 April, 30 May and 15 June (S/10570, S/10587, S/10667 and S/10700), Israel rejected Egypt's charges and reiterated that Israel's policy and actions in the Gaza and Sinai areas had been directed towards ensuring the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants, in accordance with Security Council resolution 237 (1967). The measures it had taken under its international obligations were necessitated by the terror campaign, which aimed at undermining normal civilian life.

175. In a letter dated 14 April (S/10598), Jordan charged that Israel had taken new measures to forcibly expel from the occupied territories 14 Arab inhabitants who had recently arrived on the East Bank. Those deportations, it said, were in direct violation of article 49 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and effective measures

in accordance with the Charter were required to stop such policies.

176. In a letter dated 20 April (S/10614), Egypt stated that, according to an Israeli military communiqué reported in the press, Israeli troops had fired on Egyptian prisoners of war, killing one of them. Recalling that the Third Geneva Convention made the detaining Power responsible for the treatment given prisoners of war, Egypt protested the new breach of the above-mentioned Convention and requested the Secretary-General to investigate the conditions under which the incidents had occurred, as well as detention conditions of the Egyptian prisoners of war, and to ensure full compliance by Israel with the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949.

177. In a letter dated 2 May (S/10628), Israel replied that during a search for hidden weapons in the prisoner-of-war camp, the prisoners had attacked the military police, wounding two Israeli officers, then set fire to their quarters and tried to break out. After having refused to obey the military police, warning shots had been fired in the air. A bullet had ricocheted off a wall and wounded a prisoner, who subsequently died. The authorities had established a commission of inquiry to carry out an investigation, and the International Committee of the Red Cross had been notified of the incident. After noting that representatives of the Red Cross made periodic visits to the prisoners of war and that their reports had established that Israel observed the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Israel pointed out that the exchange of all the prisoners of war between Egypt and Israel would be the most humanitarian solution of the problem and reiterated its proposal that Egypt agree to it.

178. In a letter dated 13 June (S/10698), the Syrian Arab Republic stated that, in order to justify military action against the Arab States, including Syria, Israel was using the situation of the Jews in Syria as an excuse for intervention. According to a recent official statement, Israel would act in an organized and bold manner to save the Jews in Syria. That, the letter added, was part of a world-wide campaign to have Jews emigrate to Israel because of alleged persecution and anti-Semitism. After rejecting the allegations that the Jews in the Syrian Arab Republic carried

special identification cards and noting that all Syrian citizens carried cards showing their religious affiliation, the letter countercharged that the Arabs in Israel had to carry special numbers to identify them as Arabs and that against four Syrian Jews jailed in Syria there were 4,000 Arabs rotting in jails in Israel. The letter also recalled that, since 1967, the General Assembly and some of its organs had condemned Israel 16 times for violations of Arab human rights.

C. The situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places

1. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

179. With further reference to his reports of 18 February and 20 April 1971 under Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) concerning Jerusalem, the Secretary-General issued a report on 20 August (S/10124/Add.2), containing a further exchange of communications between him and the representative of Israel on the subject of the United Nations premises at Government House in Jerusalem. In a note dated 18 August in reply to the Secretary-General's note of 12 April reiterating his request for the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises, the representative of Israel had stated that no changes were contemplated with regard to the situation as stated in the exchange of letters of July and August 1967. On the following day, in a note to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General had indicated that he understood the representative's note to mean that his Government, having already discontinued all construction and other works within the area of the United Nations premises at Government House, would refrain from reinitiating such construction until the difference of opinion reflected in the exchange of letters had been satisfactorily resolved. If that understanding were incorrect, the Secretary-General reiterated that one way of resolving any differences that might arise would be to resort to the procedure for settlement laid down in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

2. REQUEST FOR A MEETING AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL AT ITS 1579TH TO 1582ND MEETINGS (16-25 SEPTEMBER 1971)

180. In a letter dated 13 September (S/10313), the representative of Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's illegal actions in Jerusalem in defiance of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969). He charged that, contrary to those resolutions and in spite of local and international objections, Israel had continued its illegal and unilateral measures aimed at changing the city's character and environs. He added that the situation created by Israel's illegal measures was a direct threat to the character of the city, to the lives of its people and to international peace and security.

181. At its 1579th meeting, on 16 September, the Security Council included in its agenda Jordan's letter of 13 September 1971. At the request of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, it also included in its agenda the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions on the question of Jerusalem. The representatives of Jordan, Egypt and Israel and, subsequently, Mali, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Tunisia were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

182. The representative of Jordan stated that the measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem were designed to change the status and character of the Holy City and, at the same time, aimed at preventing the conclusion of a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, in the hope that the cease-fire lines would ultimately become Israel's new borders. Israel contemplated new legislation to extend the borders of Jerusalem to include the annexation of 3 Arab towns and 27 villages over and above what had already been unilaterally and illegally annexed in June 1967. Furthermore, there were reported attempts by Israel to enact a law that would confine Moslem Holy Places in the Haram Esh-Sharif area to the Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock Mosques, in disregard of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article 12 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many General Assembly and Security Council resolutions had deplored measures of annexation and had called upon Israel to rescind such measures and to desist from taking action that would alter the status of

Jerusalem. However, Israel had shown contempt for those resolutions and still declined to supply the Secretary-General with any details or satisfactory information on the "Master Plan for Jerusalem", which envisaged, among other things, developments affecting the United Nations premises at Government House. Israel's determination to Judaize Arab Jerusalem had been manifested in legislative, fiscal and urban measures, which were imposing on the city an increasingly special character at the expense of the non-Jewish population. In the light of Israel's disregard of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the Council should invoke whatever sanctions it deemed fit under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure Israel's respect for them.

183. At the 1580th meeting, on 16 September, the representative of Israel stated that Jordan's complaint was a manoeuvre to divert attention from its internal difficulties. Jordan, which had invaded Jerusalem in 1948 and seized its eastern sector, was trying to infringe upon the city's right to normal existence and development. The General Assembly and Security Council had displayed singular disinterest in Jerusalem's welfare at the most trying and crucial moments. Now that the city was united, the Security Council was being mobilized in an attempt to retard progress and to stifle growth in Jerusalem. With regard to construction work in the city, he noted that planning was a normal and indispensable element in the development of any city. Building activities in the eastern sector of Jerusalem constituted slum clearance, the reconstruction of the Jewish quarter, the Hebrew University Campus and the Hadassah hospital and the erection of new housing for Arab and Jewish residents who had been living in slums. In order to accommodate the growth of the city's population—Jewish as well as Arab—land had been acquired, and landowners, both Arabs and Jews, were being fully compensated. Contrary to Jordanian allegations, there was no "Master Plan". However, in view of the universal interest in the city, the Mayor of Jerusalem had invited an international group of outstanding individuals to form an advisory board to aid the municipality of Jerusalem. The Israel authorities, he concluded, had ensured and would continue to ensure the sanctity of the Holy Places, freedom of access to them and the jurisdiction of the various religious communities over them.

184. At the 1580th and 1581st meetings, on 16 and 17 September, the representatives of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco took part in the discussion in support of Jordan's complaint. They maintained that Israel had defied all previous Council resolutions calling upon it to rescind all measures aimed at changing the character of the Holy City and stated that the Council, in the face of that defiance, should put an end to it and take any further steps to implement its resolutions, including the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. The representative of Morocco expressed the hope that the Council would decide to dispatch a representative or a mission to determine whether Israel was complying with the resolutions adopted on Jerusalem. The representative of Saudi Arabia recalled that, in dealing with the problem of Jerusalem, the Council should bear in mind that no matter what Israel's contention might be, the fact remained that hundreds of millions in the Arab or Moslem world would not concede that 2 million Zionists should have sovereignty over Jerusalem.

185. The representative of Mali noted that the question of Jerusalem was only one of many aspects of the Middle East conflict and said that any measure infringing upon relevant United Nations resolutions would hinder negotiation for a peaceful settlement.

186. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that the real issue before the Council was Jordan's complaint and the reports of the Secretary-General on Jerusalem. From 1967 to date, the General Assembly and the Security Council had adopted five resolutions regarding the Holy City. None of those resolutions had ever been respected by Israel. The concern of the Council should therefore be to find a way to bring Israel's defiance to an end.

187. At the 1582nd meeting, on 25 September, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and General Assembly, condemning Israel's annexation of the Arab part of Jerusalem, were in accordance with the principles of international law based on the inadmissibility of acquiring territory through war. That principle was also the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Israel's defiance and negative attitude towards United Nations decisions showed its expansionist and aggressive policy towards the

Arab world. Israel's measures in Jerusalem were aimed at changing the Arab nature of the Old City by expelling Arab inhabitants, destroying Arab houses and imposing Israel settlements in the Arab section. It was clear that Israel's plans were intended to undermine the peaceful political settlement envisaged in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Therefore, the Council was bound to take more decisive action to compel Israel to respect the will of the international community. He felt that the demand that Chapter VII of the Charter be applied against Israel was justifiable and supported the demand of the Arab countries to dispatch a special mission to Jerusalem.

188. The representative of Belgium stated that, at a time when the chance to reach a negotiated solution remained possible, it was advisable to avoid any discussion that might vitiate attempts made in that respect. After noting that Israel had failed to apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, he expressed his delegation's hope that the Council would adopt a resolution that would call on Israel to abrogate measures aimed at changing the status of Jerusalem, and he suggested that the Secretary-General should submit a report showing how measures taken by Israel violated previous resolutions of the Council and The Hague Conventions on the Laws of War.

189. The representative of France said that Jordan's new complaint appeared to be the logical consequence of the latest Security Council resolution, resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, which had been preceded by resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968. Israel had never implemented the provisions of those resolutions; consequently, the Council was once again faced with the same problem. Since its occupation of Arab Jerusalem, Israel had been pursuing a policy designed to integrate that section permanently within an administratively unified Jerusalem. Israel's policy of *fait accompli* would increase the resentment of the parties concerned, aggravate tension in the Middle East and jeopardize the chances of peaceful settlement.

190. The representative of Argentina stated that the concern of the world over Jerusalem was fully justified, because of the city's historical importance to three religious faiths. Until the status of the city could be defined on the basis of respect for historic and religious interests, innovation should not take place there. Israel should adjust its conduct to the requirements of the United

Nations resolutions, and the Security Council must reaffirm its position on Jerusalem.

191. The representative of Poland said that developments in Jerusalem revealed a part of Israel's aggressive policy, based on military occupation and attempts to create faits accomplis. He urged the Council to study the question in the context of its illegality under the principles of international law, bearing in mind Israel's attitude and actions in disregard of the will of the international community. The Council should not only reaffirm previous resolutions on the matter but should consider all measures necessary to ensure their implementation.

192. The representative of Italy said that the future of Jerusalem should be determined in accordance with the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations and not through unilateral action. Israel's measures in the occupied section of Jerusalem were inconsistent with the provisions of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

193. The representative of Somalia said that the administrative and legislative measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem were in violation of numerous United Nations resolutions and had undoubtedly hindered a political settlement to the problem of the Middle East. The Council was duty-bound to adopt more effective measures. In order to take the United Nations one step forward in meeting its responsibilities in that respect, he submitted the following draft resolution (S/10337):

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section of Jerusalem,

"Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8052, S/8146, S/9149 and Add.1, S/9537 and S/10124 and Add.1 and 2), and having read the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

"Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

"Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolutions,

"Noting with concern further that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has

taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

"1. Reaffirms Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

"2. Deplores the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem;

"3. Confirms in the clearest possible terms that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status;

"4. Urgently calls upon Israel to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within 60 days on the implementation of this resolution."

194. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic proposed four amendments (S/10338/Rev.1) to the Somali draft resolution. He proposed that in the first line of operative paragraph 4, after the word "Israel", the following phrase be added: "to rescind all previous measures and actions and". In operative paragraph 5, he proposed the replacement of the words "as he may choose" by the words "as they may choose". In the same paragraph, he proposed that the Secretary-General should report in 30 days instead of 60 days. Finally, he proposed the addition of the following new operative paragraph:

"6. Decides that the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider the report referred to in paragraph 5 and what further actions should be taken under the Charter."

195. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic noted that many speakers in the Council had expressed their opposition to Israel's violations of international law and of various United Nations resolutions. That opposition should have been

reflected in a resolution more responsive to the obligation of the Council, which should call upon Member States to recognize the illegality of Israel's action in Jerusalem and to refrain from giving any form of assistance to Israel. The final step would be the application of sanctions, according to Chapter VII of the Charter.

196. In his capacity as representative of Japan, the President of the Council stated that resolution 242 (1967) had clearly emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, a principle that applied to the situation of Jerusalem. His delegation deplored Israel's failure to grant the Secretary-General a detailed description of the so-called "Master Plan" and reiterated the position of his Government on the desirability of an international régime for the city of Jerusalem. His delegation was in favour of the Somali draft resolution, as well as the idea of designating a mission of investigation which would report to the Council on conditions in Jerusalem.

197. The representative of Burundi stated that the status of Jerusalem called for respect by all parties concerned, who should do nothing that might in any way contribute to making the situation in the area more dangerous. His delegation believed that the responsibility of the Council lay in re-establishing an atmosphere conducive to prayer and meditation in the Holy City, and he thought that the United Nations should devise ways of convincing Israel to rescind its decisions concerning the city, including measures for annexation that might become irreversible.

198. The representative of Sierra Leone stated that his Government believed that peace in the Middle East could only be achieved by Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). Relying on its military power, Israel had rejected a peaceful settlement and had continued its defiance of the international will. Furthermore, it had been taking measures to change the status of the Holy City, without any consideration for the feelings of Christians and Moslems throughout the world. If that policy was not ended, the dreadful result would be an intensification of hostility in the area.

199. As a result of appeals made by the representatives of France and the United States, which were subsequently supported by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Somalia and Italy, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic with-

drew three of his amendments to the Somali draft resolution and requested a vote on the first. The representative of the USSR requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

Decisions: *At the 1582nd meeting, on 25 September 1971, the first amendment of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/10338/Rev.1) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Nicaragua and United States of America).*

Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution of Somalia (S/10337) was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (Poland, Syrian Arab Republic and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted as a whole by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Syrian Arab Republic) as resolution 298 (1971).¹⁶

200. After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he voted for the resolution, because it was consistent with his Government's position on Jerusalem. He expressed the hope that Israel would heed the resolution's call and would give its full co-operation to the Secretary-General in carrying out his mandate.

201. The representative of Jordan said that, if Israel continued in its refusal to comply with the Council's decisions, then the only avenue left would be the application of Chapter VII of the Charter.

202. The representative of the United States said that he had supported the resolution, because it was time to reiterate his Government's concern that nothing should be done in Jerusalem that could prejudice an ultimate peaceful solution.

203. The representative of Israel said that the resolution just adopted disregarded Israel's basic rights and sought to violate the natural unity of the city. Above all, it reflected the view of States hostile to Israel's independence.

204. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his delegation had abstained, because, though approving some of the draft's constructive elements, it believed that the Council should have started from paragraphs 6 and 7 of its resolution 267 (1969), which had been adopted unanimously.

¹⁶ Printed as document no. 431 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

3. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

205. In a report dated 19 November (S/10392)¹⁷ submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 concerning Jerusalem, the Secretary-General stated that, under the terms of that resolution, he had held consultations with the President of the Security Council on its implementation and subsequently had informed Israel of his intention to nominate a mission, consisting of three members of the Council, with a view to enabling him to report to the Council as requested. On 1 October, he had indicated to the Foreign Minister of Israel that he had in mind as members of the mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone, whose Governments had signified their willingness to serve on that mission. He had reminded Israel that, under the terms of the resolution, he had a 60-day limit for reporting and therefore was bound to report within that period. Having received no reply from Israel, he had again, on 28 October, drawn Israel's attention to the fact that he would appreciate receiving its comments as soon as possible. On 15 November, the representative of Israel had transmitted a letter containing his Government's views concerning paragraph 4 of resolution 298 (1971), without, however, touching upon the question of Israel's response to the proposal for a mission under that resolution. On 16 November, the Secretary-General had again addressed a letter to the representative of Israel in which, after having recalled that Israel's reply had not referred to the question of a mission, he had indicated that, inasmuch as the time-limit for his report would expire on 24 November, he had no alternative but to submit his report to the Security Council without taking further action to activate the three-man mission. Consequently, he informed the Council that, since September 1967, he had had no means of obtaining first-hand information in the fulfilment of his reporting responsibilities under resolution 298 (1971). After careful consideration of that resolution, he and the President of the Security Council had concluded that the best way to fulfil those responsibilities was through a mission of three members of the Council, for which the co-operation of Israel would obviously be required. However, Israel had not indicated willingness to

comply with the resolution. In the light of Israel's failure to abide by the decision of the Security Council, he had been unable to fulfil his mandate under resolution 298 (1971).

206. The Secretary-General annexed to his report copies of his exchange of letters with the Government of Israel. In its letter of 15 November, Israel had restated its position with regard to the provision contained in resolution 298 (1971) calling on it to "rescind all previous measures and actions" to change the status of Jerusalem. Israel held that the restoration of the status of the city prior to 1967 would involve rescinding the unity, peace and sanctity of the city in order to restore division and conflict and considered it inconceivable that the majority of the Council would wish to restore such a situation. Concerning the suggestion that Israel was planning action to annul the heterogeneous character of the population, Israel gave assurances that the proportions of different ethnic population groups in the city were not expected to change. As for the interests of the international community, Israel reaffirmed that the protection of the Holy Places was ensured by law and that there was freedom for all to visit and pray at the Holy Places of the three great faiths.

207. By a letter dated 20 January 1972 (S/10517), the representative of Jordan transmitted a statement issued by his mission with reference to Israel's letter of 15 November 1971. In reply to Israel's claim that restoration of the status of Jerusalem to that existing prior of 1967 would mean the return to a military demarcation line, Jordan stated that the demarcation line and any other arrangements flowing therefrom had been a result of Israel's aggression. Contrary to the claim contained in Israel's letter regarding the issue of population, it had been proved that what had become new Jerusalem had formerly been predominantly an Arab city, currently occupied and despoiled by Israel, in violation of all international conventions and United Nations resolutions. After pointing out that the problem of Jerusalem was an integral part of the problem of terminating Israeli occupation of all Arab territories, Jordan rejected Israel's claim that all citizens in the city had a voice in its administration and added that Israel had deported the duly elected mayor of that sector. With regard to the laws enacted by Israel for the protection of the Holy Places, Jordan stated that no one party should arrogate to itself the privilege of

¹⁷ Printed as document no. 414 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

redrafting legislation covering 2,000 years of history, traditions and rights. In conclusion, Jordan said, no matter how Israel tried to justify its annexation of the city, the measures it had taken to change its status were contrary to all international Conventions, as well as United Nations resolutions and the Charter. Consequently, the Security Council should assume its responsibilities and ensure that a life of freedom, peace, dignity and harmony was guaranteed for all.

D. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

208. By a letter dated 13 July 1971 (S/10272), the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in New York transmitted the text of resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its eighth session, held in Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 June 1971. In one of those resolutions, OAU called for immediate withdrawal of Israel forces from all Arab territories and expressed its full support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his efforts to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It also called upon Israel to make a positive reply to the Special Representative's initiative for peace of 8 February 1971.¹⁸

209. In a letter dated 13 August (S/10290), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic referred to a reported decision by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to grant Israel a loan of \$30 million to expand its highway network and stated that the loan in question was shocking, in view of Israel's disregard and defiance of all the United Nations resolutions adopted on the Arab-Israeli conflict. He stated that, in addition to more than 2,000 million dollars' worth of Arab property in Palestine taken by force by Israel in 1948, thousands of millions of American dollars had poured into that country, giving the settlers a privileged status in relation to that of the other inhabitants of the region. Even after the aggression of 1967, United States military and economic assistance had run into the thousands of millions

of dollars, despite the severe indictment of Israel by the United Nations and specialized agencies.

210. In a letter dated 24 August (S/10297), the representative of Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to a joint declaration made in Damascus on 20 August by the Presidents of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab Republic to mark the signing by the three States of the Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics.¹⁹ That declaration, the letter stated, reflected a policy rejecting peace with Israel and constituted a violation of the United Nations Charter and defiance of the obligation to reach a peaceful settlement of the Israel-Arab conflict under resolution 242 (1967).

211. By a letter dated 8 October (S/10632), Israel transmitted the text of a letter it had addressed on 30 September to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), in which it was stated that, between 23 August and 3 September 1971, two Arab terrorists had attempted to bring about the destruction in flight of an aircraft belonging to El Al, the national airline of Israel. It was the belief of the Government of Israel that further acts of sabotage were contemplated and, therefore, it was urging ICAO to take the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of acts of violence against international civil aviation that would jeopardize the safety of persons and property and would gravely affect the operations of the international air services.

212. In a letter dated 11 May 1972 (S/10639), Israel informed the Secretary-General that, on 8 May 1972, armed agents of the terror organization called Black September had captured a civilian aircraft of the Belgian airline Sabena during its flight from Belgium to Israel and that, after landing it at Lod airport in Israel, the hijackers had threatened to blow up the aircraft with its passengers and crew if Israel did not release members of Arab terror organizations detained in Israel. On the following day, a unit of Israel forces had been able to gain control of the aircraft and free all the passengers but, in the process, had killed two of the hijackers and captured two others. Israel noted that the reaction of the Arab Governments and Arab information media had indicated support for the hijackers and that the terror organizations

¹⁸ For the text of this resolution see document no. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹⁹ For an excerpt of the declaration see document no. 374 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

continued not only to enjoy the support of the Arab Governments but to maintain bases on their territories, where they received military assistance and training. That act of air piracy, the letter concluded, reflected the criminality of the activities of terror organizations, as well as the responsibility of the Arab Governments.

213. In a letter dated 31 May (S/10668), Israel informed the President of the Security Council that, on the previous day, an armed attack had taken place at Lod Airport, when three men, who had arrived by Air France from Rome, had entered the airport lounge and opened fire indiscriminately on the crowd, killing 25 persons and wounding 70. Two of the assailants had been killed, and the third, who had been captured, had stated that he and his colleagues were Japanese nationals hired to commit that crime by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which shortly thereafter had claimed responsibility for the mass murder. Israel recalled that it had previously drawn the attention of the Council to the responsibility of Arab Governments, particularly Lebanon, for the criminal operations conducted by Arab terror organizations, which it charged maintained offices in Beirut, where they received support from Lebanon and other Arab countries. In conclusion, Israel requested that the Arab Governments, especially Lebanon, put an immediate end to the activities of those organizations.

214. By a further letter dated 31 May (S/10671), the representative of Israel transmitted excerpts from a statement made by Israel's Prime Minister in the Knesset, in connexion with the Lod Airport incident. In that statement, after deploring the incident and expressing condolences to those who suffered from it, the Prime Minister recalled that dozens of air incidents had taken place since the Swissair disaster two years earlier, and stressed Lebanon's responsibility for harbouring and supporting the terrorist organizations responsible for those incidents. She warned that Israel would not be the only target of the terrorists and appealed to all Governments and airlines to co-operate and to take the necessary measures to keep the hijacking plague from spreading.

215. In a letter dated 31 May (S/10670), Lebanon said that by attributing the responsibility for the airport incident to a Palestinian organization that had its headquarters in Beirut, Israel sought to place responsibility for the incident

on Lebanon. His Government, however, condemned all acts of violence against innocent civilians and was in no way implicated in the incident. Accordingly, the accusations made by Israel should be rejected as unfounded.

216. By a letter dated 1 June (S/10673), Israel replied that Lebanon had not denied that it was the location of the headquarters of the organization responsible for the Lod Airport incident and reiterated that Lebanon was fully responsible for harbouring organizations engaged in the murder of innocent civilians and for failing in its international obligations to put an end to their activities.

217. In a letter dated 2 June (S/10675), Israel drew the attention of the Council to a statement by Egypt's Prime Minister²⁰ broadcast by Cairo radio that, the letter said, gave official approval to the incident of Lod Airport, thus showing that Government's support for the activities of Arab terror organizations. After recalling Egypt's role in the operations carried out by the terror organizations, Israel charged that Egypt's involvement in, and identification with, their activities had reached new depths of criminality and therefore Egypt's responsibility was clear. In a reply dated 8 June (S/10688), Egypt stated that Israel was trying to shift the responsibility of the incident to a number of Governments. Its official statements and threats of reprisals had the objective of furthering its aggression against the Palestinian people and its expansionist design against the Arab States in the area. In the light of those statements, Israel must be held responsible for the grave consequences of any action it might undertake in the future.

218. By a letter dated 2 June (S/10677/Rev.1), the representative of Lebanon transmitted the text of a statement made by the President of Lebanon regarding the Lod incident, in which he denied his country's responsibility and asked how Lebanon could be responsible for the action of foreign commandos transported to Israel from a foreign capital by a foreign company. The fact that a communiqué had been issued in Beirut by a Palestinian organization claiming responsibility for the incident meant only that Beirut was a centre for the world-wide dissemination of information. However, new measures had been taken to prevent Lebanon from being a centre of information for that organization. Referring to the statement

²⁰ For the text of this statement see document no. below.

of the President of Lebanon, Israel, in a letter dated 6 June (S/10683), complained that south-eastern Lebanon had become the base for 5,000 members of terror organizations and that Beirut was the seat of those organizations, where attacks were initiated, planned and directed, including the massacre at Lod Airport. Therefore, to claim that Lebanese territory was not involved in the incident was only an attempt on the part of Lebanon to misconstrue facts and evade the obligation to put an end to terror operations. Israel then cited statements made in 1969 by the former President of Lebanon and in January 1972 by its Prime Minister that, it said, indicated that Lebanon was supporting terror warfare against Israel. By invoking the refugee problem as an excuse for terror operations against Israel, Lebanon was using any pretext to justify its support for terror warfare. In a reply dated 8 June (S/10689 and Corr.1) Lebanon rejected Israel's charges and stated that Israel was deliberately distorting the statements made by the former President and by the Prime Minister of Lebanon. In a letter dated 9 June (S/10690), Israel, in reply to the Egyptian and Lebanese letters of 8 June (S/10688 and S/10689 and Corr.1), said that neither country had denied that innocent civilians had been massacred at Lod Airport by Arab terror organizations operating from Lebanon. Both continued to support terror organizations and had failed to put an end to their activities. In fact, since the agreement in 1969 between Lebanon and those organizations, 548 attacks had been perpetrated from Lebanese territory resulting in the killing of 44 Israelis and the wounding of 190. Moreover, 73 civilians had been killed and about 90 injured as a result of assaults by Arab terrorists originating from Lebanon against international aviation.

219. In a letter dated 12 June (S/10695), Lebanon stated that Israel had again tried unsuccessfully to implicate it in the airport incident, but its accusations against Lebanon had been dismissed by the Security Council on many occasions. On the other hand, since Israel's attack on the Beirut Airport in 1968, Israel had committed hundreds of acts of aggression involving violation of Lebanon's air space and territorial waters, in addition to shelling its territory and raiding its villages. As a consequence of those acts of aggression, 42 civilians and 4 military personnel had been killed, 128 civilians and 16 military personnel wounded,

and 45 civilians and 11 military personnel abducted. Instead of making false charges against Lebanon, Israel should implement United Nations resolutions aimed at establishing peace based on justice in the area. In a reply dated 13 June (S/10696), Israel stated that although it had listed measures taken by Israel in legitimate self-defence in order to put an end to terrorists' attacks, Lebanon had failed not only to take measures against the terror organizations but to abide by its international obligations to take such measures. Lebanon should realize that it was duty-bound to put an immediate and effective end to that situation.

220. By a letter dated 6 June (S/10684), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a memorandum issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization in connexion with the incident at Lydda Airport. The incident, said the memorandum, should be viewed as part of a conflict that had resulted from the usurpation of the land of Palestine and the denial of the rights of the Palestinians. The tension in the area was a direct result of the violence introduced and practised by the Zionist movement and, later, by the State of Israel, to which the Palestinians had responded with armed resistance. The acts of violence that the Zionist movement and Israel had committed before and after the establishment of the State of Israel had resulted in hundreds of innocent civilian victims and were designed to consolidate the spoils of earlier aggression and to penetrate further into the Arab world. Therefore, the responsibility for the airport incident did not lie with any Arab State but with the Zionist movement and Israel. While expressing regret for the loss of innocent lives, the memorandum warned that the Middle East was in a state of war and that in any zone of war, people travelled at their own risk.

221. In a letter dated 8 June (S/10687), Israel stated that the Palestine Liberation Organization was the principal Arab terror group openly engaged in acts of murder against civilians. Although the civilized world had been shocked by the attack at Lod Airport, there had been jubilation and attempts to whitewash the crime in the Arab States. The submission of the memorandum by the Libyan Arab Republic was a further example of Arab responsibility in the matter. In a reply dated 12 June (S/10697), the Libyan Arab Republic reiterated that Israel was responsible for the continued

violence in the area and stated that Libya's policy was to support the just struggle of the Palestinian people for its national rights.

222. By a letter dated 26 May (S/10665 and Add.1), the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a resolution on the Middle East problem that had been adopted at the Third Islamic Conference. The resolution condemned Israel for its aggression of 1967 against Arab countries and its violation of the Charter of the United Nations, insisted on the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories and requested the permanent members of the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to persuade Israel to withdraw from those territories and to refrain from providing it with any military or economic support so that it might not persist in refusing to withdraw.

E. Activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East

(a) Report of the Secretary-General

223. In a report dated 30 November 1971, (S/10403), which was also addressed to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General gave a comprehensive account of the activities of his Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, since January 1971.²¹

224. The Secretary-General repeated the details of the Special Representative's discussions with the parties, of the aide-mémoires submitted by the Special Representative to Egypt and Israel on 8 February 1971 and of the responses of those Governments, which were already contained in reports submitted to the Security Council early in 1971 and described in the preceding report of the Council.

225. The Secretary-General went on to recall that in his report of 5 March 1971 (S/10070/Add.2), he had noted with satisfaction the positive reply given by Egypt and had appealed to Israel to

respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. He had also appealed to both parties to continue to observe the cease-fire and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970. In response to that appeal, Israel had again indicated its willingness to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. On 7 March, the President of Egypt had declared that his Government was no longer committed to a cease-fire.

226. Subsequently, the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices had lapsed. He had therefore returned to Moscow on 25 March 1971 to resume his duties as Ambassador of Sweden.

227. Ambassador Jarring had again been at Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October 1971 but had found no possibility for actively pursuing his mission.

228. In his report, the Secretary-General noted that during that time, two separate initiatives had been taken to promote agreement between the parties: first, an effort made by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, which, so far, had not achieved any positive results; second, a mission of inquiry conducted by certain African heads of State on behalf of OAU, which was still in progress. The fact that those initiatives were being pursued constituted an additional reason for Ambassador Jarring not to undertake personal initiatives.

229. The Secretary-General concluded his report by stating that recent developments had added to the urgency of his views on the situation in the Middle East, as expressed in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1970/71. He felt that appropriate organs of the United Nations must review the situation again to find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward.

(b) Further communications

230. By a letter dated 9 December (S/10438), the representative of Israel transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of Israel's reply to the proposals made by the OAU Committee of Ten on the situation in the Middle East. In that reply, Israel agreed to resume negotiations without prior conditions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring under resolution 242 (1967) and agreed that the secure and recognized boundaries should

²¹ Printed as document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

be determined by negotiation between the parties and embodied in the peace agreement and that further arrangements for ensuring their security could be negotiated. Israel also agreed that the terms of withdrawal to the boundaries negotiated and agreed should be embodied in the peace treaty. In accordance with resolution 242 (1967), free navigation in all international waterways, including the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran for all ships and cargoes, including those of Israel, would be provided for in the peace agreement.

231. By a letter dated 10 December (S/10443) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Egypt transmitted the text of a memorandum submitted by his Government to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the four African heads of State in response to the proposals submitted by the OAU Committee. In that memorandum, Egypt declared that it would agree to hold indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and for the implementation of Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February 1971 for the conclusion of a peace agreement. Egypt was also ready to undertake the required arrangements for re-opening the Canal in return for the first stage of Israeli withdrawal. Egypt also would agree that secure and recognized boundaries should be embodied in a peace agreement, subject to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories to the lines existing prior to June 1967. Furthermore, Egypt would accept as guarantees for peace, United Nations guarantees, the establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders and the stationing of international forces at some strategic points, including Sharm El Sheikh.

3

Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction)²²

September 9, 1972

1. The Agency's mandate²³ was extended by the

²² Introduction to *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1971–30 June 1972, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 13* (U.N. doc. no. A/8713), pp. 1–11.

²³ [U.N. footnote omitted here; for the history of the Agency, see footnote 3 on p. 603 of *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.]

General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session for three years, from 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1975, but there was no assurance of the financial support required to maintain the programmes to be carried out under this mandate by the Agency for the Palestine refugees.²⁴

2. It is nearly a quarter of a century now since it was declared in resolution 194 (III), *inter alia*, "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible . . .", yet the choice between return and compensation has never been offered. It is nearly five years since Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, in affirming the principles to be applied for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, affirmed also the necessity for a just settlement of the refugee problem, yet the continued occupation of the West Bank²⁵ and the Gaza Strip, where more than a third of the refugees still reside, demonstrates how little progress there has been towards peace or settlement. It is also nearly five years since the General Assembly, in resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, welcomed with great satisfaction Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 calling upon the Government of Israel to "facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities" of 1967, a call repeated annually since then by the General Assembly, yet only about 40,000²⁶ out of more than 200,000 refugees and upwards of an estimated 300,000²⁷ other displaced persons have

²⁴ A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA's working definition, is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and means of livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition or the children or grandchildren of such refugees are eligible for agency assistance if they are (a) registered with UNRWA, (b) living in the area of UNRWA's operations, and (c) in need. [This and following footnotes are part of the report.]

²⁵ Throughout this report the term "West Bank" means the occupied West Bank of Jordan.

²⁶ Figure supplied by the Government of Israel in 1971.

²⁷ Figures supplied by the Governments of Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic in 1967.

been allowed to return and the emergency camps in east Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic are still full. During the period 1971–1972, there has been a mood of pessimism about the progress of official and unofficial peace initiatives. Meanwhile, the refugees hear conflicting talk of plans for their future and for the future of the West Bank and Gaza, in which they seem to have little say and in some of which they would play a very minor role, if any. It is against this background of frustration and disillusionment, and of bitterness at the failure to implement United Nations resolutions, which they regard as a failure by the international community to honour a commitment to justice, that the refugees have also been obliged to listen during the last year to warnings of an imminent reduction or even breakdown in the services provided by the United Nations, especially in the education services they value so highly for their children's future.

3. With an estimated deficit of \$3.3 million for 1972, even after deducting provision of \$1.4 million in payments towards the cost of certain government services, and cash in hand so low that extraordinary efforts would be required to obtain sufficient early payments of contributions to tide the Agency over the month of January, the Commissioner-General warned the Secretary-General and the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in December that it might not be possible to maintain services in full and without interruption in 1972. At the end of January, he was obliged to communicate to the host Government members of the Advisory Commission, for discussion with them, specific proposals for reductions in services, beginning in April, calculated to save about \$1.5 million in 1972 and avoid a more disastrous breakdown, on the understanding that further reductions might have to be considered at a later stage. At a meeting of the Advisory Commission, held on 8 and 14 March, at the request of the host Government members, the Commission expressed the view that the services provided for the Palestine refugees had reached "the minimum tolerable humanitarian limit" and that all possible efforts had to be made to avoid new reductions. The Advisory Commission asked that the Secretary-General should make an appeal (the Working Group had already made the same request), and also asked that the

Agency should continue its efforts to obtain further assistance from Governments and the specialized agencies of the United Nations. As there was some fresh hope of increased contributions, the Commissioner-General agreed to defer action on reductions for a further period and the Secretary-General made an appeal on 20 March 1972. There was an early response to the Secretary-General's appeal, the Chairman of the Working Group was encouraged by his tour of a number of Arab capitals in April, and discussions in which the Agency was engaged with the European Economic Community bore promise of further support. By the end of June, the estimated deficit had fallen to \$1.8 million (including the payments to Governments) and for the time being the threat of reductions had receded.

4. This improvement in the Agency's financial situation reflects a recognition on the part of contributors that, in the present political impasse in the Middle East, with the problem of the Palestine refugees still unresolved, the services provided for them by UNRWA must be maintained. It may be also that the response to appeals for funds reflects a wider and better understanding of the nature of UNRWA's operations. Some misunderstanding of the Agency's role persists, however, and it is worth repeating that the camps, in which only 40 per cent of the refugees live, are not extra-territorial areas under United Nations jurisdiction and that UNRWA has no police function or similar administrative responsibility in them. Nor, with the exception of buildings of minor importance in camps in Lebanon, referred to in paragraph 171, can it be said that United Nations facilities are being misused.

Finance

5. The Working Group appointed by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session "to study all aspects of the financing of the Agency" and, "in the interval between the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions, to assist, as appropriate, the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in reaching solutions to the problems posed by the Agency's financial crisis", submitted a report (A/8476 and Corr.1) to the General Assembly on 26 October 1971. The Working Group explained in its report that it had concentrated during the year on the

short-term problem of financing the Agency's activities in 1971 and 1972. With regard to the longer-term problems, the Working Group concluded that "in view of the existence of a fundamental weakness in the financing of UNRWA", more than temporary or annual efforts for bridging chronic deficits were required. It recommended, *inter alia*, that the Group's mandate should be extended for another year and the General Assembly adopted this recommendation in resolution 2791 (XXVI).

6. At the meeting of the UNRWA Advisory Commission, held on 8 and 14 March 1972, to which reference is made in paragraph 3 above, the Commission decided "to follow more closely the preparation of the Agency's budget" and appointed a committee consisting of the representatives of France, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States of America to discuss with the Commissioner-General the means of putting this decision into effect. The committee held two meetings with the Commissioner-General and his advisers, on 2 and 17 May, at which it was acquainted with the detailed information on the Agency's budget and finances already available in Agency documents. The committee will report to the Advisory Commission at its next meeting.

7. As a result of the response to appeals for increased contributions, the deficit for 1971, estimated at \$2.4 million in the report for 1970-1971, was reduced to \$0.7 million, but, even after withholding the payments to Governments, cash in hand on 1 January 1972 was only \$1.1 million, with an estimated deficit in the budget for 1972 of \$4.7 million. Sufficient early payments of cash contributions were obtained to tide the Agency over the opening months of 1972, efforts were continued to obtain new or increased contributions, an appeal was made by the Secretary-General in March and, by 30 June 1972, the estimated deficit had been reduced to about \$1.8 million. The cash forecast for the end of the financial year on 31 December 1972 showed, on the basis of current estimates of contributions and expenditure, that cash in hand would be no more than \$1.4 million, even if outstanding cash contributions of about half this amount due for the years 1970-1972 were received by that date. Cash in hand would thus again be less than one month's cash expenditure.

8. While the improvement in 1971 and 1972

has been encouraging, the Agency's finances are still very far from assured for the remainder of the mandate. The estimates for 1973 included in chapter II below show total expenditure of \$52.8 million, which, on the basis of 1972 income, will produce a deficit of \$3.6 million. This is more than the Agency's working capital can support; moreover, the Agency has not yet absorbed the full effects of inflation into the 1972 budget, and it is probable that the estimates for 1973 will have to be raised before the conclusion of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. If the Agency's services are to be maintained in full, in accordance with the desire of the UNRWA Advisory Commission and the General Assembly, income must be increased still further to keep pace with inescapable expenditure.

9. The possibilities for reducing expenditure on programmes were reviewed in the report presented to the General Assembly last year by the Working Group (A/8476 and Corr. 1, annex III) and no reduction in programmes was recommended by the Group. As regards "administrative expenses", there is nothing to add to what was said in paragraph 32 of the Commissioner-General's report for the period 1968-1969:²⁸ expenses of this nature are kept under constant scrutiny and the figures for "common costs" in paragraphs 237-243 demonstrate the Agency's success in enforcing economy and keeping down costs in this area of expenditure in a time of inflation. The small cadre of international staff has been pruned—the process has perhaps gone too far—and those who are a charge on UNRWA's budget, that is, in the main, those who are not UNESCO or WHO staff on non-reimbursable loan, now number only 83 out of a total Agency staff of over 14,000. The Commissioner-General shares his predecessor's view that there is little scope for economies on this item if the international character of the Agency is to be preserved, as is essential for its operation—and financing—and if he is to fulfil his responsibility to the General Assembly for direction, control and supervision. The only way of relieving the Agency of any substantial part of this expense would be by making it a charge on the regular budget of the United Nations.

²⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614).*

General operations

10. The Agency made further representations to, and had further discussions with, the Government of Lebanon concerning the occupation of Agency property by Palestinian organizations referred to in paragraphs 12 and 170 of the Commissioner-General's report for 1970-1971.²⁹ The Government assured the Agency of its own concern over the matter and kept the Agency informed of the progress of its efforts to find a solution. On 27 February, during an Israeli air attack, three buildings in Nabatieh camp that had been occupied were destroyed by rocket fire. In the same attack, six shelters were destroyed and an UNRWA school, clinic, and feeding centre and three shelters were damaged. As the attack occurred on Sunday, the school was closed, but two adult refugees were killed and a number injured. In April, a small store in Nahr-el-Bared camp was occupied for the first time, but evacuated promptly after representations had been made to the Government by the Agency. In May, one of the buildings occupied in 1969 in Rashidieh camp was returned to the Agency. The Agency understands that, on 2 June 1972, the Palestinian organizations informed the Government of their agreement to evacuate all Agency property, but difficulties arose in executing the agreement and no other buildings had been restored to Agency possession by 30 June. The Government assured the Agency, however, that the matter was still being pursued and that effect would be given to the agreement. Otherwise Agency operations were able to continue undisturbed.

11. In the Syrian Arab Republic, the replacement of tents in emergency camps by concrete block shelters continued and, by 30 June, 490 had been constructed. Progress was affected by delay in decisions on sites, including uncertainty about the future of Jaramana camp, which may have to be moved on grounds of town planning. Negotiations continued with the Syrian authorities over formalities required for the travel of international staff from Headquarters to the Syrian Arab Republic, which hampered the Agency in the exercise of its functions and an acceptable solution appeared to be in sight.

12. In Jordan, security operations by the Jordanian Army against Palestinian *fedayeen* in the Jerash

area interrupted operations in Jerash camp for a few days in July 1971: there was only minor damage to Agency property and no refugee deaths were reported. For the remainder of the year, the Agency's operations were undisturbed, except that a number of staff were detained, parts of three of the Agency's schools were temporarily occupied by the Army and security checks on vehicles caused some inconvenience. In July, the closure of the frontier between Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic interrupted delivery of Agency supplies from Beirut to Jordan for a period until special authorization for transport by road and/or rail could be obtained, and the dock strike in United States ports in 1971 caused delays in the delivery of flour. The Agency was nevertheless able to maintain distribution of rations, although stocks were reduced to critical levels. There was again some movement from the uplands to the Jordan valley but, at the end of the reporting year and until progress had been made with plans for economic development, the numbers involved seemed unlikely to have serious financial implications for the Agency. In particular, the reconstruction of houses in Karameh under a voluntary agency self-help scheme was halted pending Government reconsideration of the site.

13. In the West Bank, the Agency's services were maintained despite rising prices, which affected locally-purchased supplies and building works such as the extension of the Kalandia Vocational Training Centre. The current shortage of semi-skilled and unskilled labour for the agricultural and construction industries in Israel, and for the extensive Israeli building schemes in Jerusalem, has raised wage rates and the Agency has recently had difficulty in recruiting sanitation labour. The continued rise in the cost of living in the West Bank has led to further representations, now under examination, from Agency staff for an increase in cost of living allowances.

14. In Gaza, the year under report opened with what were described as major security operations by the Israeli Army, including the destruction at short notice of 7,729 rooms,³⁰ 4,471 of them Agency built, in Beach, Jabalia and Rafah camps and the displacement of 15,855 persons. These operations, as they affected the refugees, were the subject of a special report by the Commissioner-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413).

³⁰ On the basis of the most recent survey.

General transmitted by the Secretary-General to the members of the General Assembly on 17 September 1971 (A/8383). A supplement to this report (A/8383/Add.1) was transmitted to the members of the General Assembly on 23 November 1971. When notifying the Commissioner-General of their intention to demolish shelters at short notice before new shelters could be built (contrary to the practice that had been followed, after Agency representations, in the construction of security roads in 1969 and 1970 in other camps), the Israeli military authorities explained that they could not allow the current violence to continue, that over 80 persons, almost all Arabs, had been killed in a period of five months and that congestion and inadequate roads in the camps hampered the security forces in their task. They also said that alternative accommodation would be provided, some of it at El Arish in Sinai. As the scale and manner of the operations became clear, the Commissioner-General felt bound to protest and ask that they should be halted, not only because of the extent of the hardship and distress suffered by the refugees, but because destruction of shelters was much in excess of the alternative housing available. As regards housing at El Arish, most refugees did not wish to leave the Gaza Strip, fearing they might not be allowed to return and, even if all the housing at El Arish had been taken up, many hundreds of families would still have been homeless. In resolution 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971,³¹ the General Assembly called upon Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence and to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation. The Secretary-General was asked to report, after consulting with the Commissioner-General, on Israel's compliance with these provisions of the resolution. The position on 30 June 1972 was that no further demolitions had taken place in the course of security operations, the only demolitions being those referred to in paragraphs 173 and 174, but that no housing had been constructed to replace the demolished shelters. A detailed survey by the Agency, begun in February

and completed in May, found over 900 families still living in unsatisfactory conditions.

15. During the rest of the reporting year, the Gaza Strip was quieter than in previous years, there were fewer incidents, travel restrictions and curfews were latterly eased, and the Agency's operating problems were correspondingly reduced. There was also more employment, mostly, however, of a temporary and casual nature and in Israel, to which workers travelled daily from the Strip. The cost of living continued to rise towards the level of the West Bank, as the influence of the Israeli economy on the Gaza Strip became more marked. Agency staff in Gaza have for some time been demanding parity in salaries with staff on the West Bank and, since 1967, the unit staff cost has risen by 57 per cent in Gaza (compared with a rise of 22.5 per cent in Lebanon). The cost of equating Gaza salaries with West Bank salaries, even at present West Bank levels, would be over \$0.5 million.

16. In addition to the information given in chapter I below, it may be appropriate to refer briefly in this introduction to health, education and the Agency's relations with other organizations.

Health

17. The Agency maintained its comprehensive health care programme and continued to provide curative and preventive medical services, nursing care, environmental sanitation and nutritional support for eligible refugees.

18. With strict surveillance and preventive measures kept in force, cholera, which had invaded the region in 1970 and had affected a number of refugees, remained under complete control. A smallpox epidemic which entered the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic was immediately brought under control by vigorous Government measures, and corresponding measures taken by the Agency prevented any case from occurring among the refugee population. Other communicable diseases remained at about the previous year's levels, with some improvement particularly in poliomyelitis, trachoma and measles (in the last case attributable to immunization with donated vaccine).

19. Improvements in health facilities included the construction of a new health centre in the Syrian Arab Republic, where the Government also constructed two rooms in another health centre

³¹ For the text of this resolution see document no. 428 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971* (ed. note).

to accommodate a new clinical laboratory and a dental clinic. Plans were prepared, against special contributions, for the construction of new buildings for one health centre in Jordan, two in Gaza, the extension of one centre in the West Bank to provide better maternal and child care, and a rheumatic diseases clinic in Gaza. Improvements in environmental sanitation included the extension of public water supplies to three camps and agreement to extend to a camp in the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic, at Agency expense, a government sewerage scheme now under construction. The Agency's programme of milk distribution and supplementary feeding for vulnerable groups contributed to the lower incidence of under-weight children.

20. The twenty-fifth World Health Assembly, meeting at Geneva, again expressed its concern for the health situation among refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East, adopting resolution WHA 25.54 on 25 May 1972, the text of which is reproduced in annex II below.³²

21. The Commissioner-General would like to record his appreciation of the co-operation received by the Agency from Ministries of Health in all fields in carrying out its health programme.

Education

22. The UNRWA/UNESCO education programme operated smoothly in comparison with previous years, with few interruptions or other troubles, apart from the continued, prejudicial absence of some text-books in all fields except Lebanon (for details, see paragraphs 112 to 115 below). Enrolment rose to 245, 078 in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, there were 3,592 students in UNRWA/UNESCO training centres, and the total teaching staff approached 7,500.

23. A modest programme of school-building continued in order to ease to pressure of double-shifting and to avoid turning children away; the limiting factors were funds from special contributions and land. During the year, 248 additional classrooms were completed and 201 were under construction or in the design stage with funds committed on 30 June 1972. The Amman Training Centre was at last opened in December, after delays in construction, with 700 places for men and women; the capital cost was met from funds

provided by NEED and the recurrent cost in 1971-1972 from a special additional contribution for vocational training from the Government of the United States of America. An extension of the Kalandia Vocational Training Centre, financed both as to capital and, for five years, recurrent expenditure from the same United States contribution, was put in hand but not completed by 30 June. At Wadi Seer, the extension undertaken in 1969 continued to bear fruit in 1971-1972 with an increase of 116 places over the previous year.

24. A notable development in the work of the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education was closer co-operation with Ministries of Education in the region, a number of which are now interested in making use of the Institute's experience in in-service training. With financial assistance from UNICEF, an extension service has been introduced to acquaint Ministries with the Institute's methods and, on request, arrange seminars and briefing for government educationalists engaged in in-service training of teachers. During the year, seminars were held for educationalists from Jordan and the Sudan, visits to the Institute were paid by delegations from the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, and the Extension Services Officer visited also Yemen and Democratic Yemen. In June 1972, the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in response to a request by the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and bearing in mind the request of the Economic and Social Council for assistance to the Palestine refugees, approved a project under which the Institute would receive financial assistance amounting to \$480,000 over a period of two years from 1 July 1972 by means of a contract between UNDP and UNESCO.

Relations with other organs of the United Nations system

25. Collaboration with UNRWA by UNESCO and WHO has continued in the conduct of the education and health programmes, thus assuring the professional competence of the Agency's policy and activities in these two fields. Over the past three years, the number of UNESCO staff, including associate experts, made available to UNRWA without reimbursement from or through UNESCO, has increased from 21 to 28. UNESCO continued its efforts to increase contributions to the UNRWA/

³² See document no. 22 below (ed. note).

UNESCO education programme, co-ordinating them with the Working Group and the Agency, and many Governments which had responded to the Director-General's appeal of 1 January 1971 renewed their contributions.

26. Seven Governments responded to the WHO appeal for funds for the health programme, based on resolution WHA 24.32 of 18 May 1971.³³ The number of WHO staff made available to UNRWA without reimbursement has increased from four to five since 1969.

27. As mentioned in paragraph 24 above, UNDP approved a two-year project of financial assistance to the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education. UNICEF waived its annual fee for procurement services for the Agency and co-operated with the Institute of Education by financing a post of Extension Services Officer to enable the Institute to make the results of its experience available to Governments in the region at their request.

28. The Agency received a further payment in respect of its share of the net profits from the sale of the record entitled "World Star Festival", and co-operated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the sale in its area of operation of the new record entitled "Top Star Festival".

29. The Agency's accounts for 1971³⁴ have been audited by the United Nations Board of Auditors and their report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

Assistance from voluntary agencies and other non-governmental organizations

30. The Commissioner-General again acknowledges the generous assistance provided by a large number of voluntary agencies and other organizations and individuals. In the course of the year, a number of new donors added their support to those regularly contributing funds and supplies for the Agency's programmes. Many of these contributors follow the operation of the Agency's programmes closely through correspondence and visits to the field, with benefit to the Agency's work.

31. The projects financed by these contributions are noted in the appropriate sections of the present report. The main organizations were: Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); Canadian Save the Children Fund; the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the Finnish Refugee Council; the French Red Cross; the Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO) of New Zealand; the Norwegian Refugee Council; the Gulbenkian Foundation; the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Swedish Free Church Aid; Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Bärnen); Swiss Aid Caritas; OXFAM of the United Kingdom; American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Federation of Business and Professional Women; Zonta International; a group of Japanese business organizations; Catholic Relief Services; the Pontifical Mission for Palestine and the Lutheran World Federation. Contributions made direct to UNRWA from non-governmental sources are recorded in table 20 of annex I.

32. The Commissioner-General also wishes to pay tribute to the devoted service rendered to the refugees by the voluntary agencies based in the area of the Agency's operation (see table 17 of annex I).

Summary and conclusion

33. During the three-year period of the extension of its mandate, which ended on 30 June 1972, the Agency was beset by operating difficulties that were a consequence of the events of 1967 and the political environment fostered by perpetuation of the *status quo post-June 1967*. The Palestine refugees were in ferment: there were sporadic violence and security problems; at its height in 1969-1970, political tension exacerbated staff and student problems. At the same time, the Agency's financial crisis came to a head, with income rising slowly, expenditure rising rapidly and inexorably under demographic and inflationary pressure, and the working capital dwindling to the precarious point of month-to-month financing. The Agency nevertheless avoided a breakdown in operations, though the strain was great at times, and the international community, once it was aware of the gravity of the financial crisis and of what was at stake, responded in a most encouraging way. The Commissioner-General wishes to express his gratitude to Member States and to the organiza-

³³ Printed as document no. 437 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971* (ed. note).

³⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 7C (A/8707/Add.3).*

tions, intergovernmental and non-governmental, and individuals, who demonstrated their concern that the Palestine refugees should continue to benefit from United Nations programmes and their confidence in the Agency as the instrument for administering these programmes.

34. Although the General Assembly has never laid on the Commissioner-General the duty of finding the funds necessary for the Agency's programmes, it is inevitable that the Agency's income should be one of his principal preoccupations and that he should do whatever he can to ensure that it is adequate for the Agency's task. During recent years, however, a quite disproportionate amount of his time and that of senior members of his staff has had to be devoted to the financial crisis in all its aspects, from the day-to-day husbanding of resources and the preparation of contingency plans for reductions to what can only be called emergency fund-raising. As a result, the Agency's management have been distracted from what should be their normal, proper, task of directing and supervising the Agency's operations with a view to improving not merely the efficiency of the operations, but the quality of the programmes themselves by the introduction of better procedures and the redeployment of resources to meet changing needs. It is therefore important, unless a just solution to the Palestine refugee problem emerges within the next few months, that some effective means of maintaining the improvement in income should be devised and the Agency's senior staff enabled to devote more attention to their primary task.

4

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine³⁵

September 29, 1972

1. In paragraph 4 of resolution 2792 A (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, the General Assembly noted

³⁵ U.N. doc. no. A/8830, p. 2.

with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon to the Assembly as appropriate, but not later than 1 October 1972. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. In its twenty-fourth³⁶ and twenty-fifth³⁷ reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to earlier requests by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2052 (XX) and 2154 (XXI) in connexion with the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. Far from there having been any evidence of such changes, the events which had occurred in 1967 had further complicated an already very complex problem.

3. Although various developments have taken place since the submission of the Commission's last report, the situation described in that report remains essentially unchanged as regards the circumstances governing the possibilities open to the Commission. The Commission, while regretting that it has not been in a position to carry forward its work, nevertheless remains determined to resume its endeavours as soon as this is possible. It wishes to note that its ability to do so will depend not only on an amelioration of the situation but also on the willingness of the parties to co-operate with it.

³⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/6451. [This and the following footnote are part of the report.]

³⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 34, document A/6846.

Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

5

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories³⁸

October 9, 1972

CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
Letter of transmittal	[not published here]
INTRODUCTION	1-11
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	12-23
II. MANDATE	24-25
III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE	26-82
A. Allegations of annexation and settlement	26-38
B. Allegations of transfer of population and expropriation of property	39-45
C. Allegations of demolition of houses	46-50
D. Allegations of deportation	51-56
E. Allegations of the denial of the right to return	57-61
F. Allegations of ill-treatment whilst under detention	62-73
G. Cumulative effect of measures referred to in sections A to F	74-78
H. Other allegations	79-82
IV. CONCLUSIONS	83-99
V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT	100

ANNEXES

[not published here]

³⁸ U.N. doc. no. A/8828; the note by the Secretary-General, letter of transmittal and annexes have been omitted.

INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this introduction is to trace briefly the history of the Special Committee and to that extent it reproduces what has been stated in its previous reports. The Special Committee was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII), adopted at its 1748th plenary meeting on 19 December 1968. In that resolution, the General Assembly referred to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the right of everyone to return to his country. It recalled Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, Commission on Human Rights resolution 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968, in which the Government of Israel was called upon, *inter alia*, to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the area of military operations at the outbreak of hostilities. The General Assembly recalled the telegram despatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 March 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to desist from actions destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in the occupied territories. In addition, the Assembly recalled Security Council resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, in which the Council expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and deplored the delay in the implementation of Council resolution 237 (1967). The General Assembly also noted resolution 1 on respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968 in which the Conference, *inter alia*, expressed grave concern at the violation of human rights in the occupied territories, drew the attention of the Government of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories, called upon the Government of Israel to desist from acts of destroying homes of Arab civilians in the occupied territories and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and affirmed the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who had fled their homes as a result of the outbreak of hostilities to return home, resume their normal

life, recover their property and homes and rejoin their families, according to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By that resolution, the General Assembly decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter, and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task. The Special Committee's mandate, namely to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, was established in that resolution.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.

3. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic appointed Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, to represent Somalia on the Special Committee. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H.S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, to represent Sri Lanka on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Dr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and member of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the representative of Yugoslavia on the Special Committee. On 24 June 1971, the Government of Somalia Democratic Republic informed the Secretary-General that Mr. Hussein Nur-Elmi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, had been appointed to act instead of Mr. A.A. Farah on the Special Committee. Ambassador Nur-Elmi has continued to function in that capacity since that date.

4. The General Assembly in resolution 2546 (XXIV), adopted at its 1829th plenary meeting on 11 December 1969, reaffirmed its resolutions relating to the violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel; expressed its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of

human rights in those territories; and condemned such policies and practices as collective and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel. The General Assembly urgently called upon the Government of Israel:

to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in the occupied territories and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations.

The Assembly requested the Special Committee to take cognizance of the provisions of resolution 2546 (XXIV).

5. In pursuance of its mandate, and taking cognizance of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2546 (XXIV) as directed by the Assembly, the Special Committee in 1970 conducted an investigation of the allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Hearings were held by the Special Committee in London, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Geneva and New York, and the evidence of persons who claimed to have first-hand experience of such violations of human rights was recorded. The Special Committee also received information from the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, which appear as annex V to its first report (A/8089). The evidence presented to the Special Committee in addition included documentary evidence in the form of newspaper articles by journalists, published statements of responsible representatives of the Government of Israel, published reports, including reports of surveys such as those conducted by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the American University of Beirut, and of investigations such as those undertaken by Amnesty International, the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers; and graphic evidence in the form of films on the human rights of the population of occupied territories.

6. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee presented its first report³⁹ to the Secretary-General

in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII). The Secretary-General made the report available to the General Assembly. In accordance with the recommendation of its General Committee the General Assembly decided to refer it to the Special Political Committee. The report was discussed in that Committee at its 744th-751st meetings from 7 to 11 December 1970 (A/SPC/SR.744-751). On 15 December 1970, at its 1931st plenary meeting, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee (A/8237) and adopted resolution 2727 (XXV). In this resolution, the General Assembly, while renewing the mandate of the Special Committee, called upon the Government of Israel to implement the recommendations of the Special Committee embodied in its report and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations. The General Assembly asked the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work.

7. The Special Committee's programme in 1971 consisted of a series of hearings, conducted from 7 to 16 July 1971 in Amman and Beirut, where further evidence relevant to its mandate was recorded. In addition to the oral testimony recorded at these hearings, the Special Committee had before it information from Governments, information communicated to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) existing in publications of the ICRC and information contained in Israeli newspapers, in the reports of the Institute for Palestine Studies and the Palestine Research Centre, as well as information contained in memoranda presented to the Special Committee in the course of its visit to Amman and Beirut.

8. On 17 September 1971 the Special Committee presented its second report to the Secretary-General (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2), prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV).⁴⁰

of the report.] Printed as document no. 317 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970* (ed. note).

³⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth session*, document A/8089. [This and the following footnotes are part

⁴⁰ This report (excl. the annexes) is printed as document no. 409 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971* (ed. note).

9. In that report, the Special Committee stated that since it had been unable to obtain the permission of the Government of Israel to visit the occupied territories, it had been obliged once again to pay particular attention to official pronouncements by members of the Israeli Government and other Israeli leaders concerning Israeli practices in the occupied territories.

10. On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee presented a supplementary report to the Secretary-General containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report (A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2).⁴¹

11. The Secretary-General made these reports available to the General Assembly. They were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings from 13 to 16 December 1971 (A/SPC/SR.798-803). On 20 December 1971, at its 2027th plenary meeting, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee (A/8630) and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI). In that resolution, the General Assembly called upon the Government of Israel to permit all persons who had fled the occupied territories or who had been deported or expelled therefrom to return to their homes. The General Assembly reaffirmed that all measures taken by Israel to settle the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem were completely null and void. The General Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue its work and to consult as appropriate with the ICRC. It called upon the Government of Israel to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and urged it to co-operate with the Special Committee and to facilitate its entry into the occupied territories in order to enable it to perform the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly. The Assembly requested all States parties to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respect and fulfil its obligations under that Convention. In the same resolution the Assembly called upon Israel to rescind all measures and to desist from all policies and practices which infringed on the rights of the population of the

occupied territories. The Assembly requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

12. The Special Committee continued to follow developments in the occupied territories through the Israeli press and other sections of the foreign press, as well as through press reports of statements by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. In addition, the Special Committee took note of information contained in United Nations documents, some of which contained the text of letters from the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Special Committee also took note of the information communicated to it by the ICRC and contained in publications of the ICRC.

13. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure reproduced in annex III of its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089).

14. The Special Committee had a series of informal meetings at United Nations Headquarters in New York in June 1972 to examine the information that it had before it and to decide whether to undertake another field mission for the purpose of hearing further evidence. The Special Committee did not consider it necessary at that stage to undertake another field mission. It decided therefore to hold meetings in Geneva during the period 21 August to 1 September 1972 to consider and adopt a report based on information received after 10 December 1971, the date of the adoption of its last report to the Secretary-General (A/8389/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2).

15. On 12 June 1972, the Special Committee addressed letters to the Secretary-General and to the ICRC.

16. In the letter to the Secretary-General, the Special Committee stated:

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories will be meeting in August to prepare its report as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2851 (XXVI) of December 1971.

It would be most helpful to the Special Committee, in the preparation of its report, if you could communicate to it any information that is available as a consequence

⁴¹ This report (excl. the annexes) is printed as document no. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971* (ed. note).

of paragraphs 7 and 9 of this resolution, by which the General Assembly,

‘[Urged] the Government of Israel to co-operate with the Special Committee and to facilitate its entry into the occupied territories in order to enable it to perform the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly;

‘[Requested] all States parties to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects and fulfils its obligations under that Convention.’

17. On 20 June 1972 the Secretary-General replied as follows:

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 12 June 1972 requesting on behalf of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories the communication of any information that might be available as a consequence of paragraphs 7 and 9 of General Assembly resolution 2851 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971.

I wish to inform you that on 22 December 1971, my predecessor transmitted resolution 2851 (XXVI) of the General Assembly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, drawing his attention in particular to paragraphs 5 and 7 of that resolution. No reply to this communication has been received to date.

I have no information on the response to the request which the General Assembly addressed to all States parties to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 in paragraph 9 of its resolution.

18. In the letter to the ICRC, the Chairman of the Special Committee stated:

I have the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 2851 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 entitled Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, copy attached. By paragraph 6 of this resolution, the Assembly has requested the Special Committee to consult as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Special Committee plans to hold a series of meetings from 21 August to 1 September 1972 in Geneva to adopt its report under the same resolution 2851 (XXVI). The Committee would take this opportunity to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct consultations with it on the current state of the implementation of the Geneva Conventions in the Israeli occupied territories.

The Special Committee considers it a matter of urgent necessity to secure the effective implementation of the Geneva Conventions in the occupied territories. As the ICRC has declared itself ready to assume all the functions envisaged for Protecting Powers in the Geneva Conventions, the Special Committee would wish to consult with

the ICRC as to whether the ICRC intends to or agrees in principle to apply this declaration to the Israeli-held territories and, if so, how the humanitarian functions referred to by the ICRC in its declaration could best be discharged.

The Special Committee thanks the ICRC for making available to it on a regular basis the information notes issued periodically by the ICRC. These notes have served as an additional source of information and have helped the Special Committee to maintain a fairly accurate impression of developments in the Israeli-occupied territories.

‘I should like on behalf of the Special Committee to express our appreciation of the co-operation extended to us by the ICRC.’

19. On 11 July 1972, the ICRC replied as follows:

I have the honour, on behalf of the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 12 June 1972, in which you drew our attention to the text of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2851 (XXVI).

The ICRC information bulletins, which you receive regularly, and the report on activities for the year 1971, which has just been published show that our organization has, as in the past, been devoting its efforts to ensuring the implementation of the four Geneva Conventions by the parties to the conflict in the Middle East. It is apparent from this information that ICRC is already assuming in practice some of the tasks incumbent upon the substitute for the Protecting Power under the terms of the fourth Convention. ICRC would, of course, welcome any initiative which would result in the more effective implementation of the Geneva Conventions.

It is correct, as you point out in your letter, that ICRC has declared itself ready, in the event of conflict, to assume the functions devolving upon the Protecting Power under the Geneva Conventions. This position was stated at the first session, in 1971, of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. It was reiterated in a statement made by the President of ICRC himself at the second session of that Conference, held in Geneva from 3 May to 2 June 1972. You will find enclosed the text of that statement.

With regard to the situation in the Middle East, ICRC has offered its services to the Governments concerned on a number of occasions and in various forms since 1967, and is still engaged in consultations with them on the subject. Naturally, it would not be advisable to give further details about those consultations here.

If you, Sir, alone or together with the members of your Committee, wished to have a private conversation on these questions with ICRC representatives, we would be pleased to invite you to the Headquarters of our organization during one of your forthcoming visits to Geneva.

20. On behalf of the Special Committee a further communication was addressed to the ICRC on 24 August as follows:

I have the honour, on behalf of the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 11 July 1972 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2851 (XXVI).

The Special Committee has considered your letter at its current series of meetings and wishes to express its appreciation for the information contained therein. In particular, the Special Committee welcomes your acceptance of the Committee's invitation to the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct consultations with it on the current state of the implementation of the Geneva Conventions in the Israeli-occupied territories, formulated in its letter of 12 June 1972. The Special Committee wishes to thank the ICRC for its kind invitation to conduct private consultations with representatives of the ICRC at its Headquarters. The Special Committee has asked me to communicate to you its suggestion that, in accordance with the practice of all special committees of the General Assembly, these private consultations be held at the United Nations Office in Geneva at your convenience prior to 30 August 1972, when the Special Committee is scheduled to conclude its current series of meetings.

21. To this communication the ICRC sent the following reply on 30 August 1972:

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of 24 August 1972 which you have addressed to us on behalf of the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

We are grateful to know that the Special Committee has considered our letter of 11 July 1972, and we have noted the Special Committee's suggestion that private consultations be held at the United Nations Office in Geneva rather than at ICRC Headquarters as originally proposed in our letter.

The matter has received careful consideration and I have been asked to communicate to you that the ICRC, while appreciating the wish of the Special Committee not to depart from normal practice, would still prefer that such consultations be held at its Headquarters. If it were agreeable to the Special Committee these talks might of course be held in a mutually agreed place which would neither be on United Nations nor ICRC grounds.

We take this occasion to inform you that so far as the substance of issues considered by the Special Committee is concerned, the contents of our letter of 11 July and its attachments remain valid. There is no new element at

this stage which would modify the situation as described in our earlier communication.

The Special Committee considered this exchange of correspondence at its meetings held in Geneva from 21 August to 1 September 1972 and found the ICRC's suggestion regarding the venue for this private conversation unacceptable as it was inconsistent with the Special Committee's established practice and procedure. Moreover, as the ICRC itself felt that there was "no new element at that stage which would modify the situation as described in [their] earlier communication," the Special Committee was of opinion that, irrespective of its procedural objection, an informal meeting, wherever convened, would serve very little purpose.

22. With regard to the Secretary-General's reply to the Special Committee's request for information available as a consequence of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2851 (XXVI), in which he indicated that, as of 20 June 1972 he had received no reply from the Government of Israel to his communication, the Special Committee noted with regret that the Government of Israel persisted in its refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee or to comply with the General Assembly's request to facilitate entry into the occupied territories in order to enable the Special Committee to perform the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

23. In connexion with paragraph 9 of resolution 2851 (XXVI), the Special Committee decided on 23 August 1972 to request the Secretary-General to send a note verbale to the States parties to the fourth Geneva Convention seeking information on the action taken by them in accordance with the request addressed to them by the General Assembly, "to do their utmost to ensure that Israel fulfils its obligations under that Convention".

II. MANDATE

24. The Special Committee had given its interpretation of its mandate in its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089, chapter II). In its second report and the supplementary report the Special Committee reiterated this interpretation and continued to exercise its functions according to that interpretation (A/8389, chapter II; A/8389/Add.1, paragraph 8). Once again, the Special Committee adheres to this interpretation of its mandate whereby the Special Committee considers

that the General Assembly requested it to investigate practices and policies of the Government of Israel affecting human rights—namely, those which the Security Council referred to as “essential and inalienable” in its resolution 237 (1967) and those embodied in certain instruments of international law, such as the third and fourth Geneva Conventions—of the population of those territories that Israel occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

25. As it has constantly indicated in its reports to the Secretary-General, the Special Committee considers its mandate to be strictly a humanitarian one and has consistently maintained this approach to its task. As the Special Committee indicated to the Secretary-General in the letter of transmittal of its second report (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2), it did not allow itself to be deterred from discharging what it considered to be an essentially humanitarian duty and had consciously sought to separate the humanitarian aspects of the problem, which are its primary concern, from the political issues involved. The proper execution of its mandate by the Special Committee called for accurate fact-finding and an examination of those facts in the context of the applicable international humanitarian law. The Government of Israel had denied this Committee the opportunity of examining for itself the situation of the civilian population in the occupied territories. The Special Committee, therefore, has had to rely on extensive evidence from eyewitnesses and others, as well as on documentary evidence, in order to keep abreast of developments in the territories. By this means, the Special Committee has been able to acquire a reasonably accurate picture of the situation in the occupied territories.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

A. *Allegations of annexation and settlement*

26. In its latest report, the Special Committee reiterated its conviction that it was the policy of the Government of Israel to annex and settle the occupied territories (A/8389/Add.1, para. 11). In its report the Special Committee had cited a number of facts that tended to support this conclusion (A/8389, para. 47), including express pronouncements by Israeli Ministers and leaders in which that policy, in the view of the Special Committee, was made manifest. That conviction

was further strengthened by the evidence cited by the Special Committee in its supplementary report of 10 December 1971 (A/8389/Add.1, chapter 1), which included a statement by the Prime Minister of Israel, who was quoted in the Israeli press on 10 October 1971, as having stated:

Our borders are fixed by the people who live along them. If we retreat, the borders will retreat with us. The danger is then that somebody else will fix the boundaries for us.

This statement is an unequivocal rejection of established and generally recognized principles of international law governing the relations of States, including the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is also a definite repudiation of the fundamental obligations arising out of the fourth Geneva Convention.

27. In its supplementary report, the Special Committee cited further reports that had become available to it concerning the establishment of settlements by Israel in the occupied territories (A/8389/Add.1, para. 12) which supplemented information available in its second report (A/8389, para. 48 (e)).

28. Subsequent to its submission of the supplementary report, further evidence has come to the notice of the Special Committee concerning allegations of annexation and settlement. The Special Committee cites the following by way of example:

(a) Reports appearing regularly in the Israeli press indicating the continued existence of a “Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the Territories”. The Special Committee had stated in its second report that the very existence of such a Committee headed by an official of Ministerial rank—Mr. Israel Galili, Minister without Portfolio—showed, beyond doubt, that it is the policy of the Government of Israel to settle the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 (A/8389, para. 48 (a)).

(b) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1972 quoting Defence Minister Moshe Dayan as having stated in the Knesset on 16 May 1972 that 39 settlements had been established in the occupied territories since the June 1967 hostilities. Of these 39 settlements, 20 were permanent civilian settlements and the other 19 were army outposts, 6 of which had subsequently been declared civilian settlements.

(c) The statement by Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili (Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for the Settlement of the Occupied Territories) made in the Knesset on 19 July 1972, as reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 20 July 1972, that the Government of Israel had put no area out of bounds to Jewish settlement. The report quotes the Minister as stating that the Government had taken a decision to establish settlements in the Jordan valley, including the Akraba area (see para. 30 (b) below). The report adds that the Minister stated that the only limitations on Jewish settlement in the occupied territories were moral ones since Israel through its history had always paid paramount attention to the sensibilities and needs of the local inhabitants. The same report quoted Mr. Galili as stating that, since the June 1967 hostilities, 15 settlements had been established in the Golan Heights, another 15 in the West Bank and 14 more in Gaza and Sinai, together with another settlement established on 3 July 1972 in the Jordan valley. The report quoted Minister Galili as stating that settlement policy "is not dictated by security, but by historical right as well—if not more so". The same report gives a list of Jewish settlements that have been established since the June 1967 hostilities as follows:

Golan Heights: Ramat Shalom, Snir, Elrom, Merom Golan, Ein Zivan, Nahal Geshur, Ramat Magshimim, Nahal Al, Nahal Golan, Mevo Hama, Neot Golan, Giv'at Yoav, Merkaz Bnei Yheuda, Ginat, Ramot.

West Bank: Mehola, Argaman, Hamra, Nahal Massua, Ma'ale Efraim, Nahal Gilgal, Nahal Na'aran, Nahal Kaliya, Mitzpe Shalem, Kfar Etzion, Rosh Tzurim, Merkaz Alon Shvut, Mevo Horon, Kiryat Arba, Bik'on.

Gaza Strip and Sinai: Nahal Netzarim, Nahal Kfar Darom, Sadot, Dikla, Nahal Sinai, Nahal Yam, Neot Hakikar, Ein Hatzeva, Nahal Tzofar, Nahal Ketura, Neviot, Di-Zahav, Ophira (Sharm el-Sheikh) and Nahal Morag.

The report is accompanied by a map showing the settlements established in the occupied territories since the hostilities of June 1967. This map is produced in annex I to this report. As a matter of interest it may be noted that in an official communication to the Secretary-General from the Government of Syria dated 20 September 1969, published as documents S/9459 and A/7689, the Government of Syria had accused the Government

of Israel of establishing the following settlements in the occupied territories:

<i>Name of settlement</i>	<i>Former name</i>	<i>Date of establishment</i>
Shenir	Banias	14 August 1967
Golan	Kuneitra	5 November 1967
Geishur	Tel el-Faras	10 March 1968
El-'Al	El-'Al	5 May 1968
Ezz Ed-Dine	Mazra'et	7 July 1968
	Ezz Ed-Dine	
Fiq	Fiq	8 August 1968
Yoab	Kafar Hareb	November 1968
Gibin	Jibin	28 December 1968
Ein Zivan	Ein Ziwan	29 December 1968
Shalom	Jabat a Az-Zeit	5 May 1969

(d) The statement made by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, reported in *Maariv* on 5 June 1972, according to which, in the event of negotiations aimed towards a settlement, Israel would be prepared to negotiate on 98 per cent of the occupied territories—except East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sharm el-Sheikh, and the Gaza Strip. The statement was made in the course of an interview given by the Minister to a reporter of the United Press International News Agency.

(e) Two reports appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 25 May and 5 June 1972 respectively, according to which Defence Minister Moshe Dayan suggested that planning should take place on a long-term (10–15 year) basis. According to the report appearing on 5 June 1972, the Defence Minister was addressing the Municipal Council of Hebron and his suggestion was directed to it. The report states that the Defence Minister's remark on long-term development projects "drew startled looks from the City Fathers, who appeared to have taken the statement as a hint that the status of the territory is unlikely to change in that period". The report continued, "'I am serious', Mr. Dayan stressed, while advising the audience to free themselves of illusions". In the report appearing on 25 May 1972, the Defence Minister was addressing the Graduation Ceremony of the Feinberg Graduate School of the Weizmann Institute and his statement was made in the context of his comments on the likelihood of a peace settlement being reached in the foreseeable future.

29. In its previous reports the Special Committee referred to particular areas where, according to the evidence, settlements were being established. The

Special Committee has received considerable evidence concerning settlements in other parts of the occupied territories. This evidence shows that new settlements are being established and existing ones are being made permanent. The reports mentioned in the following paragraphs are cited by way of illustration.

30. The following reports concern settlements in the West Bank:

(a) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 25 May 1972 announcing a settlement for the Latrun area east of the village of Beit Nuba. In this connexion the Special Committee recalls that in its first report, it had received evidence showing that the three villages of Yalu, Beit Nuba and Emwas had been completely razed to the ground and their inhabitants dispersed, that that destruction was not due to military requirements but that, in the terms of the commentary on the fourth Geneva Convention (article 53), Israel had had "unscrupulous recourse to military necessity in carrying out this wanton destruction" (A/8089, paras. 126 and 131). The Special Committee finds that this is in clear contravention of article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention as interpreted in the commentary on that Convention. The Special Committee notes that these villages have not been rebuilt and that, according to the report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 25 May 1972 the Government of Israel is planning settlements in that very area. In this connexion, the Special Committee recalls that in its second report, it had noted evidence according to which a settlement which had been founded by the Jewish Agencies Settlement Department near Latrun was becoming permanent (A/8389, para. 48 (d) (iii)). The Special Committee noted also a report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 February 1972 of a statement made in the Knesset by Agriculture Minister Haim Gvati according to which the Israeli Land Authority had, since the June 1967 hostilities, spent over IL 900,000 (approximately \$214,000) in the purchase of land around Jerusalem and in the Latrun salient "for public use".

(b) Reports appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 7, 10, 18 and 19 July 1972 and in *Ma'ariv* on 14 July 1972. According to these reports the villagers of Akraba (near the Jordan River) had been prohibited from using a certain area of land (reports differ as to the exact area, some giving 500 and other 5,000 dunams [1 dunam = 1/4 acre = 1,000 sq.

metres, approximately]) when this area was declared a security zone following border clashes with guerrillas in 1968. According to the report in the *Jerusalem Post* of 7 July 1972, the villagers had returned to cultivating the land in late 1971 and a controversy arose when their crops were sprayed by a plane with a chemical that destroyed them in June-July 1972. The same report states that this was reportedly done on orders issued by military officers who had failed to consult their superiors before taking the measure. The *Jerusalem Post* of 18 July 1972 reported a statement by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in the Knesset to the effect that the military authorities were to review the status of closed areas in the West Bank, including the lands of the village of Akraba. In the same statement Minister Dayan is quoted as stating that no land had been taken away from Akraba. The *Jerusalem Post* of 19 July 1972 reported Agriculture Minister Haim Gvati as having stated in the Knesset that "no decision has been taken so far on a plan to establish a settlement on lands of Akraba village". The report quotes the Minister as stating that an official from the Israel Land Administration had met with the villagers from Akraba with the purpose of trying to exchange their lands for lands of absentees in the neighbourhood. The report adds that the Minister denied the implied allegation that this official had told the villagers that their crops had been destroyed by spraying so as to pressure them into selling their land. These incidents are confirmed in the report appearing in *Ma'ariv* on 14 July 1972.

31. The Special Committee notes that the following facts emerge clearly from these reports:

(a) That the crops of the villagers of Akraba were destroyed some time in June-July 1972 by chemical spraying, on the pretext that those crops were planted on land which was a security area, the security status of which was stated to be subject to review within a few weeks after spraying;

(b) That officials of the Israel Land Administration were making attempts to secure ownership of the land belonging to the villagers of Akraba by offering them in exchange land belonging to absentee owners.

32. Continuing its examination of evidence relating to settlements in the West Bank, the Special Committee in its supplementary report (A/8389/Add.1, paras. 12 (c)-(15) made reference to an

announcement by the Housing Ministry of the Government of Israel of a master plan for Hebron to provide accommodation for 900 Jewish families. That statement was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 28 September 1971. The Special Committee had also referred to an exchange of correspondence which had taken place in 1968 when the first Israelis had moved into Hebron. At that stage, in reply to the complaint of the Government of Jordan, the Government of Israel had stated that the complaint:

magnified and distorted the matter in question. ... A small group of pious Jews and their families have on their own spontaneous initiative taken up residence in Hebron, a town with venerable Jewish historical and religious associations.

There is no good reason why their neighbours should not live on peaceful and amicable terms with them and so help to heal the tragic memories of the massacre of Hebron Jews in 1929.

33. In addition to the evidence cited in its previous reports by the Special Committee, further evidence has since become available on developments concerning this settlement established in Hebron, known as Kiryat Arba. This evidence refutes the Government of Israel's attempt to dismiss the Jordanian complaint as "magnified and distorted" and to seek to explain a serious violation of human rights as a spontaneous act of piety on the part of a group of Jewish families. The following reports are cited by way of illustration:

(a) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 February 1972 quoting a statement in the Knesset by Housing Minister Zev Sharef according to which planning had already been completed for another 1,000 apartments in Kiryat Arba in Hebron. The report gives an estimate of IL 18 million (approximately \$4.3 million) as the cost of the project.

(b) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* of 29 May announcing that the Israeli Cabinet had decided "in principle" to build another 200 apartments in Hebron, that 250 apartments had already been completed and that there existed on paper plans for a total of 1,000 apartments.

(c) The report appearing in *Haaretz* of 5 June 1972 according to which the Mayor of Hebron Sheikh Ja'abari had asked Defence Minister Moshe Dayan to stop further building in Hebron of apartments meant exclusively for Israeli Jews.

(d) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 5 June 1972 which states:

In reply to Sheikh Ja'abari's expressions of concern over plans to enlarge the nearby Jewish settlement in Kiryat Arba, Mr. Dayan promised that the Israelis would in no way confront or compete with their Arab neighbours. He stressed that an Israeli settlement in the area would not be held at the expense of the local Arabs, adding that no acre of land would be acquired without proper compensation. 'Let anyone who believes he has been deprived of such compensation step forward and his claim will be settled'.

(e) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 16 June 1972 according to which Absorption Minister Natan Peled was examining the possibility of directing new immigrants from the Soviet Union and from Western countries to the settlement at Hebron.

(f) The report appearing in *Haaretz* on 12 July 1972 and the *Jerusalem Post* on 13 June 1972 announcing the establishment of a Jewish hotel in Hebron.

(g) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 July 1972 announcing the completion of construction of the 200 new apartments in Hebron, referred to in subparagraph (b).

34. In addition to the evidence referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, the Special Committee has received further allegations of annexation and settlement of other areas of the West Bank. The Secretary-General has brought to the notice of the Special Committee a letter dated 10 August 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan contained in document A/8355-S/10760, according to which the Government of Israel continues to take measures in pursuance of its declared policy of annexing occupied Jerusalem.

35. The following reports concern settlements in the Golan Heights:

(a) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 May 1972 according to which one of the paramilitary settlements, Nahal Golan, had become a civilian settlement.

(b) The report appearing on 10 July 1972 in the *Jerusalem Post* announcing the opening of an industrial settlement in the Golan Heights in August 1972 and the planning of another one.

(c) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 27 January 1972 that residents of the Golan Heights were being required to pay taxes to the Israeli Government. The report states that, apart

from the residents of occupied Jerusalem, this is the first time that residents in the rest of the occupied territories are being taxed under Israeli law and this, according to the report, is "because East Jerusalem has been legally incorporated into the State of Israel". The Special Committee does not recognize the incorporation of East Jerusalem with the State of Israel as having any validity under international law. The report adds that in other occupied territories the residents are required to pay their taxes according to Jordanian law on the West Bank and Egyptian military law in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, which the Special Committee considers to be in strict accordance with the fourth Geneva Convention.

(d) The report in the *Jerusalem Post* of 15 March 1972 of the dedication of a new settlement in the Golan Heights, where, according to the report, Housing Minister, Zev Sharef, speaking at the dedication ceremony, "assured the settlers that the Golan would remain in Israel's hands".

36. The Special Committee has also taken note of the letters dated 5 January and 20 June 1972 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations contained in documents A/8651-S/10495 and A/8699-S/10704 respectively, furnishing evidence of the avowed policy of the Government of Israel to annex the Golan Heights. The Special Committee has noted in particular that in the letter of 20 June 1972 referred to above the Permanent Representative of Syria cites as evidence certain publications and includes excerpts from the *Reports for the Period January 1968-September 1971 submitted to the Twenty-eighth Zionist Congress in Jerusalem*, January 1972, issued by the Executive of the World Zionist Organization in December 1971. These excerpts give details of Israeli settlement policy in general, including the Golan Heights.

37. The following reports concern settlements in the Gaza Strip and Sinai:

(a) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 15 December 1971 that work had begun on preparations for a new settlement in an area south of Gaza. The report states that this settlement was to be the second Israeli settlement in the Gaza Strip.

(b) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 28 December 1971 of a statement by the Chairman of the Jewish National Fund, Mr. Y. Tsur, according to whom eight to 10 settlements were

planned for the area between Gaza and El Arish, to provide a protective line between the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

(c) The report of the *Jerusalem Post* on 19 January 1972 on a visit by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan to the three Nahal settlements in Sinai. The report adds that at two of these settlements, namely Nahal Sinai and Dikla, the topics discussed included the possibility of converting the settlements to civilian settlements.

(d) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 16 June 1972 announcing the Government of Israel's decision that the paramilitary settlement at Nahal Sinai referred to in the preceding subparagraph was to become a civilian settlement.

(e) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 July 1972 of a statement by the Prime Minister of Israel according to which 300 families had been registered for settlement in Sharm el-Sheikh and that 100 houses were under construction.

38. The Special Committee, basing itself on the evidence that has been referred to in the preceding paragraphs, has no hesitation in stating that its findings as formulated in its previous reports to the effect that it is the policy of the Government of Israel to settle the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967, have been confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt. The Special Committee agrees that the existence of such a policy of annexation—in direct violation of article 47 of the fourth Geneva Convention—has been established:

(a) By the statements of Israeli Ministers and leaders such as those referred to in paragraph 27 above; and

(b) By the fact that these statements are corroborated by undisputed evidence, showing that the policy enumerated in these statements is being implemented.

B. *Allegations of transfer of population and expropriation of property*

39. In its three reports to date, the Special Committee has analysed evidence relating to allegations of transfer of population and expropriation of property (A/8089, paras. 61 *et seq.*, 75 *et seq.*, and 123 *et seq.*; A/8389, para. 48 (g) and (h); A/8389/Add.1, paras. 17 *et seq.*).

40. In its supplementary report, the Special

Committee referred to the mass transfer of population that took place in Gaza in August 1971 (A/8389/Add.1, paras. 17–20). The following information, contained in the annual report of the ICRC for 1971,⁴² which has since become available, is pertinent:

On 21 July, the ICRC delegation in Gaza was informed by refugees that the Israeli army the day before had started to transfer refugee families to El Arish or to unoccupied camps on the West Bank of the Jordan. At the same time, in the Jabalia, Shatti and Rafah camps, work had started on the destruction of some of the shelters and on the laying of new avenues in order to reduce the camp population and facilitate supervision.

The occupation authorities, whom the ICRC delegates immediately contacted, ascribed the measures adopted to overriding security needs. They explained, however, that arrangements had been made to rehouse and compensate the persons displaced.

By the end of August, more than 14,700 persons had been affected by those measures. Most refugees were dissatisfied with their new housing and before long returned to Gaza. Relatives or friends provided shelter, usually in the camps. By the end of the year, some 200 families were staying on at El Arish and around 50 on the West Bank.

The ICRC made various approaches of a general nature to the Israeli authorities. It expressed concern about the forced transfers and urged that rehousing and compensation should be accelerated and intensified.

In addition, ICRC delegates contacted a number of families whose houses had been destroyed; on two occasions they went to El Arish to see in what conditions the displaced persons were living. They also conveyed to the authorities the complaints they had received about the matter of compensation.

The Israeli Government subsequently informed the ICRC that the operations, which had considerably reduced the number of outrages, were to cease for the time being. It assured the ICRC that, should any further transfers be contemplated, new housing would first be provided near the areas to be evacuated, to ensure that the persons displaced would be promptly rehoused.

41. The same report (pages 50 and 51) contains the following information concerning expropriations and transfers of population:

Expropriations

The ICRC continued to follow with close attention the question of expropriations in the occupied territories. However, as the Israeli Government declared at the end of 1970 that it did not want to enter into any discussion on the subject, ICRC delegates confined themselves to

submitting strictly humanitarian problems to the authorities as and when they arose.

Uprooting of people

In December, the ICRC delegation intervened on behalf of a Bedouin tribe of about 260 persons whom the Israeli authorities had compelled to leave their lands near the Dead Sea and to settle in the Bethlehem district. As a result of the transfer, those people were deprived of their lands and their livelihood. The place where they found themselves did not belong to them, and their flocks could not graze there.

The ICRC delegates approached the Israeli authorities with a view to the Bedouins' return to their former site. They supplied the Ministry of Social Welfare with 20 tents, 100 blankets, 200 kg. of sugar, 200 kg. of rice and 50 kg. of wheat for the displaced Bedouins.

The Special Committee would note that the ICRC report contains no indication as to the effect of their representations on the fate of these Bedouins.

42. Since the time it adopted its last report, the Special Committee has received further evidence concerning such allegations. The following reports are cited by way of illustration:

(a) The report in the *Jerusalem Post* on 24 January 1972 giving details of the plans to resettle the refugees in the Gaza Strip. It states that four sites (in Rafah, Khan Yunis and in Gaza) had been designated for "refugees with some savings (such as civil servants, police and teachers)" who would be able to build homes with financial assistance from the military government. The report adds that this scheme was a continuation of the "rehousing scheme" undertaken in August and September 1971 when the construction of so-called security roads in the refugee camps necessitated the demolition of several thousand dwellings and the displacement of several thousand refugees. The report goes on to state that the long-range goal of the programme was the rehabilitation of the refugee camps so that they would eventually become autonomous municipal units.

(b) Press reports appearing during March 1972 indicating that an area in Rafah (Southern part of the Gaza Strip) had been fenced off by the Military authorities. This incident gave rise to some controversy which led to a debate in the Knesset. On 28 March 1972 the *Jerusalem Post* reported Minister Israel Galili as having stated in a speech in the Knesset that "the Gaza Strip

⁴² ICRC Annual Report 1971 (Geneva, 1972), pp. 50–51.

would not again be separated from Israel".⁴³ The Minister was further quoted as stating that "there are political reasons for accelerating settlement in the Gaza Strip, . . . and [he] revealed that 'some time' this year an army outpost, Nahal Sinai, would become a civilian settlement" (see paragraph 37 (d) above). Press reports indicate that the incident surrounding the fencing off of the land of the Rafah area was the subject of an investigation by the Chief of Staff of Israel, whose forces were responsible for carrying out the fencing off. These same reports state that the results of this investigation were not disclosed to the Government, but that three senior army officers had been reprimanded and one of them transferred from his post. Another report on 28 March 1972 in the *Jerusalem Post* adds that the fencing off of land had involved "the unauthorized transfer of some 6,000 Bedouin from the Pithat Rafah area, the destruction of some 24 buildings, water holes and the fencing in of 20,000 dunams of land (5,000 acres = 20,000 sq. km., approximately). Other reports indicate that compensation was being offered to the evicted persons and that it was planned to rehabilitate them in alternative accommodation. On 19 July 1972, for example, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 200 housing units were due for completion to accommodate the evicted persons. However, according to a report appearing in *Maariv* on 25 June 1972, Israeli youths were advising Bedouins to refuse compensation and were assisting them in seeking redress in the courts.

43. The Special Committee has taken note of the information contained in letters addressed by the Government of Egypt to the Secretary-General alleging *inter alia* the forcible transfer during January 1972 of more than 10,000 Egyptian citizens from their homes in Sinai to other areas within a triangle near the Gaza Strip, isolating the area of Rafah for several weeks from the rest of the area and expropriating land situated in the Rafah area, encircling it with barbed wire and denying the population any access to it. One of these letters (A/8667-S/10565) alleges that these acts were committed with a view to establishing Israeli agricultural settlements in the expropriated area. The Government of Israel replied to the allegations in a letter to the Secretary-General (A/8671-S/10570) in which the following is stated:

The aforesaid letter from the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* contains a series of distortions and unfounded allegations. Their baseless nature is illustrated, for instance, by the charge that lands have been expropriated in the Rafah area, encircled with barbed wire and barred to the local population. In fact, the lands in question are public domain which, prior to 1967, had served the Egyptian Army as training grounds and firing ranges. During that period, access to them had been denied to local inhabitants and to the bedouin. In certain areas, a number of bedouin have entered the grounds as squatters. Terror organizations have exploited their presence to establish arms caches and to utilize the grounds for crimes of violence and a transit point for arms smuggling from Egypt to Gaza. Consequently, the grounds were closed again, although for humanitarian reasons the bedouin are permitted to enter them and to continue work on parcels of land which they had brought under cultivation. Moreover, compensation has been paid to those bedouin who have made investments in the land in question, for example, by putting up huts, despite the fact that they have done this as squatters on grounds closed to all throughout years.

In the same letter the Government of Israel states that the other allegation in the letter of the Government of Egypt, namely, of the demolition of a number of houses, is without foundation because this was done in accordance with local law and the inhabitants affected were provided with full compensation and alternative housing. The letter adds that these incidents do not constitute violations of the fourth Geneva Convention since this Convention contains provisions which allow for security measures of the kind Israel was taking in order to maintain law and order.

44. This exchange of letters gave rise to further communications addressed to the Secretary-General by Egypt and Israel. The Egyptian letters are contained in documents A/8674-S/10582, A/8677-S/10590, A/8685-S/10663, A/8692-S/10694 and A/8735-S/10717. The replies of the Government of Israel to these letters are contained in documents A/8671-S/10570, A/8675-S/10587, A/8687-S/10667, and A/8695-S/10700. In this exchange of letters, the Government of Egypt reiterated its allegations of forcible transfer of more than 10,000 Egyptian citizens, the destruction of 44 houses in Sinai and the expropriation of lands situated in the Rafah area. The Government of Israel, in its replies, reiterated its contention that these charges were unfounded distortions of incidents that had taken place.

⁴³ An excerpt of this speech is printed as document no. 64 below (ed. note)

45. The Special Committee, having examined the evidence referred to in the preceding paragraphs concerning allegations of transfer of population and expropriation of property, finds that there is indeed in existence a policy designed to effect the transfer of the civilian population of the occupied territories as well as to expropriate their property. This finding is supported by such evidence as that furnished by the ICRC in its annual report, cited in paragraphs 40, 41, 47 and 52 (d), and by the admission of the Government of Israel that such policies were in fact being followed. Having regard to the nature and scope of these policies and the manner of their implementation the Special Committee considers the Israeli justification to be completely specious and the policies themselves to be in excess of what is permissible under the fourth Geneva Convention. The evidence before the Special Committee compels it to confirm its conclusion, reached in its previous reports, that this policy is part of an overall policy deliberately designed to annex the occupied territories.

C. *Allegations of demolition of houses*

46. In its previous reports, the Special Committee had analysed evidence of demolition of houses by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories. In its second report, the Special Committee showed that it was the Government of Israel's policy to destroy the houses of persons suspected of helping members of the resistance, and that this policy was in violation of articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention (A/8389, paragraph 75).

47. The ICRC has, in its annual report for 1971, confirmed the Special Committee's finding when it states:

Destruction of houses

In view of the continued destruction of houses in the occupied territories, the President of the ICRC made a renewed appeal to the Israeli Prime Minister at the end of April that her Government should abandon a method to counter subversive activities which the ICRC regarded as being contrary to the provisions of articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. In her reply in August, the Prime Minister stated that the Government of Israel could not renounce measures which it deemed essential for the maintenance of security in the occupied territories.

ICRC delegates in the field therefore concentrated on rendering material aid to those whose homes had been destroyed. They provided the Israeli Ministry of Social

Welfare with 199 tents and 1,675 blankets for the homeless.⁴⁴

48. The evidence of an organization whose integrity and impartiality are beyond question shows that houses are being destroyed at will in the occupied territories on the ground that their existence and the presence of their former Arab occupants are a threat to the security of Israel. The international community appears as an indifferent spectator of this systematic destruction of houses by a State whose military superiority and whose capacity to resort to punitive military measures against each one of its neighbours have time and again been clearly demonstrated. The ultimate outcome of such a policy could be the total extirpation of Palestinian property and presence in these areas, and it is inconceivable that the limited rights conceded to the Occupying Power under the fourth Geneva Convention can be exercised in this arbitrary manner without a whimper of protest from the international community.

49. The Special Committee has received further evidence of a policy of destruction of houses. The Government of Egypt, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General circulated as document A/8667-S/10565, alleged that 44 houses were destroyed in Sinai during the month of February 1972. This allegation was subsequently admitted by the Government of Israel in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated as document A/8671-S/10570 and which stated *inter alia*:

Thus the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires a.i. refers to another security measure which the Israeli authorities have been constrained to undertake—the demolition of a number of houses. This was done in accordance with local law and the inhabitants affected have been provided with full accommodation and alternate housing.

These letters are also referred to above, in paragraphs 40 and 41, under the subheading *Allegations of Transfer of Population and Expropriation of Property*.

50. The Special Committee, having considered the evidence before it, in particular the statement by the Prime Minister of Israel cited in paragraph 47 above to the effect that the Government of Israel could not renounce measures which it deemed essential for the maintenance of security

⁴⁴ ICRC Annual Report 1971, pp. 49–50.

in the occupied territories, finds that demolition of houses remains a policy of the Government of Israel, that the reason adduced by the Prime Minister of Israel is untenable and that measures adopted in pursuance of this policy are, therefore, contrary to articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention.

D. *Allegations of deportation*

51. In its previous reports, the Special Committee analysed evidence on allegations of deportation (A/8089, paras. 75–77; A/8389 paras. 49–51). In its second report the Special Committee expressed the opinion that the practice of deportation of persons from occupied territories, as carried out by Israel, was not only contrary to article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention but was also part of a total policy of depriving the people of the occupied territories of their right to remain in their homeland (A/8389, para. 73).

52. The evidence that the Special Committee has received since the adoption of its last report on 10 December 1971, shows that this policy continues to be pursued. The following is cited by way of illustration:

(a) The statement made by the Israeli delegate in the Special Political Committee to the following effect:⁴⁵

The expulsion of certain individuals by the military authorities is an entirely different story. In view of the terror warfare waged against Israel from across the cease-fire lines, Israel has been constrained to order a number of agents of terror organizations to leave the areas under its administration. The total number of persons ordered out in the past 4½ years has not exceeded several hundred. They did not constitute even one-tenth of 1 per cent of the Arab population.

... I say that deportation is more humane, because in most cases it has been the alternative to long detention. Furthermore deportation of a person to Jordan is neither a deportation to a country of an occupying power, nor to the territory of another country, but means that an enemy agent is sent to those for whom he acted in contravention of the law.

Immediately upon their arrival on the East Bank, some of these deportees have publicly boasted of their subversive activities in the West Bank, and the Government of Jordan, in recognition of their services, has promoted some of these deportees to its highest offices, including members of the Cabinet. This could not be compared to the concept of deportation which was in the minds of those who wrote the international law on this matter.

(b) The report appearing in *Haaretz* on 18 January 1972 of a telegram sent by the Mayor of Hebron, Sheik Mohammed Ali Ja'abari to the Military Commander of the West Bank asking him to stop the deportation to Jordan of the inhabitants of Hebron and of the West Bank. The report adds that Mayor Ja'abari stated that in spite of the petitions that he had sent in the past to the Military Commander and to the Defence Minister of Israel asking them to put an end to deportation, deportations were still continuing.

(c) The information contained in ICRC news releases to the effect that ICRC delegates in Jordan visited persons who had been evicted from the occupied territories, such as the information contained in the *ICRC in Action—Information Notes*, of 22 March 1972, No. 177 b, of a visit by the ICRC delegate on 12 February 1972 to a group of 18 persons who were being held in the Mahatta prison in Amman after being deported from the occupied territories and that contained in the *ICRC in Action—Information Notes* of 19 April 1972, No. 178 b, of a visit by the ICRC delegate in Jordan on 29 February 1972 at the same prison to 14 persons who had been evicted from the occupied territories.

(d) The following information contained in the annual report of the ICRC for 1971:

The ICRC approached the Israeli authorities several times with a view to stopping expulsions which it regarded as being contrary to article 49 of the Fourth Convention. In a communication addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel at the end of February, the President of the ICRC expressed the ICRC's concern regarding the dire consequences for the persons stricken by such measures, against which appeal was not possible and which provided for no time limit. The Prime Minister replied that the expulsion orders had been dictated by security considerations and that they were to be preferred to detention over an indefinite period. As the explanations failed to allay ICRC apprehensions, Mr. Umbricht, a member of the ICRC who went to Israel towards the end of 1971, confirmed that the ICRC wanted the expulsion of Arabs from the occupied territories to cease. The Israeli authorities agreed to consider individual applications

⁴⁵ The statements quoted here and in the subsequent paragraphs attributed to the delegate of Israel in the Special Political Committee are taken from the verbatim text of the statement made at the 799th meeting of the Special Political Committee on 14 December 1971 which was released by the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations on 14 December 1971 and not from the summary records of the proceedings of that meeting.

from persons who had been driven out and who wanted to return.⁴⁶

(e) The letters dated 14 April and 29 June 1972 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations alleging the deportation of 28 persons during the months of April, May and June 1972 and giving the name, age, profession and town of origin of each person, and circulated as document A/8678-S/10598. The Special Committee notes that these allegations have gone unrefuted and uncontradicted.

53. The Special Committee, having considered the evidence before it, examples of which it has cited in the preceding paragraph above reiterates the conclusion reached by it in its previous reports to the effect that there exists a practice of deportation of persons from occupied territories and confirms its conclusion that the existence of a policy of deportation has been established beyond any reasonable doubt. The Government of Israel has invoked the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, as its authority for the issue of deportation orders for the expulsion of persons from the occupied territories. The Special Committee regards this policy as being contrary to article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention. The Special Committee has analysed the legal validity of these Regulations and has expressed its opinion that any law, even though based on security considerations, is invalid if such law violates the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (A/8089, para. 60). The Special Committee confirms this finding. As regards the Israeli contention that deportation or expulsion is more humane than long detention, the Special Committee is of the opinion that the measures provided for by the fourth Geneva Convention to safeguard security are sufficient and that both long detention and deportation are equally inhumane and constitute violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

54. The Special Committee would stress that article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention expressly prohibits any "individual or mass forcible transfers as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,

occupied or not, . . . regardless of their motive".

55. The Special Committee is of the opinion that under any reasonable interpretation of article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention the prohibition contained in that article is applicable to those protected persons who are being deported by Israel to *any place* outside the occupied territories.

56. The Special Committee's interpretation of article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention is confirmed by the observation contained in the commentary published by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the fourth Geneva Convention,⁴⁷ on paragraph 1 of article 49 to the effect that "the prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2" of article 49. The cases in question are clearly outside the scope of paragraph 2, which permits, "total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand". This interpretation flows *a fortiori* from the inherent right of all such persons, including those who had fled the occupied territories, to return to their homes in these territories, which is an incontestable element in the *corpus* of human rights.

E. Allegations of the denial of the right to return

57. In its three reports to date, the Special Committee has reached the conclusion that those persons who had fled their homes during the hostilities in 1967 were being denied their right to return to their homes. This applied to those persons who had fled their homes and remained within the occupied territories as well as to those who had fled and who had taken refuge in the areas outside the occupied territories. It is equally applicable to those who have been deported or otherwise expelled from the occupied territories. Since the adoption of its supplementary report on 10 December 1971, the Special Committee has received further information relevant to these allegations. The following reports are cited by the Special Committee by way of illustration:

(a) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 13 June 1972 quoting a statement made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan according to which "Israel will not permit the return of the hundreds

⁴⁶ ICRC, *Annual Report 1971*, p. 49.

⁴⁷ *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary on the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), pp. 277-279.

of thousands of West Bank residents who left the country before and during the Six Day War". In the same statement the Defence Minister is quoted as stating that in keeping with the guidelines laid down by the Government, the reunion of as many families as possible would be permitted, and that the military authorities would allow the return of former residents where humanitarian considerations were involved, as well as of those persons who could contribute to the economic development of the West Bank. The statement of the Minister was in reply to a plea by the Mayor of El-Bireh, Mr. Abd al-Jawad Salih, who had complained to the Defence Minister that the quota for the reunification of families split between the West Bank and Jordan was too low.

(b) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 20 June 1972 according to which the Defence Minister is quoted as stating that of the 200,000 West Bank residents who had left during the Six Day War, 30,000 had been permitted to return under the family reunification scheme and that there were many more who wished to return, but this was a "difficult problem that will be solved only when broader arrangements are made".

(c) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 27 June 1972 which quoted Defence Minister Dayan as stating during a visit to Qalqilya that requests for the return of those who had fled that town during the 1967 hostilities would be directed to the military authorities which would deal with them with "understanding".

58. The Special Committee notes that, according to the evidence available to it, the family reunification scheme appears to have resulted in more persons leaving the occupied territories than returning to their homes in the occupied territories. Statistics furnished to the Special Committee by the ICRC show that during 1971, 529 persons returned to Egypt while 173 returned from Egypt to the occupied territories, 50 persons returned from the Syrian Arab Republic to the occupied Golan Heights, 54 persons returned from Jordan to the West Bank, while 11 left the occupied territories for Jordan, and 7 persons from the occupied territories went to Lebanon (*The ICRC in Action—Information Notes*, No. 177 b—22 March 1972). The Special Committee notes that subsequent reports furnished by the ICRC since the end of 1971 show that more people are still leaving the occupied territories than are being

repatriated into the occupied territories under the family reunification scheme.

59. In its last two reports the Special Committee made reference to the so-called "Summer Visitors' Programme" which permits Palestinians living outside the occupied territories to visit relatives and friends within the occupied territories during the three-month summer period. In its second report the Special Committee stated that although the summer visitors' programme might be considered as a positive aspect of Israeli policy towards the territories it occupied, it was no substitute for the admission of the right of refugees to return to their homes. The Special Committee further observed that the summer visitors' programme did not have any bearing whatsoever on the declared policy of the Government of Israel to settle occupied territories or on the fact that several hundred persons had been deported from their homes in the occupied territories on official deportation orders purporting to be issued by the Israeli authorities under the "Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945" (A/8389, para. 74 and A/8389/Add.1, para. 2).

60. The Special Committee would reiterate its acknowledgement of both the family reunification programme and the summer visitors' programme as positive aspects of Israeli policy, but they cannot conceivably extinguish the right to return to their homes of the civilian population.

61. In the light of such unequivocal evidence as the statement made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan referred to in paragraph 57 (a) above to the effect that Israel will not permit the return of the hundreds of thousands of West Bank residents who have left the occupied territories, notwithstanding the same Minister's subsequent attempts to modify his earlier statement of policy, and the other evidence that is referred to in the other preceding paragraphs, the Special Committee cannot but come to the conclusion that it is Israeli policy to deny the population of the occupied territories their right to return to their homes.

F. Allegations of ill-treatment whilst under detention

62. In its three reports to date, the Special Committee has analysed evidence of ill-treatment while under detention (A/8089, paras. 78–111, A/8389, paras. 59–67, A/8389/Add.1, paras. 23–30). The Special Committee has analysed certain cases on which, it felt, the evidence was compelling.

After further examination of the evidence the Committee would like to record its conviction that general prison conditions, despite reported efforts at improvement, are bad, mainly owing to overcrowding.

63. The Special Committee stated in its second report (A/8389, para. 77) that in the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence, it was unable to reach a conclusive finding in regard to the numerous allegations of ill-treatment while under detention that had been made before it. Particular attention was given to the cases of Mr. Mohammed Derbas and Mr. Moayyad Othman El-Bahsh in the previous reports, mainly because the Special Committee had secured further evidence on their allegations. Since it has not been able to examine the persons cited by the alleged victims in their evidence the Special Committee is not yet in a position to reach a conclusive finding. With regard to the other cases that it had mentioned in its first and second reports (A/8389, para. 66), the Special Committee did not receive any further evidence. These cases did, however, provide strong evidence which in the Special Committee's judgement as expressed in its previous reports (A/8089, para. 108 and A/8389, para. 66) justified the conclusion that there was still a regular practice of ill-treating inmates mainly during interrogation. These are the cases of Mr. Sadaddin Kamal (A/AC.145/RT.11, A/8089, paras. 78 and 79), Mr. Youssef Salahat (A/AC.145/RT.21, A/8089, paras. 78, 96 and 100), Mr. Abu Ras (A/AC.145/RT.20, A/8089, paras. 93-95), Mr. Majeb Mohammed Issa El-Khattab (A/AC.145/RT.23, A/8089, paras. 96, 100), Mr. Suleiman M. Sheikh-Eid (A/AC.145/RT.24, A/8089, paras. 98 and 99), Mr. Munir Abdullah Ghannam (A/AC.145/RT.23, A/8089, para. 102), Mr. Abu Rumeile (A/8089, paras. 80 and 86), Mr. Ismael Abu Mayaleh and his wife. Mrs. Abla Tahla (A/AC.145/RT.22, A/8089, paras. 78, 85 and 101).

64. The Special Committee has taken note of reports furnished in ICRC publications indicating that the number of civilian detainees in the 13 places of detention visited by its delegates was over 3,000 as of the twentieth series of visits by ICRC delegates, which took place between 25 January and 29 February 1972 (*The ICRC in Action—Information Notes*, 19 April 1972, No. 178 b). The *Jerusalem Post* reported on 17 July 1972 that in Gaza there were as of that date 1,400 Arabs

imprisoned, out of whom 500 were awaiting trial.

65. The Special Committee notes that, of the cases that it cited in paragraph 63 above, the representative of Israel in the Special Political Committee, in the course of the Special Political Committee's consideration of the report of the Special Committee at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly (A/SPC/SR.799), attempted to rebut the allegations in regard to only three cases, namely Mr. Mohammed Derbas, Mr. Sadaddin Kamal and Mr. Suleiman Sheikh-Eid.

66. With regard to the case of Mr. Mohammed Derbas, the representative of Israel alleged that Mr. Derbas had lied to the Special Committee in testifying that, while under detention at the hands of the Israelis, he had been castrated by surgery. The delegate of Israel produced two certificates which purported to prove that Mr. Derbas had undergone surgery for the removal of his testicles in 1965 and 1966, that is, prior to the June 1967 hostilities. So far as the Special Committee is concerned, the case of Mr. Derbas has not yet been closed as the Special Committee still awaits a reply from the Government of Egypt to a communication addressed to it by the Special Committee.

67. In regard to the case of Mr. Suleiman M. Sheikh-Eid who had testified that he had been ill-treated while under detention and who, in the course of his testimony, had stated that whilst hospitalized, he had been treated by three Arab doctors whose names were given as Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Jihad and Dr. Rahman, the representative of Israel, by way of rebuttal of the allegation of ill-treatment while under detention, stated:

I am authorized to state that a most thorough investigation has been carried out in the afore-mentioned hospital and that it has been established beyond any doubt that a patient of the name of that witness has never been admitted, let alone hospitalized for five months, in that hospital. Furthermore, it has been established that none of the aforesaid three doctors, whose names were given by the witness to the Committee, had ever served or worked in that hospital.

68. In regard to the case of Mr. Sadaddin Kamal, which the Special Committee had analysed in its first report (A/8089, paras. 78 and 79), the representative of Israel stated:

The case has been investigated and it has been ascertained

through Arab witness Tawfiq Gaza of Quneitra who personally knew this man, that he—regrettably—had lost his eyesight by the explosion of a shell in the course of the fighting in Ramat Golan, that he was hospitalized by the Israeli Army and later released and transferred to Syria.

69. The Special Committee notes that the representative of Israel in his statement expressed the opinion that the three cases that he had referred to (namely, the cases of Mr. Mohammed Derbas, Mr. Suleiman M. Sheikh-Eid and Mr. Sadaddin Kamal) showed to “any objective persons at the very least how very easy it was to deceive the Special Committee, how easily it lent itself to such tactics, how eagerly it is prepared to classify as compelling and reliable evidence of fabricated stories, how ill-equipped, again to put it at its lowest, the Committee is to examine evidence and to draw conclusions from it”.

70. Faced with this type of remark, the Special Committee is compelled to state its position on the question of allegations of ill-treatment while under detention.

71. The Special Committee has heard to date a total of 195 persons and it has examined reports and detailed documentation. In its reports it has described the evidence before it. From this evidence emerged a number of allegations, most of which were eventually proved beyond any doubt, mainly owing to frank declarations of the existence of policies and practices by Israeli Ministers and leaders and actions taken in implementation of such declarations. This is true with regard to such allegations as those concerning transfers of population, expropriation, establishment of Israeli settlements, transfer of Israeli citizens to these settlements, deportation, administrative detention and demolition of houses. These allegations have been proved.

72. Allegations of torture and ill-treatment were made before the Special Committee by the vast majority of the 195 individuals who testified before it. The Special Committee—as it has stated in all its reports to date—dealt with these allegations with due circumspection and it has sought to make reference to those cases on which, it felt, the evidence was compelling. Whenever further evidence was available, the Special Committee has sought it out and evaluated it—as in the case of Mr. Mohammed El-Bahsh (A/8389, para. 64 and A/8389/Add.1, paras. 23–26). There has been

not one single case of ill-treatment on which the Special Committee has stated that it had reached a definitive judgment beyond any doubt. It has rather sought to bring to the General Assembly's attention a number of cases of alleged ill-treatment which, in its opinion, represented a fair cross-section of practices which are alleged to prevail in Israeli prisons and detention camps and in regard to which the evidence appeared to be strong *prima facie* evidence. In its first report the Special Committee referred to a number of cases on which, it felt, the evidence was so compelling as to merit attention. The Special Committee intends to pursue the investigation of these cases cited in paragraph 63 above and make every effort to establish the truth. In regard to the three cases selected by the representative of Israel, out of the large number of cases brought to the notice of the Special Committee by the vast majority of the 195 witnesses who appeared before it, and to nine of which cases the Special Committee made pointed reference in its reports, the Special Committee will pursue its investigation of these cases, treating the observations of the representative of Israel in the Special Political Committee on the three cases selected by him as further evidence on the subject. The Special Committee reiterates its firm conviction that the best manner in which the truth could be established in allegations of ill-treatment while under detention would be a free and on-the-spot investigation in the spirit of the Geneva Convention.

73. The Special Committee has quoted the representative of Israel in spite of the offensive tone of his comments and the challenge to the integrity of its members to allow the General Assembly to judge for itself whether the choice of three cases out of the large number cited by the Committee and their investigation by the Israeli Government itself without the presence of an impartial observer provides the Israeli Government with any right to indulge in such remarks. The Israeli Government has refused to allow a body appointed by the General Assembly to investigate conditions in the occupied territories. On the other hand, it has reserved for itself the right to comment on evidence after investigations conducted in a manner which no impartial authority has been in a position to check and it claims the privilege of being the sole investigator and judge of its own actions. The Special Com-

mittee has not reached any final conclusion in regard to any allegations unless there has been evidence which satisfied the accepted criterion of being beyond all reasonable doubt.

G. Cumulative effect of measures referred to in sections A to F

74. The Special Committee, while dealing with these allegations separately, gave its attention to their cumulative effect and it is obliged to express its conviction that, irrespective of the intention of the Occupying Power, the practices and policies referred to in sections A to F must, of necessity, result in the international community's being faced with a *fait accompli* or, in other words, a situation which would be irreversible. This situation would be the incorporation of the occupied territories in or their annexation to the State of Israel. Such a policy of annexation can find expression in different forms, social, political, economic and juridical. Examples of social and political measures are the establishment of settlements, transfer of population, expropriation of property, demolition of houses, deportation and the denial of the right to return, as they produce radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied territories, which would result in the elimination of a distinct Palestinian identity.

75. Examples of economic measures, which in the manner of their operation contribute to the policy of annexation, are to be found in the following report appearing in *The Economist* of London on 18 March 1972 on conditions in the West Bank, which states:

Before 1967 agriculture was the mainstay of the West Bank's economy. Now farming is feeling the draught because of land lost to Israel and the loss of labour: the 40,000 Arabs who have gone to work at Israeli building sites or factories. Property owners—the people who will vote in the coming municipal election—are, even if not farmers, concerned by this threat to the West Bank's basic economy. No serious alternative industry is being developed to which Arab labourers might turn when Israel's boom slackens.

These Arab workers in Israel get at least £1.40 take-home money a day. The Arab small-holders who need farm labourers cannot keep up with such rates. The bigger farmers might do so if they could sell their produce in Israel, where the wholesale prices paid are commensurately high. But except when there are occasional shortages in Israel, the West Bank farmers must sell on the

low-paying West Bank, or else in East Jordan—where prices over the past year have been abysmal.

The Israeli authorities on the West Bank concerned with agriculture are doing their best to assist the Arab farmers—advising them about crops, providing insecticides and helping to get them piped water. But they cannot shelter them from thrusts of Israel's powerful commercial interests. The effect of this has been felt in the man-made oasis near Jericho created by the Palestinian philanthropist Mr. Musa Alami—the vocational school and farm of the Arab Development Society.

Here again the Israeli army has taken a great deal of land, the citrus trees dying upon it; but there remain 1,000 acres of hospitable oasis. Yet it has been hard done by. It was once the biggest dairy and poultry farm in the region. It has had to cut its herds because its principal former customers, the big hotels in East Jerusalem, are now obliged to buy Israeli milk. It used to supply the whole West Bank with day-old chicks and broilers. Now it can no longer do so because it could not compete with similar Israeli products subsidized by the Government that were dumped in the West Bank at half the normal price during its necessarily short trading season. So the ADS was put out of the poultry business except for the selling of eggs. This was a severe blow, for the ADS applies its profits to housing and training destitute Arab boys.

Many farmers have a fear—perhaps groundless—that, should they run into difficulties in getting labour or markets, their farms might be expropriated. Meanwhile the farmer, like everyone else, Arab or Israeli, breathlessly tries to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the West Bank this follows closely on Israel's which has increased since 1967 by 300 per cent.

There is a clash between two economies, between Israel's grant-aided, intensely capitalized and broadly protected agriculture, and the Arab kind, labour-intensive, manually highly skilled but vulnerable and unorganized.

The Israeli claim that the economic situation in the occupied territories has materially improved during the occupation is open to question. In the view of the Special Committee this alleged improvement is merely the natural consequence of an under-developed economy being brought into a close relationship with and placed unavoidably in a position of dependence on a more developed economy. In such circumstances it is to be expected that the standard of living, wages, prices, etc. in the weaker economy would increase as the impact on it of the stronger economy came to be felt. This, in the view of the Special Committee, is the case in the occupied territories, particularly

as revealed in the employment pattern which shows that the economy of the Occupying Power has benefited by a substantial influx of manpower from the occupied territories. The foreign trade figures for the West Bank for the period July-September 1971⁴⁸ which disclosed that the occupied territories had an adverse balance of trade of IL 44m (\$10.5 million, approximately) with the Occupying Power during that period, is an eloquent commentary on this trend.

76. The Special Committee has considered the effect of these measures on the economic life and economic future of the occupied territories. In the view of the Special Committee, the fact of the creation of employment, for example, is not, by itself as important as that cheap Arab labour is being used in Israeli territory to promote the interests of the Israeli economy. It appears to the Special Committee that the economy of the West Bank is being employed to promote the interests of the Israeli economy. For this reason, even though the standard of living in the occupied territories may have risen, the question of the dependence of the occupied territories on the economy of the Occupying Power causes the Special Committee serious misgivings as to whether the policy adopted by the Occupying Power and which has brought such an economic situation into being is in consonance with the fundamental rights of the population of the occupied territories. The principle of a people's sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, which derives from their right of self-determination, has been expressly prescribed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 1 of each of which states:

1. All Peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they are free to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligation arising out of international economic co-operation, based on the principle of mutual benefits, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence....

77. The evidence cited above, particularly the passages appearing in *The Economist* of London on 18 March 1972 and quoted in paragraph 75 above, justifies the misgivings of the Special Committee. These passages create the impression of a policy and a situation which conform to the classic pattern of colonial economic dominance and exploitation. Such a policy, if given free rein, would reduce the economy of the occupied territory to a position of almost entire dependence on the economy of the Occupying Power for a long time after the end of the occupation. In this sense, the Special Committee has come to the conclusion that the occupation is causing undue interference in the economic life of the occupied territories and even if, for the sake of argument, it is conceded that certain short-term benefits are accruing to the population of the occupied territories the situation could in the long run prove irreversible and, therefore, prove detrimental to the economic future of these territories.

78. Juridical measures through which the policy of annexation has found expression are illustrated by the incorporation of occupied Jerusalem into the State of Israel and the declaration of Jerusalem by Israel as its capital. The Security Council has declared that it does not recognize these measures as valid in its resolution 298 (1971).

H. Other allegations

79. In its three reports to date, the Special Committee has analysed evidence on allegations as to restrictions of movement, harsh curfews and administrative detention. Since the time of the submission of its last report, the Special Committee has received further evidence relevant to these allegations.

80. The evidence that the Special Committee has received shows an improvement in recent months in the freedom of movement allowed to the civilians of the occupied territories, both within these territories and the territory of the Occupying Power. A report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 2 July 1972 disclosed that restrictions on movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank had been lifted. Other reports, appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 May and 14 June 1972 and in *Ma'ariv* on 14 July 1972, state that curfew had been reduced by two hours in a number of areas in the Gaza Strip.

81. As regards allegations of administrative

⁴⁸ See *Monthly Statistics of the Administered Territories*, vol. II, No. 1 (Jerusalem, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1972), pp. 8-9, table C/1, Foreign Trade Summary.

detention, the Special Committee has taken note of the reports that the number of detainees, given as 600 on 20 January 1972, is being reduced considerably. According to a report in the *Jerusalem Post* on 18 July 1972, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan stated in the Knesset that there was a possibility of reducing the number of administrative detainees to 25. An earlier report in the same newspaper on 5 June 1972 had quoted "informed sources" as stating that 150 persons in Gaza remained in administrative detention.

82. The Special Committee notes that, according to the evidence before it, the number of administrative detainees has decreased and the restrictions on freedom of movement of the civilian population have been somewhat relaxed. The Special Committee expresses the hope that administrative detentions will cease altogether and that resort to curfews and other restrictions on the movement of the civilian population will be totally eliminated.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

83. In its second report, the Special Committee stated that the evidence that it had received reflected a policy on the part of the Government of Israel designed to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the territories under occupation by the progressive and systematic elimination of every vestige of Palestinian presence in these areas. The Special Committee's findings in regard to the allegations that had been brought before it up to that time appear in paragraphs 72-83 of its second report (A/8389).

84. In its supplementary report the Special Committee confirmed its findings with regard to the existence of a policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories (A/8389/Add.1, para. 16), of transfer of population and of the denial of the right to return (A/8389/Add.1, para. 20), of ill-treatment whilst under detention (A/8389/Add.1, para. 30), and of mass arrests which, in the view of the Special Committee, were clearly calculated in part to be a means of destroying the morale of the people of the occupied territories (A/8389/Add.1, para. 33). On all these allegations additional evidence had become available to the Special Committee.

85. The Special Committee has noted the evidence that has become available to it since the date of the adoption of its last report, namely,

10 December 1971, and has analysed this evidence in the preceding chapter.

86. In the view of the Special Committee this evidence confirms the existence of a policy on the part of the Government of Israel which, as stated in its second report, is designed to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the territories under its occupation by the deliberate eradication of a distinct Palestinian national identity, which has been acknowledged by the General Assembly and the Security Council in their resolutions, among them resolution 181 (II) by virtue of which the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as spelled out in that resolution and, more recently, resolution 2792 D (XXVI) of 6 December 1971.

87. The Special Committee, replying on the evidence before it, now confirms that there is a deliberate policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories and that this policy is in contravention of the human rights of the population of those territories.

88. The Special Committee notes, for instance, that the practice of deportation and the policy of demolition of houses, of establishment of Israeli settlements, of expropriation of Arab property and of denial of the right to return of the civilians who had fled those territories during and after the 1967 hostilities are not only confirmed but are accentuated by the developments, pronouncements and actions that have come to the notice of the Special Committee since its last report was adopted.

89. The Special Committee notes that in the course of the last year there has indeed been some relaxation in security measures. The Special Committee had previously found these measures to be inordinately severe and in excess of the permissible limits under the law and, therefore, to be in violation of the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories. It notes, for example, the shortening of the curfew hours in Gaza by two hours as well as the lifting of certain restrictions on movement of the civilians of the occupied territories and the progressive reduction in the number of persons under administrative detention.

90. With regard to allegations of ill-treatment while under detention, the Special Committee, despite the compelling nature of the evidence

it has received, is still unable to reach a conclusive finding, which would only be possible after a free investigation by the Special Committee carried out inside the occupied territories. This is not, however, in the Special Committee's opinion, an indispensable requirement for the substantiation of other types of allegations. The Special Committee, having examined all the evidence before it to date, would reiterate its conviction that general prison conditions, despite reported efforts at improvements, still leave much to be desired, mainly due to overcrowding, and that interrogation procedures very frequently involve physical violence.

91. The Special Committee notes that the Occupying Power consistently invokes reasons of security to justify measures taken by it which, in fact, deprive the civilian population of the occupied territories of the protection which international humanitarian law seeks to ensure for them. Thus the Government of Israel has invoked reasons of security in vindication of:

(a) The expulsion of persons from the occupied territories under so-called deportation orders;

(b) The transfer of several thousand persons from their homes to other parts of the occupied territory;

(c) The expropriation of property including property belonging to persons transferred from their homes;

(d) The establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territory and the transfer of Israeli nationals to these settlements;

(e) Demolition of houses;

(f) Administrative detention;

(g) The denial of the right to return to their homes of those persons who fled the occupied territory because of the June 1967 hostilities and those deported or otherwise expelled.

92. It is abundantly clear to the Special Committee that a provision of international law which was designed to be used in exceptional circumstances and under pressure of urgent necessity, has been used indiscriminately and has been arbitrarily converted by Israel into a rule of conduct or definite policy. The Special Committee finds such conduct a negation of the very letter and spirit of the fourth Geneva Convention as formulated in the Commentary on this Convention, which states that the Convention:

... is rather a series of unilateral engagements solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the other Contracting Parties. Each State contracts obligations *vis-à-vis* itself and at the same time *vis-à-vis* the others. The motive of the Convention is such a lofty one, so universally recognized as an imperative call of civilization, that the need is felt for its assertion, as much out of respect for it on the part of the signatory State itself as in the expectation of such respect from an opponent, indeed perhaps even more for the former reason than for the latter.⁴⁹

The civilian population has certain inalienable rights which cannot be derogated from. In addition, the fourth Geneva Convention, whose *raison d'être* is the protection of civilian persons in occupied territory, only allows certain security measures to be taken by the Occupying Power under conditions that are specified in that Convention. The Special Committee recognizes the importance of security considerations, but these can only be invoked in strict accordance with the applicable rules which are clearly enunciated in the Convention and should be without prejudice to the safety and well-being of the civilian population.

93. In the three reports that the Special Committee has presented to the Secretary-General (A/8089, A/8389 and Add.1), the Special Committee recommended the following formula in an attempt to secure an arrangement acceptable to the parties and which would provide a greater safeguard for the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories:

(a) The States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

(b) Suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising its right of self-determination;

(c) A neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement.

94. The Special Committee had recommended that under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might

⁴⁹ *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949...*, p. 15.

be authorized to undertake the following activities:

(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the third and fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of any other applicable international instruments;

(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.

95. In its latest report (A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and Corr.2), the Special Committee explained that it had made this recommendation in the hope that the investigation of allegations of violations of human rights could be conducted on the spot, inside the occupied territories, since this could not be accomplished by the Special Committee itself owing to the refusal of the Government of Israel to receive the Committee or to co-operate with it. The Special Committee continues to believe, and this is borne out by the evidence before it so far, that one of the most effective means of safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories is to provide an arrangement whereby it would be possible to have a direct and on-the-spot investigation of allegations of violations of human rights of the civilian population. The Special Committee states this because its experience has shown that, irrespective of the motives of the occupying power, policies and practices contrary to the fundamental human rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories are being followed in those territories by the Government of Israel. The Special Committee feels that in the circumstances, where an occupation has persisted for as long a period as five years, it becomes imperative to establish a mechanism whereby effective international supervision is assured in conformity with the spirit of the fourth Geneva Convention.

96. The Special Committee has thought fit to recommend an arrangement which is inspired by the protecting Power formula contained in the fourth Geneva Convention and which could

be adapted to the particular circumstances existing in the occupied territories in the Middle East. The recommendation of the Special Committee seeks to avoid such difficulties as have arisen from the political attitude that exists between Arab countries on the one hand and Israel on the other. It has been impelled to make this recommendation, because it is convinced that in this particular situation humanitarian considerations should prevail and take precedence over political issues and because the civilian population of the occupied territories has a right to the protection envisaged in the fourth Geneva Convention and to full respect for its fundamental rights as envisaged in international humanitarian law.

97. The Special Committee regrets that, despite the specific recommendation that has been made repeatedly in its reports, its mandate has been renewed with no attempt or any action to provide such a machinery for the supervision of the implementation of the international law pertaining to the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In the debates that have taken place in the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions on the reports of the Special Committee, a large section of the membership of the United Nations did not appear to pay more earnest consideration to the recommendation of the Special Committee. This attitude of indifference has not served the cause of humanity and has not helped to discourage the Occupying Power from persisting in its disregard for the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention.

98. The Special Committee would appeal to Member States, whose concern for human rights is beyond question, to show their concern in an effective manner. The responsibility of the United Nations for the safeguarding of human rights has been repeatedly and universally stressed by the Member States and there is, therefore, no reason why a recommendation such as the one made by the Special Committee in its reports should not have formed the subject of more earnest consideration by these States in the course of the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly.

99. The Special Committee has not been able to carry out its functions in the same manner as a protecting Power duly appointed under the Con-

vention would have done. The Special Committee feels that it is now, more than ever, necessary with the least possible delay to secure the arrangement proposed by the Special Committee and under which it would be possible to ensure direct supervision of the implementation of the fourth Geneva Convention. The Special Committee recalls that this Convention has not only been ratified by the parties concerned without relevant reservations but that it is applicable in occupied territories since all the conditions for its applicability have been satisfied. It has been stated not only by the Special Committee itself but also by the Special Working Group of Experts appointed by the Commission on Human Rights to investigate alleged violations of the fourth Geneva Convention (E/CN.4/1016 and Add.1-5) that this Convention is applicable in the occupied territories. The International Committee of the Red Cross has repeatedly expressed the same opinion and has on several occasions attempted to secure a formal application of this Convention.

V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

100. This report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 25 September 1972 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure as follows:

(Signed) H. S. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka)
Chairman
(Signed) H. NUR-ELMI (Somalia)
(Signed) B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

6

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation by Israel of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2792 E (XXVI) of December 6, 1971⁵⁰

September 13, 1972

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, which deals with the displaced inhabitants who have fled the Israel-occupied areas since the outbreak

of hostilities of June 1967. In that resolution, the General Assembly considered that the plight of the displaced inhabitants continued since they had not yet returned to their homes and camps, expressed grave concern that the displaced inhabitants had not been able to return in accordance with Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and previous General Assembly resolutions on this subject, and called once more upon the Government of Israel to take immediately and without any further delay effective steps for the return of the displaced persons. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the Assembly.

2. By a letter dated 23 December 1971 the Secretary-General transmitted the text of General Assembly resolution 2792 E (XXVI) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel and drew attention to the request addressed by the General Assembly to the Government of Israel and to the Secretary-General's reporting responsibility under the resolution. In a subsequent message dated 26 June 1972 and addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations the Secretary-General requested the Government of Israel to provide him with information on the steps it had taken to implement the resolution and the results thus far achieved. In this connexion, the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the required information would be made available to him not later than 31 August 1972 as he planned to submit the report that had been requested of him before the opening of the twenty-seventh session of the Assembly.

3. The reply of the permanent representative of Israel to this message was set forth in a note verbale dated 8 August 1972, which reads as follows:

The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 26 June 1972 concerning General Assembly resolution 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 has the honour, on instructions from his Government, to state the following:

The Israel Government is aware of the humanitarian aspects of the problem of the displaced persons who fled as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. However, the conditions prevailing in the area do not permit a large-scale return of those persons. The extent and rapidity with which a return can be facilitated are inevitably

⁵⁰ U.N. doc. no. A/8786. The resolution is printed as document no. 428 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

affected by the political and security conditions. Arab Governments are continuing to aid and support terrorist and subversive activities in order to disturb and hinder normal life in Israel and in the Israel-held areas. These Governments are also continuing to oppose any step that could reduce tensions in the region or help to arrive at a peace settlement. They actively support acts of aggression across the cease-fire lines and openly declare their intention to continue this policy. In many cases, permits granted in recent years by the Israel Government for return of displaced persons have been exploited for the purpose of infiltrating trained terrorists, saboteurs and espionage agents. To ignore all this and to allow the influx of masses of persons from enemy countries would be a step to which no responsible Government would agree under similar conditions. Pending a peace settlement, the Israel Government continues to seek to reconcile the return of displaced persons with its responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the local population and the security of the State itself.

In spite of the difficulties set out above, the Government of Israel has, during the last year, continued to facilitate the return of persons displaced in 1967. The special arrangements for family reunion and hardship cases remained in force, and, as in the past, this was done in co-operation with the local Arab authorities. More than 40,000 displaced persons have returned to their homes since 1967. Further details on the subject will be presented by the Israel delegation during the debate on the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA at the next session of the General Assembly.

Finally, it should be noted that the annual debates in the General Assembly on the reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA are exploited by Arab and several other delegations for political and propaganda purposes in a manner which complicates and confounds the issue and which intentionally hinders efforts to advance the true interest of the refugees and displaced persons. Resolution 2792 E (XXVI) did not take into account the actual conditions prevailing in the area, and the Israel delegation, for this reason, was among those voting against it.

The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

7

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation by Israel of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2792 C (XXVI) of December 6, 1971⁵¹

September 15, 1972

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 concerning Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip. In paragraph 3 of the resolution, the General Assembly called upon Israel "to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence", and in paragraph 4 it called upon Israel "to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation". In paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to report as soon as possible and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty-seventh session of the Assembly, on Israel's compliance with the provisions of paragraph 3 and on the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the resolution.

2. By a letter dated 23 December 1971, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of General Assembly resolution 2792 C (XXVI) to the Foreign Minister of Israel and drew attention to the request addressed by the Assembly to the Government of Israel in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution and to the Secretary-General's reporting responsibility under paragraph 5. In a subsequent message dated 26 June 1972, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General requested the Government of Israel to provide him with information on the steps it had taken to implement the resolution and on the results thus far achieved. In this connexion, the Secretary-General expressed

⁵¹ U.N. doc. no. A/8814; the annex has been omitted. The resolution is printed as document no. 428 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

the hope that the required information would be made available to him not later than 31 August 1972, as he planned to submit the report that had been requested of him before the opening of the twenty-seventh session of the Assembly.

3. The reply of the Permanent Representative of Israel to this message was set forth in a note verbale dated 8 August 1972, which reads as follows:

The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 26 June 1972 concerning General Assembly resolution 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 has the honour, on instructions from his Government, to state the following;

The extreme gravity of the security situation which prevailed in the Gaza area until the summer of 1971 is well known. Criminal terrorist organizations based in the Arab States and sustained and supported by these States, conducted a campaign of indiscriminate murder and sabotage, the main victims of which were the local Arab population, including refugees. Terrorist activities involved the throwing of bombs into crowded streets, the killing of innocent women and children, and even the murder in hospitals of Arabs injured in previous incidents. The purpose of this criminal activity was to create an atmosphere of violence and insecurity in the Gaza area; and to prevent, by intimidation and fear, all efforts to improve the situation, in order to perpetuate, for political ends, the human misery which was the legacy of the 19-year Egyptian occupation. In the period June 1967-August 1971, Arab terror organizations killed 239 residents of the Gaza area and wounded 1,362. Most of the victims were refugees.

Such a situation could not be tolerated. The measures taken by the Israeli authorities in refugee camps were designed to put an end to the reign of terror and murder, in pursuance of their responsibility, as stipulated also in Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, to ensure the safety, welfare and security of all the inhabitants in the areas under their control.

Because of overcrowding, the congested layout of houses and the large number of dilapidated structures, refugee camps offered especially convenient conditions for terror operations. It was necessary to construct access roads within the camps, involving in certain places the demolition of some shelters. All possible safeguards were taken to avoid undue hardship to the inhabitants of the affected shelters. In all cases alternative housing was offered; the offer was accepted by the majority and the housing provided. If a refugee expressed a preference for new housing of his own choice to that which was offered, he was free to avail himself of it. Evacuees received compensation for expenses incurred by them

on the structures evacuated and a grant of cash to pay for the cost of moving into new housing. Arrangements were made to enable evacuees to continue in their old employment; whenever necessary, new employment was provided.

It is noteworthy that the Israeli measures have met with considerable success, and the security situation in the Gaza area has greatly improved since the aforesaid steps were taken. Violence and terror, which had taken a heavy toll among the local population, have been virtually eliminated. During the period March-June 1972 three acts of terror took place, resulting in the wounding of one local Arab inhabitant. During the same period last year there were 119 terror attacks causing the death of 64 Arab inhabitants and injury to 217. In the final account the saving of lives and the general benefits of the present situation have outweighed by far the temporary inconveniences in the camps.

Finally, it should be noted that the annual debates in the General Assembly on the reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA are exploited by Arab and several other delegations for political and propaganda purposes in a manner which complicates and confounds the issue and which intentionally hinders efforts to advance the true interest of the refugees and displaced persons. Part C of resolution 2792 (XXVI) did not take into account the actual conditions prevailing in the area, and the Israel delegation, for this reason, was among those voting against it.

The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

4. After consultation with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, the Secretary-General wishes also to report the following to the General Assembly.

5. With regard to paragraph 3 of the resolution, it may be recalled that the Commissioner-General indicated in his special report of September 1971 (A/8383)⁵² that the large-scale demolitions which had begun on 20 July 1971 continued until 26 August of that year. No further demolitions of this nature with their attendant removal of refugees have taken place since then. However, there were until 11 January 1972, some demolitions of individual shelters as a punitive or deterrent measure.

6. With regard to paragraph 4 of the resolution, the figures given in the supplement to the Commissioner-General's special report (A/8383/

⁵² Printed as document no. 410 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

Add.1)⁵³ now stand revised on the basis of verifications carried out by the Agency subsequent to November 1971. The Agency's present understanding is that a total of 2,554 families, comprising 15,855 persons, were affected by the demolitions carried out in July and August 1971. Of these, 590 families (3,227 persons) are understood to be staying with relatives or friends, 514 families (3,245 persons) to be living in shelters or buildings which were vacant, 998 families (6,442 persons) in rented accommodation and 106 families (725 persons) in improvised accommodation.⁵⁴ It is also understood that 251 families (1,671 persons) are in El Arish and 62 families (361 persons) on the West Bank.⁵⁵ Over 900 of these families who are living in the Gaza Strip are regarded by the Agency as being unsatisfactorily accommodated even by a low standard.⁵⁶ The table in the annex to this report shows the number of shelter rooms demolished and the position regarding the present housing of the refugee families affected by these demolitions.

7. Of these 2,554 families, 822 families have received assistance from the Israeli authorities in the form of payment of rent for alternative accommodation for a limited period and 1,443 families have received compensation for loss of private property as a result of the demolitions, e.g. for privately-built shelters or for additions to Agency-built shelters. In cases where compensation or assistance with rent was given, payment was not made through the Agency.

8. The Agency's claim for compensation for demolished shelters was rejected by the Israeli authorities on the grounds that the demolitions were necessary for security reasons and that the families concerned "were offered and given alternative accommodation of at least the same standard as their previous habitation". The Agency is pursuing the claim.

9. In the absence of any evidence of actual construction by the Israeli authorities to rehouse

refugees whose shelters had been demolished and who were without adequate accommodation or had been obliged to leave the Gaza Strip, the Commissioner-General inquired of the Israeli authorities on 29 February 1972 what their plans in this regard were and also asked for confirmation that no impediment would be placed in the way of those displaced refugees who had not already returned from El Arish and wished to do so.

10. The Israeli authorities replied on 24 April 1972 to the effect that in all cases alternative housing had been offered to refugees whose shelters had been demolished and that the majority had accepted the offer; that if a refugee had expressed a preference for new housing of his own choice he had been free to avail himself of it; and that compensation had been paid for expenses incurred by refugees on demolished structures and a grant of cash made to pay for the cost of moving into new housing. The reply suggested that refugees who still required help with housing should approach the Israeli authorities in the area, who would do their best to assist them. As regards refugees in El Arish, an assurance was given that they might go back to the Gaza Strip if they wished and that no impediment would be placed in their way by the Israeli authorities. It will be noted that of the 400 families who are believed to have gone to El Arish only 251 remained there in June 1972, though, as those who returned to the Strip no longer have shelters there, they are not necessarily in their camps. The Agency understands that there is also no impediment to return from the West Bank.

11. Following this reply the Commissioner-General expressed reservations to the Israeli authorities at a meeting on 3 May 1972 about the statement that all refugees whose shelters had been demolished had been provided with adequate alternative accommodation, and pointed out that according to the Agency's information many were still living in unsatisfactory conditions.⁵⁷ He also referred to the assurance given at the time of demolitions that new housing would be constructed, and he renewed his inquiry about the plans of the Israeli authorities in this respect.

⁵³ Printed as document no. 411 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁵⁴ These figures comprise families now living inside as well as outside the camps. [This and the following footnotes are part of the report.]

⁵⁵ Thirty-three families (184 persons) are understood to have left either for east Jordan or other, unknown, destinations.

⁵⁶ For example, one criterion was the accommodation of more than five persons in a room.

⁵⁷ The Israeli military authorities in Gaza have queried the Agency's information about the numbers, status and circumstances of those said to be living in unsatisfactory conditions and a joint check is being made.

Subsequently, at a meeting in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 August 1972, the Commissioner-General was told that no information could be given about Israel's plans for housing but that if refugees in difficulty approached the military authorities they would be helped. The Commissioner-General is pursuing the matter further with the Israeli authorities.

12. To the best of the Commissioner-General's knowledge the only housing for refugees constructed since the demolitions or now under construction in the Gaza Strip forms part of two programmes, neither of which is related to the needs of refugees whose shelters were demolished in July and August 1971. One programme consists of housing under construction by the Agency,

at the expense of the Israeli authorities, for the accommodation of refugees whose shelters were demolished in connexion with the construction of security roads in other camps (see the Commissioner-General's report for 1969–1970⁵⁸ and his report for 1970–1971.⁵⁹) The other programme consists of housing under construction by the Israeli authorities which the Commissioner-General understands is being offered to residents or refugees for purchase on an instalment plan.

⁵⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013)*, paras. 13 and 58. (Printed as document no. 316 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*; ed. note.)

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413)*, para. 64.

Reports Submitted to the Security Council

8

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council's consensus of April 19, 1972, to increase the U.N. observer force on the Lebanon-Israel border⁶⁰

April 25, 1972

1. In pursuance of the consensus reached by the members of the Security Council on the action to be taken in response to the request of the Lebanese Government [S/10611], the Secretary-General proceeded in the manner outlined in his memorandum of 4 April 1972 [ibid., *annex*] and instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, in consultation with the Lebanese authorities, to implement the arrangements envisaged in paragraphs 4 to 7 of that memorandum.

2. General Siilasvuo held detailed discussions between 20 and 22 April 1972 with Major-General Iskander Ghanem, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese army. On 21 April a reconnaissance was carried out with the senior Lebanese delegate to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, and the sites of the three proposed observation posts were selected. One observation post is located at the existing UNTSO outstation at Naqoura (approximate map reference 1629-2805) and the other two in the Marjayoun area at the village of El Khiam (approximate map reference 2071-3025) and near Bent Jbail at Maroun Er Ras (approximate map reference 1920-2785), respectively. At the same time full agreement was reached with the Lebanese authorities on various arrangements aimed at ensuring the effective functioning of the extended Mixed Armistice Commission operation and the security of UNTSO personnel. In particular, provision was made for the installation of suitable

observation platforms and the accommodation of the observers, the early construction of protective fencing and shelters, United Nations radio communications, full freedom of movement on all roads to and from the observation posts, the assignment of Lebanese army liaison officers to each post, military escorts for UNTSO personnel when the situation demanded it, and other facilities under the Convention of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

3. It should be placed on record that throughout these discussions and the joint reconnaissance referred to above, the fullest co-operation and assistance was extended to UNTSO by the Lebanese authorities.

4. The two new observation posts at El Khiam and Maroun Er Ras are called "OP Khiam" and "OP Ras" respectively. Although they are some distance away from the Israel-Lebanese armistice demarcation line and widely separated from each other, they are located on high ground and provide extensive observation over various portions of the armistice demarcation line, including areas which recently were the scene of serious incidents.

5. The existing UNTSO outpost at Naqoura, now called "OP Naq" will, in addition to its present essentially administrative functions, also serve as an observation post; measures are being taken to improve its observation possibilities which are at present limited.

6. In the light of indications received from the Lebanese authorities, the effectiveness of the three observation posts may be increased as they intend, whenever the situation warrants, to request the observers to move to areas from which a given incident can be better observed. In addition, more recourse than hitherto may be made to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission for inquiries into incidents.

7. Although UNTSO had planned to man the observation posts as of 22 April, their establishment was delayed until 24 April at the specific request of the Lebanese authorities. On that day, OPs Khiam, Ras and Naq became opera-

⁶⁰ U.N. doc. no. S/10617, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, p. 36; for text of the consensus see document no. 15 below.

tional at 0930, 1000 and 0845 hours GMT, respectively.

8. Geberal Siilasvuo has informed the Israel authorities, through their liaison officer, of the arrangements made for the observation posts in question, including their location and date of opening.

9. As already indicated in the Secretary-General's memorandum of 4 April 1972, the strength of the Mixed Armistice Commission is being augmented from 7 to 21 observers for an initial period from existing UNTSO resources; likewise the necessary supplies and equipment are being drawn from UNTSO's current stocks. In this regard it should be noted that the UNTSO logistics convoy, from UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem, crossed smoothly and without delay both the Israel and Lebanese checkpoints of Rosh Hanikra and Naqoura, respectively, in the early morning hours of 24 April 1972.

10. As from 25 April, relevant information based on the observers' reports will be circulated to the Security Council as occasion requires. In addition, the Secretary-General, as he had been invited to do, will report periodically to the Security Council on the need for the continuance of the above measures and on their scale.

9

Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East⁶¹

September 15, 1972

1. In accordance with his responsibilities under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, the Secretary-General has, from time to time, submitted to the Security Council progress reports on the activities of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the Special Representative to the Middle East, in pursuit of his mandate of

promoting agreement and assisting efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East situation.

2. On 13 December 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2799 (XXVI)⁶² on the situation in the Middle East. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.⁶³ In paragraph 8, the Secretary-General was requested to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress made by the Special Representative in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and of General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI).

3. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, Ambassador Jarring held meetings with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Israel, who were still in New York, and with the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations to discuss arrangements for the reactivation of his mission. Further inconclusive talks took place in New York from 10 to 27 January 1972. From 28 to 31 January, Ambassador Jarring was in West Africa at the invitation of President Senghor of Senegal, who had been the Chairman of the group of four African Heads of State which had visited Egypt and Israel towards the end of 1971, and he also met President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, who had been Chairman of the Committee of Ten, to which the group of four had reported.

4. After further consultations with me in Rome on 5 February, Ambassador Jarring visited Cairo, where he met the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt on 19 and 20 February. He held discussions with the Jordanian authorities, at their request, on 23 February, and with the Israeli authorities, at his suggestion, on 25 February. After reporting to me at Geneva on 27 February, Ambassador Jarring returned to New York, where

⁶² Printed as document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁶³ For the text of the aide-mémoire see Annex I to the Secretary-General's Report on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East, November, 1971, printed as document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁶¹ U.N. doc. no. S/10792 and A/8815, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*, p. 102.

he continued to see representatives of the parties until 24 March. Subsequently, Ambassador Jarring returned to Headquarters from 1 to 4 May and from 1 to 12 August for a further review of the positions of the parties and consultations with all concerned. He also had other contacts elsewhere with representatives of the parties and met twice with me in July 1972 in Geneva to discuss

what further useful action might be taken.

5. In spite of our continued efforts, it has not been possible to make any substantial progress. As can be seen from published statements of the parties, an agreed basis for discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices does not seem to exist at the present time. Despite this situation, we shall continue our efforts.

Resolutions and Decisions

I. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

10

General Assembly Resolution 2949 (XXVII) censuring Israel and calling on all states to avoid actions implying recognition of changes and annexations implemented by Israel⁶⁴

December 8, 1972

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 15 September 1972 on the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East,⁶⁵

Reaffirming that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 must be implemented in all its parts,

Deeply perturbed that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971 have not been implemented and, consequently, the envisaged just and lasting peace in the Middle East has not been achieved,

Reiterating its grave concern at the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

Reaffirming that the territory of a State shall not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force,

Affirming that changes in the physical character or demographic composition of occupied territories are contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as to the provisions of the relevant applicable international conventions,

Convinced that the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations to restore peace and security in the Middle East in the immediate future,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2799 (XXVI);

2. *Deplores* the non-compliance by Israel with General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), which in particular called upon Israel to respond favourably to the peace initiative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East;

3. *Expresses its full support* for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

4. *Declares once more* that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored;

5. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles:

(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

6. *Invites* Israel to declare publicly its adherence to the principle of non-annexation of territories through the use of force;

7. *Declares* that changes carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories in contravention of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are null and void, and calls upon Israel to rescind forthwith all such measures and to desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories;

8. *Calls upon* all States not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and invites them to avoid actions, including actions in the field of

⁶⁴ U.N. doc. no. A/RES/2949 (XXVII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 30*, pp. 6-7. Adopted at the Assembly's 2105th plenary meeting by 86 votes to 7, with 31 abstentions.

⁶⁵ Printed as document no. 9 above.

aid, that could constitute recognition of that occupation;

9. *Recognizes* that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

10. *Requests* the Security Council, in consultation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, to take all appropriate steps with a view to the full and speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), taking into account all the relevant resolutions and documents of the United Nations in this connexion;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the progress made by him and his Special Representative in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to transmit the present resolution to the Security Council for its appropriate action and requests the Council to keep the General Assembly informed.

11

General Assembly Resolution 2963 (XXVII) concerning the administration and finances of UNRWA, censuring Israeli action in the occupied territories, and reaffirming the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people⁶⁶

December 13, 1972

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2792 A (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 and all previous resolutions

referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1972,

Taking note also of the appeal made by the Secretary-General on 20 March 1972,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1973;

4. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

5. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

6. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United

⁶⁶ U.N. doc. no. A/RES/2963 A.B.C.D.E.F. (XXVII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 30*, pp. 27-29. Adopted at the Assembly's 2108th plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 124 to none, with 1 abstention (Sierra Leone)

Part B: 125 to none, with no abstentions

Part C: 95 to 6, with 24 abstentions

Part D: 93 to 5, with 26 abstentions

Part E: 67 to 21, with 37 abstentions

Part F: Adopted without objection

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 2792 B (XXVI) of 6 December 1971,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1972,

Taking note also of the appeal made by the Secretary-General on 20 March 1972,

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV), 2672 B (XXV) and 2792 B (XXVI);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations concerned.

C

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-

General of 15 September 1972⁶⁷ regarding the effect on the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip of the continued Israeli policies and measures in the Strip,

Noting that both the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East have expressed great concern about the effect on Palestine refugees of these operations in which shelters in refugee camps were demolished and thousands of persons displaced, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip,

Noting with regret the failure of Israel to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971,

Deeply concerned at the continued measures by Israel which prejudice the rights of the population and the demographic composition and the status of the Gaza Strip,

1. *Declares* that such measures involving the physical and demographic structure of the Gaza Strip, including the destruction of refugee shelters and the forcible transfer of population, contravene the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970, entitled "Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts";

2. *Strongly deplores* these actions by Israel;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from all measures that affect the physical structure and the demographic composition of the Gaza Strip;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report as soon as possible and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with and implementation of the present resolution.

⁶⁷ Printed as document no. 7 above.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 September 1972⁶⁸ concerning the implementation of resolution 2792 E (XXVI),

Noting that the Israeli occupation authorities have persisted in changing the physical, geographic and demographic structure of the occupied territories, by the displacement of inhabitants, the destruction of towns, villages and homes, and the establishment of settlements in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as the pertinent United Nations resolutions,

Gravely concerned about the plight of the displaced inhabitants,

Convinced that the plight of the displaced inhabitants could be relieved only by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,

Emphasizing the necessity of full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions,

1. *Affirms* the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps;

2. *Considers* that the plight of the displaced inhabitants continues since they have not yet returned to their homes and camps;

3. *Expresses its grave concern* over the failure of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions;

4. *Calls once more upon* Israel immediately to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

5. *Calls again upon* Israel to desist forthwith from all measures affecting the physical, geo-

graphic and demographic structure of the occupied territories;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report in detail thereon to the General Assembly.

E

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, its resolutions 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 2792 D (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, in which it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and its resolutions 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970 and 2787 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, in which it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to the right of self-determination,

Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,

1. *Affirms* that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Expresses once more its grave concern* that the people of Palestine have not been permitted to enjoy their inalienable rights and to exercise their right to self-determination;

3. *Recognizes* that full respect for and realization of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine are indispensable for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

F

The General Assembly,

Having noted that the present membership of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations

⁶⁸ Printed as document no. 6 above.

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, established pursuant to its resolutions 302 (V) of 8 December 1949 and 720 B (VIII) of 27 November 1953, is composed of Belgium, Egypt, France, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Noting further that it is in the general interest that other contributing countries join the Advisory Commission,

Decides to include Japan in the membership of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

12

General Assembly Resolution 2964 (XXVII) adopting the report of the Working Group on the financing of UNRWA⁶⁹

December 13, 1972

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 and 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1972,

Recognizing with grave concern that the financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continues to be acute, thereby endangering the already minimum services being provided to Palestine refugees,

Emphasizing the continuing need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at

their present level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. *Commends* the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the report of the Working Group;

3. *Endorses* the conclusion of the Working Group that further vigorous and constant fund-raising activities on behalf of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East are essential;

4. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

13

General Assembly Resolution 3005 (XXVII) calling on Israel to desist from policies violating the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and requesting the continuation of the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices⁷⁰

December 15, 1972

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Invoking the provisions and principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 237 (1967)

⁶⁹ U.N. doc. no. A/RES/2964 (XXVII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 30*, p. 29. Adopted at the Assembly's 2108th plenary meeting by 122 votes to none, with no abstentions.

⁷⁰ U.N. doc. no. A/RES/3005 (XXVII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 30*, pp. 30–31. Adopted at the Assembly's 2112th plenary meeting by 63 votes to 10, with 49 abstentions.

of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, as well as other pertinent resolutions of the United Nations,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,⁷¹

Considering that a system of investigation and protection is required for ensuring effective implementation of the international instruments, such as the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, which provide for respect for human rights in armed conflicts,

Recalling that, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, the States parties have undertaken not only to respect, but also to ensure respect for, the Convention in all circumstances,

Considering that implementation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 cannot and should not be left open in a situation involving foreign military occupation and the rights of the civilian population of these territories under the provisions of that Convention and in accordance with the principles of international law,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it;

2. *Strongly calls upon* Israel to rescind forthwith, and desist from, all such policies and practices as:

(a) The annexation of any part of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements in those territories and the transfer of parts of an alien population into the occupied territories;

(c) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property;

(d) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

(e) The denial of the right of the displaced persons to return to their homes;

3. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel in contravention of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to settle the occupied

territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are null and void;

4. *Affirms* the principle of the sovereignty of the population of the occupied territories over their national wealth and resources;

5. *Calls upon* all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize or co-operate with, or assist in any manner in, any measures undertaken by the occupying Power to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character or institutional structure of those territories;

6. *Requests* all States parties to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects and fulfils its obligations under that Convention;

7. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, especially:

(a) The measures concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the moving into the occupied territories of an alien population, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

(b) The situation concerning the annexation of any part of the territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967;

(c) The exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories;

(d) The changes in the physical character or demographic composition or institutional structure of those territories, including the transfer or deportation of population thereof or the demolition of houses and towns therein;

(e) The pillaging of the archeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories;

(f) The interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories;

⁷¹ Printed as document no. 5 above.

9. *Calls upon* Israel to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Special Committee and to facilitate their tasks;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat;

11. *Requests* the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session on the task entrusted to him;

13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-eighth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

II. SECURITY COUNCIL⁷²

14

Security Council Resolution 313 (1972) demanding immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon⁷³

February 28, 1972

The Security Council

Demands that Israel immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese territory.

15

Consensus of the Security Council deciding to accede to Lebanon's request for an increase in the U.N. observer force stationed on the border with Israel⁷⁴

April 19, 1972

The President of the Security Council has held consultations with the members of the Council following the request of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon that the Security Council take necessary action to station additional United Nations observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector, as conveyed to the President of the Security Council and contained in annex I of his memorandum of 31 March 1972 to the Secretary-General, and in paragraph 1 of the annexed memorandum dated 4 April 1972 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. The President of the Security Council also informed and consulted the Secretary-General. Exceptionally, a formal meeting of the Security Council was not considered necessary in this instance.

In the course of these consultations, the members of the Security Council reached without objection a consensus on the action to be taken in response to the request of the Lebanese Government and invited the Secretary-General to proceed in the manner outlined in his above-mentioned memorandum. They further invited the Secretary-General to consult the Lebanese authorities on the implementation of these arrangements.

They also invited the Secretary-General to report periodically to the Security Council and in doing so to give his views on the need for the continuance of the above measures and on their scale.

ANNEX

Memorandum dated 4 April 1972 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

1. On 29 March 1972 the President of the Security Council received the following request from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon:

The Lebanese Government, because of repeated Israeli aggression against Lebanon and because the work of the Lebanon-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission has been

⁷² In 1972 the membership of the Security Council was as follows: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Yugoslavia.

⁷³ U.N. doc. no. S/RES/313 (1972); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 13. Adopted unanimously at the Council's 1644th meeting.

⁷⁴ U.N. doc. no. S/10611, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, pp. 32-33.

paralysed since 1967, wishes the Security Council to take necessary action to strengthen the United Nations machinery in the Lebanese-Israeli sector by increasing the number of observers, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1949.

2. Following consultations with members of the Security Council, the President orally informed the Secretary-General on 31 March that the members of the Council had reached the view that the Lebanese request should be met. Pending the final decision of the Council on this matter, the President, on behalf of the Council, asked the Secretary-General to clarify the measures to be taken for the implementation of the Lebanese request and to determine the number of additional observers required for the Israel-Lebanon sector. It was understood that the increase of observers, taking also into consideration the wish of the Lebanese Government, should not exceed 25-30. The Secretary-General was also asked to inform the Council of the financial implications resulting from that increase.

3. The Secretary-General immediately instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, to initiate informal consultations with the authorities concerned and to submit to him his recommendations on the necessary arrangements to be made, the number of additional observers required for the sector, and the manpower and equipment which could be made available from existing UNTSO resources. The Secretary-General made it clear that the action requested of the Chief of Staff was of a preliminary nature for the sole purpose of providing information to the Security Council and that the Council had not taken a final decision on this matter as yet.

4. On 3 April, General Siilasvuo informed the Secretary-General that the Lebanese authorities had indicated their strong preference for the establishment of three static observation posts only, to be located at Naqoura, in the close vicinity of Bent Jbail, and at Marjayoun. For the implementation of this plan General Siilasvuo considered that the following arrangements by UNTSO would be necessary:

(a) The number of observers assigned to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission in Lebanon would have to be increased from the existing 7 to 21. In the initial stages, all 14 additional observers required could be provided

from the existing UNTSO manpower. However, if the operation were to last for an extended period, it might prove necessary to recruit up to 8 additional observers.

(b) Five additional Field Service Officers (security officers and radio technicians) and 8 local employees would have to be provided.

(c) Some of the equipment, such as vehicles, caravans and radio equipment, would have to be additionally provided, although General Siilasvuo would draw from the existing UNTSO stock to the extent possible.

5. The approximate financial implications of the above arrangements, for a period of eight months, assuming that no additional recruitment of observers is immediately required, would be as follows:

	<i>United States dollars</i>
Local staff	17,600
Field Service staff	42,000
Vehicles	40,000
Caravans	13,500
Communications	55,000
Generators	23,000
Maintenance and construction	55,000
Freight and utilities	18,500
Miscellaneous	8,000
Total	<u>272,600</u>

6. General Siilasvuo has indicated that it would be possible to set up the proposed observation posts at short notice by providing all the required personnel and equipment from existing UNTSO resources for the initial period. It would also be necessary to reach firm agreement with the Lebanese authorities on various arrangements concerning the effective functioning and security of the United Nations personnel concerned in this operation.

7. General Siilasvuo has pointed out that the establishment of three observation posts, as proposed by the Lebanese authorities, cannot provide comprehensive coverage of the armistice demarcation line. The proposed posts must be considered rather as a limited United Nations presence on one side of the line which would provide only a measure of observation and a somewhat more rapid supply of information from UNTSO sources than exists at present. As two of the three posts

would be relatively far from the Armistice demarcation line, with limited areas of observation and large territorial gaps between them, it would be impossible for them to observe most activities along the demarcation line or to verify complaints relating to them.

8. In a conversation with the Permanent Representative of Israel on the evening of 3 April, the Secretary-General had the opportunity to speak with him on this matter and to hear his objections concerning the request of Lebanon for the strengthening of the United Nations machinery in the Lebanese-Israel sector by increasing the number of observers on the basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1949. The Chief of Staff has also met with the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer in Jerusalem on this question.

16

Security Council Resolution 316 (1972) condemning Israeli attacks on Lebanon and calling for the release of abducted Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel⁷⁵

June 26, 1972

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1650/Rev.1,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, the Permanent Representative of Israel and the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic,

Recalling the consensus of the members of the Security Council of 19 April 1972,

Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contained in documents S/7930/Add. 1584 to Add. 1640, of 26 April to 21 June 1972, and particularly documents S/7930/Add. 1641 to Add. 1648, of 21 to 24 June 1972,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and of Israel,

Deploing the tragic loss of life resulting from all acts of violence and retaliation,

Gravely concerned at Israel's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970, 285 (1970) of 5 September 1970 and 313 (1972) of 28 February 1972 calling on Israel to desist forthwith from any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon,

1. *Calls upon* Israel to strictly abide by the aforementioned resolutions and to refrain from all military acts against Lebanon;

2. *Condemns*, while profoundly deploring all acts of violence, the repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Israel's obligations thereunder;

3. *Expresses* the strong desire that appropriate steps will lead, as an immediate consequence, to the release in the shortest possible time of all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces on 21 June 1972 on Lebanese territory;

4. *Declares* that if the above-mentioned steps do not result in the release of the abducted personnel or if Israel fails to comply with the present resolution, the Council will reconvene at the earliest to consider further action.

17

Security Council Resolution 317 (1972) reaffirming Resolution 316 (1972) and deploring Israel's failure to implement it⁷⁶

July 21, 1972

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda adopted by the Security Council at its 1651st meeting held on 18 July 1972,

⁷⁵ U.N. doc. no. S/RES/316 (1972); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 14. Adopted at the Council's 1650th meeting by 13 votes to none, with two abstentions (Panama, U.S.A.).

⁷⁶ U.N. doc. no. S/RES/317 (1972); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 15. Adopted at the Council's 1653rd meeting by 14 votes to none, with one abstention (U.S.A.).

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of Lebanon,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and of the Syrian Arab Republic,

Having noted with appreciation the efforts made by the President of the Security Council and by the Secretary-General following the adoption of resolution 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

1. *Reaffirms* resolution 316 (1972) adopted by the Security Council on 26 June 1972;

2. *Deplores* the fact that despite these efforts, effect has not yet been given to the Security Council's strong desire that all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory on 21 June 1972 should be released in the shortest possible time;

3. *Calls upon* Israel for the return of the above-mentioned personnel without delay;

4. *Requests* the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make renewed efforts to secure the implementation of the present resolution.

III. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

18

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 3 (XXVIII) deploring Israel's disregard of human rights in the occupied territories and calling on Israel to respect those rights⁷⁷

March 22, 1972

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Recalling all the relevant resolutions adopted by the various United Nations organs on the subject of the protection of the human rights of the inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by Israel,

Recalling also that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Member States bear a special responsibility to ensure the protection of human rights and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person,

Recalling further that, in accordance with article 1 of the said Geneva Convention, States parties have undertaken not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

Taking note of the reports submitted to and/or discussed in the different competent organs of the United Nations on the aforementioned subject,

Gravely concerned at all acts and policies that affect the status or the character of those occupied territories and the basic rights of the inhabitants thereof, such as:

(a) The declared intention of annexing certain parts of the occupied Arab territories,

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the transfer of parts of the civilian population into those territories,

(c) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of occupied territories,

(d) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property,

(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes,

(f) Collective punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees,

(g) Administrative detention and holding of prisoners incommunicado,

Noting with regret that the aforementioned acts have not been rescinded in spite of the numerous resolutions adopted on the subject,

Deplores the persistent defiance and disregard by Israel of all United Nations resolutions on the protection of human rights of the inhabitants of

⁷⁷ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 7 (E/5113)*, pp. 51-53. Adopted at the 1161st meeting by 15 votes to 4, with 11 abstentions.

the occupied territories and on the preservation of the demographic composition and geographic character thereof,

Taking note of the fact that the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 (article 147) has considered unlawful deportation or transfer, unlawful confinement, deprivation of the rights of fair and regular trial, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property as grave breaches of the Convention,

Noting that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg as confirmed by General Assembly resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 has considered as war crimes the "grave breaches" later enumerated in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949,

Recalling its resolution 5 B (XXVI), which considered violations of the Geneva Conventions as war crimes and an affront to humanity,

1. *Strongly calls upon* Israel to rescind forthwith all measures and to desist from all policies and practices affecting the demographic structure or the physical character of the occupied Arab territories and the human rights of their inhabitants;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to permit all persons who have fled the occupied territories or who have been deported or expelled therefrom to return to their homes without conditions;

3. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to annex or settle the occupied territories are null and void;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel, once more, to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;

5. *Also calls upon* Israel once more to respect and implement the resolutions adopted by the Commission and other competent organs on the question of the protection of the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

6. *Requests* all States Members of the United Nations and all States parties to the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects the principles of human rights and fulfils its obligations under that Convention;

7. *Considers* that grave breaches of the fourth Geneva Convention committed by Israel in the occupied Arab territories constitute war crimes and an affront to humanity;

8. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session as a matter of high priority the item entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

IV. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

19

UNESCO Executive Board Decision 89 EX/ 4.4.1 deploring the continuation of Israeli archaeological excavations in Jerusalem⁷⁸

July 6, 1972

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954),

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth session and decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1 and 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd and 88th sessions respectively,

3. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

4. *Taking note* of the report of the Director-General (89 EX/19 rev.) and his efforts to secure the implementation of the decision of the Executive Board,

5. *Reproves* Israel's negative attitude with regard to decision 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board of Unesco at its 88th session;

6. *Deplores* the continuation under present conditions of archaeological excavations in Jerusalem by Israel;

7. *Urgently calls again upon* Israel to:

⁷⁸ Text provided by the UNESCO office, Beirut. Adopted at the 26th meeting of the Executive Board's 89th session by 22 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

(a) see that the necessary measures are taken for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings, monuments and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem;

(b) desist from any archaeological excavations, the transfer of such properties and any change of their features or their cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites;

(c) adhere scrupulously to the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954) and the resolutions mentioned above, particularly paragraph 7 of decision 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 88th session;⁷⁹

8. *Thanks* the Director-General for his continuous efforts in this matter and *invites* him to continue his efforts and to report to the Executive Board at its 90th session, in order to consider the necessary measures to be taken.

20

UNESCO Executive Board Decision 90 EX/4.3.1. submitting the problem of Israeli excavations in Jerusalem to the General Conference⁸⁰

October 12, 1972

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954),

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth session and decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd, 88th and 89th sessions respectively, particularly paragraph 7 of decision 4.3.1 which invites the Director-General "to ensure the presence of

Unesco in the city of Jerusalem with a view to securing an efficient implementation of the resolution of the General Conference and the Executive Board in this respect",

3. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

4. *Taking note* of the report of the Director-General (90 EX/9) and appreciating his endeavours for the implementation of decisions 88 EX/Decision 4.3.1 and 89 EX/Decision 4.4.1,

5. *Observing* that Israel's attitude does not constitute a satisfactory response to the Executive Board decisions 88 EX/Decision 4.3.1 and 89 EX/Decision 4.4.1, as communicated in the letter of the Director-General dated 18 July 1972,

6. *Decides*, in view of the attitude of Israel, to submit the matter to the General Conference to be considered under item 13.3 (17 C/5 subchapter 3.4 "Preservation and Presentation of the Cultural Heritage") with a view to securing an efficient implementation of the resolutions of the General Conference and of the Executive Board in this respect.

21

UNESCO General Conference Resolution 17C 3.422 calling on Israel to desist from altering the features of Jerusalem and from archaeological excavations⁸¹

November 17, 1972

The General Conference,

Aware of the exceptional importance of the cultural property in the Old City of Jerusalem, particularly of the Holy Places, not only to the countries directly concerned but to all humanity, on account of their exceptional cultural, historical and religious value,

Recalling once more the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property

⁷⁹ Printed as document no. 436 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁸⁰ Text provided by the UNESCO office, Beirut. Adopted at the 17th meeting of the Executive Board's 90th session by 25 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions.

⁸¹ *Records of the General Conference, Seventeenth Session*, vol. I, *Resolutions, Recommendations*, pp. 61-62. Adopted at the 36th plenary meeting by 53 votes to 8, with 21 abstentions.

in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954),

Recalling once more Security Council resolutions 250 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Recalling resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth session, and Decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1 and 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd, 88th, 89th, and 90th sessions respectively,

Recalling particularly paragraph 7 of Decision 4.3.1 of the 88th session of the Executive Board, which invites the Director-General "to ensure the presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem with a view to securing an efficient implementation of the resolutions of the General Conference and the Executive Board in this respect",

Taking note of Decision 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 90th session, which observed "that Israel's attitude does not constitute satisfactory response" to the Executive Board Decisions 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 of the 88th and 89th sessions as communicated in the letter of the Director-General dated 18 July 1972 and in which the Board decided "in view of the attitude of Israel... to submit the matter to the General Conference under item 13.3 (17 C/5, Sub-Chapter 3.4: 'Preservation and Presentation of the Cultural Heritage') with a view to securing an efficient implementation of the resolutions of the General Conference and of the Executive Board in this respect".

Noting that Israel persists in not complying with the relevant resolutions and that its attitude prevents this Organization from undertaking the mission which is incumbent upon it under the terms of the Constitution,

Having noted the Director-General's proposal to provide Israel with an expert, a measure which does not seem sufficient to establish Unesco's presence in Jerusalem,

1. *Disapproves* of the continuation by Israel of archaeological excavations in Jerusalem,

2. *Urgently calls again upon Israel:*

(a) to take the necessary measures for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the Old

City of Jerusalem;

(b) to desist from any alteration of the features of the City of Jerusalem;

(c) to desist from any archaeological excavations, the transfer of cultural properties and any alteration of their features or their cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites;

(d) to adhere scrupulously to the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954) and of the above-mentioned resolutions;

3. *Invites* the Director-General to continue his efforts to establish the effective presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem and thus make possible the actual implementation of the resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board for that purpose;

4. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 92nd session on the implementation of this resolution in order to enable it, should the occasion arise, to consider the necessary measures.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

22

World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 25.54 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East⁸²

May 25, 1972

The Twenty-fifth World Health Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;

⁸² Annex II, *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1971—30 June 1972, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 13* (U.N. doc. no. A/8713), pp. 103–104. Adopted at the 14th plenary meeting.

Conscious of the fundamental right of all human beings to physical and mental health, without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social conditions;

Having considered the report of the Director General and the annual report of the Director of Health of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);

Disturbed by the fact that Israel not only continues to refuse to allow the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes but continues to displace by force thousands of persons from their homes and shelters;

Noting that these acts have included the demolition of a large number of UNRWA shelters, causing further suffering to the refugees, and aggravating the financial crisis of UNRWA;

Gravely concerned about the consequences of such acts on the physical and mental health of the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

Recalling its resolutions WHA21.38, WHA22.43, WHA23.52, WHA24.32, WHA24.33,

1. *Reaffirms* that the protection of the life and physical and mental health of the refugees and displaced persons requires that they immediately be afforded to return to their homes, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

2. *Deplores* Israel's repeated acts of expulsions of human beings and destructions of their homes and shelters, which directly affect their physical and mental health, and constitute grave

violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

3. *Decides* that, meanwhile, emergency assistance to the maximum extent possible be given to the refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East;

4. *Requests* the Director-General of the World Health Organization to:

(a) intensify and expand to the largest extent possible the Organization's programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

(b) prepare a comprehensive report on the conditions of physical and mental health of the population of the occupied territories to be submitted to the Twenty-sixth World Health Assembly;

(c) take all measures in his power to safeguard health conditions of the populations of the occupied territories, and to report to the Twenty-sixth World Health Assembly on the steps taken in this regard;

(d) bring this resolution to the attention of all governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned including international medical organizations,

5. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Director-General of the World Health Organization, the Director of Health of UNRWA, to the specialized agencies and other organizations that provide assistance to the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East.

International

Television interview statement by U.S. President Nixon confirming agreement in principle to sell more Phantom jets to Israel¹

Washington, January 2, 1972

Q. But I can't leave—with your permission, I think we have to do it fairly quickly—leave without asking at least one question about the Middle East. There have been widespread reports that you have agreed in principle to sell additional Phantom jets to Israel. Is that true?

A. We have made a decision, Mr. Rather, implementing a policy that I have long announced that we will not allow the balance, the military balance, in the Mideast to be shifted.

Now, the Soviet Union has been sending in very significant arms shipments to the U.A.R. In view of those shipments, as that continues to escalate, we have had to consider the requests of Israel for planes in order to see that the balance does not shift.

We have made a commitment in principle. As far as implementing that commitment is concerned, however, I—this is not, of course, the time to go into it.

24

Statement by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China expressing support for the Arabs, made during a dinner in honour of a visiting Iraq government delegation²

Peking, early January, 1972

The anti-imperialist struggle waged by the people of the world has always been an indivisible whole. In this struggle, the people of the world have sympathized with and supported one

¹ Excerpted from the partial transcript of the interview conducted by Dan Rather of CBS News, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1700 (January 24, 1972), pp. 84–85.

² Excerpted from the partial English text, *Peking Review*, XV, 1 (January 7, 1972), p. 6; the visit took place December 25, 1971–January 3, 1972.

another. The Chinese Government and people and the people of Iraq, Palestine and other Arab countries are comrades-in-arms standing on the same battlefield. We have always regarded the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against U.S.-Israeli aggression as our own struggle and as a support to us. The anti-imperialist struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples is now in a new stage. Although they will still encounter difficulties in their struggle, we are convinced that, so long as the Palestinian and other Arab peoples strengthen their unity, maintain vigilance, fear no threat, refuse to be taken in and persevere in struggle, they will surely be able to further advance their struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression and win final victory. The Chinese Government and people have all along sympathized with and supported the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. We will remain forever your reliable friends in your struggle against imperialism.

25

Radio interview statement by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili explaining the reasons for and Israeli reaction to the resumption of U.S. supplies of military aircraft³

January 3, 1972

Q. Mr. Galili, has the United States decided to resume Phantom supplies to Israel as the result of any concessions by Israel in the political field?

A. My answer is absolutely negative. This is not the first time we have received aircraft from the US Government. Just as in the past, the receipt of aircraft was not dependent on concessions, this time there was no bargaining in the discussions between the Premier and the US President. In any case, we were not asked

³ Interview conducted by Arye Mekel, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3880/A/4–5; reprinted by permission.

for, nor did we make any concessions. In the past, the Israeli Government has opposed on principle that the receipt of the arms needed for the defence of Israel's existence should depend on conditions or political obligations. This opposition continued this time, and these were not dependent on any political concessions.

Q. Then why did the President take this step?

A. Firstly, I told you that, even in the past, we were given aircraft by the US Government, but in my view, President Nixon's testimony in last night's interview is sufficient. I can add to this that since Israel asked the United States to keep its promise to supply aircraft for our defence, Sadat's visit to Moscow took place. Then there was an increase in Soviet arms supplies to Egypt, including aircraft with air-to-ground missiles. It should be added that, in the meantime, there was the Soviet conduct during the India-Pakistan affair; and now there is the demand for the evacuation of Malta—all these events are very significant and have added validity to the Israeli Government's request and to the US realization of its duty to keep its promise to us.

Q. Is there no fear of the negative effect of the publication of the US decision? For example, is it not to be feared that the Arabs will try to undertake military operations of some kind before the promised aircraft arrive?

A. In my opinion, there is no such fear. I am convinced, as we were convinced before, that the US promise has a greater deterrent and curbing value than a provocative value and will not spur the Arabs into military activity.

Q. Since the problem of the supply of Phantoms was one of the main clarifications we demanded from the United States, why do we continue to demand clarifications from the United States, before we agree to enter into talks on a special settlement?

A. Firstly, there is a long way between an announcement about the aircraft and getting them. I think it is clear we are not willing to conduct talks under a US embargo. We are waiting for the US President's announcement to be translated into facts. Apart from this, clarification on other points was demanded from the President, such as the six points raised by the US Secretary of State in his speech to the United Nations, and the nature of the US Administra-

tion's conduct in the course of the talks. What role will it play in the talks between us and the Egyptians, which will take place via the United States. These matters are still being discussed in the course of our request for clarification, and only when we receive this shall we discuss and draw our conclusions.

Q. Can it be understood from what you say that Israel will agree to embark upon talks for a special settlement only after the supply of Phantoms has at least begun?

A. I assume that the promises of the US President last night will be fulfilled, and that this issue will not be an obstacle hindering the talks.

Q. Do you expect an actual fulfilment of the promise in the near future?

A. The question is what do you call the near future? I expect such a fulfilment in the very near future.

26

Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the role of the U.S. in maintaining political and military stability in the Middle East⁴

Washington, January 4, 1972

Mr. Smith: Mr. Secretary, I am going to make us jump again, all the way to the Middle East. The most promising initiative, actually closely identified with you, was the initiative for peace in the Middle East, and at the end of 1971 and the beginning of '72 it doesn't look as promising as it used to. Do you have any ways to revive that initiative that you can tell us about, to give it new life?

A. Yes. I think, Mr. Smith, you should start out on this premise: that the cease-fire that was brought about in the Middle East as a result of the initiative President Nixon took is still in effect. We have had no fighting there for about 18 months, so that in itself is an encouraging fact. Now, we hope that we are able to get negotiations started. We are not too concerned about whether

⁴ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by Howard K. Smith and Ted Koppel of ABC News, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1700 (January 24, 1972), pp. 90-92.

they are negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring at the United Nations or whether we take an active role in those negotiations in trying to get an interim agreement. We are working in both ways. We are seeking to encourage both sides to start negotiations, or to resume negotiations, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. We also are encouraging both sides to engage in discussions in what we say is close proximity, with us—the United States—as a mediator, in looking toward an opening of the Suez Canal.

We think there are some possibilities that might happen. It is a slow process, a very discouraging process, but the conditions in the area are much more stable now than they were a year ago, or 2 years ago, and a cease-fire is still in effect. In fact, it is one of the encouraging developments that it has lasted as long as it has, and we are going to do everything we can as a nation to take the lead diplomatically to continue the cease-fire and to see if we can't get some progress going, started, in looking toward a final guarantee—

Mr. Smith: How about the prospect of the United States actually offering a guarantee of any borders the two sides will agree on? Is that a possibility?

A. Well, I don't think that the United States individually as a nation would undertake that. I think that the United States will consider possibilities of some kind of United Nations guarantee—

Mr. Smith: The Israelis don't have much faith in the U.N. guarantees.

A. Well, you can understand why that is, Mr. Smith, because it didn't work before; but that doesn't mean we can't set up a new system that might work, and if there was a veto power so the Secretary General himself couldn't change the rules we might be able to work out a guarantee that would be meaningful.

Mr. Smith: How about a Russian-American guarantee? I am thinking of the way they occupied Vienna after World War II. American and Russian and French and British soldiers all went around in the same jeep and policed the streets.

A. Well, as you know, the Soviet Union has indicated a willingness for the first time to take part in a peacekeeping effort. Now, whether that is a realistic possibility or not, I don't know.

In the first place, we have to find out whether the parties can agree on something first before we find out how we can guarantee the agreement.

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, the President said, again the other evening, that the United States was now ready, in principle, to start resupplying the Israelis with Phantom jets. Now, without questioning Washington's principles, what, precisely, does that mean?

A. Well, we have followed the policy for some time of attempting to maintain a military balance in the Middle East. By that we mean that we will provide arms to Israel in order to make sure that they can defend themselves. If that were not the case it would be destabilizing. It would be incentive for the other side to start a conflict. We want that to be avoided. On the other hand, we do not want our support to Israel to appear to be encouraging Israel itself to start hostilities.

We talk about a military balance in those terms: to provide sufficient arms to Israel to maintain its independence, its sovereignty, without causing the Arabs to feel that we are supporting them to the point where we are encouraging the initiation of hostilities.

As far as what kind of arms we supply and when we make those shipments, and so forth, we are not going to discuss that publicly. We are going to maintain a policy of keeping an arms balance in the area, hopefully to keep the cease-fire in effect.

Mr. Koppel: Well, can we deduce from the President's statement of the other evening that the United States now feels that balance is in danger of shifting in favor of the Egyptians?

A. No, I don't think you could come to that conclusion, but he pointed out that the Soviet Union is continuing to supply Egypt with arms, and in those circumstances we expect to continue to supply arms to Israel to be sure that the balance doesn't shift.

Mr. Koppel: You could say, then, it has not yet reached the point where the balance has shifted so far in the Egyptians' favor?

A. No, and we don't intend to let the balance shift.

Mr. Smith: Sir, you said something about the situation growing more stable in the Middle East, but one of the factors which many people thought was a

stabilizing factor was the bringing under control of the guerrillas by King Hussein, which he did in 1971. Now we see persistent reports that the Russians are taking those defeated Palestinian guerrillas and training them and equipping them to go back. Do you know whether that is true? If so, are you concerned about it?

A. Well, we would be concerned about the renewal of the strength of the guerrillas, but we are encouraged by the fact that King Hussein does have control of his country, as distinguished from the condition that existed 2 years ago. Obviously, if the *fedayeen* movement gained in strength we would be concerned. At the present time we do not think that is the case. We think that the King has control of his country and is in complete command.

27

Press interview statements by Israel Deputy Minister of Health Zu'bi regretting the lack of a Palestinian consensus and the forthcoming West Bank elections⁵

Early January, 1972

Q. Despite the absence of any agreed-upon national consensus, what influence do the Palestinians have on a peace settlement?

A. There is no national Palestinian consensus today. Some Palestinians want a state independent of Jordan. Others want a Palestinian state in both Banks of the Jordan. The Palestinians know that they are on the side with which Israel must make peace but, internationally speaking, they are a negligible factor.

Q. Is that also in Israel's opinion?

A. To my regret, yes. Israel also thinks that the Palestinians are not particularly important. They are not represented in the United Nations nor do they have an army. Israel has to take them into consideration primarily as a political element.

Q. What do you think of the forthcoming local elections in several West Bank cities?

A. My talks with West Bank inhabitants have confirmed my feeling that the decision to hold elections was adopted hastily. The Mandatory-Jordanian law gives only the owners of houses and property the right to vote. They constitute only 10% of all the males of voting age. I favor holding elections, but only if there are no property qualifications for the right to vote. Israel's authorities placed the property owners in the West Bank cities between the hammer and the anvil. On the one hand, there is Jordanian and Egyptian opposition to the elections. On the other hand, Israel's authorities threaten that if the inhabitants of the West Bank cities do not participate in the elections, they will appoint officers to be the mayors. The public in the West Bank is disappointed that the conduct of Israel's authorities has sunk to the level of the Jordanian authorities.

In themselves, elections are desirable, but in the present circumstances elections will be reactionary because they will be like Mandatory-Jordanian elections.

Q. Your words have the ring of careful optimism. What should Israel do now to improve relations between it and the inhabitants of the occupied territories?

A. Israel's authorities have received thousands of requests to unite families, but has granted only part of those requests. If it were in my power, I would permit the reunion of families between Arabs from Arab countries, the occupied territories and Israeli Arabs. I would permit the return to the occupied territories of the Six Day War's refugees. The return of the refugees would be implemented gradually and only after they had received a security clearance. Now is the time for such projects. The Arab refugees living in the territories and the refugees that would come under a family reunion program would receive compensation and be rehabilitated. In that event—even if peace with the Arab states were to tarry and the international machinery were to continue to work slowly—we would, in effect, have achieved peace between the state of Israel and the large majority of the Palestinian people.

In a word, we should not wait for the "big" peace; we should promote the "little" peace between Israel and the Palestinians on both banks of the Jordan.

⁵ Interview conducted by Yitzhak Shor for the Israel daily *Al Hamishmar* (Tel Aviv), January 7, 1972; excerpted from the English translation, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XV, 1 (January, 1972), pp. 11-12.

Radio interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili commenting on President Sadat of Egypt's speech of January 13⁶

January 14, 1972

Galili: I would ask you not to regard my reaction to the Egyptian President's speech as an official reaction by the Israeli Government, but as an evaluation after a first reading of the speech [passage indistinct]. The main thing, as I see it, is that Sadat thought fit to persuade the Egyptian public of the correctness of his decision not to open fire after having prepared his people for a resumption of war before 1971 ended. This I regard as having a positive value.... However, the speech has still left things vague. Had we heard President Sadat use not merely generalities about a decision to continue what he calls "political activity" but speak about willingness to go to the Jarring talks without prior conditions; had we heard not mere generalizations about political activity but about his willingness to resume talks about a Suez Canal settlement through the good offices of the United States—then we could have said that this speech was a turning point. The obscurity remains both in the case of a continuation or a beginning of talks in the Jarring channel as well as in the case of new discussions to find a solution at the Canal.

To a certain extent, his words have a bitter note—not a new argument but new stress. He repeated two principles. One principle is that of "not a foot." Arab land is held by Israel. The other principle is no bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people. We know that the definition of the rights of the Palestinian people does not refer to the settlement of the refugees but refers to an alternative to the very existence of the State of Israel. These are not new things, but it is not clear whether Sadat is presenting these as prior conditions for the Jarring talks or as a prior condition for the talks on a settlement at the Canal; that is, Sadat talked about political

activity but he did not remove the obstacle upon which both the Jarring talks and the talks on a settlement at the Canal foundered. We must, therefore, wait and see what [passage indistinct].

Nor is it clear from Sadat's speech how he regards the question of reopening the Canal. He has not officially removed the United States from the role it is to play in the talks on opening the Canal, and one can pinpoint a few hints here and there to the effect that he has not closed the door to talks on a Canal settlement. However, it can be understood from the text of the speech that he links this to two principles. If he continues to link the Jarring talks or the talks for a settlement at the Canal to the two principles about which he spoke, or even to the spirit of Jarring's memorandum of last February, the obstacle remains in place. Let us hope that in the next few days, perhaps in the month of January, the situation will become clear and the obscurity surrounding this speech will be removed.

Q. To what extent do you estimate that Sadat's speech, and what you have said about it, will make Israel take new action or adopt a new attitude in reaction in the diplomatic or practical sphere?

A. As stated, I take into account the fact that Sadat explained to his people that he intended to continue what he calls political activity. This will ensure an Israeli response. However, Sadat's speech cannot be regarded as an abandonment of plans for the resumption of the fight at a later date, whenever he deems it suitable, perhaps after his talks with the Russians. If this speech contains a positive aspect, Israel can say: Let's talk. We know your position; you know ours. Let's talk, and without prior conditions. If there is a more positive tendency in Egypt, this will become clear in the next few days from Egyptian reaction, as will a possibility for resuming talks under Jarring or a possibility for resuming talks about opening the Canal through the services of the United States.

⁶ Interview conducted by Yonadav Navon, broadcast on Israeli Forces Radio in Hebrew; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3890/A/5; reprinted by permission; for Sadat's speech see document no. 176 below.

29

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel on possible moves towards negotiations with Egypt⁷

Mid-January, 1972

Q. Prime Minister Meir, do you discern the signals that Sadat is sending us, signifying that he does not want another war in the Near East?...

A. ...We must be ready for every possibility. However, there is no one in the Government—and I know of no person in Israel—that does not want peace.

I am ready to give Sadat credit, even if he does not deserve it. He did not go to war, that is good—even excellent. Determining the motives for that move is of major importance. Yet, if it were possible to find an agreed-upon formula for agreement we can accept, I would not care why Sadat agreed to it. Naturally, an awareness of Israel's strength would induce him to do so but that does not matter. Signaling? What is that? There is a difference between a yellow and a green traffic light. However, some drivers become confused and drive when the yellow "caution" light is on. As a result, people are killed. We must watch the lights and see when it is permissible to proceed and when travel is forbidden.

Q. What kind of signs are the establishment of Sadat's new Government and the relatively moderate tone of his recent speeches?...

A. The question is whether or not Sadat wants peace. I have not found one serious person who has visited Egypt recently who thinks that Sadat has reconciled himself to Israel's existence. They tell me—and I do not underestimate the importance of this—that due to internal distress, the desire to avoid a confrontation with Israel's army and many other reasons, he is interested in reaching some kind of agreement. But when I ask them point blank whether he has reconciled himself to Israel's existence, they always reply: "no!" Sadat frankly tells them so and they report it to me. I do not say that it is

impossible to reach an agreement that will prevent war, because Sadat has not yet reconciled himself to our existence. I do not say that in order to reach an agreement it is necessary to wait until Sadat, or some other Arab leader, accepts the Zionist philosophy. But we must know what kind of peace is feasible. There is a difference between peace concluded with someone who recognizes your existence and your rights, and a peace concluded with someone who does not reconcile himself to your existence but is not ready to fight you at the time.

Q. ...Has the Government which you head, really done everything possible to achieve a peace that accords Israel recognition and respects its rights, which you do not rule out as a reasonable possibility?

A. Some day it will be possible to tell how many efforts we made to talk with Egypt and other Arab states, even when cold reason and logic indicated that there was not the slightest hope that we would succeed. We tried time and time again—to no avail. Yes, we have done everything possible! But there is no assurance that a peace based on a world outlook like that of Sadat or perhaps all the Arab leaders, is a peace that guarantees the end of wars. Consequently, in such peace it is imperative to guarantee certain things so that we shall not be surprised some day.

Q. Obviously, it is necessary to advance by stages towards any kind of agreement. Is Israel ready to renew the negotiations to achieve a partial agreement with American mediation only on the basis of the known, declared conditions, or are there new Israeli suggestions?

A. I hope that some day my children or grandchildren will enjoy genuine peace and a border that people cross and re-cross in friendship.

Negotiations under American auspices are all right but at present there are no negotiations. At present there is nothing but a Sadat ultimatum regarding the conditions of the partial agreement. For example, the matter of a crossing of the Canal by the Egyptian army: that is not merely a matter of security, it is also proof that Egyptian conditions are unreasonable.⁸ We have not yet begun to speak about a comprehensive peace settlement. We are speaking about a partial agreement that would create an atmosphere of calm in which it would be possible to conduct

⁷ Interview conducted by Dov Goldstein, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv) January 21, 1972, p. 9; excerpted from the partial condensed English translation, *Tadmit Newsletter* (Tel Aviv), II, 16 (February 1, 1972), pp. 6-9.

⁸ See document no. 390 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

negotiations without fearing that the fighting would be resumed. Perhaps in such an atmosphere it would be possible to enhance the chances of peace. But what does Sadat do? He dictates terms to us! He says there must be a Canal crossing by Egyptian military forces and tells Israel's army how far it must pull back, and issues a ukase about how long the cease-fire will continue. Dictated terms—no! Negotiations—certainly. But we cannot and shall not participate in negotiations under duress.

Q. What is the "clarifications" argument with the United States about?

A. I cannot go into detail but I can say that we must reach an understanding with the Americans about a minimum of three or four basic matters before it will be possible to participate in talks under American auspices. We requested explicit clarifications concerning Rogers' six points to prevent a situation from arising in which we find ourselves not only in disagreement with Egypt but also with the United States, a situation in which there is an affinity between the American and Egyptian positions and our position is the minority position. Israel can neither agree to participate in negotiations or actually participate in them under such circumstances. We asked the Americans: Would you please tell us whether or not the Rogers six points are official Government policy? In an interview granted to *U.S. News and World Report*, Rogers said that the six points are not America's position and that the American Government has not yet decided on its positions.⁹ We are in a process of clarifying these subjects with the United States.

Q. In an interview with me Ambassador Rabin called the United States a friend that deserves to be trusted. Is that consistent with your approach to the question of clarifications from the United States?

A. ... I am only saying that it is better to argue and make certain that the conclusions each side draws are perfectly clear than to reach hastily some nebulous agreement and then argue about its interpretation. In such a situation each side says its interpretation is the correct one and the confusion is compounded. It is no calamity if the United States and Israel conduct negotia-

tions and cannot reach agreement rapidly. One bright day Ambassador Jarring suddenly presented a plan to us and said: "That's that, sign it!" After that bitter experience I want to know exactly how the United States regards its role, how it will conduct the negotiations and how it sees the questions in dispute before the talks for an agreement on the Suez Canal are renewed. I believe we shall reach an understanding with the United States.

I agree with Rabin. We must not forget that the United States is the best friend we have. . . .

Q. ... If the clarifications satisfy you, will Israel agree to participate in the "hotel talks"?

A. ... If talks concerning negotiations for a partial agreement satisfy us, we shall agree to participate in them. I do not know whether those talks will necessarily be "hotel talks." We shall decide that question after we receive satisfactory clarifications from the United States. Naturally, this does not mean that we and the Americans will stand shoulder to shoulder against the Egyptians because in that event Sadat would not be ready to participate in negotiations.

Q. Assuming that Israel's talks with the United States turn out favorably, what, in your opinion, are the chances of a partial agreement?

A. We want a partial agreement. The path to a comprehensive settlement is much more complicated and difficult. The Government will make its final decision only after we present it with the results of all the stages of the negotiations. In the event that there is anything in the proposed agreement that is not in keeping with the founding principles of the Government, we shall take the matter to the Knesset and ask for its approval. We want a partial agreement and we are doing what is possible to give it a chance. Most assuredly we shall not do anything to impair Israel's security or status. Our effort is sincere and genuine. I do not know whether we shall succeed in concluding a partial agreement. That depends on whether Sadat really wants such agreement and to what extent he has the authority—and by that I do not merely mean authority in the formal sense of the word—to do so or whether he is the prisoner of his various declarations.

⁹ See document no. 226 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

30

Recommendation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to improve the situation of UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees¹⁰

Strasbourg, January 20, 1972

The Assembly,

1. Recalling its Recommendations 520 (1968) and 566 (1969) on the situation of the refugees in the Middle East, and noting that the lot of the Palestine refugees remains a problem of grave concern;

2. Expressing its gratitude to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA) and to other organizations who, through their assistance to the Palestine refugees, have made a significant humanitarian effort;

3. Considering, however, that relief operations hitherto have not led to any fundamental change in the situation of the refugees nor to any decrease in their numbers, after more than twenty years;

4. Believing that Israel and the Arab States concerned should endeavour to reach a political agreement with a view to bringing about lasting peace in the Middle East and achieving a satisfactory solution to the refugee problem;

5. Considering that, in the absence of a political settlement, the situation of refugees should be reviewed and action taken to reduce their numbers and enable them to resume a normal life;

6. Believing that one of the most effective ways of improving the lot of the refugees is to provide them with vocational training to enable them thereafter to live in normal conditions without recourse to international aid;

7. Considering that unless industrialization is intensified in the host countries, even trained refugees will have difficulty in finding work;

8. Noting that the present structure of UNRWA is not conducive to that body itself implementing projects designed to increase employment for refugees in the host countries, but considering that Council of Europe member States might contribute individually to the economic development of this area,

9. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers invite member governments:

(a) to finance, in agreement with the authorities of the host countries, industrial peaceful projects designed to further the economic development of this area, and at the same time create employment opportunities for refugees;

(b) by means of subsidies or guarantees, to help private industry in member States to carry out schemes, in agreement with the authorities in the host countries, of a nature to create employment from which refugees might derive benefit;

(c) to increase their special financial contributions to UNRWA, with a view to combined aid for education and housing programmes, while requesting that body to expand its own corresponding programmes in collaboration with specialised agencies of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and private foundations in a position to further development projects in the Middle East.

31

Radio interview statements by Israel Defence Minister Dayan commenting on the reduced defence budget¹¹

January 22, 1972

Dayan: The budget we submitted was IL6,000 million and not IL6,500 million. We said we were submitting a budget of IL6,000 million as against IL6,500 million for the previous year. The budget was put at IL5,750 million, of which IL5,300 million will actually be put on the record if the security situation does not get worse, and I hope it will not get worse. I really hope that only IL5,300 million will have to be put on the record. But—and here comes the big but, and I wish I could have said the opposite—but if our anticipated arms procurements materialize—and I hope they will materialize—we shall actually spend in this financial year IL6,250 million or even more, and this provided the firing is not resumed. That is to say, IL6,250

¹⁰ Recommendation 658 (1972) adopted at the 17th sitting of the 23rd session; text supplied, on request, by UNRWA, Beirut.

¹¹ Interview conducted by Nahman Shai, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3897/A/10-11; reprinted by permission.

million compared with IL6,500 million for the previous year. . . . In the final analysis, to my regret, the defence burden on the state will this year again remain over IL6,000 million—IL6,250 million or more—even if the difference is actually paid in the next year, and perhaps it will be possible to postpone payment for future years. This will be something else. In any case, if there is need next year to pay all the debts we are incurring this year and to maintain the Israel Defence Forces at the curtailed level to which we dropped this year, this will mean that next year the defence budget will have to be more than IL7,000 million, because it will have to include next year's budget and payment of debts on account of this year's defence budget.

Q. Would this cut in the budget affect our ability and activity in the sphere of the production of sophisticated weapons systems?

A. No. I am really sorry that, from an absolute standpoint, the reduction is small this year as compared with last year. There are many things we did last year which we are not doing this year. I quote as an example the building of fortifications, and it is possible to give other examples. The principal change is that we are assuming and hoping that the firing will not be resumed. If the firing is resumed, all the cards will be upset. . . .

32

Television interview statements by Israel Minister of Transport and Communications Peres, explaining Soviet intentions in the Middle East¹²

Jerusalem, January 24, 1972

Q. As far as the United States is concerned, it wants to understand, in intelligible terms, its role in the Middle East. Obviously, what we would desire is peace in the Middle East, and what we would also desire is peace

that is not secured at the cost of satellitizing the entire region to the interests of the Soviet Union.

Now, advancing that analysis forward, Americans are entitled to ask the following question: what is it that the Soviet Union intends and to what extent is Israel indispensable to keep that from happening?

A. Well, I think the Soviet Union really intends to take over the Middle East and all its parts, ultimately so.

Q. Take over in what sense—occupy it or merely satellitize it or dominate it, make it like Finland, or what?

A. I think they have in mind two stages. The second stage is that the ground here would be prepared for a sort of social revolution which would bring the nations into the Communist camp. But, until that stage, which is the second one, I think they want to take over the governments and make them as close as they can or as tied as they can to Russian policies, to Russian armies, to Russian navies, and so on and so forth. I think the greatest discovery of communism, politically speaking, was the discovery of the seas, of the oceans, by Lenin; because, basically, Russia was a territorial country—I mean a country which had a feeling for land, not for sea. Today, you have the Russian navy; it's all over other places. There is a competition between Soviet Russia and the United States of America over who is the most successful power in our age, who is the better mortal, socially speaking. I think the indication of the winner is simply the number of nations or the number of people who are moving from one side to another side.

So, the Soviet Russians can really demonstrate that the whole Arab world, the African nations, the Asian nations, are leaving, so to speak, the Western part, and going over to the Eastern block. This is a demonstration of their success, for their own people and for the outside world. Then, they think, "Okay, these people are still religious; they are backward; they are not ready for communist ideology, but the day will come and they will be."

Q. How will Israel stand in the way of that operation?

A. First of all, by demonstrating the imperfection of the Russian infiltration. You see, you can import from Soviet Russia a tank or a gun, but you can't import from Soviet Russia a quality

¹² Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by William F. Buckley, Jr., "Israel: War or Peace?", *Firing Line*, Southern Educational Communications Association (broadcast on Public Broadcasting Service, February 13, 1972), p. 3.

or a parliament or an institution or a strength. You buy arms from Soviet Russia, all the planes and all the tanks, and hear all the speeches made by the Soviet Russians—in spite of that, you can see a free, small little nation standing on its own feet, which is inferior in numbers and poorer in arms, still sticking to its guns, holding its territories, not losing its nerve. Now, one should never forget that Israel is not alone; I mean, what will happen to Israel, in the final analysis, will happen to Jordan, will happen to Lebanon; or, if you want, in a way, will happen also to Persia, to Turkey. Most of the people in the Middle East are neither Arabs nor even Moslems, so they don't appear as a camp, and they are not as strong propaganda-wise. But they are here and they are watching very carefully what's happening to Israel, and how Israel stands.

33

Recommendations to the Twenty-eighth Zionist Congress by its Committees¹³

Jerusalem, late January, 1972

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

A. ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP LEAGUES

The Congress calls upon the Zionist Executive:

1. To give full support and active assistance to all Israel Friendship Leagues and Friendship Leagues with Israel in other countries in promoting the establishment of new Friendship Leagues or by what other name they are called in countries where they do not already exist and widening the scope of activities of those in existence at present.

2. To maintain contact and collaborate with non-governmental international bodies and organizations in order to widen the scope of information in regard to Israel and Zionism.

3. To collaborate with representative groupings in Israel in the professional, educational and cultural fields, as well as with service organizations, all of which maintain active contact with parallel institutions and kindred organizations abroad, strengthening relationships between Israel and other countries.

4. To extend the activities connected with Christian and other ecclesiastical groups in relation to the significance and meaning of Zionism and Israel.

5. To promote in every possible way the special publications appearing in various countries by the Friendship Leagues with Israel and other pro-Israel circles.

The Congress calls upon Zionist Federations:

a) To establish special committees where these are not already in existence, which will widen the scope of information available to non-Jewish personalities and organizations, including intellectuals, writers and artists, academics, politicians, and pro-Israel organizations generally.

b) To extend the efforts already being made in acquainting the clergy of all religious denominations with the significance and meaning of Zionism and Israel.

B. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. By meeting in Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Israel, on the 75th anniversary of the First Congress, the 28th Zionist Congress demonstrates its full identification with the State of Israel in its struggles, aspirations and ideals. Congress stresses the centrality of the State of Israel not only in the life of the Jewish people as such, but also in the life of every individual Jew.

2. Congress declares that the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael is inalienable. In the Six Day War the aggressors were beaten back. The land of our fathers was liberated and Jerusalem again became a united city.

3. The 28th Zionist Congress fully supports Israel's fight for a just and lasting peace with secure borders, and reaffirms the necessity of establishing true peace in the Middle East, thus opening a new area of prosperity and creativity for all peoples of the region. True peace can be achieved only by free negotiations between the parties, without prior conditions, and it must be based on binding peace treaties providing for agreed and secure boundaries.

¹³ English text of the recommendations as published in *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), I, 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 175–200; the last section, ELECTIONS, has been omitted. The Congress was held January 18–28, 1972.

The text of the resolutions as finally adopted was not available at the time of going to press.

4. The 28th Zionist Congress welcomes the continuing cease-fire between Egypt and Israel and is convinced that this situation must continue as a pre-condition for making progress towards the ultimate attainment of a meaningful and lasting peace. At the same time, the Zionist Congress expresses its concern about the belligerent proclamations and attitudes of the Arab leaders, primarily of the Egyptian leadership, thus generating a war-like atmosphere.

5. The 28th Zionist Congress declares that, in order to secure peace in the Middle East, it is essential that Israel's full capacity for self-defence be ensured, in view of the continuing massive supply of offensive weaponry to Egypt by the USSR and the intensification of Soviet involvement and active Russian military assistance to Egypt and to other Arab countries. The 28th Zionist Congress urges those countries in favour of stability and peace in the region to supply further defensive arms to Israel to enable her to prevent and resist aggression.

6. The 28th Zionist Congress affirms the principle of the freedom of religion and worship for all religions. Recognizing the universal religious significance of Jerusalem, Congress notes with satisfaction that since its unification the entire population of Jerusalem has been living together in peace and amity, in a spirit of cooperation and harmony, with full freedom of worship and free access to the Holy Places accorded to the members of all faiths.

C. THE JEWS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES

The 28th Zionist Congress expresses the grave concern of the whole Jewish people for those of its brethren still languishing in the Arab States. Congress records its profound alarm about the fate of the vestiges of the Jewish communities still remaining in these countries, where they are held as hostages, as highlighted by the persistent news of the humiliation and oppression of the Jews in Syria.

With severe restrictions imposed on personal freedom and movement, on cultural, religious and community life, on economic activity, with evidence of arbitrary arrests, prolonged interrogations and physical and mental torture, the life of the Jews of Syria has become intolerable.

The 28th Zionist Congress proclaims that the Jewish people, as well as supporters of justice throughout the world, will continue to fight for the

human rights of the Jews of Syria and other Arab countries in which Jews are persecuted and for the right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for any citizen freely to leave any country of residence in accordance with the fundamental principles of international justice.

The 28th Zionist Congress conveys its appreciation to those governments and international agencies, as well as to individual leaders in the intellectual, religious and political spheres, who have spoken out on behalf of our persecuted brethren. Congress calls upon them to persist in this humanitarian struggle to bring an end to oppression and persecution of those imprisoned and to procure their release and freedom.

D. The 28th Zionist Congress urges the government of West Germany to include within the framework of personal reparations those Jews who were persecuted by the Nazis during their conquest in Europe, but only recently received permission to leave.

The Congress believes that those who were persecuted but, despite all their efforts, did not succeed in emigrating until 1965, should not be prejudiced. It would be right that all those people should also benefit from the payment of personal reparations as provided by the West German government to the other persecuted Jews.

E. RESOLUTION ON SOVIET JEWRY

The 28th Zionist Congress recognizes with profound admiration the extraordinary struggle of Russian Jewry to return to their historical homeland in Israel as an outstanding phenomenon in Jewish life. This heroic manifestation of Jewish rebirth and identification is welcomed as an inspiration to the Jewish people to return to their cultural and national inheritance in the Land of Israel. Congress realizes that the expansion of aliya from USSR is the result of a great common struggle on the part of the Jews in the USSR, of the entire Jewish people, and of the world at large, and expresses its gratitude to the progressive and humanitarian forces in the world who have raised their voices on behalf of justice and human rights.

Congress notes the increase in aliya from the USSR in recent months, but asserts that this development does not indicate that the USSR have changed their basic policy of denying to the Jews of the USSR the right to aliya to Israel. Congress appeals to the Soviet Union to respond to

the call of the Jewish people—"Let My People Go."

Congress protests against the anti-Zionist campaign waged by the USSR, deplores and condemns the acts of discrimination in the USSR against Jews as a people and as individuals.

The 28th Zionist Congress protests against the manifestations of oppression and defamation against Jews who express their desire to go to Israel, and requests the government of the USSR to cease from their practice of dismissal of such persons from their employment, and their expulsion from universities, and to annul the oppressive requirement of payment of an emigration tax and other difficulties placed in the way of those who wish to go to Israel from the Soviet Union.

Congress directs itself to the Jewish people in Israel and in the Diaspora, as well as to all other people throughout the world, to continue and increase the struggle for the right of every Jew in the USSR to go to Israel whenever he may wish to do so, and not to rest, not be silent, until the release of every Jew imprisoned in the USSR on account of his wish to go to Israel has been achieved.

Congress sends out a message of solidarity and encouragement to all those who are languishing in prisons as a result of their courageous struggle on behalf of Jewish rights, and pledges its unceasing support of the Prisoners of Zion in their fight for justice and freedom.

COMMITTEE FOR ALIYA AND ABSORPTION

1. ALIYA AS THE CENTRE OF ACTIVITIES OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

In view of the fact that aliya is the quintessence of the Zionist Movement, the Congress declares that the task of creating an aliya consciousness among the Jewish masses in the Diaspora must be the centre of Zionist activities.

Along with the miraculous phenomenon of the increasing aliya from the USSR the Congress believes that all the Jewish communities in the free countries should intensify aliya, particularly at this crucial hour, in order to take part in the task of the ingathering of our people.

The 28th Zionist Congress declares its deep satisfaction with the intensification of aliya from the entire Diaspora and calls upon the Zionist Executive to continue a ceaseless struggle on behalf of immigration of Jews from all countries and regimes.

2. a. USSR JEWRY

The Congress warmly welcomes the beginnings of immigration from the Soviet Union and calls upon the Government of Israel to set in motion all the necessary preparations, mainly in the fields of housing, employment, vocational training and education in order to absorb the hundreds of thousands of olim who hopefully may immigrate. Congress calls upon the Government of Israel to encourage and assist the olim in settling throughout the country thus fulfilling their Zionist aspirations.

b. GEORGIAN JEWRY

The Georgian Jewry was among the first to wage the struggle for immigration and to preserve the spark of Judaism, under a regime of severe repression. Due to the special nature of this aliya, its problems deserve special attention. The Aliya and Klita authorities¹⁴ are requested to adopt such absorption methods as to conform to the social, religious and traditional aspirations of this aliya. Their good absorption requires that they be settled, as communities, in centres all over the country.

3. FOSTERING OF IMMIGRATION

a. The members and leaders of the Zionist Movement are called upon to use all the means at their disposal to encourage the present and future flow of aliya in their communities, especially through the intensification and the expansion of Jewish education.

b. As a step towards the personal fulfilment of the members of the Zionist movement, the Congress calls upon every parent to send at least one member of his family on aliya so that he may serve as a forerunner.

c. The Congress calls upon the Executive to continue its activities for the fostering of aliya and to initiate new programmes, as for example those which would develop a direct link between Israelis and Jews all over the world toward the end that the message of aliya be spread across the length and breadth of the Jewish world.

Attention should be paid to circulating maximum absorption information so that potential olim can make short and long range planning for their aliya.

d. The Congress views with favour the initiation

¹⁴ The Aliya and Klita authorities deal with immigration and absorption problems respectively.

of projects in the sphere of tourism to Israel for the encouragement of aliya, and the continuation of the Tour Vaaleh programme, the organization of tours, seminars and various investment programmes in Israel. It recommends that the possibility of setting up joint projects with the Ministries of Absorption and Tourism be explored.

4. ALIYA MOVEMENTS

a. The Congress congratulates the aliya movements on their development in recent years as a driving force in aliya.

The Congress calls upon the Executive to do its utmost to strengthen the aliya movement; to impose upon it the important task of imparting Zionist education to potential olim before their aliya so as to assure their successful absorption in the country. The aliya movement will foster pioneering settlement in border settlements, in the kibbutzim and moshavim and will support the programme of cooperative group settlements established on the basis of the wishes of the olim. The Congress calls upon the Executive and the Government offices to offer all possible assistance for these purposes.

b. The Congress believes that the aliya movement should be guaranteed the necessary means for its activities and for its development.

5. OLIM ASSOCIATIONS

The Congress confirms its former resolution (Resolution No. 31 of the 27th Congress) which stated: "The Congress recommends that the social absorption of olim be achieved with the active assistance of volunteer activities of Israelis. The olim associations should be an integral part of every authority dealing with the planning of aliya and social and economic absorption."

In view of the importance of the above resolution which has not yet been implemented in full, the Congress calls upon the Zionist Executive for prompt action to fulfil the spirit and the letter of this resolution.

6. ACTIVITIES OF THE ALIYA AND KLITA AUTHORITIES

The Congress expresses its appreciation to all those who are active in the framework of immigration and absorption, highlights their efforts which have been exerted in this work and urges them to continue to improve their services on behalf of the olim.

A. SHLICHIM¹⁵

The Congress congratulates the shlichim on their work. In view of the various needs involved in the planning of aliya, the Aliya Department is requested to appoint suitable shlichim capable of relating to the professional, social and religious needs of the olim in their area.

B. INCENTIVES

The Congress recommends to the joint authority of Aliya and Klita the continuation of incentives which will serve as effective encouragement for aliya. Should there be any change of incentive benefits, consideration should be given for a reasonable period of time to the rights of those who have already made preparations for aliya on the old incentives.

C. TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATIONS

1. The Congress views with great satisfaction the valuable activities of absorption centres, hostels and ulpanim and calls upon the Executive to increase and strengthen them to meet the present needs of increased aliya.

2. The Congress calls upon the Executive to continue to preserve Kashrut in all the Aliya and Klita institutions, and to see that there is no public desecration of the Shabbat and Jewish holidays in these places.

3. A great many olim have, in their countries of origin, been deprived of Jewish studies and of learning about Jewish tradition and Zionism. In order to reaffirm their Jewish and Zionist consciousness, the Absorption institutions must offer them not only a programme of Jewish and Zionist studies but must also create a Jewish and Israeli climate in which the Shabbat and holiday customs and spirit are preserved.

4. The Immigration and Absorption Department, in coordination with the Ministry of Absorption, is called upon to take appropriate steps to make possible the professional training and retraining of olim in the absorption centres, in addition to their Hebrew studies.

D. HOUSING

1. In preparation for an influx of hundreds of thousands of olim, the Congress calls upon the Government of Israel to make widespread prepara-

¹⁵ Shlichim: Zionist "envoys" who reside for a period in countries with sizeable Jewish communities in order to encourage their emigration to Israel.

tions and to gather all the necessary resources to enable the State to provide for this aliya. The Congress considers the plan of the Ministry of Absorption to provide 50,000 housing units, and to plan for an additional 100,000 units, a mission which should be carried out without delay.

2. Congress calls upon the Jewish world to gather the financial resources, knowledge, equipment and manpower to help realize the housing plans.

3. The Congress recommends spending for the construction of rental housing for olim throughout the country.

4. Special attention should be given to the problem of housing for single, young and old olim.

E. EMPLOYMENT

The Congress calls on the Aliya and Klita authorities to find solutions to the employment problems of olim and recommends the following:

1. Long range employment planning by extending working opportunities in existing fields and by creating new ones.

2. Retraining of immigrants whose professions are not in demand under existing conditions in Israel and, insofar as possible, it is recommended that this process be started while still in the country of origin.

3. Regular issuing of forecasts indicating the employment openings which will be available at stated periods, this to serve as a guide to the oleh in the planning of his aliya.

4. The Congress instructs the executive to ensure that Sabbath-observing olim are not prevented from obtaining work because of their beliefs and observances.

F. INFORMATION

The Congress demands that every immigrant be given full and accurate information, written in his native language, concerning existing services in the fields of education, health, national insurance, etc.

G. SOCIAL SERVICES

The Congress notes with satisfaction the social services given to the oleh, and urges improvement of these services and their continuation during the entire three-year period of olim rights.

7. DEVELOPMENT PLANS

The Congress calls upon the Aliya and Klita authorities to prepare such enlarged development

programmes as will be commensurate with the increasing tides of immigration, and to mobilize all the necessary resources and encourage initiatives towards this end.

The Congress instructs the Zionist Executive in conjunction with the Government to offer immigrants who settle in development areas preferred conditions.

8. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

The Congress notes with satisfaction the establishment of religious communities and calls for a continuation of this trend.

9. YOUTH AND STUDENTS

a. *Youth*

The Congress calls upon the absorption authorities and the Ministry of Education to pay special attention to the children of olim within the temporary accommodations and schools. Special programmes must be arranged in order to enhance their understanding of the country and its culture. Special help must be given them to facilitate their integration into classes and into the society of their classmates.

b. *Students*

The Congress is in favour of the activities carried out in the area of absorbing students and youth within learning frameworks. The Congress calls upon the educational institutions and the Education and Culture Ministry to make preparations for the absorption of the increased immigration of students and youth.

10. SOCIAL ABSORPTION

In order to give momentum to the social integration of the increasing streams of immigration from both East and West, the Congress believes that a suitable climate must be created in the country for this purpose. This should be achieved through the cooperation of Government, Jewish Agency and Zionist Organization, Labour Organizations, the Associations of Olim, Women's Organizations and other voluntary groups.

11. ABSORPTION OF PRISONERS OF ZION AND VETERAN ZIONIST LEADERS

a. The Zionist Movement hails the contribution of the Prisoners of Zion to the Zionist struggle and urges that steps be taken for their absorption and that arrangements be finalized for their pensions.

b. The 28th Zionist Congress reaffirms the resolution of the Zionist Executive Committee

of July 1, 1971, which states: "The Zionist Executive Committee notes with satisfaction the increased immigration of veteran leaders in the Zionist movement, and recognizes a need for special care in order to facilitate their absorption in housing suitable to their particular needs." The Congress urges the Absorption Ministry to implement this resolution, following its approval by the Congress.

12. ABSORPTION OF ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS

The Congress recommends establishment of a special fund for absorbing artists and intellectuals.

13. INTERNAL IMMIGRATION

The Congress instructs the Zionist Executive to concern itself with the subject of internal immigration and to bring a systematic and detailed plan to the next meeting of the Zionist Executive Committee after the present Congress.

14. REHABILITATION IN SPECIAL CASES

The Congress charges the Executive with the task of rehabilitating special cases of olim who, for objective reasons, have failed to be integrated and whose regular eligibility for assistance has expired.

15. AID TO LARGE FAMILIES

The Congress instructs the Zionist Executive to investigate possibilities for providing aid to large families in order to facilitate their absorption.

COMMITTEE FOR YOUTH ALIYA

A. The 28th Zionist Congress applauds the achievements of Youth Aliya in the years since the 27th Congress and urges the continuation and expansion of those efforts in the following spheres:

1. Bringing youngsters without their parents to Israel from affluent countries and from countries of distress.

2. The educational absorption of these children and the children of new immigrants.

3. The cultural and educational absorption of disadvantaged Israeli children.

B. 1. The Congress affirms the resolution adopted by the Zionist General Council in July 1969: "The primary task of Youth Aliya is to bring Jewish children from the Diaspora to Israel and to look after their integration and education in its affiliated institutions. Faced with the danger of

assimilation which is threatening Jewish children in the Diaspora, Youth Aliya must invest its best efforts in rescuing them by bringing them to Israel."

2. The Congress notes with satisfaction that the education provided at the various institutions affiliated with Youth Aliya has helped trainees to find their places in Israeli society, has helped them develop into good citizens and taught them skills that make them an asset to their country. Tens of thousands of youngsters have received the benefits of this training.

3. The Congress calls upon Youth Aliya to intensify its efforts in encouraging and promoting aliya of youngsters from affluent countries and calls upon the World Zionist Executive to make available the funds for the full development of this programme.

C. 1. The Congress welcomes and supports Youth Aliya's decision to absorb within the next two years an additional 4,600 disadvantaged Israeli children into its framework as a first step in an expanded programme. The Congress expresses its conviction that Youth Aliya's extensive experience in rehabilitation of disadvantaged children will, through this programme, make a valuable contribution to the solution of the problems of poverty, to the bridging of social gaps and to the social and educational advancement of these disadvantaged boys and girls.

2. The Congress calls upon the institutions of the Zionist Organization to increase their assistance to Youth Aliya to ensure the success of this programme. This assistance will provide for much needed additional dormitories, educational, social and recreational facilities, and for research and experiment in the education field.

3. The Congress reaffirms Youth Aliya's long-standing policy of assuring each individual child the education required by his religious background through placement in appropriate institutions, youth villages, kibbutzim and day centres.

D. The Congress considers it necessary to make available to Youth Aliya a budget that will enable it to provide for the full needs of maintaining Youth Aliya's wards in kibbutzim, youth villages and other institutions.

E. The Congress expresses its appreciation to all organizations the world over for their outstanding efforts and continued support on behalf of Youth Aliya.

COMMITTEE ON THE ZIONIST FEDERATIONS

1. TASKS INCUMBENT ON THE ZIONIST FEDERATION AT THE PRESENT TIME

The 28th Zionist Congress notes with satisfaction the manifestation of a renewed Zionist democracy which found expression in the success of the World Membership Drive, carried through in 44 countries, which enrolled in the ranks of the Zionist Movement more than 900,000 members. Furthermore, it is gratified with the fact that, for the first time in many years, democratic elections to the Zionist Congress were conducted in 23 countries.

This new reality obliges the Zionist Federations and their affiliates in all countries to transform the large number of sympathizers with the Zionist Movement into full and active members and to fulfil more energetically the tasks in the various important fields of activity of the Federations, so as to render the Zionist Movement a central force both in the Life of the Jewish people as a whole and in the life of every Jewish community. In this way the Zionist Movement will become the effective medium for the implementation of the Zionist idea.

The Territorial Zionist Federations embrace all Zionists in their respective countries who personally subscribe to the Jerusalem Programme and pay a membership fee to the Federations directly or through their constituent organizations.

The Zionist Territorial Federations are the unified and comprehensive framework within which all organizations and institutions cooperate in order to plan and carry out the Zionist functions which are held in common by all of them.

2. PROGRAMME FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ZIONIST FEDERATION

The Zionist Congress calls upon the Zionist Federations to examine, strengthen and improve their structure, organization and methods of work. Each Federation must work out and implement short and long-term comprehensive plans and the Zionist Executive must extend its full assistance to the Federations in the implementation of these plans.

The Congress reiterates that each Zionist Federation must convene territorial conferences at fixed intervals—at least one every two years—likewise set up its governing bodies (such as territorial councils, executive, etc.) in keeping with local conditions and the requirements of its

work, and to incorporate in its constitution the system of elections to such institutions. In addition to the affiliated Zionist organizations, suitable representation must be given to the National Funds, the aliya movement, and affiliated organizations of the young generation and students, the young adult generation and the young adult sections of the parties, youth movements, women's organizations and similar bodies.

Each Federation should set up regional and local Federations wherever possible to carry out programmes of the Federations in their respective communities within which all organizations and institutions cooperate in order to plan and carry out their common Zionist tasks.

Each Zionist Federation and affiliated organizations shall conduct periodically a territorial Membership Drive, utilizing all the media of Zionist ideological information. Such Membership Drives must be conducted both through the medium of organizations affiliated to the Federation and directly by the Federation.

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERATION AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ZIONIST EXECUTIVE

a) Every Territorial Zionist Federation which shoulders responsibility for the implementation of the function of the Zionist Movement in its respective country shall be recognized by the Zionist Executive as the central and authorized institution in all matters affecting Zionist activities. The Congress decides that the functions and activities of the W.Z.O. shall gradually be transferred to the Federations in the various countries. Discussions with the Executive on this arrangement shall be started now, and the Executive shall report to the next session of the Zionist General Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution.

b) In each Territorial Federation there shall function committees (departments) charged with functions parallel to those of the Departments of the Zionist Executive. Members of the Federation Executive shall act as Chairmen of the various committees, assuming responsibility for the sphere of activity of each committee.

c) The Shlichim of the Departments of the Zionist Executive shall regard themselves as part of the Territorial Zionist Federation and participate in the work of the relevant committees of the Federation. The principal Shaliach of each department shall be responsible together with the Chair-

man of the committee for the sphere of activity of the committee to which he is attached, and it is desirable for him to act as co-ordinator of such a committee and as director of the relevant department of the Federation. By virtue of such duty, he shall participate in the meetings of the Executive of the Federation in an advisory capacity.

d) Wherever a number of Shlichim function, they shall constitute a team, headed by the representative of the Zionist Executive accredited to such a country. The representative of the Zionist Executive will maintain regular contact with the Chairman of the Federation and participate in the meetings of the Federation's Executive in an advisory capacity.

e) The Departments of the Executive shall decide on the annual budget for their activities in each country, in consultation with the Executive of the Federation and the principal Shaliach. The Executive shall ensure full co-ordination in so far as the budgetary allocations of the various departments for their activities in each country are concerned. The Federation shall receive full information on the budget and its implementation.

f) The Zionist Executive, in consultation with the Zionist Federation, shall determine when the above proposals shall become effective, taking into consideration the organizational conditions in each country. The Executive shall issue directives for the implementation of the above arrangements in stages, in accordance with the prevailing conditions in each country.

g) The Executive should consult with the Territorial Federations concerned in all matters relating to contact and cooperative efforts with local Jewish Organizations.

4. FINANCING OF FEDERATION ACTIVITIES

It is the duty of the Zionist Federation to make every effort to finance its activities from their own resources, including membership fees payable by all members of the Federation.

5. FEDERATION STAFF

The Congress calls on the Zionist Executive to assist Federations in providing professional and ideological training programmes for the Federation staff, both in Israel and in the countries concerned.

6. THE YOUNG GENERATION IN THE ZIONIST FEDERATION

The Congress makes it obligatory upon the Zionist Movement in all countries to employ every possible means—informational, organizational and constitutional—in order to attract and make possible the participation of new forces from among the young generation in Zionist activity. Emphasis should be placed on gathering those new elements from among the young adult generation, enlisting them in Zionist activity within the framework of the Federations and Zionist Organizations, and enabling them to fulfil responsible functions in the Executive institutions of the Federation.

Cognizant of the fact that the co-operation of the young adult generation is vital for the future of the Zionist Organization of the Territorial Federations, the Congress instructs the Executive to strengthen and develop the activities in this field and to see to it that the necessary means for this activity are placed at its disposal. The Executive is instructed to report to the Zionist General Council, at the next session, on progress made in this direction.

The Congress calls on the Executive and the Federations to set up a suitable framework to serve, encourage and guide the activities of the young adult generation and the young adult sections of the Zionist parties, and to place at their disposal adequate budgets and Shlichim.

The Congress requests the Zionist Executive and the Federation to consult with the representatives of the young adult generation and the young adult sections in all matters pertaining to the promotion and expansion of activities in this field.

7. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TERRITORIAL ZIONIST FEDERATION IN JEWISH COMMUNAL LIFE

The Territorial Federation is obliged to ensure the regular course of communal life; the inculcation of the Zionist spirit into the cultural and educational activities of the community; the strengthening of ties with the State of Israel; and to assure the centrality of Israel in the community's life.

8. PARTICIPATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ZIONIST GENERAL COUNCIL IN ZIONIST ACTIVITY

Each member of the Zionist General Council is obliged actively to participate in the work of the Zionist Organization in his country of

residence. The Congress recommends that the various groupings shall ensure that their representatives on the Zionist General Council shall be Zionists who occupy a leadership role in the activities of the Territorial Federations.

9. THE DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL ZIONIST

The following obligations stem from the tasks and functions embraced in the Jerusalem Programme and from membership in the Zionist Organization:

- a) To realize his aliya to Israel.
- b) To be an active member of the Territorial Zionist Organization.
- c) To endeavour to implement the programme of the Zionist Movement.
- d) To study Hebrew, to give his children a Jewish education, and to bring them up towards aliya and Zionist self-fulfilment.
- e) To contribute and to be active on behalf of the Zionist funds and to actively participate in the consolidation of Israel's economy.
- f) To play an active role in the life of his community and its institutions, and to endeavour to ensure its democratic nature, to strengthen Zionist influence within the community, and to intensify Jewish education.
- g) To work for the defence of Jewish rights in the Diaspora.

The Federations shall make every effort to inculcate a consciousness of these duties among their members and to demand from Zionist leaders to set a personal example in their implementation.

10. ADMITTANCE OF NEW MEMBER OF THE W.Z.O.

In accordance with Art. 5, sec. 1 (a) of the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization and upon the proposal of the Executive, the Congress resolves to admit the Zionist Organization of Paraguay as a Member of the World Zionist Organization.

LEGAL MATTERS

1. APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

The Zionist Congress resolves to charge the Executive with appointing, after consultation with the Presidium of the Zionist General Council, a committee consisting of public personalities and legal experts which shall examine the Constitution and Regulations for its implementation in view of the developments and requirements of the Move-

ment after the promulgation of the Constitution, and shall draft proposals for amendments of the Constitution and the Regulations.

The Congress recommends in particular that this committee shall consider the matter of determining the Congress representation of Israel.

The committee shall submit its recommendation to the Zionist General Council for deliberation and decision.

2. AUTHORIZATION OF THE ZIONIST GENERAL COUNCIL TO DECIDE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

In accordance with Articles 15 and 64 of the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization, Congress authorizes the Council to decide on amendments to the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization.

3. ADMISSION OF THE MACCABI WORLD UNION AS MEMBER OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

In accordance with Art. 5, Sec. 4 of the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization, Congress resolves to admit the Maccabi World Union as member of the W.Z.O. and in accordance with Art. 15 of the Constitution, the Congress authorizes the Executive to determine the conditions for the participation of the Maccabi World Union in the Congress, the General Council and other bodies of the W.Z.O., including the nature of its representation and the number of its representatives.

4. ADMISSION OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF SEPHARDIC COMMUNITIES

In accordance with Art. 5, Sec. 4 of the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization, Congress resolves to admit the World Federation of Sephardic Communities as member of the W.Z.O. and in accordance with Art. 15 of the Constitution, the Congress authorizes the Executive to determine the conditions for the participation of the World Federation of Sephardic Communities in the Congress, the General Council and other bodies of the W.Z.O., including the nature of its representation and the number of its representatives.

5. REPRESENTATION OF THE ISRAEL ZIONIST COUNCIL IN THE GENERAL COUNCIL

Congress resolves to charge the Executive and the Presidium of the General Council with determining together the representation of the Israel Zionist Council.

6. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

Congress resolves in accordance with Article 64 of the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization that the maximum number of the Members of the Congress Tribunal stated in Article 47 of the Constitution shall be 30.

COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENT AND LAND DEVELOPMENT

A. EXPANSION OF THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAMME

1. The 28th Zionist Congress notes with satisfaction and appreciation the achievements of the Settlement Department which since the Six Day War has established over 50 new settlements throughout the country and along its borders. Congress conveys the best wishes of the Zionist Organization to all the new settlers, in mountains and valleys, the Aravah and along the border.

2. Congress is pleased to note that 284 agricultural settlements have attained economic, organizational and social independence, and approves of the Settlement Department's plans for the consolidation of additional settlements. The Congress wishes to see all the settlements firmly consolidated by the time the next Congress convenes.

3. While noting the achievements made so far, Congress considers it essential that the settlement programme be vigorously pursued as a basis for the rebuilding of the land, the dispersal of Israel's population, the strengthening of her economy, the conservation of her social values and the security of her borders.

B. MANPOWER AND ABSORPTION PROBLEMS IN THE SETTLEMENTS

1. Congress notes with satisfaction the absorption in rural settlements of almost ten thousand olim who have arrived since the Six Day War. At the same time Congress expresses concern at the diminishing potential for rural settlement, despite the growth of the country's population.

2. Congress regards it as a focal goal of the Zionist Organization to attract olim to the rural settlements and calls upon the Settlement, Youth and Hechalutz, Education, Immigration and Absorption and Information Departments to make a concerted effort to this end.

3. Congress calls upon youth and the younger generation in Israel and the Diaspora to regard settlement as a primary challenge, to set up

pioneering settlement core groups, enlist in Nahal units and join those yeshiva students who are fulfilling the commandment of settling the Land of Israel.

The Zionist Executive is called upon to provide material assistance for the organization of settlement core groups among young Israelis and olim.

4. Congress welcomes the programmes of the Settlement Department for second-generation settlers, making provisions for them by diversifying the range of employment in the rural areas and integrating industry within the organic village structure.

5. Congress notes with satisfaction the announcement of the settlement organizations to the effect that they are able, within the existing settlements and on the basis of the present infrastructure, to take in thousands of additional families, and calls upon the competent agencies to step up the housing programme in the various settlements to facilitate the integration of these families.

6. Congress notes that the settlement authority will help every settlement agency and every suitable social group willing to settle on the land.

C. THE KEREN KAYEMET AND LAND DEVELOPMENT

1. The Congress notes with appreciation the report of the Keren Kayemet recording its achievements in the fields of land reclamation, building roads in rural and wooded areas since the Six Day War. Congress regards the systematic land development carried out by the Keren Kayemet as a pre-condition for the expansion of rural settlement.

2. Congress approves of the Keren Kayemet's land development programme for 1972-75 and calls upon the Zionist Organization to make available to the Keren Kayemet all the financial resources required for the development of new areas for Jewish settlement and for expanding the land base of the mountain and border settlements.

COMMITTEE ON THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ORGANIZED WORLD JEWRY

1. a) The Congress takes cognizance of the wide range of present co-operation between the World Zionist Organization and Jewish bodies which are internationally active in the political, educational and religious fields. Congress notes, however,

that such co-operation, and the relationships between the organizations concerned and the World Zionist Organization are frequently of an *ad hoc* nature. Congress expresses the view that a greater degree of planning and co-ordination are necessary in regard to policy and practical work and believes that in many cases co-operation between the bodies concerned could be intensified to their mutual benefit. Congress therefore instructs the incoming Executive to make a detailed study of the existing relationships between the Zionist Organization and internationally active Jewish bodies with a view to achieving closer co-operation and co-ordination in every sphere of Zionist interest.

b) In this regard the Congress requests that special consideration be given to the World Jewish Congress, a body which was brought into existence with the support of the Zionist Movement and the functions of which are in many fields related and interlinked.

c) Congress believes that in the field of Jewish cultural activity there is a special need for the Zionist Movement to initiate a continuing process of consultation and co-operation on the highest level between major Jewish bodies throughout the Jewish world in order to consider together both the ends and the means necessary to enhance effectively the cultural standards of Jewish life.

2. Congress instructs the executive that wherever it is represented at international Jewish conventions every effort should be made to put the Zionist point of view forcibly and to ensure that it prevails; and to this end it considers it essential that the representatives of the Executive and of the Zionist Movement generally should consult together before and if necessary during such conventions, in order to frame a common line of policy.

3. In those countries where there exists a national overall representative Jewish organization, close co-operation should be established with such a body to make more effective all Israel-orientated activity.

4. Congress instructs the incoming Executive to ensure that all territorial Zionist organizations and individual members of the Zionist Movement use their influence with the Jewish international, national and local organizations and associations which operate in the political, religious, youth, educational, welfare, cultural or social fields, in order to make them more and more Israel-oriented

in accordance with the principle of the centrality of Israel in Jewish life.

THE INFORMATION COMMITTEE

INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

For information to be effective, it must be carried out in close collaboration with organizational measures. The ideological evaluation and the membership drive that preceded the 28th Congress have shown that the enlistment of new members and the activation and consolidation of the Zionist Organization can only be achieved by co-operation between its information and organization agencies.

Zionist information should also be extended beyond the organized ranks of the movement to embrace those who are searching for their Jewish identity as well as members of the Left and liberals who have become alienated from the Jewish people, and information programmes should be developed and actively pursued among various religious circles in order to bring them into the Zionist fold.

To ensure the continuity of Zionist leadership, priority should be given to programmes designed for the younger generation and more intensive information campaigns should be conducted among scientists, students and members of the liberal professions.

The Zionist Federations together with the Organization and Information Department and other Departments concerned should set up research and information centres on matters relating to the Jewish people, organize seminars for lecturers and various circles, and maintain contact with those who shape public opinion.

The experience of the numerous seminars held for youth movement delegates, students and university people in Israel under the auspices of the Organization and Information Department in collaboration with the Zionist Federations has shown that these seminars are a most effective information medium and that the relevant programme should be expanded.

Congress stresses the need to promote and increase the circulation of the Zionist press in the Diaspora and the periodicals published in Israel for the Diaspora. Encouragement should be given to the press catering to the younger generation and to student programmes and the Zionist Federations are called upon to intensify their

contacts with representatives of the Jewish press.

Congress approves of the publications issued by the Organization and Information Department in collaboration with other Departments, such as "In the Diaspora," "Sources of National Thought," "Confrontations," Zionist paperbacks and others, and recommends the continuation and expansion of this literary programme.

In view of the growing importance of the mass communications media, the Zionist Organization is urged to develop modern information programmes including various audio-visual programmes (films and exhibitions).

ISRAEL'S BROADCASTS TO THE DIASPORA AND TO ISRAEL

1. The Congress conveys its appreciation to the Broadcasting Authority on establishing immediate contacts with the Jewish people in the Diaspora by means of various foreign-language broadcasts. The broadcasts to the USSR will go on record as a historic achievement.

2. Congress considers the expansion of the broadcasts a matter of paramount importance and urgency. The expansion should apply to French-language broadcasts for French-speaking Jews and to the broadcasts to Latin America. The Congress recommends that the resources required for this purpose be assured.

3. Congress attaches importance to the broadcasts of Kol Zion Lagola dealing with the inculcation of Jewish traditional values, especially in those countries where Jewish educational activities have been outlawed. Congress recommends the establishment, at the Zionist Organization, of a special committee to draw up detailed proposals for the implementation of this project.

Likewise the Congress attaches special importance to imparting Jewish and Zionist values to the residents of Israel by means of the Israeli broadcasting network, special emphasis being placed on programmes for the younger generation.

THE JEWISH PRESS

The 28th Zionist Congress notes with appreciation the role played by the Jewish newspapers in the Diaspora, which render loyal service to the cause of the nation and the State by combating assimilation, promoting Jewish education and preserving the national cultural and communal values of the Jews in the Diaspora.

Congress expresses its regret at the fact that the

Jewish daily, "The Day Morning Journal," closed down after having for seventy-five years served the biggest Jewish community in the world and expresses concern at the dangers that threaten the remaining Jewish press.

Congress recommends that the Executive of the World Zionist Organization take steps to ensure the appearance of the Jewish and Zionist press.

IDEOLOGICAL GUIDELINES FOR INFORMATION WORK

1. The Zionist Movement is the national, social and spiritual liberation movement of the Jewish people. The establishment of the State has given an enormous impetus to the realization of Zionism. But as before, the mobilization of the whole Zionist camp is needed to strengthen the process of ingathering of the exiles and help in the development, advancement and consolidation of Israel.

2. *The establishment of the enlarged Jewish Agency requires the redefinition of the uniqueness of the Zionist Movement as a realizing movement.*

Its principal aims are immigration and settlement in Israel and the implementation of the "Jerusalem Program" for the concentration of the Jewish nation in Eretz Israel, its historical homeland. The informational and educational tasks of the Zionist Organization in the Diaspora and in Israel have thus gained redoubled importance.

3. From the outset, the information programmes will be in the spirit of Herzl's injunction: "Return to Judaism precedes the return to the Land of Jews," in an endeavour to enhance the attachment to our spiritual heritage and the national and universal yearning for redemption, in the spirit of Israel's prophets and the great preceptors of its Zionist revival.

4. Zionist information in the seventies will be carried out as follows:

a) Against the background of the present condition of the Jewish nation throughout the world, the danger of the spread of anti-Semitism (at times in the guise of anti-Zionism) in the East and the West, growing assimilation and increased mixed marriages, lessons of the holocaust, the physical or spiritual survival of the Jewish people in the Diaspora is at peril.

b) In cognizance of the fact that "solutions" to the "Jewish Question" and the ensuring of our national survival have one after another come to naught, both in the East and the West, both under dictatorial as well as liberal regimes, where Jews

are facing persecution, national annihilation or spiritual decline and extinction.

c) In face of the open gates of Israel which needs millions of additional Jews in order once and forever to safeguard the future of the Jewish nation and the security of the State.

5. The 28th Zionist Congress reaffirms that the paucity of ideas and the dichotomy between the declared ideological principles and actual practice, having seriously hampered the Zionist Movement and detracted from its influence and credibility among the people as a whole and the younger generation in particular. [*sic*] It accordingly urges the revival of the Zionist Movement as a revolutionary national, social and spiritual movement both in theory and in practice. This movement will be free of illusions concerning eternal exile, and the Congress wishes to state that the Jewish problem cannot be solved in any other way except through the ingathering of the exiles.

6. To inculcate the idea of the singularity of the Zionist movement it is essential to define the duties and rights of Zionists as compared with those of friends of the State of Israel. Zionists must make it their duty to link their own fate with that of Israel as potential olim; they are required to learn Hebrew and to educate their children in the Jewish-Zionist spirit so as to prepare them for aliya; to assist all aliya movements and Zionist and pioneering youth organizations. Their activities in the communities must be directed toward increasing the influence of Zionism and the development of the Hebrew schools. They must be ready to defend the State of Israel and the rights of the Jews wherever they may be; and contribute themselves and solicit from others contributions designed to strengthen the State of Israel and enhance its absorption capacity. On the other hand, Zionists are entitled to a privileged position among the Jewish Organizations in the Diaspora and should be given advisory status in the forming of Israel's external and internal politics.

7. The effectiveness of Zionist information will be tested by the Zionist credibility of the leadership and Zionist workers in the various countries. They must set an example for every Zionist by implementing their ideals and coming to Israel themselves. If they do not go on aliya within two terms of office they cannot continue to hold office.¹⁶

8. The Congress maintains that in view of the many distortions and falsifications of Israel's

image and the vicious attacks by antagonists and enemies, it is incumbent upon the Zionist Organization to set up the information drive about Israel as a country aspiring to live in security and true peace and upholding the principles of democracy despite the present state of emergency. Notwithstanding certain undesirable manifestations which have to be eradicated, Zionist information can be proud to hold up Israel's numerous achievements—as a spiritual centre of the Jewish nation in the ingathering of the exiles, the revival of the nation's culture, the reduction of social gaps and the gap among the communities, the extensive development of agriculture and industry and the shaping of a pluralistic society as well as the establishment of a diversified economy comprising publicly, privately and collectively owned enterprises. Israel is laying the foundations for a regenerated life based on social justice in the hope of continuing to develop towards becoming an extraordinary people. This gives us the authority to tell the young generation in the Diaspora, which is straying in alien fields, that the paths towards pioneering action and the reconstruction and regeneration of society lead to Israel.

9. STANDING COMMITTEE AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

Following the statement made by the Presidency of the Congress which has been affirmed by the Plenary Session as follows: "The 28th Zionist Congress decides to establish a Standing Committee which will examine the principles of Zionism and will formulate, before the end of 1972, a proposal for the basic principles of Zionism and a definition of the obligations of the Zionist and their implementations. These proposals will be brought before the General Zionist Council for discussion and resolution,"

It is suggested that a World Ideological Conference, in which intellectuals and members of ideological movements will participate, be held during the course of 1972. This conference will attempt to clarify and work out Zionist ideology. Within the framework of this conference discussions with representatives of the younger generation should be included.

¹⁶ In accordance with the legal opinion expressed by the Legal Advisor of the World Zionist Organization, this resolution is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Zionist Organization and therefore not valid. [Original note]

10. THE ZIONIST COUNCIL IN ISRAEL

The Congress views with concern the apathy and confusion prevalent among a section of the younger generation in Israel with regard to Judaism, Zionism, the image of Israeli society and the tasks which they have to fulfil in all those spheres. This apathy and perplexity may be traced to several sources such as: the inadequate time devoted to purposeful Jewish and Zionist education; the lack of a carefully cultivated attitude to Diaspora Jewry and their problems, and the undermining of national and social values in Israeli society. With the help of the Youth and Hechalutz Department, the Israel Zionist Council must continue to be active in this sphere, to make the youth aware of these problems and to initiate topics for discussion which will bring about a more positive and active attitude towards Zionism and the Jewish people.

The following activities should be developed:

a) The expansion of Jewish-Zionist education for the younger generation in Israel by means of compulsory classes in Judaism, Zionism and clarification of the problems of Israeli society, and an integration of these subjects in the curricula of elementary schools, high schools and institutes of higher learning, and the training of suitable teachers for these subjects.

b) The establishment of permanent seminars where the younger generation and high school students in general and members of youth movements in particular will be educated towards identifying themselves with the values of Judaism and Zionism. These seminars will also provide a great deal of information about the functions and activities of the Zionist movement.

11. The Congress supports the activities of the Zionist Council in its attempts to increase the political and social awareness as well as the awareness of Zionism among the younger generation, and calls on the Zionist Executive to allocate additional funds for this purpose.

COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL

1. The Zionist Congress expresses its profound concern about the social, cultural and economic gap in Israel with its potentially dangerous effects on the unity of the nation, the security of the country and the absorption of immigration. The Congress accordingly urges the Government of Israel,

the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization to design and implement such actions as are required for the rapid closing of the social gap. The Congress regards this demand as one of its greatest and most pressing goals towards the materialization of the Zionist ideal.

2. The Congress appeals to the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency to establish a central authority holding far-reaching responsibilities and powers. This authority should possess all necessary financial means to establish social services to co-ordinate and centralize the efforts to eliminate poverty. This should be accomplished together with the efforts to bolster the absorption facilities of Israeli society. The Congress recommends that the director of this authority should be chosen from the Sephardic community.

3. a) The Congress commends highly the activities of those voluntary groups in Israel who have worked within existing frameworks to battle this crisis. The Congress calls for the intensification of these activities and their being made public among the citizenry of Israel.

b) In order to deepen the consciousness of the need for reducing the gap and of social problems in general, the Congress recommends to include these problems in the curricula of the secondary schools.

4. The Congress appeals to the Jews of the Diaspora to intensify the drafting of financial resources and creative abilities among World Jewry. This will help greatly to enable Israeli society to overcome its problems of poverty and misfortune which is the lot of its less progressive elements.

5. The Congress turns to the Government of Israel to implement an intensive construction programme in order to eliminate slums in all senses of the word and to assure suitable living conditions for large families now living in congestion as well as for young couples lacking sufficient economic means. Attention should be paid to the assimilation of different communities and their easy absorption into the social and cultural life of Israel. The Zionist movement must take the initiative in drafting the means for this programme from world Jewry in co-ordination with groups working in these fields. At the same time, the movement must call on the Israeli public to concentrate all its resources toward this goal and to avoid non-essential construction.

6. The Congress appeals for an encompassing ideal plan which will ensure the economic and vocational progress of low-income and large families such that they will be assured of adequate income and an inclusive social insurance that will answer the needs of poor families. Families will be treated on the welfare, health, educational and vocational training levels.

7. The Congress regards the rapid solution of the cultural and educational gap in Israeli society as an essential step towards the inner unity of the nation. Therefore the Congress appeals to the Israeli Government, to the Jewish Agency and Zionist Federations to act towards the modernization of Israel's educational system. This programme must provide a long school day, even from the youngest grades, and the raising of the educational level of primary schools (including full treatment of children requiring nutrition, help in homework or well-rounded educational activity).

This system must provide the full material facilities for these aims. Particular efforts are needed to widen and deepen the curricula of high schools and post-high school education, as well as vocational and technological education among youth, those originating from Asia and Africa. Student and youth centres must be established for the implementation of a wide educational programme. Informal educational institutions also must be strengthened (youth movements and organizations). The network of neighbourhood centres and libraries must be enlarged. Attention should be paid to the problems of those youth who are unemployed and not learning. Programmes should be arranged for the easy absorption of youth from these communities who have finished army service. The latter often do not have high school diplomas. These programmes should be set up under the auspices of universities and provision should be made for the easy continuation, upon completion of these studies, into college-level studies. Likewise, there must be considerable enlargement of student grant facilities for those needing such during their periods of study. These facilities must provide for the upkeep of at least 2,000 students of Asian or African origin in institutes of higher education.

In order to preserve the cultural values of the various communities in Israel, the Congress calls upon all the factors engaged in educational work in the Zionist Movement to give suitable expression

to the cultural values of the Oriental communities, their form of life in the Diaspora and the story of their aliya and absorption in Israel, and to stress their role in the upbuilding of the country, the settlement of the Negev and the establishment of development townlets and border settlements.

8. The Congress appeals to the management of the Jewish Agency to widen the scope of Youth Aliya activity in order to guarantee the maximal absorption of youth from the poverty sector at the youngest possible ages. Likewise, the Congress demands that the activities of the education fund be expanded toward closing the educational gap.

9. The Congress calls upon all the youth of World Jewry and Israel to come to the aid of our nation in its political and security struggle, to solve its social problems through a large volunteer programme. This programme must include youth trained in education, social and community work, and other experts for work with youth.

10. The Zionist Congress appeals to all those affiliated with the Zionist movement and to the Israeli public to accept responsibility for the social absorption of immigrants through the adopting of immigrant families by native Israeli families and through the absorption of immigrant children in Israeli educational frameworks. A mutual appreciation of various cultures must be achieved among the different communities and information on the cultural heritage of the various communities. [sic]

11. The Zionist Congress proudly commends Israel's record of the safeguarding of humane morals during battle and during difficult crises which tried the nation. The Congress calls upon the Zionist movement to work for a moral and social climate in Israel's society through more intense Jewish and Zionist education faithful to the traditional and historical values of the movement among all walks of Israeli life.

COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATION AND CULTURE IN THE DIASPORA

The 28th Congress expresses the concern and anxiety of the entire Zionist Movement about the future of Jewish education in the Diaspora. The educational crisis is a painfully real fact in spite of the development of primary and secondary Hebrew day schools, Yeshivot, and institutions of higher learning and Hebrew language classes.

Only a fraction of the Jewish children in the Diaspora receive a full Jewish education. Schools suffer from a serious shortage of staff and material resources, while the Jewish family is, in most cases, no longer able to impart to its children Jewish national traditions. The wave of assimilation threatens to engulf major sections of the Jewish communities. Only the bulwark of Jewish education, firmly founded on Jewish culture and tradition and on the spiritual values of Judaism, can save our nation from spiritual annihilation.

The Zionist Congress affirms that—

a) It is the duty of every Zionist to study the national tradition and learn the Hebrew language which must be the second language of every Jew in the Diaspora. It provides the means for fostering Jewish culture, preparing those who are learning it for aliya and integration in Israel and enriching the spiritual life of the Jews in the Diaspora.

b) It is the duty of every Zionist to give his children a Jewish education. No Zionist who fails to impart a Jewish and Zionist education to his children can serve in any office in the Zionist Movement.¹⁷

c) Concern for Jewish education and the inculcation of Jewish culture is acknowledged as the supreme duty of the Zionist movement, including the Zionist Federations, the Zionist organizations and every individual Zionist wherever he may be.

d) A message of solidarity goes out to Zionists in countries where the study of Hebrew is outlawed, who are sacrificing their lives in order to learn the language and culture of their people. Their devotion and attachment to the Hebrew language ought to serve as an example for the Jews of the free countries.

e) The Zionist Movement is called upon to be the vanguard of the campaign, to be conducted with the participation of the community leaders, aimed at strengthening awareness of the need for Zionist-Jewish education, and to use daring, non-routine methods to enlist the organized communities in an effort to maintain and expand the Jewish education system.

f) The Zionist Federations and organizations are called upon to establish education committees to further Jewish and Zionist education and ensure

that educational needs should have priority in the distribution of the community funds.

g) The centrality of Israel and the primacy of aliya should be a central goal of Jewish-Zionist education, whatever the framework, and Zionists are required to fight for this goal.

h) Congress calls upon the Zionist Executive together with other factors to set up a World Education Fund to provide incentives and infrastructure investments for Jewish education and to finance the educational programmes of those communities which need such support. Full collaboration shall be ensured between the educational agencies and the Zionist youth movements which are making a major contribution to the education of the younger generation.

i) Congress appreciates the good work of the Departments of Education and Culture in the Diaspora and urges that the necessary means be made available to them for the expansion and intensification of their activities. To further the educational programmes for coming years, the Departments are called upon to carry out the following projects:

1) To draw up a long-term programme to meet the needs of Jewish education, in collaboration and coordination with all the appropriate agencies and above all with the Zionist Federations, in accordance with local conditions.

2) To promote the establishment of a reserve of teaching staff for Jewish education and attract suitable candidates for this purpose who regard Jewish education as an avocation and a national goal; to initiate and promote the establishment of rabbinical and teachers' training colleges in the Diaspora; to train first-class professionals to be the leaders of Jewish education in the future; to provide training facilities for educators abroad, with the aid of experts from Israel; to raise the status of the Jewish educator and enhance his prestige by improving his working conditions and providing for his education and further training; to expand the facilities available in Israel for the education and advanced training of teachers from the Diaspora and to expand and foster the Israeli teaching staff capable of filling educational posts in the Diaspora.

3) Recognizing the importance of the Hebrew day schools, to promote the expansion of the network of primary and secondary day schools,

¹⁷ In accordance with the legal opinion expressed by the Legal Advisor of the World Zionist Organization, this resolution is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Zionist Organization and therefore not valid. [Original note]

including Yeshivot, as well as other forms of education.

4) To expand the teaching programmes in Israel for youth, students and yeshiva students from the Diaspora as an integral part of the Jewish and Zionist education of youth in the Diaspora.

5) To develop curricula, teaching material, textbooks and teaching media for Jewish schools in the Diaspora, in collaboration with educational agencies abroad and using modern technology and the educational know-how and philosophies evolved in Israel.

6) To extend the study of the Bible among youth and adults.

7) To intensify Jewish cultural activities among adults by publishing basic books on Judaism and other great works of our cultural heritage, setting up libraries, organizing seminars for cultural workers, sending intellectuals and artists abroad and developing a network of classes and teaching facilities. To assist in the establishment of university chairs in Hebrew, Jewish History and Judaism, and to help student organizations and Yeshivot in their educational programmes.

8) To pay attention to small, isolated communities by training manpower and developing suitable teaching material for the inculcation of Jewish and national values.

9) To publish teaching and educational material for the Jewish home, explaining the values of Judaism and enabling parents to supplement the Jewish education given to their children at school.

10) To support the activities of parents' groups and assist in their establishment.

j) The 28th Zionist Congress welcomes the co-operation between the World Zionist Organization and the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Government of Israel and calls upon them to collaborate in intensifying Jewish consciousness and Zionism in the schools in Israel and the Diaspora. Intellectuals and educators in Israel and in the Diaspora and institutions of higher learning should be made to participate in this programme.

k) Congress appeals to the Zionist Executive and the National Zionist Federations to collaborate with the World Hebrew Union and assist it in its operations.

l) The Zionist Organization and its Education Departments are called upon to collaborate with the teachers movement on behalf of the Keren

Kayemet and to lend it their full support in the attainment of its goals, for the intensification of Zionist education in the schools.

m) Congress appeals to the education departments of the World Zionist Organization to consolidate the education network in the Sephardic communities in the Diaspora and to enhance their commitment to Israel by promoting their specific values.

COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND FUNDS

A. BUDGET

1. The Congress takes note of the financial report of the Executive World Zionist Organization—The Jewish Agency, for the period 1.4.67 to 31.3.71, and points out that the annual budgets were carried out according to their specifications.

2. The Congress takes note of the Comptroller's oral report on his inspection activities and subjects for the period between the 27th Congress and the present Congress.

3. The Congress takes note of Report No. 15 of the Comptroller of the World Zionist Congress as well as the remarks of the Executive as presented to the Congress.

4. The Congress approves the recommendations of the Permanent Budget and Finance Committee as presented in the Comptroller's report, including the reports which the 27th Congress authorized the Committee to deal with.

5. The Congress takes note of the Proposed Budget of Needs of the Jewish Agency to a total of 775 million dollars.

5a. The Congress recommends to the Executive to present to the Permanent Committee for Budget and Finance of the Actions Committee the detailed Budget of the Jewish Agency, and bring the Committee's conclusions before the authorized institutions of the Jewish Agency.

6. The Congress recommends to the Executive of the World Zionist Organization to take steps to set up a Permanent Committee for Budget and Finance of the Assembly of the Jewish Agency in which the Permanent Committee for Budget and Finance of the Actions Committee will be included in accordance with its proper composition.

7. The Congress approves the budget framework of expenditure of the World Zionist Organization for the period 1.4.72–31.3.73, to a total of IL

128,992,500 (\$30,712,500) as well as the estimated income for that period to the same amount, and authorizes the Zionist Action Committee to discuss and decide on the details of the expenditures directly or, should it so decide, by the Permanent Budget and Finance Committee.

8. The Congress approves the budget framework of expenditure of the Keren Kayemet Le Israel for the period 1.4.72–31.3.73 to a total of IL 79,800,000 (\$19,000,000) and also the estimated income for that period to the same amount, and authorizes the Zionist Action Committee to discuss and decide on details of the budget of expenditure directly, or, should it so decide, by the Permanent Budget and Finance Committee.

9. The Congress delegates its authority regarding budget and finance to the Zionist Action Committee, and authorizes it to discuss and decide for the period from Congress to Congress on all budget and finance matters either directly, or, should it so decide, by the Permanent Budget and Finance Committee.

B. FUNDS

1. Contributions by Jews throughout the world to the Keren Hayesod United Israel Appeal and the United Jewish Appeal.

Five years after the Six Day War, there is an increasingly heavy burden weighing on the citizens of Israel, stemming from security expenditures required for the defence of the State. In view of this, the Congress calls upon the Zionist camp, and the entire Jewish nation, to take part in an immediate and massive rescue action, enlisting its resources through the Keren Hayesod–The United Israel Appeal and the United Jewish Appeal. The aim—meeting the urgent needs of increased immigration and absorption (and especially those from the Soviet Union), the needs of settlement and youth aliya, the need to reduce the social gap, particularly in the fields of education and housing.

2. The Central and Senior role of the Keren Hayesod – The United Israel Appeal.

a) The Congress re-emphasizes the central and senior role played by the Keren Hayesod – The United Israel Appeal and the United Jewish Appeal.

b) The Congress insists that recognized Israeli institutions dealing in raising money for the goals assigned them, must coordinate the timing of

their activity with the offices of the central bodies of the Keren Hayesod – The United Israel Appeal, and of the United Jewish Appeal, to preserve the senior rights of these latter two.

3. THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT AND APPEAL ACTIVITIES

a) The Congress calls upon the Zionist organizations in various countries to increase the participation of their members in the activities of the Keren Hayesod and the United Jewish Appeal.

b) The Congress emphasizes the necessity for participation by the Zionist leadership in the activities of the Appeal both through personal contributions by the leaders and their friends, and through placing Zionists in positions of central activity. The Congress emphasizes again that every member in the movement is duty-bound to serve as an example, by his personal contribution to the Appeal, and his devotion to its work.

c) The Congress again determines that a person who does not fulfil his duty to the Keren Hayesod – The United Israel Appeal or to the United Jewish Appeal will not be able to hold any post in the Zionist Movement, whether on the local or the national level, or in any institution affiliated with the movement.

4. "THE YEAR FOR NEW WORKERS"

The Congress notes with satisfaction the proclamation by the Keren Hayesod that 1972 should be a year for new workers. The Congress calls upon the Zionist organizations in various countries to lend their support to the leadership of the Appeal by enlisting new active members.

5. THE NEXT GENERATION

The Congress welcomes the efforts by the Keren Hayesod–The United Israel Appeal and by the United Appeal to add young forces to its ranks of active members. The Congress calls upon the next generation in the Zionist Organizations, and especially upon the Zionist Youth Movements, to take an active part in carrying out this mission, in order to ensure continuation in the Appeal leadership.

6. THE UNITED ISRAEL APPEAL (KEREN HAYESOD – THE JEWISH NATIONAL FUND)

The Congress calls upon the Jewish public in Israel to increase its contribution to the United Appeal, the Keren Hayesod–The National Jewish Fund. This is the voluntary channel by which citizens of Israel take part in the activities of the

Zionist Movement, especially in the area of immigration, absorption and agricultural settlement. The Congress calls upon the Zionist Council in Israel to take an active part in this United Appeal.

The Jewish National Fund

The 28th Zionist Congress congratulates the Jewish National Fund on the 70th anniversary of its foundation at the 5th Zionist Congress in Basle.

The Congress confirms the principle of the land being national property, a principle which has become the basic element of the agricultural and social system in Israel; it expresses its appreciation of the historical function the Jewish National Fund has fulfilled in the great enterprise of Zionist settlement in Eretz Israel by means of land redemption and development, the building of new roads, opening of new areas for settlement and the improvement of natural resources and ecological conditions of the country by means of extensive development and afforestation.

The Congress confirms once more that in force of the Convention signed in 1960 between the Government of Israel and the Jewish National Fund, and approved by the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish National Fund became the recognized instrument for land redemption and development and afforestation.

The Congress recognizes the important role of the Jewish National Fund in Zionist activities in the Diaspora, in the educational sphere and the raising of funds, its aspiration to reach every Jewish household every day of the year by dint of its popular character and its traditional methods of fund raising. It calls upon all the Zionist organizations throughout the world to support the Jewish National Fund in the fulfilment of its functions and its considers it as vitally important to strengthen collaboration between the Zionist Federation and the Jewish National Fund in every country throughout the world.

It resolves that to the advantage of the Zionist Movement, and in the spirit of the resolutions of the Executive Committee ever since the 27th Congress, which recognize the independent status of the Jewish National Fund with the World Zionist Organization, the Zionist Executive to be elected and the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund are requested to propose ways for the strengthening of collaboration between them and to prepare

recommendations which will be presented for the approval of the Zionist Executive Committee.

COMMITTEE ON YOUTH AND STUDENT AFFAIRS

1. YOUTH MOVEMENTS

a) The 28th Zionist Congress notes with satisfaction that the efforts made by the Halutzic and Zionist youth movements have give rise to the consolidation and expansion of these movements in several countries of the Golah. Nevertheless, it is clear that the potential of the youth movements as an educational force has not been fully exploited, and for this reason the Congress calls on the Youth and Hechalutz Department and on the youth movements to find ways and methods which will answer the needs of the youth of the seventies without adversely affecting the basic values of Zionist fulfilment.

b) Congress deems it essential to give preference to those educational frameworks which educate youth towards Zionist fulfilment by means of aliya to kibbutzim, moshavim, development areas and other forms of settlement.

c) While stressing the importance of work within the Zionist youth movements, Congress deems it essential that the shlichim of the youth movements do their utmost to widen the scope of their activities also outside their movements. Congress calls on the youth movements to direct their shlichim and youth leaders to play an active role in programmes which will attract the Jewish youth to Israel, and to encourage aliya within communal and other frameworks which are not specifically Zionist. These activities will be on a completely non-party basis.

d) Congress notes with satisfaction that there are movements in the Golah belonging to different ideological trends which are able to attract various groups of youth. However, in certain places too many such movements exist, especially in small communities. Congress, therefore, instructs the Youth and Hechalutz Department to approach the executives of these movements in order to prevent unnecessary competition among them.

2. ROOF ORGANIZATIONS FOR YOUTH AND PROMOTION OF ZIONIST ACTIVITY WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

a) Congress notes with satisfaction the establishment of Zionist Youth Councils in many countries, following upon the membership drive and the

ideological discussions, and calls upon all the leaders of Zionist and Jewish youth organizations abroad to cooperate in the implementation of joint programmes (seminars, demonstrations, actions on behalf of Jews in countries of distress, etc.) in order to attain a greater measure of Jewish solidarity and awareness of the centrality of Israel in Jewish life.

b) The Zionist Congress calls upon the roof organizations for youth to have their constituent organizations become an active force in the community, in Jewish education, activities on behalf of the Jews in the countries of distress, and to encourage and assist aliya.

c) Congress calls upon Zionist youth in the Golah to be active within the community and to share in the responsibility for its programmes, with a view to persuading its members that Zionism is the sole solution to the Jewish question in all countries.

d) Congress notes with satisfaction the expansion of the shlichut programme and the development and expansion of the projects relating to Israel within the Jewish organizations and community movements in the world. It calls upon the Youth and Hechalutz Department to persist in these activities in order to ensure the attachment of organized Jewish youth to Israel and enhance the growing tendency among youngsters to confront to confront the problems of their Jewish identity and the question of aliya.

e) Congress appeals to all Jewish communities and Zionist Federations to regard the Youth Councils as an essential framework for activating the younger generation and exhorts them to tender to these Councils their fullest moral and material assistance.

f) Congress notes with satisfaction the existence of various organizations in the Golah, belonging to different ideological trends, which are able to attract various groups of youth and students. However, in many places attempts are being made by *non-youth* political groups to establish their own movements for the sake of enlarging their party influence. Since total resources for student and youth work are limited, Congress therefore calls upon the parties to approach existing Zionist Youth Councils to solicit the Councils' support before *non-youth* groups establish new youth organizations, or alternatively that the parties themselves fund and service such organizations.

3. MEANS OF ENCOURAGING ALIYA AND PROJECTS IN ISRAEL

a) In line with the demand put forward by the Zionist Congress for the strengthening of aliya and the Zionist imperative of personal fulfilment, Congress stresses the need for a radical, uncompromising approach to aliya by all Zionist youth organizations.

b) In order to prepare the educational, psychological and practical ground for aliya of youth, Congress exhorts every Jewish boy and girl, at the earliest possible stage of their maturity to spend at least one year in Israel in one of the existing programmes (the college programme, Shenat Sherut, Sherut La'am, etc.).

c) Congress notes the achievements of the Youth and Hechalutz Department in increasing the number of young people taking part in short-term programmes whose scope is increasing from year to year. This is of decisive importance educationally and as a means of furthering aliya.

d) Congress recommends that the Youth and Hechalutz Department deepen and intensify the Jewish and Zionist content of the curricula offered to youth groups coming to Israel.

e) Congress recommends that the Youth and Hechalutz Department give priority to programmes designed for the training of youth and student leaders.

f) Congress calls upon the Youth and Hechalutz Department to prepare emergency programmes for making adequate provision for the thousands of volunteers likely to come to Israel at time of crisis.

g) Congress urges that diverse programmes be established for the aliya of youth by setting up aliya groups, and developing new experimental projects in the field of rural and urban settlement, etc.

4. INVOLVEMENT OF ISRAELI YOUTH IN THE SOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL

a) Organized Israeli youth is urged to take the initiative in bringing additional assistance to the economically and socially disadvantaged strata of the younger generation, with a view to helping them integrate into Israeli society.

b) Israel's youth movements are urged to take action for the promotion of social integration between veterans and newcomers and between different social strata within their own movements.

c) Congress calls upon the Youth and Hechalutz

Department to initiate, in association with other Zionist Organizations, programmes for the aid and advancement of disadvantaged youth, and to encourage and assist the youth movements and young Zionist organizations in these activities.

5. ZIONIST ACTIVITY AMONG ISRAELI YOUTH

a) Congress notes with satisfaction the establishment of the Institute for Zionist Education of the Youth and Hechalutz Department and the various programmes sponsored among Israeli youth by the Israel Zionist Council, comprising seminars and courses for the clarification of the nature of Zionism which were attended by tens of thousands of young Israelis. However, in view of Israeli youth's apathy to the Zionist enterprise, Congress urges the continuation of these programmes which are essential in order to foster Zionist awareness, understanding of the needs of the Jewish people, Jewish solidarity and the commitment of youth to its Jewish heritage.

b) Congress once again calls upon the Executive to ensure that Israeli youth and Jewish youth from abroad visiting in Israel should meet and associate as much as possible.

c) In the light of the tendency notable on the periphery of Israel's youth to disassociate itself from aliya and from the link between Israel and the Jewish people, Congress calls upon the Israeli youth and Israeli students abroad to play a more active role in the integration of new immigrants and in the strengthening of ties between Israel and the Jewish people.

d) 1. The Zionist and Halutzic youth movements in Israel are the main and most effective tool for educating the youth in Israel for Zionist and Halutzic fulfilment. The 28th Zionist Congress therefore urges:

a) that educational and Zionist activity among youth in Israel be increased, and directed to Halutzic fulfilment in general, and the Kibbutz in particular. In addition, Zionist educational and ideological activity among youth of the settlements should be increased;

b) that further means and tools be given to the Youth and Hechalutz Department, in order to intensify and expand its many activities among Israel's youth.

2. In order to strengthen the ties between the youth in Israel and the Zionist Movement, the Congress urges that suitable representation be granted to Israeli youth in the Zionist General

Council, the Congress, and other elected bodies of the World Zionist Organization.

6. ACTIVITIES AMONG STUDENTS

a) Congress calls upon the Youth and Hechalutz Department and upon all agencies active among Jewish students to promote and enhance the growing trend among Jewish youth to intensify the search after their Jewish identity, affiliation with the Jewish people and its roots. This should be done by helping to develop and consolidate the Jewish content that forms the basis of Jewish and Zionist education while carefully preserving the idea of Israel's centrality.

b) In response to the changing mood among the Jewish students in the Golah, Congress calls upon the Zionist Executive to place greater emphasis in its educational programmes, seminars and publications on the Jewish spiritual heritage and cultural development of Israel.

c) Congress urges the Youth and Hechalutz Department and all agencies active among students to diversify their modes of activity and show flexibility in implementation of their projects in order to reach the largest possible number of Jewish students. The Zionist students' organizations must remain open as they have in the past to all shades of the ideological and organizational spectrum of the Zionist Movement.

d) Congress urges the expansion of the educational facilities for student leaders from all Jewish student organizations offered by the Youth and Hechalutz Department by way of seminars in Israel and abroad.

e) Educational activities among students are carried out mainly in small settings (campuses, local and national organizations). While recognizing the importance of student organization on a continental or world-wide scale, Congress calls upon Jewish communal leaders at local and national levels to promote student activities similar to those of the North American Jewish Student Appeal. Congress also calls for support of the activities of student ideological organizations linked to the Zionist Movement.

f) The 28th Zionist Congress:

Expresses its disappointment at the non-participation of some national branches of WUJS in the membership drive of the Zionist Movement.

Congress notes with satisfaction the existence of student groups which expressed their loyalty to the Zionist Movement through the Membership

Drive. Urges that the Executive of WUJS recommend to the next Congress of its organization a thorough re-examination of its organizational structure and ideological platform. Recognizes the work done by WUJS in the field of aliya, information on behalf of Israel on the campuses, Jewish-Zionist education and the protection of the rights of the Jewish minority. Calls upon the Zionist Executive to continue to extend support to WUJS.

g) Congress does not recognize WUJS as being the only representative of all Jewish student opinion throughout the world and therefore calls on the Executive to support other Jewish student organizations.

h) Special note should be taken of independent national campus organizations, such as Yavneh, which serve a wide spectrum of student needs. Because of their variegated programmes these organizations are able to reach and attract many students who cannot be reached by groups concentrating only on Zionist programmes. Since these organizations do carry on many significant Zionist activities Congress calls upon the Zionist Executive to support them in order to increase the level of their Zionist activities and in this way attract more students to Zionist programmes and ideology.

i) This Congress recognizes the importance of promoting specific Zionist activities for students of Yeshivot Gevohot and requests the Youth and Hechalutz Department to promote and develop such activities.

7. REGIONAL PROGRAMMES

a) Congress notes with satisfaction the successful implementation of the "American Plan" which has proved its viability in spite of the budgetary limitations that have curbed its momentum, and calls upon the Executive to continue and expand this programme as well as the various other regional programmes embarked upon.

b) In view of the success that is being recorded in such regional programmes as the American Plan, Congress urges the Executive to develop a regional programme for the Jewish communities in Latin America.

8. YOUNG ADULT ORGANIZATIONS (MISHMEROT TZEIROT)

Congress supports the concept of the establishment of Young Adult Organizations (Mishmerot

Tzeirot) in the Golah and calls upon the Executive to act towards the implementation of this idea.

9. SHLICHIM

a) The Congress urges all the shlichim sent out through the Zionist Executive and active within the youth movements or organizations to regard themselves as forming a unified mission sent out to the country in which they are working. The representatives of the Executive who are in charge of coordinating the activities of the various movements and shlichim are exhorted to make the fullest possible use of the shlichim abroad within the general community.

b) The Congress directs the Executive to take part in the screening of all shlichim and to make sure that only shlichim suited for their tasks be sent abroad.

c) Congress directs the Zionist General Council which will convene in approximately one year's time to ratify the principle to be proposed for the allocation of shlichim and the manner in which it is to be implemented according to the criteria suggested by the Youth and Hechalutz Department together with the youth movements. The resolutions passed by the special sub-committee of the Youth and Students' Committee should be passed on as recommendations to the Zionist General Council. Criteria for the allocation of shlichim should include:

1. One year's Hachshara Courses in Israel, the Institute for Youth Leaders abroad or some other facility for the training of youth leaders in Israel.

2. Youth movement members and members below the age of 30 who go on aliya and declare their membership upon arrival shall according to our criteria be regarded as immigrants.

10. GENERAL

a) Congress urges the Youth and Hechalutz Department to organize a conference of at least two days duration of all youth delegates who will be attending:

- 1) The ideological conference soon to be held.
- 2) All meetings of the Zionist General Council.
- 3) The 29th Zionist Congress.

Such conferences should be held for clarification of views before the above events take place.

b) Congress notes that the Keren Hayesod-United Israel Appeal has become active within the younger generation. Congress calls on all

Jewish youth to give their utmost assistance in building the State of Israel, and towards assisting Jews living under oppression, by contributing to the Keren Hayesod, the financial arm of the Jewish Agency

c) Recognizing the demands made upon the means of the World Zionist Organization and the limitations of those resources, Congress urgently requests that the Executive provide the Youth and Hechalutz Department with the necessary means to enable it to carry on the existing programmes and that it initiate the new programmes suggested in the body of the resolutions adopted by this Congress.

34

Press interview statements by Israel Prime Minister Meir on the form and subjects of negotiations with the Arab states¹⁸

Jerusalem, January 28, 1972

Q. What territory do you consider necessary for Israel's security?

A. If you mean that we should draw a line, that we haven't done. We will do that when we get to it. But one basic article in Israel's policy is that the borders of June 4, 1967, cannot be re-established in the peace agreement. There must be changes in the borders. We want changes in borders, on all our borders, for security's sake. So our policy is, we want to negotiate peace treaties with our neighbors on secure, agreed and recognized borders.

Q. One of the ultimate goals of Israeli policy is to get a settlement with fixed frontiers?

A. Exactly. Fixed frontiers which must have two elements: One, a deterrent for further wars and further attacks, and two, if they are not deterrent enough and some day some Arab leader will want to try it again, we should be able to defend our borders with as few casualties as possible. This is all of our policy in a nutshell.

Q. One has the impression reading the newspapers that there is, shall we say, an understanding in one or

another form with Washington that, in furnishing more Phantoms, Israel is more disposed to enter into negotiations or to talks, whatever you wish to call it, with Egypt.

A. We want two things. We want to be strong enough to defend ourselves and we want to negotiate not from a position of weakness. One is not dependent upon the other. There is no deal, there is no linkage. Israel's position is on the merits of the case. When we are negotiating with the United States, under what conditions we are prepared to negotiate—indirectly, to my sorrow—with our neighbors, we are negotiating on that. When we demand or ask for Phantoms to be delivered to us, we are negotiating for something which we believe is essential to our security. We refuse to acquiesce to a linkage between the two things, and certainly we are not going to be the ones that will institute a linkage.

Q. It seems to be inescapable that the implications of the Pakistan-India war have had their effect on the diplomatic nonnegotiations or negotiations in the Middle East.

A. What it did do was to strengthen one of the points that we have been trying to make when people said to us, borders are not important—what you people need is international guarantees, and leave it to that to take care of your security. And we didn't accept it. We didn't believe in it. What the India-Pakistan war did for us is only to prove our point. It is a tragic way to prove it. But we saw international guarantees in operation.

Now, our situation is not similar to that of Pakistan. We do not belong to any group. Nobody formally is committed to come to our aid when we are attacked. We are not anywhere. We are all alone. Of course we have friends, and we have one big friend—the best friend we have—the United States, but there is no comparison between our status and Pakistan's status and yet look what happened? And what was the Security Council discussing for a week? Not peace and not borders. They sat there all the time when people were killing each other. All this went on merely trying to come to an agreement on a cease-fire resolution.

Q. I was wondering if at any point the problem would be posed of having a delegation from the Palestine Arabs, because this involves the whole Jordan question?

A. No. We are negotiating with states.

¹⁸ Partial transcript of the interview conducted by C.L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, January 30, 1972, p. 2; ©1972 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

Q. Do you think the next phase diplomatically thinking is going to be renewed Jarring talks or some other approach?

A. We have agreed to Jarring talks and we wanted Dr. Jarring to go on with the talks, and the talks stopped not because we refused to talk. Actually, we were not even talking, there was an exchange of papers. What the Egyptians wanted, and to my sorrow succeeded, was that they were not negotiating with Israel at all, even indirectly. They were negotiating with Dr. Jarring, and we thought we were negotiating with Egypt through the aegis of Dr. Jarring, as it was stated by Secretary Rogers when he presented his proposal. But we said, okay, we are going on—until Dr. Jarring did something which blocked everything. The moment that he presented a plan of his own, a solution of the problems which we were negotiating, and asked us to accept his plan, the major article of which was the return to the 4th of June borders, and to that we said no.¹⁹

Q. How do you restart it then?

A. The moment that Dr. Jarring will say: "Now I have the position of the Egyptians and I have the position of the Israelis. Now we can negotiate."

Q. It depends on him to put the negotiations into motion again?

A. So we think. At any rate it doesn't depend on us. We did not say, oh, since Sadat says that we must go back to the 4th of June borders, we don't talk. We didn't say that. It is perfectly legitimate for Sadat to want anything of us. But it is just as legitimate for us not to accept his idea, but we are prepared to negotiate.

We don't ask for preconditions. We don't ask Sadat to recognize our position, to agree to our position before negotiations that we will not go back to the 4th of June borders. This is the entire point. The idea of negotiations becomes ridiculous when before negotiations you have to agree to something which you do not agree to, which has to be negotiated.

Q. Are there any conditions under which you would envisage, in an interim agreement, Egyptian troops east of the canal?

A. No. This is not a peace agreement. This is

a means, as we see it, to stop shooting and create an atmosphere for peace negotiations.

Israel was prepared and is prepared to take a risk, quite a big risk. We have our fortifications on the canal. Now, when Israel says that it is prepared in order to allow Sadat to open the Suez Canal to step back a bit from these fortifications, that is a risk.

When Sadat says, that's fine—now I am going to bring my army across the Suez Canal so that now instead of having the canal separating the armies we have to pay Sadat for opening the canal by letting him bring his army across so that it sits right on our neck, I say it is an insult to intelligence.

He does not agree to an unlimited cease-fire, but says, I will give you six months for the clearing of the canal. After that a few more months and then you keep moving, keep moving to what he thinks should be our borders and if not, I will shoot. And some of our friends say, well, of course, if he begins shooting, you have the right to shoot our way back, but what happens when people are shooting their way back? Some people don't get to the canal. Why should we do that?

We must have full control of Sharm el-Sheik. There must be a territorial connection between Sharm el-Sheik and Israel proper, which means there must be changes in the Israeli-Egyptian borders. Now, the question what happens in the rest of the Sinai—the Sinai cannot again be filled with the Egyptian Army.

Q. As I understand it, apart from Sharm el-Sheik being sine qua non, so are the Golan heights and Jerusalem?

A. Look. We have never said that there is anything which the other side cannot put on the table. If Jordan comes and puts Jerusalem on the table, we won't get up and say, no, now we go home.

But Israel has taken a definite position that Jerusalem will not be divided again and is a part of Israel and is the capital of Israel.

Now Jerusalem is united. There are 70,000 Arabs in East Jerusalem, what was the Old City. Nobody was driven out. Every religious place, Christian or Moslem, is intact and we have said that we have no desire, nor ambition, nor need, to be the places [*sic*], either Christian or Moslem, and are prepared to have any of these religions take care of their own places.

¹⁹ For the Jarring aide-memoire see Annex I to document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

Q. At various times I heard mention of an idea of establishing in Jerusalem, under Israel, a small area of a Moslem administration, like the Vatican City is in Rome?

A. Moslem administration of their holy places, but nothing territorial.

35

Radio interview statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon commenting on the prospects for a settlement in view of the situation in Egypt²⁰

January 29, 1972

Allon: I think that President Sadat took a courageous decision when he decided not to open fire in spite of his earlier commitments, because as a realist he should have known that such an action would lead to nowhere, a lot of bloodshed and no solution. He took, of course, some internal risks because he committed himself openly and publicly, and this is now his problem. I don't accept your notion that there is a standstill, because everybody is trying to do something in order to get things moving. First, I understand that the basic idea of a special agreement on the Suez Canal is not dead. Secondly, that Dr. Jarring is trying to find new life in his mission, in his own way. As far as everyone is concerned, both options are open, whether a special agreement on the Suez Canal or an overall agreement on peace.

Q. But is there any movement in all this motion?

A. I would say there is an undercurrent movement, but all parties concerned, I believe, are interested in getting political activity more meaningful than it is now.

Q. Do you believe that Egypt is still interested in some kind of settlement?

A. I'm sure she is interested. I think Egypt needs it as we do.

Q. What effect do you think the student unrest in

Cairo and President Sadat's upcoming trip to Moscow will have on these peace moves?

A. The disturbances in the student body in Cairo is a direct result, I think, of a wrong policy which President Sadat adopted during the last year, when he kept promising that 1971 must be the year of decision and the year of showdown and so on and so forth. In fact, he created expectations both on the military and the political arenas, and both were not covered enough. Of course, the day came when he had to tell the truth—or at least more the truth than ever before—to his people, that he couldn't go to war yet, that he was still seeking a political solution, that there still holds the military option open as far as he is concerned [as heard]. Some of the young students lost their patience. We are told that some of the organizers of the disturbances among students in Cairo were less concerned with the extolment of fire than with their worry that liberalization will be stopped in Egypt under the disguise of austerity and preparedness for another war, and so on. And therefore no one can say for sure whether one centre created those disturbances or there were different motives who met together in the same campus and for different reasons created similar disturbances.

Q. What about Sadat's trip to Moscow—what effect do you think this will have? What do you think the Russians will tell him?

A. Well, I'm not a prophet. I don't know what the Russians will tell him. I think he is going to Moscow in order to obtain some more arms, as if this is the problem. He wants to create the impression at home that he is doing his best to build up his army, and maybe to create the impression on the home front that he is consulting with the big ally or the big friend, and if after such consultations no fire takes place, it means that the Russians are for it and therefore some of the hotheaded extremists in Egypt may be convinced that they have to wait patiently. But, if I may calculate something, I would say that since the Soviet Union not less than the United States is interested in some sort of rapprochement with the Americans, some understanding with Europe, any military clashes can kill the prospects of President Nixon's visit to Moscow. I can guess that at least until May, even the Egyptians may impose upon themselves some restraint. Of course, no one can be sure of

²⁰ Interview conducted by Andrew Maisels, broadcast on Israel radio in English; excerpted from the text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3903/A/6-7; reprinted by permission.

that, and we have to be ready every day and every night, but I don't exclude the possibility that, thanks to developments in the international arena among the great powers, we may have some further quiet months ahead.

36

Statement by President Zhivkov of Bulgaria reiterating support for Syria and the Palestine Resistance²¹

Damascus, February 1, 1972

It is from this firm stand that Bulgaria regards the Middle East crisis. Today we state with concern and worry that Israel's aggression against the Arab countries and its occupation of Arab lands and its continued provocations have created, over the years, a tension in the Middle East and a danger to world peace.

It is clear to all friends of the Syrian and Arab peoples and to all honourable people that it would have been possible to find a just solution to the dispute had the Israeli aggressors not received encouragement and extensive help from American imperialism. It is not difficult to understand the objectives of American imperialism in using Israel and the occupied Arab territories as a base for active intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and to choke the Arab national liberation movement. For this reason, the flagrant manoeuvres of the United States to play the role of middleman and peace advocate in the Middle East dispute are annoying.

The shameful role played by world Zionism in the Middle East crisis has of late become clearer. Zionism has become the ideology in Israel. This Zionism is our common enemy, the enemy of the Arab and socialist countries. World Zionism has assumed the role of front man, the most reactionary front man of imperialism, attempting in this way with all its ability to sow the seeds of mistrust in

the socialist countries and particularly in the U.S.S.R. It is trying to wage a campaign of hostility against communism and the Soviets.

Certainly we do not seek to impose our ideologies on anyone, since ideologies in themselves have a great appeal. Through the experience they have acquired, the people know well who are their friends and who are their enemies. Life has shown that attempts to antagonize communism and the Soviets are actually directed against the interests of the Arab peoples, against the struggle for national and social liberation of the peoples and against peace and progress in the world.

We are profoundly confident that the just cause of the Syrian people and the Arab peoples will win due to the increasing efforts for the unity of the Arab peoples and the increasing determination to defend their vital interests and strengthen their friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

Now, as in the past, we sympathize with the Palestinian Arab people and express our solidarity with, and support for, their liberation struggle. I would like to reaffirm to you, dear Syrian friends, that in the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Communist Party you will find trusty friends in your just struggle to liquidate the effects of the Israeli aggression and to strengthen and develop the Syrian Arab Republic in various fields.

37

Statements by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Noyes at a Congressional hearing outlining the military balance and detailing U.S. involvement in Israeli arms manufacture²²

Washington, February 2, 1972

Rep. Hamilton (Dem.): Let me ask a few questions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, if I may.

²² Excerpted from *U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972; February 2, June 7, August 8 and 15, 1972, pp. 30-31.*

²¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 2, 1972, p. 7; President Zhivkov visited Syria February 1-4.

Has there been any noticeable change in the military balance between Egypt and Israel or the Arabs and Israel in the months since you last testified before the subcommittee?

A. Mr. Chairman, there have been, of course, continuing Soviet supplies to Egypt. The most notable I believe has been, and I know it has been referred to in the press, the augmentation of the TU-16 bombers which are Soviet manned to our knowledge and based in southern Egypt. [Security deletion.] There has been [security deletion].

Q. That has occurred in just recent months?

A. Yes.

On the other side I might say that there is a modernization requirement for the Israeli Air Force. [Security deletion.]

As the President stated on a CBS program, there has been a decision in principle to continue the U.S. supply of aircraft to meet Israeli requirements.²³ This discussion has been going on now maybe a year or two.

Q. Are there any delivery dates set at this point?

A. There are no delivery dates actually set at this point. Arrangements are being discussed, details are being worked out. I should add, too, that when arrangements are completed there is a leadtime factor of course in some cases of considerable duration.

Q. What is the leadtime on the Phantom?

A. This is an extremely complex question to answer because of the production leadtime because in some cases planes [security deletion].

Q. What are the perimeters of the time?

A. It would be anywhere from a matter of a few months on to several years or more.

Q. Is there an agreement on the number of Phantoms to be delivered?

A. [Security deletion.]

Q. Can you say anything to us all? [Security deletion.]

A. I am really not at liberty to do so, sir.

Q. Can you give us any information on the nature of the agreement for Israel to manufacture weapons in Israel?

A. Yes, I certainly can. Here again I am afraid

that the press treatment has rather distorted something which is basically a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel. We have specific production arrangements with many other countries—NATO countries, Iran, et cetera. This memorandum is really an umbrella agreement; it has been under discussion for 2 years, we have been taking up various questions on an ad hoc basis. The principal purpose of our production assistance is to permit the Israelis to locally produce, where economically feasible, spare parts that go into weapons systems manufactured in the United States. This is really a balance-of-payments problem for them which we are trying to help alleviate. This [security deletion] really formalizes procedures which are already in effect and which are standard practice for all such requests.

Second, the memorandum provides certain safeguards against the misuse of U.S.-supplied information. In other words, we are gaining by this memorandum the ability to control information that may be passed out or may be provided Israel so that they cannot in turn pass it on to someone else without our permission, also, they may not sell a particular weapon which has a U.S. component. If it is a locally manufactured component, they cannot sell this say to some country in Africa without our permission. So we have provided ourselves with safeguards and we retain the right to review each item; it is not a blanket agreement that they can produce XYZ.

Q. One interpretation that has been given to the memorandum is that Israel may now become a producer of arms and sell them all over Africa and other countries. That is false?

A. This is quite false. In other words, that we are turning over the rights for them to manufacture a U.S. tank or aircraft or even a machinegun or something of that sort, that is not the case.

²³ See document no. 23 above.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)²⁴

Moscow, February 4, 1972

President Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt, chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union from February 2 to 4, 1972.

The sides paid special attention to the situation in the Middle East.

The sides strongly condemned the aggressive, expansionist policy pursued by Israel with the support of the United States. The ruling circles of Israel are continuing their brazen defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations aimed at securing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They are persisting in their efforts to undermine the progressive Arab regimes based on the support of the masses of the people which have chosen the path of peaceful democratic development, national independence and progress. This policy of Israel is the root-cause of the continuing dangerous situation in this region, is creating a threat to universal peace and is an obstacle in the way of a just settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The Soviet side expressed its high appreciation of Egypt's firm position in the face of the provocations of imperialism and Zionism and noted that this position enjoyed the support of all peace-loving states and peoples. It was noted with satisfaction that the discussion of the Middle East problem at the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly demonstrated that all the peace-loving states of the world support the efforts of the Arab Republic of Egypt to liberate the Arab territories occupied by Israel and to secure a just settlement of the conflict. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 13, 1971 is an indisputable success for the consistent and active foreign policy of Egypt and its friends and is evidence of the further international isolation of Israel.²⁵

The sides reaffirmed their determination to continue their struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East on the basis of compliance with all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, above all for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab lands occupied in 1967.

Aware of the gravity of the prevailing situation, the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt consider it to be necessary that the United Nations secretary-general's special envoy in the Middle East, Ambassador Jarring, should, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of December 13, 1971, immediately resume consultations with the sides concerned with a view to establishing a lasting and just peace in the Middle East, providing for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and securing the rights and interests of all the countries and peoples of this region, including the Arab people of Palestine.

The sides expressed their firm belief in the need to do everything possible to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the Arab countries, which would contribute to the early elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

In view of the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the provocative, expansionist policy of Israel which is given financial and military support by the United States, as well as Israel's policy aimed at the continued annexation of occupied Arab territories and completely ignoring the United Nations' resolutions, the sides again considered measures to secure the lawful rights and interests of the Arab peoples and to render assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt, in particular in the field of further strengthening its defence capacity, and outlined a number of concrete steps in this direction.

On behalf of the government and people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Anwar Sadat expressed his sincere gratitude and acknowledgement to the Soviet Union for its active and consistent aid to and constant support for Egypt in its just struggle against the Israeli imperialist aggression.

²⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5625 (February 8, 1972), p. 41.

²⁵ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI), reproduced as document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

39

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Sadat of Egypt²⁶**Belgrade, February 5, 1972**

At the invitation of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President of the Egyptian Arab Republic Anwar el Sadat paid an unofficial friendly visit to the S.F.R.Y. on February 4th and 5th, 1972.

President Anwar el Sadat's visit was another example of the tradition of fruitful exchanges of opinion between the two presidents on international questions of mutual interest and on bilateral cooperation. In the talks special attention was given to the Near East crisis.

Informing President Tito on the results of Egyptian attempts to solve the Near East crisis and on the talks that had just been held in Moscow, President Anwar el Sadat stated that even though Egypt's peace-making efforts had not led to any positive results, the main preoccupations of the leadership of Egypt would remain the full enforcement of November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution and the resolution by the General Assembly of 13 December, 1971,²⁷ which call for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967, and for the restoration of legitimate rights to the Arab peoples of Palestine. President Josip Broz Tito showed full understanding for the efforts which the government of the E.A.R. is making to solve the crisis in the Near East and to safeguard the legitimate rights of Arab peoples.

Israel's refusal to enforce the UN resolution on withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and on recognition of the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples of Palestine makes it imperative to persuade Israel to implement the UN decisions, including an immediate return of Dr. Gunnar Jarring's mission.

The two presidents commended the development of bilateral relations and reaffirmed their agreement that ties and cooperation between the two countries should be promoted in all fields.

²⁶ English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), nos. 524-525 (February 5-20, 1972), p. 25.

²⁷ Resolution 2799 (XXVI) of December 13, 1971, printed as document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mirko Tepavac, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murad Galeb, and their aides held separate talks on the same matters.

The two presidents agreed to exchange official visits at a date to be specified in the future.

40

Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the prospects for negotiations in view of the sale of Phantom jets to Israel²⁸**Washington, February 6, 1972**

Mr. Childs: On still another part of the world, Mr. Secretary, the front pages today report that the United States will provide 45, I think it is, Phantoms to Israel. This is in return for their agreement to negotiate seriously. Now, do you think those negotiations are on the track? What about Egypt? Do you think Egypt will negotiate?

A. Well, we haven't any word from Egypt yet. In fact, we haven't really been in contact with them. We hope to have some discussions directly or indirectly in the next several weeks.

We certainly hope that it will be possible to get negotiations started, either the type that we are speaking about here today or under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. Because otherwise there's no alternative. And we think that if negotiations could be started that it's possible that a settlement could be worked out, certainly an interim kind of arrangement that would look toward a final settlement.

We—you know, we have done everything we can. Fortunately, the cease-fire is still in effect, and we hope that will remain in effect. Our policy on arms is as follows, Mr. Childs. First, President Nixon has said that he wants to maintain the arms balance. And we're prepared to discuss a limitation of arms in the area. But no one seems to be interested in that. Other than that, we're going to maintain an arms balance which will discourage, we hope, all persons from starting a war.

Secondly, we're going to do everything we can to get negotiations started. We think that there is a solution that's possible that would provide a fair future for everyone in the area.

²⁸ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted for CBS News, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1705 (February 28, 1972), pp. 272-273.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, has the new communiqué out of Moscow after President Sadat's visit²⁹ suggested that more Soviet arms are going to be going to Egypt or a more conciliatory role on the part of the Soviet Union toward—

A. Well, it's not easy to—to conclude on that. My own assessment, Mr. Kalb, is that it was somewhat conciliatory. My own assessment is that the Russians probably have the same general view that we have and that is that they hope that a war, a major war, doesn't break out there. And that certainly is our point of view.

Mr. Herman: Is it correct that those 42 Phantom jets and 90 Skyhawks will, as the New York Times says, go to Israel? And when will they start?

A. Well, Mr. Herman, we have said time and time, and we're going to repeat it, we're not going to discuss Phantoms. We're going to discuss the negotiating process. We're not going to discuss arms. We think that all attention should be focused on the negotiating process, and we're going to continue to do that. The Soviet Union doesn't announce what they're delivering to Egypt, and we're not going to.

Mr. Herman: I hope you're not adopting that just because it's the Soviet policy.

A. No. But we think that this is a wise policy for us to follow. We're not interested in the buildup of arms. We're interested in working out a peaceful settlement in the area.

41

Address by U.S. Senator Humphrey (Dem.) calling for the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, continued arms supplies to Israel, and urging the U.S. government to work for increased emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews³⁰

Miami Beach, February 6, 1972

It is a great pleasure for me this afternoon to meet with you, my friends in the American

Technion Society. My long association with Technion is one which I have always been very proud of. In almost half a century Technion has contributed much to the development of the Middle East. The fact that two-thirds of Israel's architects and engineers are Technion graduates highlights the achievements of this great institution of higher learning.

Technion clearly shows that while Israel may be a nation at war, it has not become a nation of warriors. Technion has, indeed, produced fighters—fighters against disease, poverty, and famine. And these fighters are assisting not only Israel's development, but that of many other nations.

Statesmen and diplomats can learn a lesson from Technion's history. They can learn that, no matter how complex or difficult our problems are, there are many things we can do today to make this world a better and more just place in which to live.

In terms of American statecraft and our relations with Israel, how can we apply this lesson? What can our government do today, this week?

The first thing we can do—we must do—is to recognize a reality almost a quarter of a century old—the reality of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel.

Anyone faintly familiar with the last three millennia of Jewish history cannot fail to understand the deep significance of Jerusalem. Jerusalem and the Jew are so deeply intertwined in the pages of history that even the naming of the capital in 1948 merely ratified what millions of Jewish hearts had always known. But the United States government refused and continues to refuse to recognize Israel's right to decide which city is its capital.

For 19 years, Jerusalem was a divided city, split by walls of barbed wire and hatred. The Jordanian army was finally removed in 1967 when Israel reunited the city and began, with compassion and devotion to human dignity, to bind up the wounds of division.

From the rubble of armed occupation has sprung up a city of peace. Shrines of all religions are treated with respect. Each religious group has been granted autonomy. "Jerusalem the Golden" is once again a single thriving vibrant city.

But this rebuilding the United States government chooses to condemn as "annexation" in spite of Israeli assurances that Jerusalem will be treated and restored as a holy city for all—Christian, Moslem, and Jew—with free access, under

²⁹ See document no. 38 above.

³⁰ Address given before the national conference of the American Technion Society; text supplied, on request, by Senator Humphrey.

international guarantees, if necessary, to all places of worship.

Our government has a dual standard. It is hypocritical now to condemn Israel when we silently acquiesced to the illegal seizure and calculated destruction of much of the City of Jerusalem at the hands of the Jordanians.

We were wrong not to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 1948.

We were wrong not to cry out when Jordanian forces occupied half of that sacred city later that year.

We were wrong to remain silent when the century-old Jewish quarter was reduced to rubble, and shrines of deep significance to Christian and Jew alike were desecrated.

We compound these wrongs today by ignoring the reunification of Jerusalem and the humane administration of that city under Israeli rule.

Let us welcome a united Jerusalem. That holy city must not be divided by walls, by barbed wire, by hatred. It is and must be one city, a symbol of love and the ideal of human brotherhood.

The Psalmist speaks of "Jerusalem the Rebuilt, as a city that is united together." The time has come for the United States to recognize the reality of a rebuilt and united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

The second thing we can do—we must do—is to assure Israel of the economic and military support she needs to maintain her defensive capabilities and uphold the balance of power in the Middle East.

Any sign of weakness or ambivalence on the part of the United States only adds to the present instability in the Middle East. A stop and go policy on the delivery of arms and other assistance creates uncertainty and anxiety in both Israel and the Arab states.

Israel has been spending thirty percent of its gross national product on defense. These expenditures are increasing. They are responsible for Israel's serious balance of payments deficit, a figure that is approaching \$1.5 billion.

Israel is a proud country. It carries its burden with courage. But it is not just facing the Arab armies. It is confronting the military might of the Soviet Union.

And as we meet here today, Egypt's President Sadat is returning from Moscow. We do not know what new weaponry, what advanced arma-

ments he will bring back with him.

It would be the height of irresponsibility and folly for us not to realize the dangers implicit in Sadat's journey to the Russian munitions makers.

At stake is the prospect of renewed war in the Middle East. And the stakes are too great for equivocation or confusion on our part.

Sadat and his Russian hosts must understand that we will not permit the balance of forces to tip precipitously in Egypt's favor.

We must clearly announce our obligation and responsibility to support Israel with whatever assistance she needs to ensure the continuation of the fragile peace that presently exists.

We welcome Israel's willingness to engage in so-called "proximity talks" aimed at a re-opening of the Suez Canal. It is truly a magnificent opportunity for an approach to the Arabs. But let us not fool ourselves. The final peace is far off.

And until the Russians cease their designs on the nations of the Middle East, we must not cloud over our support for Israel with dangerous ambiguities.

The third thing we can do—we must do—is say to the Soviet Union loudly and clearly: "If you are genuine in your desire for peace and harmony in the Middle East, do something about the thousands of Jews in Russia who are imprisoned in your society by not being able to emigrate to Israel."

Our government must exert its diplomatic and moral resources in support of the courageous Russian Jewish community that, at great sacrifice, refuses to submit to the destruction of its identity.

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights provides that all peoples have the right to migrate to the countries of their choice. This is a fundamental human liberty. A nation which denies that right is imprisoning its citizens.

The United States has a stake in this vital human crisis not merely because it is a measure by which we must judge Soviet sincerity in possible negotiations, but also because we know from bitter experience that those societies which deny freedom to their own peoples refuse to accept the existence of freedom in other lands.

The issues of a reunited Jerusalem, Israeli security, and Soviet Jewry are ones our government must address today, tomorrow and for however long there is strife and suffering in the Middle East.

With strong resolve, dedication, and effort, we Americans can contribute to peace and stability

in the Middle East. We cannot and should not dictate solutions. But with a clear understanding of our support for Israel, we can help set the stage for the final act at the negotiating table.

42

Television interview statements by Israel Minister of Defence Dayan considering the role of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East, the attitudes of Jordan and Egypt towards Israel, possible future borders, and pointing out the dangers to both sides of war³¹

Tel Aviv, early February, 1972

Q. How do you see the role of the super-powers in the Middle East, and Russian in particular? Do you think Russia wants war in the Middle East or would support the Arabs if the Arabs decided to go to war?

A. No, not really. I think that Russia wants to be here. And probably not only here. They want to be here and they want to be in the Indian Ocean. They feel that they have to be in many places—especially in this part of the world. Now they are making the best of what they can get during war. But I don't think that this is very essential for them. I think that they can manage and satisfy their own ambition now also within the framework of peace. It's not necessary. It's not conditional for them to be here, only on the grounds of war, no.

Q. You say that Hussein and Sadat have changed in their attitudes. What signs, I mean, what's the proof of this?

A. To begin with they talk now about peace with Israel much much more than about liquidating Israel. I think it isn't only a matter of public relations but also of the real truth. I think that they are becoming now to realise that these are the facts. And secondly—especially with Hussein—not only about the basic point of us being here, the State of Israel, but what kind of relationship should be established with Israel. And I think

that they talk now more like neighbours than like enemies.

Q. But can there really be peace in this area while Israel sits on so much conquered Arab land? Hasn't there got to be some move back by Israel? It's all very well saying 'We're here, we're going to live together with you,' but I mean, what is negotiable?

A. The—I should say, for instance, the Suez Canal is not considered by most of us as the final boundary of Israel. This is one of the lines which is not only negotiable, but what we say is that we sit there just because the war is going on. But once you agree to make peace agreement, we don't think that we should sit on your Suez Canal. So what is negotiable is not only the very fact of us withdrawing from the Suez Canal but also the question of how far we withdraw. I wouldn't know of giving an example, much more than that, because we are not negotiating here.

Q. Looking at the map of the Middle East ten years from now, how do you think it would look?

A. Well, we don't want—I'm just using this opportunity. I'm not answering the question. We don't want that big Israel from Iraq, from Mesopotamia to the Nile. This is nonsense. But I do think that we shall have to adjust our boundaries. I do not think we will have, or will go back to, the old boundaries as before the Six Day War.

Q. Why on earth should the Arabs negotiate with you on those terms?

A. Why not?

Q. What are they going to get?

A. Now, I think that just now peace is beneficial for them exactly like to us. And I think that they need now, and are trying to get peace not less than we do. I think that this point of being on equal ground is extremely important. Because for the last 100 years or 23 years of the existence of the State, we were the only party that asked for peace, and they kind of made a favour to us if they wanted peace. Now I think that Egypt needs peace not less than Israel. And Sadat needs peace not less than Mrs. Meir. And the threat—the military potential threat, not actual threat—is to Cairo not less than to Tel Aviv if war breaks. I don't think that Cairo is in danger because we are not going to bomb it. But if war breaks, I think that they realise now that Damascus being 60

³¹ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted for "This Week" by Llew Gardner and broadcast by Thames Television on February 10, 1972; copyright by Thames Television Ltd.

kilometres from our lines, and Cairo. While we are sitting on the Suez Canal—they would be in danger in case of war, not less than Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. So I think that the need for peace is as strong with the Arabs as it is strong with us.

Q. General Dayan, thank you very much.

43

Report by U.S. President Nixon to Congress on U.S. foreign policy (excerpts)³²

Washington, February 9, 1972

In the Middle East, we were unable to make a breakthrough toward peace. Although the ceasefire resulting from our initiative in 1970 was maintained, it did not prove possible to engage the parties in negotiations, and consequently no progress was made toward the essential requirement of Middle Eastern peace: an arrangement which rests the security of all on something more reliable than the good will of a nation's adversaries.

Soon after taking office, I pledged that we would "pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast that we can."³³

An end to the perpetual state of crisis in the Middle East would be a major contribution to the stability of global peace. It would free energies and resources for the building of a better life for the people of the area. It would reduce the danger of a new clash and spreading war. It would remove a major obstacle to the fuller development of productive ties between the countries of the region and the outside world.

I also pledged that the United States would now assume the initiative. Inaction was unlikely to promote peace; it was more likely to allow the situation to deteriorate once again into war as it did in 1967. It was our responsibility to engage actively in the search for a settlement, in full awareness of the difficulties we would face.

In 1971, the danger of war was contained,

although the risk remained high. New approaches to a settlement were explored, although up to now without result.

—The ceasefire between Israel and its neighbors, brought about by our initiative the previous year, endured through 1971. It has now lasted 18 months. It was in the interest of each side to maintain it, and to make it possible for the other side to do so.

—Efforts to achieve an overall Arab-Israeli settlement lost momentum. Egypt and Israel, with our help, then explored the possibility of an interim agreement—a set of concrete steps toward peace which did not require addressing all the issues of a comprehensive settlement at the outset.

—Despite our restraint in our military supply policy, substantial new Soviet pledges and shipments of arms to Egypt continued the arms race. At the end of the year I felt obliged to reiterate that the United States would not allow the military balance to be upset.

—The USSR continued to build up its own military facilities in Egypt and to station increasingly sophisticated weaponry there.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in Asia and Africa, the essential problem of peace in the 20th century has been to shape new patterns of order. The postwar period—the first generation of independence in most of the Middle East—has seen continual turmoil. If this is to give way to a new era of stability, new relationships must be shaped—accommodating national aspirations, fulfilling hopes for social progress and providing a structure of security.

The obstacles today are many.

Local tensions in the Middle East periodically threaten to break into open conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict is foremost among these. But there are others. In the Persian Gulf, the special treaty relationships between Britain and some of the sheikhdoms ended in 1971; the stability of new political entities and structures remains to be consolidated. On Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have still not found a durable formula of reconciliation. Rivalries—personal, religious, ethnic, economic, ideological, and otherwise—divide the Islamic world. The Palestinian people, dispersed throughout the Arab world, continue to press their struggle for a homeland on the consciences and policies of Arab governments, exacerbating tensions within and among

³² Excerpts relevant to the Middle East, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1707 (March 13, 1972), pp. 319, 379–383.

³³ See document no. 25 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

Arab countries and with Israel. Stable and moderate governments are threatened by subversive movements, some aided and supported from outside.

The competitive interests of the great powers are a further source of tension, adding to local instabilities and posing the risk of wider and more dangerous conflict. As I wrote in February 1970: "One of the lessons of 1967 was that local events and forces have a momentum of their own, and that conscious and serious effort is required for the major powers to resist being caught up in them."³⁴ There must be understandings on the part of the great powers, tacit or explicit, on the limits of acceptable behavior.

In the Middle East, new relationships with the world outside are developing. There are temptations for some great powers to exploit these relationships, to increase their military involvement or to obstruct peacemaking efforts in the quest for unilateral political advantage in the region. This only fuels local tensions, with consequences transcending the issues in the local dispute. But there are also opportunities for the great powers to contribute cooperatively to the search for Middle East peace, and thereby to further the constructive trends in their own global relations.

A secure peace in the Middle East requires stable relations on both levels—accommodation within the region and a balance among the powers outside.

The greatest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East remains the Arab-Israeli conflict. Last year saw a new approach to beginning negotiations. This negotiating process has not yet produced results. But the United States undertook its major diplomatic effort of the past three years with no illusions about the obstacles in the way of a settlement.

It is one of the ironies of history that the 20th century has thrown together into bitter conflict these two peoples who had lived and worked peacefully side by side in the Middle East for centuries. In the last fifty years, and particularly since independence, they have been locked in incessant struggle. The Arabs saw the new State of Israel as an unwanted intruder in an Arab world and the plight of the Palestinian refugees

as an historic injustice; to the Israelis, refugees of a holocaust, survival was more than a cliché of political rhetoric. To negotiate a peace between these two peoples requires overcoming an extraordinary legacy of mutual fear and mistrust.

The Israelis seek concrete security. To them this means more than an Arab offer of formal peace; it means Arab willingness to let Israel exist on terms which do not leave it vulnerable to future reversals of Arab policy. To Israel, security will require changes in its pre-1967 borders, as well as such additional protection as demilitarization and international guarantees might provide. Israel points out—and cites the recent war in South Asia as an example—that a formal state of peace does not by itself assure security, and that international guarantees are no substitute for the physical conditions and means for security. In the absence of a settlement negotiated by the parties without pre-conditions, Israel continues to hold the territories captured in the 1967 war.

The Arabs, on the other hand, want advance assurance that all the captured territories will be returned. They also seek a just settlement of the grievances of the Palestinians. Some Arab governments have said that they are prepared to accept Israel as it was between 1949 and 1967, but that any enlargement of Israel beyond that is intolerable and implies Israeli expansionist designs. Thus they resist any changes in the pre-war borders. In the meantime, the Arabs feel they cannot allow the situation to become frozen; they stress their determination to struggle as long as Israel holds Arab lands.

This seemingly vicious circle is the objective difficulty which has stood in the way of a settlement. Two approaches to break this impasse have been tried.

—One way has been to attempt to gain all the major mutual assurances required—peace for Israel, the territories for the Arabs—as the first stage in a negotiation. This approach has characterized most of the peace efforts since 1967. Some outside party or group—Ambassador Jarring, the special representative of the UN Secretary General; the Four Powers; or the U.S. and USSR—has tried to develop formulae containing sufficient commitments by each side to give the other hope of achieving what it wants in a negotiation.

³⁴ See document no. 40 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

—A second route, tried for the first time in 1971, is to begin a process of negotiation without pre-arranged commitments on the fundamental issues. The hope would be that an interim agreement, or the momentum of the bargaining process itself, would create conditions facilitating the more basic settlement.

The Search for a Comprehensive Solution. From 1969 to early 1971, the quest for peace in the Middle East was a search for a formula for a comprehensive political solution. The agreed and accepted framework was, and remains, UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. The effort went through two distinct phases.

In 1969 the United States first undertook to engage other powers in the negotiating effort. We did not feel that the U.S. alone should assume exclusive responsibility for making and keeping peace in the Middle East. First responsibility, of course, lay with the parties to the conflict. But it was also true that the Soviet Union and other powers with interests in the region would have to accept some responsibility, or else no structure of peace would last. We therefore conducted talks bilaterally with the USSR, and at the UN together with the USSR, Britain, and France, searching for a formula which all sides could accept as a starting point for negotiation. The Soviets turned that effort aside at the end of 1969. Tensions in the area increased sharply in the spring of 1970, with frequent and serious military clashes between Israel and Egypt and stepped-up activity by Palestinian guerrillas.

In the second phase, in response to that renewed tension and to the Soviet Union's apparent loss of interest in further cooperative effort, the U.S. decided by June 1970 that it had no responsible choice but to try on its own to break the spiral of violence. We could not stand by and watch the situation deteriorate into war. We therefore took a major initiative. We invited Israel and the Arabs to "stop shooting and start talking." We proposed a ceasefire and military standstill, to pave the way for a renewed effort at negotiation. The parties accepted our proposal in August. The autumn of 1970, however, was absorbed in dealing with new conflicts—the Soviet-Egyptian violations of the standstill agreement, and the breakdown of domestic order in Jordan and the invasion of Jordan by Syrian forces in September.

In January 1971, Ambassador Jarring finally began discussions with both Israel and Egypt on launching negotiations. He sought assurance from Egypt and Israel that negotiations could proceed on the basis of (a) an Israeli "commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British mandate of Palestine," and (b) an Egyptian "commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Egypt gave a qualified commitment to this effect. Israel was willing to enter talks looking toward agreement on secure and recognized borders but not to agree in advance to withdraw to the former international border.³⁵ Ambassador Jarring's effort lost momentum at the end of February.

The Search for an Interim Agreement. Attention then turned to another approach—an interim step toward peace in the form of an agreement for reopening the Suez Canal and a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops. This idea, which had been suggested publicly by both Israeli and Egyptian officials, was explored by the Secretary of State in May 1971 during his trip to the area and through subsequent diplomatic contacts. By autumn we had identified six principal issues in this negotiation:

- The relationship between an interim agreement and an overall settlement;

- Duration of the ceasefire to preserve a tolerable climate for ongoing talks;

- The extent of withdrawal of military forces from the Canal;

- The nature of supervisory arrangements;

- The nature of the Egyptian presence east of the Canal; and

- The use of the Canal by Israel during the period of an interim agreement.

These were not technical questions. To the parties, they went to the heart of the basic issues of security and peace. An interim agreement, for example, is acceptable to Egypt only to the extent that it implies or is linked to final recovery of all the occupied territories. But to Israel an interim agreement is acceptable only if it does not confirm that territories will be restored without negotiation on secure borders. The interim approach, however,

³⁵ See document nos. 42, 277, 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

offers hope only if it can make progress on concrete steps. But it can make such progress only if it can somehow put aside temporarily the two sides' fundamental differences regarding the final settlement. The more ambitious the proposed formula for an interim agreement, the more it risks foundering over those very differences.

Throughout all these negotiations, each side has sought to influence the other's negotiating position by increasing its own military strength. I have stated on several occasions in the past year that an arms balance is essential to stability but that military equilibrium alone cannot produce peace. The U.S. has demonstrated its commitment to maintaining a military balance that can serve as a foundation for negotiation, but we have also made intensive efforts to start peace negotiations. We have no other choice. A settlement is in the basic interest of both sides, of the United States, and of world peace.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is not in the first instance a U.S.-Soviet dispute, nor can it be settled by the global powers. But it is clear that the posture of the major powers can facilitate or inhibit agreement. Their arms can fuel the conflict; their diplomatic positions can make it more intractable; their exploitation of tension for unilateral gain can foment new crises. Hopes for peace will be undermined if either the U.S. or the USSR feels that the other is either using a negotiation or delaying a settlement to improve its political position at the expense of the other.

In this regard, the Soviet Union's effort to use the Arab-Israeli conflict to perpetuate and expand its own military position in Egypt has been a matter of concern to the United States. The USSR has taken advantage of Egypt's increasing dependence on Soviet military supply to gain the use of naval and air facilities in Egypt. This has serious implications for the stability of the balance of power locally, regionally in the Eastern Mediterranean, and globally. The Atlantic Alliance cannot ignore the possible implications of this move for the stability of the East-West relationship.

This is but one example of the consequences of the failure of the U.S. and USSR to reach some general understanding on the basic conditions of stability in the Middle East. Fundamental interests of the major powers are involved and some measure of disagreement is inevitable. Neither great power

would succeed in helping the parties reach a settlement if its efforts ran counter to the interests of the other, or if the other refused to cooperate.

This was the rationale of our dialogue with the USSR on the Middle East in 1969. Those talks unfortunately foundered because of two developments.

—The Soviet Union tried to draw a final political and territorial blueprint, including final boundaries, instead of helping launch a process of negotiation. We envisioned that boundaries could be drawn in the course of such a process to make them more secure, though it was our view that changes would not be substantial. In the fall of 1969, we reached an understanding with the USSR on a possible procedure for indirect Arab-Israeli talks. In December 1969, the Soviet Union changed its mind on this understanding.

—The Soviet Union applied its energies in early 1970 to a major military buildup in Egypt, which further delayed negotiation. Egypt's "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal had grown in intensity and Israel had responded with air raids deep into Egypt. The Soviets thereupon deployed in Egypt some 80 surface-to-air missile installations, several squadrons of combat aircraft with Soviet pilots, 5,000 missile crew members and technicians, and about 11,000 other advisers. This buildup continued through the summer of 1970, and Soviet personnel were directly involved in violations of the standstill agreement of August 7. Israel refused to negotiate until the violations were rectified. The U.S. provided Israel with means to cope with this situation. The Soviets since that time have introduced into Egypt SA-6 mobile surface-to-air missiles and the FOXBAT and other advanced MIG aircraft. Most recently they have reintroduced TU-16 bombers equipped with long-range air-to-surface missiles. Much of this equipment was operated and defended exclusively by Soviets.

The Soviet Union has an interest in avoiding major conflict in the Middle East. We hope the Soviet Union understands that it can serve this interest best by restraint in its arms supply, refraining from the use of this dispute to enhance its own military position, and encouraging the negotiation of a peace.

The urgent necessity, of course, is to find a way to an Arab-Israeli settlement.

—At a minimum, the ceasefire must be main-

tained if the climate for negotiations is to be preserved. Progress in negotiations, in turn, would provide valuable additional incentive for choosing political instead of military solutions.

—The military balance must not be allowed to tempt one side to seek an easy victory or panic the other side into a move of desperation. An end to the arms race, of course, would be the best hope for a stable balance over the longer term.

—Maintaining the military balance, however, is not by itself a policy which can bring peace. The search for an overall Arab-Israeli settlement will continue under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. Our efforts to help the parties achieve an interim agreement will also continue, as long as the parties wish. The interim approach, if it is to succeed, must find a way to make progress on practical and partial aspects of the situation without raising all the contentious issues that obstruct a comprehensive solution.

—The U.S. and the USSR can contribute to the process of settlement by encouraging Arabs and Israelis to begin serious negotiation. The great powers also have a responsibility to enhance, not undermine, the basic conditions of stability in the area. Injecting the global strategic rivalry into the region is incompatible with Middle East peace and with detente in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Peace would free the energies and resources of the Middle East for the more fruitful enterprises of economic and social development. The United States looks hopefully toward a new era of constructive and mutually beneficial relations with all the nations and people of the area. The realization of these hopes—theirs and ours—depends on the achievement of peace.

44

Statement by Chairman Hamilton (Dem.) of the U.S. House Subcommittee on the Near East suggesting new approaches to peace in the Middle East³⁶

Bloomington, Indiana, February 13, 1972

These three facts of the present Middle East situation—the impasse in negotiations, the Soviet role and the Palestine refugee issue—all indicate the dire need for new approaches to peace so that another Arab-Israeli war, with the possibility that holds for Soviet-American confrontation, can be avoided.

I suggest five concrete ways in which the United States might in 1972 help create a better atmosphere for peace in the Middle East so that the parties to the dispute can start to negotiate their differences.

First, if the United States efforts for peace have reached an impasse, the United States should call immediately for the resumption of the Jarring Mission without any prior conditions. That is, Dr. Jarring should start, not where he left off in March 1971, but with the shelving of his aide memoire.³⁷ Israel would, I think, agree to a return to the Jarring Mission without what it considers the conditions of that aide memoire. Egypt has, it seems, lost all faith in the mediation efforts of the United States, so from its viewpoint, the Jarring Mission may be the only alternative.

If there are any deeper reasons for or need of the Jarring Mission now, they are two.

First, the Soviet Union must not be kept out of any diplomatic maneuvering. To keep the Soviet Union informed of, and concerned with, efforts to help the parties reach accommodation is only to recognize the Soviet Union's interests in the area and the fact that Moscow might be able to veto any peace agreement.

Second, it is a sad fact that the United Nations and the Arab-Israeli conflict, which grew up together, have in the last three and a half years, contributed reciprocally to their mutual decline.

³⁶ Excerpted from the text of an address given at Indiana University and inserted by Hamilton into the *Congressional Record*, February 18, 1972, p. 4734.

³⁷ Printed as Annex I to document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

It has almost become a truism: there will be no peace in the Middle East without the United Nations, and there will be no United Nations without peace in the Middle East.

U.N. Res. 242 which forms the basis for Dr. Jarring's efforts is the only starting point we have for creating a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

A second important role the United States could perform is to start the process of rethinking the Sinai issue so that this major stumbling block to further negotiations can be removed. I suggest two types of plans to be explored. Both operate from the assumption that Israel wants security and not territory in Sinai and Sinai should eventually be returned to Egyptian sovereignty.

First, the United States might consider a time-related, phased-withdrawal peace plan between Israel and Egypt. In such a time-related peace, Israel would concede the return of all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty the moment Egypt signs a formal peace with it. Israel would then proceed to withdraw by stages that would go hand in hand with a defined progression from formal peace to normal neighborly relations and be contingent upon such a progression. While it would be difficult to determine when one phase was completed, and another should start, such plans could help build peace, step by step, might be self-enforcing and would not demand single steps greater than the present capacity of States in the region to undertake at any given time.

Second, the United States might consider a similar plan which, instead of involving a time-related withdrawal, would create demilitarized zones in a Sinai under Egyptian sovereignty, conditioned on Israeli and Egyptian participation in the international policing effort. Under one variation, Israel would, along with others, police a zone next to its pre-1967 border with Egypt, a zone stretching from Gaza to Sharm al-Shaykh. Such a plan might create the kinds of international guarantees the parties can accept.

An extremely important third step the United States could undertake in 1972 would be to initiate bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, based on mutual respect of the other's legitimate interests in the area. Such talks should focus on trying to reach an agreement to control the flow of arms to the area and the manufacturing of them by both Israel and the Arab states. These talks might

also usefully seek to narrow differences in interpretation on how to implement U.N. Resolution 242.

Fourth, the United States should concern itself with the Palestinian movement.

We should take note of a new, emerging political consciousness of Palestinians which has not yet jelled. While there is some sympathy for the guerrillas among Palestinians everywhere, there are many Palestinians who are committed to a peaceful, rather than military, settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue. We should watch closely Palestinian developments, be prepared to deal with them and support peaceful and viable ways to encourage expression of the Palestinians' right to have a greater voice in their own political future within the context of a peace settlement.

We might, for example, urge the parties to let an internationally supervised plebiscite of Palestinians be taken, perhaps on the West Bank, in which all Palestinians vote for, say:

A confederation with Israel or Jordan.

Return to Jordan.

Or independence within defined borders agreed to by all parties to the dispute.

The elections the Israelis plan to hold on the occupied West Bank this spring might be expanded to include all Palestinians and might be internationally supervised.

Also, the United States should work with all states of the area to make a greater number of meaningful job opportunities available to Palestinian refugees so that their lives will have more dignity and hope and less apathy, bitterness and despair.

Finally, we might explore with the parties, or independently, possible solutions to perhaps the most difficult problem in a dispute of many stumbling blocks—namely, the future status of Jerusalem. Specifically, the United States should explore ways of accommodating the interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the city and ways of guaranteeing the right of access of all groups to their holy places. The United States might also begin a study of:

Extraterritorialities for the holy places.

Consider the possibility of a joint administration of the city.

And, in general, explore alternative international guarantees.

In the final analysis, however, the parties must

negotiate the particulars of any settlement of this crucial issue. Our role can be one of examining the range of alternatives so that everyone is familiar with them.

None of these suggestions is to replace direct negotiations between the parties. Rather, they are to supplement such talks by the parties and to raise related issues which can help promote a lasting peace.

We have many interests in the Middle East. In particular, the United States has:

An interest in Israel's security and well-being which has cultural, political and moral overtones for many Americans.

An increasingly important and vital interest in Middle East oil whose pools contain 75 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. It is estimated that in 1980, the United States will have to get between 35 and 40 percent of its oil needs from the Middle East although it now gets less than 5 percent from this region.

A strategic interest in the entire Middle East as the crossroads of three continents and as an important link in global communications networks.

A general interest in the political, social and economic development of the entire area and all its peoples.

And an interest in avoiding further conflict in the area and any chance of a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Peace in the Middle East secures these interests and war threatens them as does the present state of neither war nor peace. That is why peace in the Middle East is so important to us all.

We probably must learn to live with insecurity and hostility in the Middle East, and know that we simply are not able to solve its problems in any rapid and final fashion.

I am reminded of the remark "optimism is to the diplomat what courage is to the soldier." The U.S. has no formula for instant peace. But we must proceed with optimism, not overlooking any avenue toward settlement.

May it be said of us when the course has been run:

"How beautiful upon the mountain are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that proclaimeth peace, that publisheth salvation."

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Vice-Chairman Hussein of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq (excerpts)³⁸

Moscow, February 17, 1972

An Iraqi Party and Government delegation, headed by Saddam Hussein, Deputy General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) of Iraq, and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Command of the Revolution of the Republic of Iraq, stayed in the Soviet Union from the 10th to the 17th of February, 1972, on an official friendly visit, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government.

A great deal of attention in the course of the talks was paid to the present situation in the Middle East. The sides have stated that, due to continued Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab countries, the situation in this area remains tense and is a menace to peace. This is the result of the political, military, financial and economic assistance rendered to the aggressor by the imperialist circles of the USA, and by international Zionism which, as previously, strive to undermine progressive Arab regimes, retain their position in the Arab East, and continue to plunder the petroleum resources of this area.

The sides consider that no just and durable peace can be established in the Middle East without the liberation of all Arab territories occupied as a result of Israel's imperialist aggression, and without guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They express their support of the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the rehabilitation of their legitimate rights.

The Soviet side declared that the Soviet Union is prepared to go on rendering comprehensive assistance and support to the righteous struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, for the consolidation of their national

³⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 9 (February 26, 1972), pp. 10, 11-12.

independence and social progress, and for establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Iraqi side highly appreciated the unflinching efforts of the Soviet Union in this direction. It expresses its gratitude for the valuable assistance the Soviet Union is rendering Iraq and the other Arab states, as well as for the unselfish and sincere position of the Soviet Union in relation to the Arab peoples who are fighting for freedom, peace and social progress.

It was pointed out in the course of the talks that the united actions of the Arab states, the mobilization of their efforts and possibilities in the struggle against the intrigues of the forces of imperialism and reaction, and the strengthening of their cooperation with the socialist countries, constitute a major condition for the success of the struggle against imperialist Israeli aggression.

In this connection the sides vigorously condemned the attempts of international imperialism to spread anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, calculated to violate the solidarity of the Arab countries and peoples and their cooperation with their true friends—the socialist countries.

46

Press interview statements by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany outlining relations with Israel³⁹

Mid-February, 1972

Q. It is generally expected that those Arab States which broke diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic in 1965 will soon be sending ambassadors to Bonn again. Will the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Arab States affect German-Israeli relations? Do you expect this to contribute towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East?

A. I am sure that the resumption of relations with the Arab States which broke off relations in 1965 will not have a negative effect on the relations

between Germany and Israel. Just as the establishment of relations between the Federal Republic and Israel was not at that time directed against the Arab States, so the resumption of relations with the Arab States must not be understood as being directed against Israel.

We are striving towards a positive relationship with all the states of the world. Perhaps the normalization of our relations with these Arab States will enable us to contribute more than was previously possible to the efforts towards a Middle peace.

Q. As Foreign Minister you said that there is "no neutrality of the heart." You were referring to relations with Israel. You have stated your position on the Middle East conflict: "We believe that—particularly in view of the most recent history of my own country—we cannot remain unconcerned about the crisis and that we cannot allow Israel's right to exist to be questioned. But we are endeavouring to give justice to the legitimate rights of all and also to improve our relations with the Arab States." But you have also said that you support the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. How do you estimate future German-Israeli relations?

A. Relations between the Federal Republic and Israel have developed positively, particularly after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1965, and both sides are continuously working for the further improvement of these relations. I will remind you of the visit to Bonn in 1970 of Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and the visit to Israel last year of the Federal German Foreign Minister. This is a matter of the principles which are generally the basis of the relationship between two states. But it would be strange and morally indefensible to disregard those special factors which determine German-Israeli relations. I referred to that in the interview which you quoted.

The Middle East resolution of the Security Council materialized at the end of 1967 after long and difficult negotiations and has found extensive support. In the circumstances the resolution could not be a ready-made solution but still today it is the only broad basis for endeavours towards peace in the Middle East. Therefore the Federal Government has adopted the principles and guidelines contained in this resolution.

Q. Federal Chancellor, you have recently received an invitation from Mrs. Golda Meir to make an official visit to Israel. There you will meet many victims and sur-

³⁹ Excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 25 (February 22, 1972), p. 296; the interview was conducted for the March 1972 issue of *Tribüne—Zeitschrift zum Verständnis des Judentums*.

vivors of the Hitler era, people who were once emigrants and homeless. In Jerusalem and elsewhere in Israel the name of Auschwitz will again be a reality. With what feelings and expectations do you embark on this trip?

A. I do not know yet when I am going to pay the visit to which Mrs. Meir has invited me. But it will, after all, not be my first visit to Israel for I was there in autumn of 1960, when I was governing Mayor of Berlin and President of the Council of German Towns.

I was and am well aware of the problems which confront a German with political responsibility. Earlier, you quoted my statement that there is no neutrality of the heart. I would like to add to that and say: After what was done to the Jews in Europe in the name of Germany there can be no neutrality of the heart in the future either. Based on that we must share the responsibility of ensuring that the state of Israel can live free of any threat to its existence and that it can develop peacefully.

I should add to that the progressive overcoming of the shadows of the past and the improvement of relations between the two states and not least among the people. I have in mind particularly young people in Israel and Germany who should be looking to the future without disregarding the lessons of the past. I wish once more to stress how much German policy must be aimed at that, within the context of its limited possibilities of influencing a Middle East peace settlement.

47

Radio interview statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon expressing hope for a partial settlement, regretting deteriorating relations with Uganda, and discussing plans for the occupied West Bank⁴⁰

February 19, 1972

Q. Do you think we have done everything to achieve the peace?

A. In my opinion the Government of Israel

has done all it thought possible to achieve peace. This does not mean, however, that we have not made a mistake at one stage or another. I myself have doubts about whether, after the Six Day War, we missed the opportunity of the comparatively convenient months which followed the war for laying down for ourselves a peace plan based on a logical compromise; a plan with which we would try to convince at least our friends in the world, at least the United States of America.

Q. You think this is an opportunity which has been missed?

A. I cannot say. I am only giving an example that I thought then that there were grounds for formulating such a plan and that there was a possibility of winning understanding in foreign capitals, particularly Washington and London and perhaps a number of African capitals, and on this basis to launch an extensive campaign towards the Arab countries. I am sure those who did not accept my views then were convinced that I was mistaken.

Q. How about today?

A. History will decide who made a mistake.

Q. Speaking about peace, do you feel winds of peace blowing between the two banks of the Suez Canal?

A. I can say, at least at this stage, that winds of no-war are blowing. Although I prefer peace to no-war, no-war is preferable to war.

Q. In your opinion, what are the chances of a partial settlement with Egypt?

A. Egypt is interested in any political achievements. If Egypt can achieve a partial settlement under conditions which it thinks will guarantee its claims in an overall settlement, then Cairo is likely to agree to a partial settlement.

Q. And how interested are we in a partial settlement?

A. We are interested in a partial settlement even if only to create a precedent for a possible positive settlement between us and Egypt. However, just as Egypt is seeking—up to now at least—a partial settlement under conditions of an overall settlement, we contend that a partial settlement should be made under conditions relevant to a partial settlement with a promise that the war will not be resumed and that the negotiations for an overall settlement will continue.

Q. What is a partial settlement worth?

A. I think it is worthwhile to leave the question

⁴⁰ Interview conducted by Gideon Levari, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3921/A/11-13, 14-15; reprinted by permission.

of price to the negotiations themselves when these are resumed. However, it is clear from what has been said so far by the authorized representatives of the Government of Israel that we are prepared to consider a tactical withdrawal—I say tactical not strategic—from the Canal line as a basis for a partial settlement.

Q. When you are speaking about such a withdrawal, you undoubtedly do not mean that Egyptian troops will replace our troops in these positions.

A. Heaven forbid. What I mean is that the positions remain vacant until the fixed border is determined. I never thought that the Suez Canal should be the fixed border and I do not assume that the new line, which will be at a tactical distance from the Canal, should be the fixed border. The fixed border will be east of it. However, we should remain in such a position that it will not be possible to violate the partial settlement unilaterally and thus deprive us of the chance of achieving a true peace.

Q. In other words, Egyptian troops should in no circumstances cross the Canal.

A. In no circumstances. . . .

Q. How would you explain the anti-Israel statement of the Ugandan President, Idi Amin?⁴¹

A. If it transpires that he indeed said that, then I can only regret it because President Amin has expressed feelings of friendship for Israel in action since he came to power and until recently. If, however, since his visit to Libya he has changed his mind, then I think he will regret it in the long run.

Q. Is this still in doubt?

A. As a politician who is particularly careful about his statements regarding leaders of other countries, I want to enjoy the benefit of doubt, although what has been published so far is very disturbing.

Q. And we are investing in Amin's country—money, means and manpower.

A. We have invested technical aid and technical cooperation in many countries. We were dis-

appointed in some and achieved valuable results in others.

Q. Would you say the Allon plan is being implemented in settlements being established now?

A. That plan is not only a plan for settling. The settlements are used as a lever, or one of the levers, to achieve Israel's future map as viewed by the plan. This is a political plan as well. It seeks to achieve a political solution both as regards the Palestinian public in the occupied territories and as regards the neighbouring countries.

Q. Let us take, for example, the idea of the Israel Defence Forces staying along the Jordan. We have been hearing statements recently from quite a few ministers in this sphere.

A. The Jordan Valley, which stretches from the river up to the mountains and even further, is rather wide and must be part of the state of Israel, and then of course, the IDF will be stationed along the Jordan. I do not necessarily refer to the river, but to suitable strategic positions near the river.

Q. Do you draw encouragement from the recent statements by your colleagues in the Cabinet?

A. Some of the Cabinet members who have made statements during the past two years in interviews, especially those with foreign correspondents, said things which encouraged me a lot. In fact, I found great similarity between the ideas they expressed and the said plan.

Q. Mr. Allon, who do you think is a possible partner [last word in English] for the talks with us—King Husayn of Jordan or the Palestinians?

A. First come, first served. Whoever wants to open talks will be the first to be dealt with. In my opinion, the matter is very complicated because the Palestinian public—or the Palestinian people, whatever the Palestinians want to call themselves—is divided between the West Bank and Transjordan in the east. I recently read an interview by the *Ma'ariv* correspondent from Italy, who interviewed King Husayn, in which he defined the whole nation residing east of the Jordan and himself as Palestinians. I thus assume that there is a dialogue—a close dialogue, thanks to the open bridges [over the Jordan]—between Amman and many Palestinians west of the Jordan. It is hard to imagine that in the present stage one could be

⁴¹ A joint communiqué issued after a visit to Libya by President Amin of Uganda on February 17, 1972, showed a significant movement by Uganda towards a pro-Arab policy.

preferable to the other. They must be allowed to decide who will be first.

Q. Mr. Allon, you say "first come, first served." The question is, were we not mistaken in leaving things for them to decide and failing to take the initiative?

A. We shall never know if we made a mistake in the past or not, but when I supported the adoption of an immediate decision over three years ago, I also recommended encouraging the Palestinian public in the West Bank to organize themselves by means of self-administration, without closing the options to a comprehensive agreement at a later stage, either with the Palestinians themselves—who would already be organized in a self-administrative structure—or with Amman together with the West Bank, or a tripartite settlement, in a federal structure to include between two and three elements: Israel and one or two Arab elements.

Q. Husayn talks of the price we are willing to pay for peace. Are you willing to tell him the price from far away?

A. No, I am not willing to say anything in public. Only the fact that it is not my fault that the Allon plan was made public.

Q. And not in public?

A. I would regard the said plan as a basis for peace with Jordan as well.

Q. Do you think Husayn may adopt a different policy, following the Egyptian alteration in policy, if there is such an alteration?

A. I very much admire King Husayn's repeated public statement that Jordan will not join in another war with Israel. He, in fact, appealed to the other Arab countries not to jeopardize themselves by further defeats. Such a statement by the King of Jordan shows that he has become more of a realist and has become stronger, because hitherto it was customary for Arab leaders to compete with each other in warlike declarations, and this is the first time, unless I am mistaken, that an Arab leader has made a balanced and very realistic statement publicly. In my opinion, by taking this step he has already taken many risks. The distance between the necessary courage to make a declaration of no-war and the courage necessary to make a separate peace agreement with Israel is not great. I, for example, have no doubt whatsoever that if the Palestinian public or Jordan or both

of them—and I should like any solution to include a just solution for the Palestinians—were to make a separate peace with us, they would gain a great deal from this. From many points of view. And leaving the matter open is not to their advantage. In any case, as far as the Palestinians are concerned, time is not necessarily on the side of Amman. The quicker it makes peace with Israel, the better. I would also add a comment regarding Cairo: in my opinion it would be more convenient for Cairo if the Jordanians and the Palestinians made peace quickly, because Egypt became involved in this miserable war as a result of the Palestinian element. If you solve the Palestinian problem in a reasonable way, you have taken away Egypt's reason for another war....

48

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of U.S.S.R. Minister of Defence Grechko⁴²

Cairo, February 21, 1972

Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, USSR Minister of Defence, paid an official friendly visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt from February 18 to 21 at the invitation of the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

USSR Minister of Defence Marshal Andrei Grechko had meetings and talks with President Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Prime Minister Aziz Sidki, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War Mohammed A. Sadek, and other statesmen and military leaders of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Marshal Andrei Grechko went to see a number of military units of the Egyptian armed forces and expressed satisfaction with the level of military training and the field training standard of the troops.

The Soviet guests were given a sincere and cordial reception, indicative of the Egyptian people's sincere feelings of friendship for the Soviet people and its armed forces.

In the course of the talks with the statesmen and military leaders, which took place in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and

⁴² English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5627 (February 22, 1972), p. 58.

friendship, the sides expressed satisfaction with the development of cooperation between the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt. They exchanged views on the further strengthening and expansion of military cooperation between the USSR and the Arab Republic of Egypt in the interests of enhancing the defence capacity of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

The sides noted the identity of views in their assessment of the current tense situation in the Middle East. It was stressed that the expansionist policy pursued by Israel, which bases itself on the extensive military and political assistance of the United States, remains the root cause of the mounting deterioration of the dangerous situation in this part of the world.

The sides noted that the talks and meetings held in the course of the visit have been an important contribution to the expansion and deepening of friendly relations between the two countries and armies.

The Egyptian side expressed gratitude to the Soviet government for its consistent support for the just struggle of the Arab peoples who have been attacked by the Israeli aggressors and for the great support and assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to strengthening the armed forces and the defence capacity of the country on the whole.

49

Statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon asserting the right of the Israeli army to take action in South Lebanon⁴³

February 25, 1972

Allon: The Lebanese Premier has washed his hands clean. Apparently there is an agreement between Beirut and the terrorist leadership that in future no firing will take place from Lebanese territory against targets in Israel, and in return the Lebanese will close their eyes to the training of terrorists on Lebanese territory and to the terrorist bases from which they set out for operations and to which they return after the operations. To

us there is absolutely no difference whether the shell is fired from across the border or the terrorist is sent from across the border. Therefore, we have a full right to act by ourselves in order to uproot terrorism. And if the Lebanese Government does not do this, as demanded by its sovereignty and responsibility, we shall take action ourselves.

Q. How would you define the objective of the operation the IDF carried out this morning in Lebanon?

A. We have more than once warned the Lebanese Government that if terrorist activity is resumed, we shall take action ourselves to stop it. Since the Lebanese Government has not adopted any measures, and it allowed the terrorists to cross the border into our territory and to return from Galilee into Lebanon, and since in reply to the Chief of Staff's public warning yesterday the Lebanese Premier replied that his government did not bear the responsibility for the recent terrorist actions, we fulfilled our duty to the security of Israeli citizens and took action ourselves. This is not only a punishment, but also an example of the operations we shall adopt in the future on this scale or another until an end is put to terrorism. I would strongly advise the Lebanese Premier to learn before it is too late from the bitter experience of Jordan and not to repeat its mistakes.

50

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of a government delegation from the U.S.S.R. (excerpts)⁴⁴

Damascus, February 26, 1972

A Soviet Party and Government delegation, headed by K.T. Mazurov, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and First Vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was in Syria from February 21–26, 1972, on an official visit at the invitation of the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

⁴³ Interview conducted by Arye Mekel, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3926/A/1–2; reprinted by permission.

⁴⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 11 (March 11, 1972), pp. 5, 6–7.

In examining international problems, the sides paid special attention to analysing the situation in the Middle East.

The sides are unanimous that the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, the growing US support to Israel and to its expansionist policy by granting it steadily increasing financial, technical and military assistance, particularly various types of weapons, are aggravating tension in the Middle East and creating a serious menace to world peace.

Acting as an instrument of imperialist policy in the Middle East, Israel helps international imperialism in its attempts to restore its domination in the Arab world, to undermine the progressive regimes in the Arab countries, to abolish their social and economic gains, to continue the plunder of the national wealth of the peoples of this area, to deprive them of the opportunity to make their contribution to the cause of social progress and peace throughout the world.

In this connection the sides condemn the escalation of aggression by Israel which relies upon the extensive support of the United States, and insist on the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 aggression.

The sides condemn also the policy of racial discrimination in Israel, the mass terror and persecutions of the Arab population on the occupied territories, the constant trampling underfoot of the Arabs' rights by the Israeli authorities, and attempts to change the aspect of these Arab territories with a view to their complete annexation, which is a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and generally recognized standards of international law.

Regarding the Palestinian Resistance movement as a component part of the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples, the sides confirm their support of the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their legitimate rights.

In connection with the adventurist provocative course of Israel and the resulting dangerous situation obtaining in the Middle East, concrete measures were discussed for further strengthening the defence potential of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Soviet side informed the Syrian delegation about its efforts towards achieving the speediest

solution of the Middle East crisis and declared that the Soviet Union would continue to support the just struggle of the Arab peoples for eliminating the consequences of the June 1967 aggression as quickly as possible.

The Syrian side expressed sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for the assistance rendered to the Syrian Arab Republic in strengthening its defence potential, for the constant and consistent support to the just struggle of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression and imperialism and for the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

The Syrian leaders informed the Soviet Party and Government delegation about the significance of the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics in the struggle for uniting the efforts of the Arab states against imperialism and Israeli aggression. The Soviet side expressed the conviction that the continuing efforts to unite the Arab countries on a democratic, anti-imperialist basis and to strengthen the unity of their actions conform to the interests of the Arab peoples and the task of speedily eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community are the natural and sincere friends of the Arabs in their struggle against Zionist aggression and imperialism, for consolidating national independence and social progress. The strengthening of friendship and co-operation among them constitutes an important factor for the successful development of the Arab national liberation movement and plays an important role in increasing the struggle of all the peoples against imperialism and colonialism. This cooperation helps to strengthen the staunchness of the progressive regimes in the Arab countries in the face of the imperialist conspiracies directed towards undermining these regimes.

51

Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers⁴⁵**Jidda, early March, 1972**

The Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Jeddah between 29 February and 3 March 1972, guided by the resolutions of the Islamic Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government held in Rabat from 9 to 12 Rajab 1389 H (22 to 25 September 1969),

Reaffirming the resolutions of the First Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah from 15 to 17 Moharrem 1390 H (23–25 March 1970), and the Second Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Karachi from 27 to 29 Shawal 1390 H (26–28 December 1970),⁴⁶

Considering that the support and backing of the sister Arab States striving to recover their lands and the lawful national rights of the people of Palestine is a responsibility and duty imposed by Moslem solidarity and the principles of justice and peace,

Taking due account of the discussions that took place during the Conference on the persistence of Israel in defying the implementation of the United Nations resolutions as a result of the support of the United States of America,

Noting Israel's wilful persistence in pursuing its aggression on Arab territories and violations of the United Nations resolutions and the principles of international law and human rights,

1. *Condemns* Israel for its aggression perpetrated in 1967 on sister Arab countries and its persistence in violating the principles of the United Nations Charter and refusal to implement its resolutions and holds it responsible for the deteriorating situation in the Middle East;

2. *Insists* on the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories since 5 June 1967 in compliance with the principle of the illegitimacy of the acquisition of territory by force and the

⁴⁵ English text as transmitted to the Secretary-General of the U.N. on May 26, 1972, by the representatives of the states attending the conference; issued on May 26, 1972, as U.N. doc. no. S/10665 (A/8686) and Add. 1, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, p. 83.

⁴⁶ Printed as document nos. 66 and 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

principle of the respect of the national unity and territorial integrity of States;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* of the role of Islamic States and the efforts of African and Asian States designed to find a just solution of the United Nations resolution;

4. *Denounces* Israel's uncooperative attitude, at the United Nations level, in the search for a just and lasting peaceful settlement to the Middle East crisis;

5. *Supports* sister Arab States in their efforts to liberate their territories from Israeli occupation by resorting to the means consistent with their best interests, security and integrity and appeals to all peace- and justice-loving States to adopt severe measures against Israel and its expansionist policy to force it into withdrawing its troops from the occupied territories;

6. *Requests* the Big Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, in particular the United States, to take all appropriate measures to bring Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, and refrain from providing it with any military or economic support so that it may not persist in refusing to withdraw from these territories;

7. *Declares* that Member States should strive by any appropriate means to contribute to the liquidation of Israeli aggression against the occupied Arab territories, including political and economic retortion against Israel.

52

Annual report to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel (excerpts)⁴⁷**Jerusalem, March 7, 1972**

When we talk of the possibilities of negotiations, these are numerous. The president of Egypt ought to express his opinion on the significance of Israel's readiness to discuss a separate agreement on the Suez Canal through the mediation of the United States. All the discussions which have taken place during four and a half years within

⁴⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, Seventh Knesset, Third Session, vol. XX (March 6–9, 1972), p. 1655.

the framework of the United Nations have been limited to verbal formulas:

It was said that were Israel to utter the word "withdrawal" Egypt would say "peace," and if Egypt were to say "agreement" Israel would respond "implementation," and so forth. Usually, solutions to this sort of problem can be found with stubbornness and perseverance. But it will become clear that any result thus achieved will have limited value so long as there are no serious negotiations which transform words into an agreed upon reality, in particular when such words are said with different interpretations and considerations, sometimes even with contradictory meanings.

As far as the Suez question is concerned there is for the first time a possibility of progress, not by means of a verbal declaration but through the formation of a new reality, a change of scene on most of the sensitive points of contact between Israel and Egypt. We must accustom ourselves to the idea that, for once, peace may grow from gradual developments of a human and material nature rather than from exchanges of declarations. This can be applied well to the increasingly firm relations between Israelis and Arabs in the areas of military administration and between Israelis and Arabs across the open bridges with their movement in trade, visitors and tourists. This is a pointer towards a period of peace to come in the future.

.

From the military point of view Israel has no reason to prefer one line or another to the present line on the Suez Canal. When Israel really agreed to enter into negotiations on a partial settlement to open the Suez Canal under the mediation of the United States it was done simply to show her belief that a settlement of this nature by its very implementation would contribute much to the continuing efforts to find a permanent peace between Israel and Egypt. It is doubtful whether Egypt understood the true value of the settlement with all the positive options it would have offered in the network of relations between Israel and Egypt because an agreement of this nature, so long as it does not infringe upon the security and political rights of the parties, would create an improved atmosphere for the negotiation efforts

taking place within the context of the Jarring mission.

.

53

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of a government delegation from Libya (excerpts)⁴⁸

Moscow, March 8, 1972

An official Libyan delegation, headed by Major Abd al-Salam Jalloud, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Minister of Economy and Industry of the Libyan Arab Republic, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from February 23 to March 4, 1972 at the invitation of the Soviet Government. The Libyan delegation was given a warm and friendly welcome in the Soviet Union.

.

During the discussion of international problems the two sides paid special attention to the current Middle East situation, which constitutes a serious threat to the cause of world peace. This situation has resulted from the Israeli Zionist aggression against the Arab people aided by American imperialism. The two sides condemned the expansionist policy followed by Israel as a tool of international imperialism, which seeks to enslave the Arab people, to continue plundering their natural resources, and to put an end to the progressive Arab regimes which are based on the popular masses who have chosen the way of peaceful democratic development, national independence and progress. The two parties insist on the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. Both sides condemn the assistance which American imperialism gives to Israel in the military, economic and political fields. They consider it necessary to strengthen the will of the revolutionary Arab forces to continue the struggle until victory.

Both sides condemn the discrimination and oppression which Israel perpetrates against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and

⁴⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text issued by TASS (Beirut), March 8, 1972.

also the open violation by the Israeli authorities of the rights of the Arabs and the attempts to change the complexion of those Arab territories aiming at their ultimate annexation, which conflict radically with the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized standards of international law.

The two sides declared their support for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to reclaim their legitimate rights. They consider the Palestinian resistance movement an inseparable part of the national liberation movement of the Arab people.

They believe that the achievement of unity among the progressive Arab regimes is an important factor supporting Arab efforts and mobilizing all resources for the just struggle against imperialism, the monopolies, and international Zionism, and for the attainment of victory in that struggle.

The two sides note the great importance of the friendship between the Soviet Union and the progressive Arab forces for the success of their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and Israeli Zionist aggression.

54

Introductory comment by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers to his report on U.S. foreign policy in 1971 presented to Congress (excerpt)⁴⁹

Washington, March 8, 1972

In the Middle East, the other area of most persistent tension, we will seek again during 1972 to move beyond the cease-fire toward a settlement negotiated between the parties on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Without progress on a settlement the relative calm of 1971 threatens to give way to new hostilities. We must not sit inactive and watch that happen.

As a step toward full implementation of U.N.

Resolution 242, an interim agreement providing for the opening of the Suez Canal and some Israeli withdrawal would be a decisive step away from war and toward peace. It would be in the interests not only of Israel and Egypt, but of all the countries and peoples of the Middle East. During my visit to the area last spring and in my speech to the United Nations last fall I stressed that the United States was prepared to assist in achieving an interim agreement as long as the parties wished us to. We still are ready to do so. We welcome Israel's willingness to enter talks in "close proximity" with Egypt. We hope they can be brought about.

We are prepared to play an intermediary role; however, we seek no special position. We support Ambassador Jarring's efforts to achieve an overall settlement and believe steps to achieve an interim agreement complement those efforts. And we welcome the actively expressed interest of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim in the problems of the area.

55

Press interview statement by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany discussing the desirability of a joint European policy on the Middle East⁵⁰

Bonn, early March, 1972

Q. Chancellor, let us turn to another subject. In an interview with Egyptian television you offered German and European help in the search for a Near East settlement. How and where can such efforts be made? Is this announcement related to your impending trip to Israel?

A. The trip to Israel is not immediately imminent. It will most probably take place during this year. The West European cooperation on foreign policy, which has made some progress since the autumn of 1970, has also dealt with this area. It has been a somewhat laborious task to bring six states, now ten, together over anything

⁴⁹ Excerpt relevant to the Middle East, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1709 (March 27, 1972), p. 461.

⁵⁰ Excerpted and translated from the German text, *Schwarzwälder Boten* (Rottwail, W. Germany), March 13, 1972.

like a common denominator. Even so, I consider it noteworthy that the states of the West European community will shortly be presenting their common position within the framework of the United Nations and to the Secretary-General. With the Secretary-General I include the activities of Ambassador Jarring who, as Special Representative of the United Nations, is again working on an attempt at mediation, an attempt to establish peace in the Near East. I do not believe that we should take over. But I do believe that it is quite reasonable and natural that a Western Europe which has moved closer together must also have a special responsibility in the move towards détente in an area which lies practically on Europe's door step. That is one thing.

I also said in the interview that arrangements for help to the Arab refugees must be part of any prospective secure peace settlement in the Near East. And I said that here we, the Federal Republic of Germany and the West European community, must be prepared together with others to play a constructive role.

56

Statement of policy on the Middle East adopted by the Socialist Party of France⁵¹

Paris, March 12, 1972

Four years after the last armed conflict between the Arab states and the state of Israel, arms supplies by the big powers keep up the permanent risk of a new war.

The Socialist Party appreciates the U.N. representative's efforts towards implementing in its entirety the resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967.

It considers that a lasting peace depends on acceptance of the following principles:

—recognition of Israel's right to existence and security, as well as that of all the other nations

of the Near East (as sovereign states) including the Arab nation of Palestine, which will freely choose its representatives;

—a guarantee to Israel and to all the other nations of their right of navigation in the international waterways of the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal;

—agreement among the big powers to put an end to escalation in arms deliveries;

—the fixing of final frontiers by means of negotiations between the interested parties and evacuation of the occupied territories;

—the setting up of international aid to all the peoples of the Near East in order to facilitate their economic development and peaceful coexistence, while waiting for cooperation [among them] which will benefit all the states of this area;

—negotiation among all the states of the area in order to rehabilitate the Arab refugees with the support and active solidarity of the whole international community.

57

Statement by Chairman Zadok of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee commenting on King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan⁵²

March 15, 1972

At a first reading, I see this plan as consisting of two parts, the part concerned with Israeli-Jordanian relations and that concerned with Arab internal affairs.

According to this plan, Jerusalem is to be the capital of the Western part of Jordan and, of course, as it is well known, we cannot accept that, because in our view Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and will remain a unified city.

There is also reference to Israel withdrawing from all the areas we have taken possession of since June 4, 1967 and, as is well known, this is something we cannot accept, as we insist on frontiers that will ensure our security.

⁵¹ Section on the Middle East translated from the French text of the Socialist Party programme, *Le Monde* (Paris), December 28, 1972, p. 5. (This statement is virtually identical with the draft prepared by the party's Executive Committee and published January 11, 1972; French text, *Le Monde*, January 15, 1972, p. 2.)

⁵² Excerpted and translated from the statement broadcast in Hebrew by Israel radio and monitored by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut; for the text of King Hussein's speech announcing the plan see document no. 187 below.

As for the second part... the internal arrangements of the state, whatever it is called, do not concern us, as they are an Arab internal problem.

We have always said that in the area between the Mediterranean and the Iraqi frontier there is room for two states only: a Jewish state and an Arab state, and just as the internal arrangements of the Jewish state are our affair, so the internal arrangements of the Arab state are the Arabs' affair, whether or no they accept this plan...

58

Statement to the Knesset by Israel Prime Minister Meir rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan⁵³

Jerusalem, March 16, 1972

Several days ago the world was told that King Hussein was about to make a highly important political statement affecting the future of the region. Various commentators ascribed far-reaching significance to this expected speech, and there were some who wanted to see it as a step towards a peace agreement with Israel.

This wave of interest on the eve of the speech was comprehensible in view of the sincere expectations and desires that exist and the wish to see our area emerging from the era of wars and advancing towards peace.

But the magnitude of the expectations has been matched by the magnitude of the disappointment.

After broadcasting a series of march tunes, the Jordanian radio transmitted the King's address, which the announcer described as a historic pronouncement. In this speech the King announced, after an ideological introduction, a plan for a new stage of his Kingdom and its establishment as a United Arab Kingdom which, according to him, would consist of Palestine and Jordan.

He gave details of various features of the structure and the institutions of this United Kingdom. He spoke of the strong bonds between the two banks. He stated that the armed forces of the

Kingdom, composed of select persons from both banks, would always be ready to absorb sons from both parts of the Kingdom in loyalty and devotion to the aims of victory. He went on to declare that any attempt to cast doubts on the plan was tantamount to treason against the unity of the Kingdom and the homeland, and he proclaimed the opening of a new and illustrious page in the annals of the nation. In his ideological introduction Hussein spoke of "Zionist plots" and defined the aims of Jordan after the Six Day War as a determined stand to liberate the land and his brethren from Israeli occupation in the West Bank, and in other Arab lands.

He proclaimed that he would abide by the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and called for perseverance on the road of "sacrifice and hope, until we restore the right."

At the end of his statement he called upon every Palestinian outside Jordan to join his brethren in marching together until the achievement of the goal of liberation, and he concluded with the hope and the promise that "God will grant us victory."

We have heard the speech of the King of Jordan. It does not bring tidings of peace. It is not founded on the principle of agreement and does not display readiness for negotiations. It is a pretentious and one-sided statement which not only does not serve the interests of peace, but is liable to spur on all the extremist elements whose aim is war against Israel.

In all this detailed plan the term peace is not even mentioned and it is not based on the concept of agreement. The whole of King Hussein's proposal is based on the assumption that he is capable of reaching a solution of the controversial problems at issue without an agreement between our states, as if he could dictate to Israel the plan that he has put forward. This is a plan dealing with territories which are not under his control and which he strives to obtain by "liberation." In his speech, as we have seen, Hussein announces the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom to consist of Jordan and Palestine. Of what does Palestine, according to him, consist? Palestine consists of the West Bank and of any Arab land that may be liberated.

In his speech King Hussein makes no mention at all of the State of Israel as a country with which settlement and agreement have to be reached.

⁵³ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, March 17, 1972, p. 3; for the text of King Hussein's speech see document no. 187 below.

The State of Israel, according to this conception, is nothing more than the result of a Zionist plot to dominate Palestine, and the task of Jordan and the Arabs is to liberate the soil of Palestine from this plot.

He tries to give this goal of liberation a historic dimension by recalling that as early as 1921, after the Balfour Declaration, it was Jordan's task "to save the West Bank from Zionist plots" and how again, in 1948, the Jordanian Army entered Palestine "to save a large part of it and also succeeded in conquering the sacred place in the Old City of Jerusalem, thereafter known as Arab Jerusalem."

Only through such an approach to Israel can we explain the fact that in the plan under discussion King Hussein makes no mention of negotiations and agreement with Israel, but speaks about the liberation of Palestine.

Pretentiousness is a pervading characteristic of Hussein's address. According to his plan King Hussein does not confine himself to the liberation of the administered territories. He goes further: Just as he claims Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, so he does not limit the concept of Palestine to the administered territories, but extends it to our country as a whole.

He crowns himself King of Jerusalem and envisions himself as the ruler of larger territories than were under his control prior to the rout of June 1967. The King defines the results of the participation of Jordan in the Six Day War as a "disaster" but unfortunately five years later he puts forward a plan which goes to show that he has failed to learn the lesson of his disaster.

Had the King of Jordan seen fit to change the designation of the Kingdom of Jordan and to call it by the name of Palestine, the United Arab Kingdom or any other name; had he seen fit to introduce changes in the internal structure of his kingdom, if, after negotiations between us, we were to reach agreement on all questions involved in a peace agreement, including the territorial issue—then it would not have been our concern to take a stand on internal matters which are within Jordan's sovereign competence, and we would not have interfered in them, just as we have never interfered in the internal structure or the nature of the regime of any country.

In the present case, however, the king is treating as his own property territories which are not his

and are not under his control. In the fervour of his enthusiasm as a liberator of territories and a "setter-up" of kingdoms, he has gone so far as to designate Jerusalem—Israel's eternal capital—as the capital of Palestine.

It was only for the purpose of camouflage that the plan was presented as being nothing but Jordan's internal affair, and it is only through a misconception that it can be viewed as such. The truth of the matter is that this plan affects Israel's most vital interests.

It would be a grave mistake on Jordan's part to inflame Palestinian expansionist passions. No problem can be solved in a manner incompatible with an agreement with Israel or without agreement with her. Any constructive solution can be obtained only through understanding and agreement with Israel.

Israel will continue to pursue her enlightened policy in Judea and Samaria and will maintain the policy of open bridges. She will continue to look after the provision of services to the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, and will respect every peaceful and law-abiding citizen.

Israel took a favourable view of the internal stability that has prevailed in Jordan recently. We take a favourable view of Jordan's abstention from participation in the attempts to activate the Eastern front. This serves the interests of Jordan and hampers efforts to renew hostilities in the region.

It is hard to imagine a country for which peace would be more beneficial than Jordan. If Jordan continues to act in accordance with her genuine and independent interests, and renounces pretensions and sterile plans, she will be able to direct her resources and efforts into constructive channels, while maintaining good-neighbourly relations with Israel and benefiting as a result.

The plan proclaimed by King Hussein cannot serve as a basis for an agreement with Israel. Those who are trying to create the false impression that it is an agreed programme, or the product of prior discussion with us, are being ridiculous. The entire plan is a surprise invention of its authors.

No unilateral declarations or actions whatsoever will bring Jordan one inch nearer to peace. No sophistry, even if it wins banner headlines, will lead to any constructive change. There is only one way which has any prospects: namely, serious negotiations for a peaceful solution, a bold and

realistic effort to reach understanding and agreement.

Any other way will be futile. Israel is faithful to her policy: she is maintaining the situation as determined in the cease-fire agreements. She will endeavour to strengthen her position in compliance with the needs of her security and development, and she is ready, with all her heart, for serious peace negotiations.

59

Resolution adopted by the Israel Knesset rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan⁵⁴

Jerusalem, March 16, 1972

The Knesset has duly noted the Prime Minister's statement of March 16, 1972,⁵⁵ regarding the speech made by the King of Jordan on March 15, 1972.⁵⁶

The Knesset has determined that the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is beyond challenge.

The Knesset authorizes the Government of Israel to continue its policy in accordance with its basic principles, as approved by the Knesset on December 15, 1969, according to which: "The government will steadfastly strive to achieve a durable peace with Israel's neighbours founded on peace treaties achieved by direct negotiations between the parties. Agreed, secure and recognized borders will be laid down in the peace treaties.

"The peace treaties will assure cooperation and mutual aid, the solution of any problem that might be a stumbling-block in the path to peace, and the avoidance of any aggression, direct or indirect.

"Israel will continue to be willing to negotiate—without prior conditions from either side—with any of the neighbouring states for the conclusion of a peace treaty. Without a peace treaty, Israel will continue to maintain in full the situation as established by the cease-fire and will consolidate

its position in accordance with the vital requirements of its security and development."

The Knesset supports the Government in its endeavours to further peace by negotiating with the Arab states according to the resolutions of the Knesset.

60

Statement of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH) protesting the Knesset's claim of Jewish historical rights to Palestine⁵⁷

Tel Aviv, March 17, 1972

The Knesset adopted on March 16, 1972, at the conclusion of the debate on the announcement of the Government, reacting to the plan of Hussein, a decision which received a majority of votes given by the parliamentary groups of the coalition and the right, headed by [the extreme right wing] Gahal, in which was said:

"The Knesset states that the historical right of the Jewish people to Eretz-Israel [Palestine] is indisputable".⁵⁸

This is the first time in the history of the Knesset that such an extremist decision has been adopted. This is a decision in the spirit of the "Entire Eretz-Israel Movement" and of the "Herut" Party. This is a further submission of Mapam and the other circles within the Alignment which oppose the policy of the "Entire Eretz-Israel".

This decision ignores the very existence and the very national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and the United Nations Charter, which has given the international legal basis for the establishment of the State of Israel.

This decision affords justification in principle to the continuation of the policy of occupation and territorial annexations at the expense of the Arab peoples.

Therefore the decision deepens the abyss of enmity between Israel and its Arab neighbours and sabotages the peace prospects.

⁵⁴ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, March 17, 1972, p. 1.

⁵⁵ See document no. 58 above.

⁵⁶ See document no. 187 below.

⁵⁷ English text in Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH), *Information Bulletin*, no. 3 (March, 1972), pp. 13–14. Arabic text in *al-Ittihad* (Haifa), March 21, 1972, p. 1.

⁵⁸ See document no. 59 above.

This Zionist, nationalist policy of the majority in the Knesset is executed in theory and practice, and very brutally, in the Gaza Strip in these very days. There a campaign of uprooting of thousands of Bedouins is carried out in Fithat-Rafiah, homes are being demolished, people are forcibly expelled, with the overt aim of preparing additional areas for Zionist colonization and of annexing the Gaza Strip to the State of Israel. The expulsion and the settlement in the Gaza Strip are a racist action, which sabotages the peace prospects.

The future and security of the State of Israel will not be ensured by trampling underfoot the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, by occupation and annexations of Arab territories, but by means of a just and lasting peace with the Arab peoples, on the basis of mutual respect of rights.

The Knesset decision expresses a policy which imperils the future of the State of Israel.

Every person in Israel, who is concerned about the future of his people and his country, is obliged to raise his voice against the aggressive nationalist savagery; to struggle for the full implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 1967, for a peace which will include the withdrawal from the occupied territories, and the safeguarding of the rights of all the peoples and countries in our region, inclusive of the Israeli people and of the Palestinian Arab people.

61

Statement on the Middle East situation made by General Secretary Brezhnev of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in a speech to the Fifteenth Congress of the Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R.⁵⁹

Moscow, March 20, 1972

The Middle East is becoming an increasingly dangerous hotbed of tension. Israel's stubborn reluctance to leave the captured Arab lands, and the constant provocations of the Israeli military against Arab states, heats up the situation, and creates the danger of a military explosion.

⁵⁹ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 13 (March 25, 1972), p. 4.

The Arab countries have convincingly demonstrated their preparedness for a political solution of the conflict, and for the establishment of a reliable and lasting peace in the Middle East. Israel, with the connivance and support of the U.S.A., is stubbornly refusing to abandon its aggressive policy of conquest. This, however, cannot last indefinitely. Sober-minded politicians can hardly believe that the Arab states will reconcile themselves to the occupation of their territories.

The Arab World today is not what it was several years ago. Progressive regimes have become stronger, inter-Arab cooperation is broadening, the military-defensive potential of the Arab states has grown considerably. All these are factors of long-term action, and it is they which, in the final count, will determine the alignment of forces in the Middle East.

Friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the progressive Arab states are becoming steadily stronger. Economic and defensive cooperation is broadening, and political interaction is becoming deeper. It can be said definitely that our relations with our Arab friends have never been so deep and comprehensive as they are now. We shall continue to strengthen and develop these relations in the mutual interests of the peoples of our countries, for the sake of justice, for the sake of the freedom and progress of the Arab peoples, and for the sake of a strong peace in the Middle East.

62

Statement by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China denouncing King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan and reiterating China's support for the Arabs, made during a dinner in honour of a visiting Egyptian government delegation⁶⁰

Peking, March 22, 1972

The Middle East question is a major question

⁶⁰ Excerpted from the partial English text, *Peking Review*, XV, 13 (March 31, 1972), p. 3; for King Hussein's plan see document no. 187 below.

closely linked with the anti-imperialist struggle of the people throughout the world. The reason why the Middle East question remains unsettled up to now is that Israeli Zionism stubbornly clings to its policy of aggression and expansion and that the one or two superpowers are seeking hegemony and contending for spheres of influence. Of late, the Jordanian reactionaries have come forth with a plan for creating a so-called "united Arab kingdom." This is a new plot engineered by imperialism in the face of the ever-deepening anti-imperialist struggle of the Palestinian, Egyptian and other Arab peoples. It is designed to split the unity of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and undermine their struggle against aggression in a vain effort to eventually liquidate the revolutionary cause of the Palestinian people. As soon as it came into the open, "Hussein's plan" was strongly condemned and firmly opposed by the Palestinian, Egyptian and other Arab peoples.

The Arab people's struggle against aggression is a just one and enjoys abundant support. The Chinese Government and people sternly condemn and firmly oppose the acts of aggression of U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism, resolutely support the Palestinian, Egyptian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle for the restoration of the national rights of Palestine and the recovery of the occupied Arab territories, and firmly oppose the superpowers subjecting Arab countries to their aggression, subversion, control and interference and firmly oppose their conspiracy to divide up spheres of influence.

63

Statements by United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home discussing ways towards peace in the Middle East⁶¹

Jerusalem, March 22, 1972

Many of those present here are businessmen, dealing with measureable facts. Mr. Eban and I

are less lucky. My business is politics. As a politician, I am naturally very much concerned about the conflict which has lasted ever since the foundation of the state of Israel between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Politicians may talk about approaches to a settlement; they may bandy proposals and initiatives. None of us can shirk that duty, but all the time we are conscious that it is people, the ordinary people of this country, of the Arab countries, and indeed of the countries even further afield, who pay the price of confrontation in death, in wounds and in suffering. The world needs peace.

I have just come from Lahore where I had talks with President Bhutto. We have witnessed a war in the subcontinent in the last four months and the statesmen of the subcontinent must address themselves to the task, the desperately difficult task, of making peace. But it is imperative that it should be done, for in the twentieth century confrontation is something that we simply cannot afford.

In Europe we are succeeding in sinking our age-old rivalries in the common task of building a new, united Europe.

We have recently seen the visit of President Nixon to China, and the agreement of these two great countries to replace confrontation by dialogue.

When I spoke to the Anglo-Israel Association in London at the time of your foreign minister's visit last winter,⁶² I said that central to this stubborn problem in the Middle East is Israel's right to security. That is true. There has been no change in our attitude on this fundamental point. Nor has there been any change in our views about the ways in which Israel's right to security might be protected and assured.

We think that protection and assurance ought to be provided through the conclusion of peace agreements, through the definition in these peace agreements of permanent and secure frontiers and through the achievement of arrangements on the ground designed to remove particular points of fear and to build up confidence between neighbours.

I will not repeat what I said in London about these three methods. Instead, I should like to talk a little more philosophically about the elements of the conflict as we see them. Israel is

⁶¹ Excerpted from the text of the speech delivered at an Anglo-Israel Chamber of Commerce and Israel-British Commonwealth Association dinner, London Press Service, Verbatim Service, 101/72 (March 22, 1972), pp. 2-3.

⁶² See document no. 236 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

seeking "security". Her Arab neighbours are seeking the restoration of territory. One of the major obstacles to the achievement of a settlement is that, although there is a link, security and territory are different in nature. What is clear in this situation is that territorial change is not the only way to ensure physical security.

There are a number of ways. But one of them is an intangible, the attitude of mind of the various parties concerned. To be precise, security depends not only on the deterrent of armed might, nor solely on the security that geography can provide, but also on the changed atmosphere that would be created by the act of concluding a settlement.

The creation with neighbours of a will towards constructive co-existence may give the best security of all.

Following my visit to Cairo in September, I said that I believed that Egypt wished above all to live in peace with Israel. I am still convinced that for many reasons this is her intention and desire.

Therefore as I said in my speech to the General Assembly in New York last September, to this end dialogue must replace confrontation, and discussion must be substituted for intermittent correspondence.

We hope that an effective dialogue about the many issues to be resolved will soon develop between Israel and her Arab neighbours. None can impose a settlement. Only thus, in our view, is a durable settlement—that is to say, a settlement in the perpetuation of which both sides would have an interest—likely to be achieved. On the procedures by which such a dialogue might be staged, and under which it might be conducted thereafter, we have an open mind. We have never committed ourselves to the view that one way of proceeding would be right or another wrong. Nor do we intend to do this. We shall welcome, and be prepared to do anything we can to bring about any serious dialogue and any progress towards a settlement.

The framework for dialogue is there in the form of Resolution 242. It would not be difficult to devise a formula which would suit Israel rather better. Nor would it be difficult to devise one which appealed rather more to her Arab neighbours. But it would, in our view, be impossible to devise a substitute for the resolution which stood any real chance of being accepted by both or

backed by a majority of world opinion. This conflict has gone on for much too long. Confrontation with arms at the ready is too dangerous in the twentieth century world where the anarchist is ready to take advantage of it to his own despicable ends.

We fervently hope that it will soon be brought to an end, so that the people of Israel, and the other peoples of the region, can concentrate on the manifold tasks which confront them in the realm of developing and consolidating their societies so that all may go about their lawful occasions in peace.

64

Statement to the Knesset by Minister without Portfolio Galili of Israel discussing the reasons for and the progress of the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories⁶³

Jerusalem, March 27, 1972

I want to remind you of the following: the policy of the government regarding settlement is completely clear. It involves temporary paramilitary settlements and permanent settlements. This policy springs first and foremost from the Zionist socialist ideology. We consider settlement imperative for security, providing a dimension of depth and firmness to our hold on the country. It will be the fruit of recognition in so far as the borders of peace will be determined by negotiations, but in the absence of peace we shall keep to all the cease-fire lines.

But we do not intend to keep the situation in a state of suspense, nor do we intend to leave it to others to create unfavourable facts. Settlement has a cultural value, its political value is well-known, and I know of no settlement which does not have some security value.

The decisions on settlements have been made in the light of particular limiting factors: the inhabitants of the specific area, financial limitations, and in some cases the progress of political circumstances.

⁶³ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, Seventh Knesset, Third Session, vol. XXIII (March 27, 1972), p. 2105.

So far as the Gaza Strip is concerned I have to confirm that the decisions on settlements there were made just after the Six Day War. The government decided to establish the settlement of Nahal Sinai on September 13, 1967, and its transformation into a civilian settlement will be completed some time this year.

The establishment of the settlement of Nahal Dikla was decided on February 2, 1969 and its transformation into a civilian one was decided on May 17, 1971.

I shall not go into details over the other settlements and dates. They are Nahal Natshrim, Kfar Darom, and Sadot in addition to those settlements which are being planned. At least two of these have already been decided upon and are in the process of being built.

65

Press interview statements by Israel Chief of Staff Elazar defining "secure borders"⁶⁴

Late March, 1972

Q. What do you consider to be a secure border?

A. A secure border is one that prevents the other side from hitting—with artillery, light weapons, or short, one-night raids—important targets within the State, i.e. population centers, industrial complexes, air-fields, ports, major thoroughfares and strategic targets.

If a border prevents this, if it eliminates the possibilities of conflict relationship, so that when one side wants to hurt the other, it has to open full scale warfare, with all of its limitations and risks, that is a secure border.

Now, from an operative point of view in modern warfare you have to start with the premise that every attacking force has a chance of initial success. A modern defense is not a stiff defense which guarantees the breaking of the front of an attack. The way to destroy an attacking force is to create problems for the attacker, to tire him out during the initial stages of the attack, to halt him, and then to destroy him. A secure border has to have such

conditions, and be at such a distance from important strategic targets in the State, that will guarantee that during the momentum of the initial attack, in which anyone may succeed, the enemy will not be able to reach the important points.

Q. And from a strategic point of view?

A. From a strategic point of view a border has to be such that from the point of view of distances and topographical conditions, a sufficient strategic depth will be created for the State. In other words, we must have the ability to determine the intentions and preparations of the enemy, and the possibility to plan for the expected action and to act against it. This applies to the air, sea and land sectors. A classical example of insecure borders was the borders of the State before June, 1967. Without even starting a war, the Arabs could have thrown grenades on our Knesset, could close almost all of our main transportation arteries without crossing the border, and could have forced us to travel in caravans from Tel Aviv to Beersheva, and from there to Eilat. With a little effort they could have even caused problems on the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway.

66

Statement issued by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan⁶⁵

Moscow, March 29, 1972

Recently, in Jordan, a plan was officially announced for establishing a "United Arab Kingdom" to be made up of a Jordanian region on the east bank of the Jordan River and a Palestinian region that includes the West Bank of the Jordan, as well as "other Arab territories whose peoples express a desire to join the Kingdom."

This plan has evoked concern among the international democratic public and progressive forces

⁶⁴ Interview conducted by Rafael Basham, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), March 29, 1972; partial English translation, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XV, 4 (May, 1972), pp. 41-42.

⁶⁵ *Pravda* (Moscow), March 30, 1972, p. 5. English translation, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIV, 13 (April 26, 1972), p. 23. Translation copyright 1972 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission; for King Hussein's plan see document no. 187 below.

of the Arab world. Leaders of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and a number of other Arab states, the Palestinian resistance movement and the progressive Arab public have condemned this proposal to create a "United Arab Kingdom," viewing it as an attempt to prevent a just settlement of the Near East conflict and the Palestinian problem, to disunite the Arab peoples and to create an opportunity for intensified imperialist influence in the Near East by ignoring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Soviet public shares this concern of progressive forces of the Arab world and rejects the attempts to hinder the Arab peoples' just struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israel's imperialist aggression and for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, true to the principles of solidarity with the peoples' anti-imperialist liberation struggle, declares its support for the Arab liberation movement, an integral part of which is the Palestinian resistance movement, which expresses the interests of the broad masses of the Arab people of Palestine. Our sympathies are on the side of the Arab people, who are conducting a just struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israel's imperialist aggression and to obtain a just settlement of the Near East conflict, taking into account the legitimate rights and interests of all countries and peoples of this area.

The Soviet public decisively condemns the aggressive annexational policy of Israel, which is relying on the aid and support of imperialist forces headed by the United States of America and is sabotaging the implementation of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, which should, like the other U.N. resolutions regarding the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, be carried out in all its parts and provisions.

We express the certainty that the plans of international imperialism and reaction, whose goal it is to sow dissension in the just struggle of the Arab peoples and progressive forces of the Arab countries, will fail. The Arab peoples, enjoying the support of the Soviet Union, the other states of the socialist commonwealth, and the whole international progressive and democratic movement, will achieve success in the struggle to eliminate the consequences of imperialist ag-

gression and on their path to independent development and social progress.

67

Statement by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei of China affirming China's support for the Palestinian people, made during a dinner in honour of a visiting P.L.O. delegation⁶⁶

Peking, March 30, 1972

The Palestinian people's liberation cause is a just one. You enjoy abundant support in your just cause. The revolutionary people throughout the world are on your side. I wish to reaffirm to you that the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely support you in your just struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression and for returning to your homeland. We have always held that the Palestinian people's right of national existence must be restored, that the Israeli Zionist aggressors must withdraw from all the Arab territories they have invaded and occupied, that the destiny of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples must be decided only by themselves, and that the aggression, subversion, control and interference to which the one or two superpowers subject them must be resolutely opposed. We are firmly convinced that by constantly strengthening their militant unity, guarding against the schemes of imperialism and its partner to sow discord and disintegrate their ranks and persisting in a protracted people's war, the Palestinian people and their armed forces will certainly be able to overcome the temporary difficulties confronting them on their road of advance and win final victory in their struggle for national liberation.

⁶⁶ Excerpted from the partial English text, *Peking Review*, XV, 14 (April 7, 1972), p. 6; the P.L.O. delegation visited Peking March 30–April 3, 1972.

68

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of the P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat⁶⁷**Belgrade, March 30, 1972**

At the invitation of the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, a delegation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, visited Yugoslavia from March 25 to 30.

Representatives of the Socialist Alliance and Yugoslav socio-political organizations and of the Palestinian liberation movement held a wide-ranging exchange of views on current international developments and particularly the Middle East, the liberation struggle of the Palestinian people, and relations and cooperation between the PLO and the Socialist Alliance and other Yugoslav and Palestinian social organizations.

The two delegations observed that the situation in the Middle East was constantly deteriorating as a result of continued occupation of Arab territories, the imperialistic aggressive and expansionist policy and increased attacks and pressure on the Palestinian revolution.

The two sides agreed that a democratic and just settlement in the Middle East can only be achieved by freeing of all occupied Arab territories and by the exercise of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and a national existence. Respect for and full realization of the justified aspirations and inalienable rights of the Arab and Palestinian people are an essential prerequisite for removing the causes of instability and for establishing a just and lasting peace in this area. Any settlement without the participation of the Palestinian people or against its will would only aggravate the situation and relations in the Middle East.

The two sides stress that it is the duty of all progressive and liberation movements and forces, and particularly of the non-aligned countries, to increase political and moral support and to provide the necessary aid to the Palestinian people for achieving the goals of their struggle.

The delegations feel that the Middle East crisis cannot be viewed separately from broad trends in the area of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean nations and progressive forces must unite their efforts to make this sea a zone of peace, stability and cooperation.

The PLO and the Socialist Alliance condemn the policy of imperialism and neocolonialism as well as all other forms of hegemony and outside interference. They emphasize their active solidarity with and unreserved support for the heroic struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos against American aggression and for the struggle of the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissao, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa against racist and colonial oppression.

In all the talks and meetings with the PLO delegation, independent and nonaligned socialist Yugoslavia demonstrated its full understanding and solidarity with the just cause of the Palestinian people and their struggle for freedom and the right to decide on their own fate were stressed.

The PLO delegation acknowledged the all-round support and assistance of the peoples and government of Yugoslavia and expressed satisfaction at the successful development of friendly relations and cooperation with the Socialist Alliance and other socio-political organizations in Yugoslavia.

The two sides expressed the desire to promote relations and overall cooperation in various fields and in various forms. The PLO delegation invited the Socialist Alliance to pay a return visit, and the invitation was accepted with pleasure.

⁶⁷ Partial English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), no. 529 (April 20, 1972), pp. 17-18.

69

Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Schumann of France explaining France's attitude to the Middle East conflict and deploring Israel's annexationist policy⁶⁸

Paris, March 31, 1972

Roland Faure: You won't be surprised if I take you up on the Middle East problem for a while. Because just now you spoke of a coordination among the policies of the different European countries. And I must say that on this issue you unsuccessfully tried to draw the other Community members into a policy which I disapprove of, as you know. This was particularly true when, a few days ago—while everyone was hoping that she [would be] faithful to the neutral position which she is anxious to maintain on other issues—France participated in a rather surprising resolution concerning the condemnation of Israel. So I should like to ask you: Why did France abstain, especially in this resolution, at the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, where Israel is considered a war criminal?⁶⁹ Those who have been through the so-called "occupied" territories can assert that Israel has never behaved in such a way. And then, what has France been able to gain by the pro-Arab policy which she professes and which she has been applying for several years?

A. In the first place, we do not think that Israel is a war criminal. This is why we asked that one paragraph of the resolution to which you refer should be separated from the others. We refused to vote for it—and you know that in the United Nations abstaining has a special significance for a country with the right of veto—we refused to vote for it because we share your view on this point. In the second place, it is true that, in this resolution, our European partners did not come to the same decision as us. But it is also true that, in the General Assembly of the U.N., and in the Security Council for those who are members, in resolutions far more important than this one, last September and also two months ago, all our European partners voted like ourselves, because political cooperation has resulted in a considerable narrowing of our

respective viewpoints. Finally, you are very wrong to define our policy—I am happy to be able to say this to your face for the first time—as either a pro-Arab or an anti-Israeli policy. It is a policy which rests on a certain number of principles; these principles were proclaimed in the resolution of November 22, 1967, adopted by the Security Council, and can be reduced to two: first, the occupation of territories conquered by force is unlawful. Secondly, it is not reasonable to ask Israel to evacuate the occupied territories except in exchange for definite and reliable guarantees of security. Those are our two principles.

And the day will come—I am sure of it and you yourselves would be surprised if I told you to whom I owe this phrase—the day will come when if Israel persists in rejecting the great opportunity which is today offered to her—to exchange a return to her 1967 frontiers, with certain border rectifications, for effective guarantees for her security—she will regret it, and all her friends, of whom I am one, will regret it with her.

Jean-Claude Turjman: All the same, you do think that there should be some border rectifications?

A. There must be rectifications. That has always been admitted, we have always said so from the time of the 1967 conflict—

Roland Faure: Mr. Minister, your declaration of friendship for Israel will not fail to affect many listeners of France-Inter. Why are you the only Western—European—foreign minister not to have gone to Israel last year, while very many French ministers go to Arab territories, visit Arab countries, and yet there is no official contact, no official visit [to Israel], precisely to play the role which you have just described?

A. Because at the moment I disapprove of—and I have just explained why—Israeli policy. I disapprove of it, without, however, using grand metaphors to condemn it; we have considerably improved our relations; I continually have conversations with the ambassador; I have often met Mr. Eban, the Israeli foreign minister. We have settled the problem of the Mirages and we have had discussions on a number of topics. When the day comes that the fundamental principles of the resolution of November 22, 1967 are accepted, there could be some sense and usefulness for a French minister, and particularly the foreign minister, to make a visit [to Israel].

⁶⁸ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted for France-Inter by Jean-Claude Turjman (O.R.T. F.), Roland Faure (*L'Aurore*) and André Fontaine (*Le Monde*), *La politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st semester, 1972 (Paris: La documentation française, 1972), pp. 132–134.

⁶⁹ For the text of the resolution see document no. 18 above.

André Fontaine: I am going to ask you a question. You say that you don't go to Israel because you don't approve of her policy. Does it follow that you approve of the policies of all the countries you visit?

A. No, I have just said—my visit could be useful, that's what I said.

André Fontaine: Don't you think that it could be useful precisely in order to persuade Israel to make progress on this issue?

A. If the preliminary discussions which I've had had been more encouraging, I assure you that I should have been the first to be happy about it and to act accordingly.

70

Statement by Permanent U.N. Representative Huang Hua of China expressing reservations over the terms of the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949 and the effectiveness of observers in preventing aggression⁷⁰

Early April, 1972

With regard to the Lebanese Government's request to strengthen the United Nations machinery by increasing the number of observers on the basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, the Chinese delegation would like to state the following:

(a) The Chinese Government and people firmly support Lebanon and other Arab countries in resisting aggression and defending their state sovereignty and territorial integrity, firmly support the Palestinian people in their just struggle to restore their national rights. This stand of ours is firm and unshakeable.

(b) As a result of the illegal exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations over a long period, the Chinese Government cannot have a sufficiently clear picture about the details of certain resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the past. Consequently, at

⁷⁰ Published in U.N. doc. no. S/10612 on April 19, 1972, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, p. 33; the statement was made during talks in the U.N. Security Council on the question of increasing the U.N. observer force on the Lebanon-Israel border.

present it is very difficult for us to make an over-all appraisal of the Lebanon-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949. However, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, the said Armistice Agreement was signed in circumstances unfavourable to the Arab people and the Palestinian people, and the provisions of the Agreement failed to distinguish between the aggressor and the victim of aggression; nor did they mention the question of the national rights of the Palestinian people. The Chinese Government has reservations in this respect.

(c) The Chinese delegation maintains that the prevention of Israeli aggression mainly depends on the enhancement of the strength of the victimized countries themselves and the strengthening of the unity among the Arab countries, and that the strengthening of the United Nations machinery of observers is not an effective method for preventing Israeli aggression. Should the majority of Security Council members agree to this specific request of the Lebanese Government, the Chinese delegation would not oppose.

71

Message from Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China to the P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat at the opening of the Palestine National Council, reaffirming China's support for the Palestine cause⁷¹

Peking, April 6, 1972

The Palestinian people are a people with a long-standing glorious tradition of waging struggles against imperialism. In order to recover their national rights, the Palestinian people and their armed forces have in the past few years held aloft the banner of anti-imperialist armed struggle and, in most difficult and complex circumstances, fought valiantly, dealt incessant blows on the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and their lackeys and repeatedly frustrated their military attacks and political schemes, thus making important contributions to the liberation cause of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Your just struggle has won general praise and support among the Afro-Asian people and the people of the whole world.

⁷¹ English text, *Peking Review*, XV, 15 (April 14, 1972), pp. 3-4

The Chinese Government and people extend to you their cordial regards and militant revolutionary greetings.

Dear friends, I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm to you: The Chinese Government and people will unfailingly and resolutely support your just struggle. We will forever stand together with the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. We are convinced that, by persevering in the great unity against imperialism, persisting in a protracted armed struggle and guarding against all sorts of schemes of the enemy, the Palestinian and other Arab peoples will certainly be able to overcome the temporary difficulties along their road of advance and win final victory.

72

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Iraq⁷²

Baghdad, April 9, 1972

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic,

firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-round cooperation between them accords with the national interests of both states and serves the cause of peace throughout the world and in the area of the Arab countries, the interests of freedom of the peoples, their security and respect for sovereignty,

believing that the strengthening of the solidarity of all forces of peace and progress, including the consolidation of unity of the Arab states, on an anti-imperialist basis is a vital means of the struggle for a lasting peace and international security,

inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, for freedom, independence, and social progress of the peoples,

convinced that in the modern world international problems should be settled by means of cooperation and a search for mutually acceptable solutions,

reaffirming their peaceable foreign policy and

allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

moved by a desire to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship, cooperation and mutual trust, and striving to raise these relations to a new, still higher level, have decided to conclude the present Treaty and have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties declare that unbreakable friendship will exist between the two countries and their peoples and all-round cooperation will develop in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

ARTICLE 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic declare that they will cooperate closely and in all fields to ensure conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties, consistently conducting a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, will, in conformity with their peaceable foreign policy, continue to work for universal peace, relaxation of international tension, and general and complete disarmament, embracing both nuclear and conventional types of armaments, under effective international control.

ARTICLE 4

Guided by ideals of freedom and equality of all peoples, the High Contracting Parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to wage a steadfast struggle against imperialism and Zionism, for the complete, final and unconditional liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid, and to come out for the earliest and total implementation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples.

⁷² English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 16 (April 15, 1972), pp. 4-6.

The Parties will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

ARTICLE 5

Attaching great importance to economic, technical and scientific cooperation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to expand and deepen such cooperation and exchange of experience in industry, agriculture, irrigation, water conservancy, development of oil and other natural resources, in the sphere of communications and in other sectors of the economy, as well as in the training of national personnel. The Parties will expand trade and shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured-nation treatment.

ARTICLE 6

The High Contracting Parties will further promote the development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, cinema, television, tourism, sport and other fields.

The Parties will promote wider cooperation and direct ties between state bodies and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions of both states for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and accomplishments of the peoples of the two countries in various spheres.

ARTICLE 7

Attaching great importance to concerted action in the international arena in the interests of ensuring peace and security, as well as to the development of political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the High Contracting Parties will regularly consult each other at different levels on all important international issues affecting the interests of both states, as well as on questions of the further development of bilateral relations.

ARTICLE 8

In the event of the development of situations spelling a danger to peace of either Party or creating a danger to peace or violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties will contact each

other without delay in order to agree their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or re-establishing peace.

ARTICLE 9

In the interests of security of both countries, the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defence capacity.

ARTICLE 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges not to allow its territory to be used for any action to be carried out that would do military harm to the other Party.

ARTICLE 11

The two High Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty and undertake not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with it.

ARTICLE 12

The present Treaty is concluded for a term of 15 years and will be prolonged automatically for each subsequent five-year period, if neither of the High Contracting Parties declares its desire of terminating its operation, notifying the other High Contracting Party 12 months before the expiring of the term of operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 13

Any differences which may arise between the High Contracting Parties in relation to the interpretation of any provision of the present Treaty will be settled bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

ARTICLE 14

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest possible future.

The present Treaty is done in two copies,

each in Russian and Arabic, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in the City of Baghdad on April 9, 1972, which corresponds to 25 Safar 1392, Hegira.

For the Union of
Soviet Socialist
Republics
A. KOSYGIN

For the Iraqi
Republic
A. H. AL-BAKR

73

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. (excerpts)⁷³

Baghdad, April 10, 1972

The Soviet Government and Party delegation led by A.N. Kosygin, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, stayed on an official friendly visit in Iraq on April 6 through 10, 1972, at the invitation of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) and the Government of the Iraqi Republic.

Moved by a reciprocal desire to strengthen and consolidate still more relations of friendship and cooperation between the two states and nations, and being firmly convinced that the further development of these relations conforms to the interests of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq and promotes the cause of strengthening world peace, the sides decided to conclude the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Iraq.⁷⁴

The Treaty was signed in Baghdad on April 9, 1972. On behalf of the Soviet Union the Treaty was signed by A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and on behalf of the Republic of Iraq by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of the Republic of Iraq.

This Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is an important document which seals the attained level of friendly relations between the two countries,

and provides a stronger foundation for their further development and consolidation, and makes a major contribution to the cause of the joint struggle against imperialism, colonialism and Zionism, for peace, national independence and social progress.

During the discussions on the problems dealing with the Middle East, the sides reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the liberation of all the Arab territories occupied as a result of the Israeli imperialist aggression, and without ensuring the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They once again expressed their support for the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the re-establishment of their lawful rights.

In the light of the recent visits of the Iraqi delegation, headed by Saddam Hussein, Vice-President of the Council of Command of the Revolution, to the friendly fraternal countries of Egypt and Syria, the Iraqi side described its latest steps toward Arab unity to oppose the intrigues of imperialism and its agents in that area.

The Soviet side, highly appreciating the efforts to strengthen the unity of the Arab countries on a progressive, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist foundation, welcomes the steps taken by the leaders of Iraq and other progressive Arab countries in that direction.

74

Statement by the U.S. Department of State justifying its allocation of supporting assistance to Israel⁷⁵

Washington, mid-April, 1972

Spanning the Administrations of five successive Presidents, the United States has consistently supported Israel's sovereignty and political independence. We have become a major supplier of arms in recent years and, to assist Israel in financing

⁷³ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 16 (April 15, 1972), pp. 6-7.

⁷⁴ See document no. 72 above.

⁷⁵ Text as published in *Near East Report* (Washington), XVI, 16 (April 19, 1972), p. 62.

its arms purchases, we have extended several hundreds of millions of dollars in military sales credits.

The United States is committed to a policy of maintaining a balance of military power in the Middle East. A shift in the balance against Israel could, in our judgment, destabilize the situation, threaten the continuation of the cease-fire now in effect and set back efforts to bring peace to the area. We maintain a careful watch for any increases in the military capability of the Soviet Union in this region, or increases in the military capabilities of the Middle East nations to which the Soviets supply arms.

In its efforts to maintain its relative military strength, Israel has more than doubled the dollar value of its defense expenditures since the Six Day War in June 1967. Between 1967 and 1971, defense outlays rose from the equivalent of \$500 million to \$1.6 billion. By 1971, Israeli defense expenditures were about 30% of estimated gross national product. Israel financed most of this added military burden by increasing its foreign indebtedness, which rose from \$1,320 million at the end of 1966 to \$3,192 million by the end of August 1971.

Thus, military requirements have absorbed substantially all of Israel's increased net import of goods and services. As a result, Israel has had to look to growing production for the capital needed to maintain an expanding economy. Israel is experiencing increasing difficulty in balancing available resources against the competing claims of defense, investment and consumption.

Private consumption has been compelled by government policy to accommodate to needs for defense and investment. The consumer has been permitted a smaller and smaller fraction of the diminished annual gain in national income. The Israeli Government has been finding it more and more difficult to finance its budget requirements for defense, immigrant resettlement, etc., and to meet private sector needs without resort to inflationary financing. As a consequence, price pressures have mounted.

The Israeli authorities have displayed considerable skill and initiative in their efforts. Special taxes, including a 20% imports surcharge, have been imposed. Purchase of government bonds has been made compulsory. Credit to the private sector has been restricted. And, in order to spur

foreign exchange earnings and limit the requirement for foreign economic assistance, special incentive payments are being made for exports.

Supporting Assistance of \$50 million is being provided in FY 1972 and another \$50 million is proposed for FY 1973 to assist Israel in financing its heavy fiscal burden. We plan to provide the funds as balance of payments and general budget support which will allow the Israeli Government to meet the expenditures caused by such extraordinary requirements as the resettlement of new immigrants and increased military mobilization.

75

Statement by the U.S. Department of State justifying its allocation of supporting assistance to Jordan⁷⁶

Washington, mid-April, 1972

A stable Jordanian Government with a moderate outlook is essential to the eventual realization of a just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israel confrontation. Jordan is the only major Arab protagonist in the dispute which has retained full diplomatic relations with the United States. If the present Jordanian government were to fall, the likely result would be a marked shift in the balance of power in the area.

Prior to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Jordanian economy was growing rapidly, and U.S. economic assistance was on a phaseout schedule. Defense expenditure comprised a high percentage of the budget (40 per cent) but were sustainable. Following the war, much of Jordan's most productive territory was occupied by Israel, and most of Jordan's traditional sources of foreign exchange earnings, such as tourism, were lost. Moreover, there occurred an influx of refugees who, along with the displaced persons of the 1948 settlement, constituted approximately half the population of unoccupied Jordan. Even so, the Jordanian Government was able to maintain its position as a moderate Arab state and continue to improve its people's standard of living.

Following the 1967 war, Jordan's economic

⁷⁶ Text as published in *Near East Report* (Washington), XVI, 16 (April 19, 1972), p. 63.

development was sustained by budget support payments from Jordan's Arab neighbors under an agreement reached at Khartoum. The Khartoum subsidies of about \$105 million per year were sufficient to meet Jordan's military needs. As a result, only a modest amount of developmental assistance from abroad was required to augment Jordan's domestic revenues and cover non-military expenditures.

The lack of progress in achieving a peace settlement of the 1967 war enabled the fedayeen to attract substantial financial support from the Arab world. By 1970, the fedayeen had achieved sufficient independent military strength that they felt capable of challenging the Government of Jordan. Several serious clashes were inconclusive, but a major confrontation in September 1970 established the superiority of the Jordan Arab Army and substantially reduced the threat from the fedayeen.

Two of the countries which had been providing assistance to Jordan, Libya and Kuwait, expressed their displeasure with these actions of the Jordanian Government by discontinuing their Khartoum payments. This resulted in a loss of \$64 million annually, much more than could be offset either by budgetary economies or increased mobilization of domestic resources. In order to reduce Jordan's 1971 budget deficit to manageable proportions, the United States provided a \$30 million cash grant from FY 1972 Supporting Assistance funds and an additional \$15 million cash grant from the FY 1972 Contingency Fund.

Jordan's narrow economic base, further reduced by loss of the West Bank area, is not capable of yielding adequate revenues to cover essential non-defense spending. Thus, continued budgetary support from abroad is necessary to maintain a level of domestic outlays without which economic and political stability would be threatened since the Government of Jordan otherwise would be forced either to curtail expenditures drastically or to undertake a level of domestic borrowing which would precipitate strong inflationary pressures. The political and social tensions thus provoked might well induce Jordan to abandon its moderate foreign policy stance. Even with Jordan's continuing, serious efforts to increase domestic revenues and limit expenditures, it is estimated that Jordan will require a \$40 million Supporting Assistance cash grant in FY 1973.

Press interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili explaining the distinction between annexation and Israel's plans in the occupied territories⁷⁷

Mid-April, 1972

Q. In the debate on settlement in Gaza during the special session of the Knesset, you said in a statement you made on behalf of the government, that Gaza will remain within the frontiers of Israel. When did the government take such a decision?

A. I said in the Knesset that the government had given instructions to its representatives who are active in the political field to the effect that the Gaza Strip will become part of the state of Israel, this being based on certain decisions taken by the government on more than one occasion. On every occasion that the government decided to instruct its representatives to have talks with outside elements, it recalled in detail that its intention was that henceforward the Gaza Strip shall not be separated from the frontiers of Israel and shall be under Israeli control, and that the Gaza Strip shall be an indivisible part of the state of Israel and within the frontiers of Israel.

All these are definitions taken from decisions by the government on different occasions since the Six Day War.

Q. Could you give the dates on which the decisions were taken?

A. Certainly I could, but I do not see the point.

Q. Were these decisions taken by all the members of the government or a part of them?

A. I am not talking about decisions taken in some "kitchen" or other, but decisions taken by the government in official sessions.

Q. You say that this information has been given to outside elements. Why has a clear statement of this kind not been made to the public?

A. The contents of this decision have been announced to the public on various occasions, and in the statements of members of the government, including myself. We did not see any need to

⁷⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text of the interview conducted by Dan Margalit and Gideon Samt, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), April 18, 1972.

explain to the public all the decisions that were taken at the time when they were issued for, as I said, they were instructions to persons engaged in negotiations. But the matter has been announced to the public on various occasions.

There has been no discussion in the government as to whether or not we should inform the public, nor has any decision been taken to the effect that the public should not be informed of this matter, for the decision speaks for itself. For example, this matter came up on one occasion after I returned from a tour of the Gaza Strip; it also came up in the gentleman's agreement, and in the decisions of the Labour Party Conference and in the Mi'rach election programme, and later in various forms in statements by the Prime Minister at press conferences.

Q. The impression given is that the object of leaking information about the future of the occupied areas in this way is to avoid giving a very strong impression of annexation and at the same time to create the fact of annexation.

A. I do not use the word "annexation" in connection either with Jerusalem or the Golan Heights. You are entitled to use whatever words you think fit, but we do not use this word in any official document or government statement. I do not know if there is a bloc in the Knesset that uses this word positively. When we unified Jerusalem we called it unifying Jerusalem. We do not use the word "annexation" because it has associations and these associations are negative because they suggest ideas that do not apply to us, such as occupation, colonization and so on. They have tried to attribute these negative characteristics to us in every step we have taken in our homeland in the state of Israel. Similarly, the word "annexation" is not in current use among us and no one can force us to use it. But when we say that our intention is that the Gaza Strip should remain within the frontiers of Israel or under Israeli control what is meant is clear and this has been expressed on various occasions.

Q. Why has the government of Israel not decided to enforce Israeli law in the Gaza Strip?

A. The Israeli government has decided to refrain at this stage from defining the legal and juridical status of the areas it wants to link to the state of Israel, with the exception of Jerusalem which has been unified with Israeli law enforced in it. We have political reasons for this. Inasmuch

as we say that we are prepared to negotiate with the Arab states without preconditions we have preferred not to establish legal *faits accomplis* as regards the enforcement of Israeli law in other areas apart from Jerusalem.

Q. We have more than once said that we want negotiations without preconditions, but will not the statement that Gaza is to remain within the frontiers of Israel, and the creation of facts in the area, lead to obstacles being placed in the path of such negotiations in the future just as much as an official definition would?

A. We are determined not to leave the occupied areas in a vacuum, for leaving the areas in a vacuum would postpone possibilities of peace. This is incompatible with the requirements of the inhabitants of the area, and that would be an artificial situation and incompatible with our political intentions. All the same we say that everything is open to negotiation.

Q. How can everything be open to negotiation when in fact we declare that Gaza will not be part of the negotiations—

A. I did not say that.

Q. —how can Gaza be part of the negotiations if it remains within the frontiers of Israel?

A. We have expressed our intention that the Gaza Strip should be within the frontiers of Israel. We have taken no legal juridical steps to link the Strip to the state of Israel. We have expressed our intention that the Golan Heights shall be part of the state of Israel, and we have expressed our intention that at least certain areas in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley shall be part of the state of Israel; this is an expression of intentions. This is a position we shall struggle for and we are justified in struggling for it. We repeat that we shall make no preconditions for negotiations, nor shall we give any prior territorial commitment that may be asked of us as a condition for negotiations.

Q. Do you not think that such steps will put an end to chances of negotiation? And freedom of action and the possibility of starting negotiations?

A. As far as I know it is not necessary that these steps should put an end to chances of negotiations if the Arab countries also really want negotiations on the territorial question. We are not going to the negotiations as a neutral element, as an element with no intentions and with no interests. We have decided in all seriousness not to return to the 1967

frontiers, and we have decided in all seriousness that it is vitally necessary to make substantial modifications of the previous frontiers, and we want to do this by negotiation, if the Arab countries really want serious negotiations and if they are prepared to coexist with a state of Israel within defensible frontiers. If this is impossible from the Arab countries' point of view, we must regret it, and in that case there is the Knesset's decision to the effect that in the event of there being no peace we shall maintain the whole situation as defined in the ceasefire agreements.

Q. What do you think of the maps in the Allon Plan and of the Dayan Plan, as regards the four "pillars" in Judea and Samaria?

A. What I can say at this stage is that I do not think that peacetime requires a line of political frontiers between us and Jordan, and I am not in favour of making a distinction between security frontiers and political frontiers. I am in favour of security frontiers coinciding with political frontiers and it seems to me that if we say that the River Jordan must be the frontier over which neither the Jordanian army nor any other army can cross into the West Bank, we are saying that the River Jordan must be the frontier, that is, the political frontier, between Israel and Jordan. I was ready to support the Allon Plan, which is a solution that leaves the densely concentrated population in the West Bank linked to Jordan by a corridor, and demarcates the River Jordan as the frontier between our states. As regards the precise drawing of frontier lines on the map, the government has not yet taken a decision on the matter, and I do not think there is any need to do so now. It depends entirely on the situation that comes into existence when the subject is discussed.

Q. That means that, in your view, a situation may arise, not necessarily, but it may happen, in which the final Israeli frontier line, which will be both a security and a political line, will be the River Jordan, but will also pass through Tulkarm?

A. Certainly, as we all know; on the basis of the assumption that the River Jordan is our political and security frontier with Jordan, and also that neither the Jordanian army nor any other Arab army shall cross to the west of the Jordan, and that there will also be a narrow corridor linking the densely populated area with the Kingdom of Jordan. No Arab army will be allowed to cross

to the west of the Jordan and this will be one of the conditions of the peace agreement. I should like to add, although you have not asked me, that the government's opposition to Hussein's plan was directed against its political territorial programme, not against the federal principle in the internal structure of the Kingdom of Jordan.

77

Statement by Director Armitage, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, explaining the United States' interest in continuing support for UNRWA⁷⁸

Washington, April 19, 1972

More broadly, our continued support of UNRWA is an integral part of our overall efforts to maintain political stability in the Middle East and to help bring about a negotiated peace settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

What do we mean by that well-worn phrase "political stability"? It has several elements. First, it means maintaining a suitable international atmosphere for continuing efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. As you know, after some ups and downs, the cease-fire we worked hard to promote remains tenuously in effect between Egypt and Israel. The parties adhere to it in part because of their hope that their differences can be settled in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. In recent months Ambassador Jarring has resumed contacts with Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, and Israel has accepted the idea of participating in proximity talks with Egypt through the United States to reach an interim Suez Canal agreement.

Continuing U.S. support of UNRWA is a visible and significant indicator for the Arabs of our continued support for a peaceful settlement that takes into account the legitimate concerns of the Palestinian refugees.

⁷⁸ Excerpted from Director Armitage's statement, *The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972; April 19, 1972, pp. 9-10.

I believe the full committee had a session with Mr. Sisco so you are as fully aware of the current situation in the area and I won't try to amplify on Mr. Sisco's testimony.

Second, stability means avoiding social and economic dissension within countries of the Middle East. UNRWA serves an important function in providing for many of the basic needs of the Arab refugees in the countries in which UNRWA operates. Adequate support of this kind helps to avoid dissatisfaction among refugees and particularly through UNRWA's training programs and educational projects helps to give their children the means to participate constructively in the life that goes on around them.

At the same time, some of the burdens often thrust on host governments are alleviated by the international support granted to these refugees through UNRWA. Moreover, the host governments have benefited in the past and I believe will continue to benefit in the future from some of the techniques and services introduced by UNRWA in the normal administration of its programs. Mr. Michelmore mentioned several of those.

Another element of political stability is the feeling of the refugees about their future. We must recognize that it would be potentially destabilizing if UNRWA were forced to reduce the level of its operations in the absence of an overall Middle East settlement, including a just settlement of the refugee problem as called for in Resolution 242.

So, the United States sees its significant strategic, political, and economic interests in the Middle East importantly served by the maximum possible degree of political stability in that area and that UNRWA contributes importantly to that stability.

78

Resolutions of the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) rejecting Israeli annexation of occupied territory and demanding equal rights for Arabs in Israel⁷⁹

Tel Aviv, April 22, 1972

1. Against a Policy of Annexations, Dispossession and Accomplished Facts

The actions and schemes of the Government to maintain permanent settlements in the administered areas, the establishment of accomplished facts, contradict the principle proclaimed by the Israel Government itself that was the cause of Gahal's retirement from the "national unity government," namely the principle that Israel is prepared to withdraw, within the framework of a peace agreement, to safe, recognized borders to be agreed in negotiations without preconditions. Israel demands, and rightly so, that the problems in dispute, including the question of the future borders, be solved by their presentation at the conference table. This demand is absolutely incompatible with the establishment of accomplished facts, and certainly not with acts of dispossession that are an obstacle on the way to peace.

The 17th Congress of Maki, bearing in mind its national responsibility and concern for the future of the Jewish-Arab relations, views with deep anxiety the acts of dispossession and the schemes of establishing Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and in the Rafah area.

The recent activities in these areas contradict the positive principles of distinction between the terrorists, their supporters and innocent inhabitants. They are incompatible with the principles of morality and a human approach and undermine the efforts to build a bridge of understanding between the two peoples.

Maki, standing up firmly in the front for the national defence of Israel's security and rights considers it as its political and moral duty to reject the hysterical campaign conducted by the nationalist circles that seek annexations, a campaign that started against the members of the Hashomer Hatzair kibbutzim in the south and that is directed

⁷⁹ Excerpted from the English text of the resolutions, *Israel at Peace* (Tel Aviv), no. 5 (May, 1972), pp. 6, 10.

against all people with a conscience who oppose these activities.

The 17th Congress of Maki calls for a united stand of all forces in the Israeli public that adhere to the commands of national defence on the one hand and to a tireless strive for peace on the other hand, in the campaign for the formation of a consistent, daring peace policy developing incessant initiatives.

8. Equal Rights for the Arab Population in Israel

Maki demands that the Arab population in Israel must enjoy, by law and in practice, the same full democratic rights to which the inhabitants of Israel are entitled.

The Arab population must be given a full share in the funds made available for education, housing and other public services, the Arab municipalities must get no less allocations than the parallel Jewish municipal councils.

The Arab population must be allowed the same measure of self-administration in municipal affairs, in the Histadrut and in every other sphere of public life, as the Jewish population.

Public and private places of employment must provide jobs for Arab employees indiscriminately and give them no less chance of promotion than Jewish employees.

All direct and indirect forms of discrimination, such as the remnants of military government, the discrimination against "absentees" who live in Israel, the requisitioning of lands in Arab villages—must be abolished. The administrative arrests and restrictions on the movement of Arab inhabitants must cease.

Arab tradition and national honour must be respected in educational issues. The Jewish and Arab population alike must be educated to mutual tolerance and mutual respect.

79

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)⁸⁰

Moscow, April 29, 1972

Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union from April 27 to 29, 1972, at the invitation of the CPSU central committee and the Soviet government.

In accordance with the Soviet-Egyptian treaty on friendship and co-operation and in an atmosphere of full trust and mutual understanding, the sides discussed a wide range of questions connected with the situation now taking shape in the area of the Middle East and characterised by an intensification of the intrigues by imperialist forces directed at undermining the progressive movement of countries of the Arab world and at isolating this movement from its natural and reliable ally—the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

The Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt are convinced that the openly expansionist policy pursued by Israel in respect of the Arab states in the Middle East, with the growing political, military and financial support of the United States, continues to remain the main source of tension in that area and is creating a serious threat to universal peace. Openly challenging United Nations decisions, rudely flouting international law, setting out rash demands for annexing occupied Arab territories, Israel's leaders are dangerously aggravating the situation in the Middle East.

Israel is not only ignoring the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967 demanding the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied by them in 1967, but, moreover, is continuing to develop these Arab territories. Israel's ruling circles want, so to speak, to get a prize for their bandit-like act of aggression against Arab states.

The events of recent months clearly show that

⁸⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5636 (May 2, 1972), p. 141.

the circles hostile to progress in the Arab East and their agents have not given up their plans for breaking the will of the Arab peoples, frustrating a political settlement and making them succumb to the demands of the imperialists.

In these conditions, the Arab states against whom aggression has been committed, have every justification for using other means, as well, to regain the Arab territories captured by Israel.

The Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt are resolved to conduct a further consistent struggle against the perfidious intrigues by the enemies of peace and progress in the Middle East. They are profoundly convinced that, with the support of countries of the socialist community and all peace-loving forces, the Arab peoples will foil these plans and that the cause of the progressive development of the peoples of the Arab East will triumph.

Time has convincingly shown that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be established only if all the provisions of the November 22, 1967 resolution of the Security Council are fulfilled on the imperative condition of a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied by Israel as a result of aggression, and of ensuring the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In this connection the sides again declared their determination to continue the struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East.

The strengthening of the economic, political and military might of Arab states advancing along the road of progress, the consolidation of the unity of all Arab peoples on an anti-imperialist basis and resolute opposition to attempts to split their ranks constitute a most important condition for eliminating the aftermaths of the imperialist Israeli aggression and of a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Soviet side expressed full support for the efforts of the Arab Republic of Egypt and other Arab countries directed at liberating Israeli-occupied Arab territories. Since the dangerous situation continuing in the Middle East poses a threat to universal peace, the sides found it necessary to study again in a spirit of fraternal co-operation measures directed at protecting the lawful rights and interests of the Arab peoples, in particular, by way of further increasing the military potential of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The sides reached agreement on the further

strengthening of military co-operation between them. The holding of appropriate important measures in this direction was arranged.

The sides expressed profound satisfaction with the development of relations of friendship and fruitful co-operation between the Soviet Union and Egypt, and confirmed their desire to further develop and strengthen this co-operation in all fields.

It was noted again with satisfaction that the close friendship between the Soviet Union and Egypt is not a transient but a permanent factor, determining the development of relations between the world's first socialist state and the Arab Republic of Egypt, which is advancing along the road of socialist transformations.

President Sadat expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for its constant support of the just struggle of the Arab peoples against the Israeli aggression and imperialism's intrigues and to build a new and free life.

The sides expressed their profound satisfaction with the results of the visit to the Soviet Union by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, a visit which will undoubtedly contribute to the further consolidation of the bonds of friendship between the USSR and Egypt and will serve the cause of world peace.

80

Statement issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross explaining its role in the Sabena hijacking incident⁸¹

Geneva, May 10, 1972

The International Committee of the Red Cross was asked to act on behalf of the passengers and members of the crew of a Boeing of the Sabena airline held as hostages by a Palestinian commando at Tel Aviv airport. With the agreement of the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian commando and solely with the purpose of coming to the aid of innocent persons threatened with death, it agreed to serve as an intermediary between the two parties.

⁸¹ English text in International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1972* (Geneva, 1973), p. 74.

The intervention of the Israeli armed forces took the delegates by surprise. The ICRC cannot admit that anyone should use its humanitarian action for military or political ends.

The ICRC therefore firmly rejects both the attempts to manoeuvre it and the accusations that it willingly lent itself to such a manoeuvre.

Finally, it once again severely condemns acts of air piracy, the taking of hostages and any other attempts at blackmail that imperil the lives of innocent human beings.

81

Statement by Prime Minister Maurer of Rumania expressing support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, made during a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Meir of Israel⁸²

Bucharest, May 4, 1972

We are concerned over the perpetuation of tension in the Middle East. Rumania favoured and favours the solution of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the application of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. This implies the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the recognition of the rights to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the area and a solution to the problem of the Palestinians—the creation of conditions that will allow this population to maintain satisfactory conditions of life in accordance with their wishes and aspirations. We hope that by the efforts of all the peace-loving states a just and lasting peace will be achieved in the area, in keeping with the interests of all the peoples.

82

Speech by U.S. Senator McGovern (Dem.) defining his attitude to Israel and the Middle East⁸³

Columbia, Md., May 13, 1972

Those of us who have supported and led the movement for peace in Indochina are sometimes asked how we can reconcile our position on that issue with an equally firm insistence upon American aid to Israel.

The question is a dismal reflection of how badly our judgment has been impaired by the trauma of Vietnam.

We cannot permit our revulsion against the war in Indochina to distort our judgment about America's responsibilities elsewhere in the world. And any hint of a similarity between our involvement there and in the Middle East is sadly and dangerously mistaken.

In fact there is no common element between the lamentable role we have played in Indochina and the role we must continue to play in the Middle East.

This is true with respect to the merits of the conflict, the nature of our supportive role, the depth of the Soviet commitment, and the degree of American self-interest involved in both areas.

And because we made a mistake in backing a corrupt dictatorship in Saigon is no reason at all to deny our economic, diplomatic and political help to the free and independent state of Israel.

The Israeli government, as everyone well knows, is a democratically elected coalition that includes Arab representatives. Its basic popular support is as firm as that of any government in the world. Personal freedom and dissent flourish there.

Israel's treatment of the Arab population in the areas now under its control has been among the most enlightened and humane of any occupying power in history. The sharp rise in the standard of living in these territories, the success of the recent West Bank elections, and Israel's open-borders policy with Jordan attest to this. They also bear witness to Israel's genuine desire for reconciliation and peace with its Arab neighbors.

⁸² Excerpted from the English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, May 7, 1972, p. 3; Prime Minister Meir visited Rumania May 4–7.

⁸³ Speech made during the presidential primary election campaign in Maryland; text supplied, on request, by Senator McGovern.

What policies should the United States pursue in the Middle East, in its own best interest, and in the interests of all of the peoples of the area?

Our basic goal, of course, is to maintain the peace. But what is crucial here is the *kind* of peace we should be seeking.

The best objective is a peace based on genuine reconciliation and mutual respect between neighbors. I hope and pray that some day a leader of an Arab nation will be courageous enough, and concerned enough for the welfare of his own people, to state publicly and unequivocally, "we must live in peace with Israel."

But until these magic words are spoken and true reconciliation between Arab and Jew begins, we must follow policies that do not invite further bloodshed, and improve the chances for eventual reconciliation. We must take actions consistent with our desire for peace, but also consistent with the realities of the present situation in the Middle East and the respective positions of the adversaries there.

In my view that means that the survival of a democratic, thriving and secure Israel should stand as the cornerstone of our policies in the Middle East.

By leaving no doubt as to our determination to help sustain Israel in those terms, we will act consistently not only with our own ideals and interest, but also with the only conditions under which a settlement can eventually be achieved.

The specific elements of such a policy must be discussed in terms of past and recent history.

We know that the basic goal of Israel's foreign policy is the establishment of a secure peace with its neighbors and that is a sensible, realistic course. It is absurd to regard tiny Israel with three million people as a threat to its Arab neighbors who number more than 100 million. But neither can we question Israel's determination or right to remain an independent Jewish state.

By peace, Israel means a settlement with its neighbors embracing the concept of defensible and recognized national boundaries capable of deterring possible future aggression.

The three Israel-Arab wars in the past 25 years are largely traceable to the strategic vulnerability in which Israel was cast by the arbitrary and erratic lines drawn as its temporary boundaries. These boundaries, because of their tempting vulnerability, were themselves invitations to armed

invasion and maritime blockade. The 1949 lines, it is worth recalling, reflected Arab invasions and Israel's response.

Israel insists now upon the establishment, for the first time, of national secure and recognized boundaries, determined through a process of negotiation with its neighbors.

Clearly there can be no reconciliation without such prior negotiation. I cannot recall when in history a dispute between nations has been solved without the parties themselves meeting together to hammer out their differences. This certainly applies in a dispute so complex as the Israel-Arab conflict.

Being realists, the Israelis have expressed their willingness to enter into indirect negotiations as a start. They are correct in asserting that meaningful progress is ultimately dependent upon the Arab governments' readiness to enter into face-to-face talks. The Arab refusal to meet with Israel directly as sovereign equals is really tantamount to continuing nonrecognition. Israel has placed on public record its readiness to enter into negotiations without prior conditions, and has expressed its willingness to withdraw from the present ceasefire lines to new boundaries which the negotiators would agree upon in a treaty of peace.

In the total absence of Arab willingness to enter into comprehensive peace negotiations at this time, recent American efforts to break the stalemate have centered on a limited Suez agreement. Israel has declared its agreement to enter into proximity negotiations with Egypt through the good offices of the United States, with a view to concluding a partial settlement affecting only the Suez Canal sector.

The obvious advantage of such an agreement would be the disengagement of the opposing military forces. This would permit the clearing and re-opening of the Canal, revive normal civilian life in the Canal sector, and perhaps, most importantly, spawn a climate of trust and cooperation conducive to later, more comprehensive peace negotiations.

But until the conditions for either a Suez settlement or an overall peace agreement have matured, no effort must be spared by all the parties concerned to reduce the threat of renewed hostilities.

The most dangerous front is, of course, the Suez Canal sector where opposing forces are poised. On the Egyptian side, a formidable combat

Soviet presence is entrenched including a significant number of combat pilots and the most up-to-date weapons in the Soviet arsenal—weapons not deployed anywhere else outside the Soviet Union.

It should be obvious that a weakening of Israel's capacity to respond successfully to any attempted assault across the Suez Canal would increase the prospects of war. President Sadat's public threats leave no doubt as to his intentions should he reach the conclusion he can win a military victory over Israel.

Nor does the Soviet-Egyptian communiqué offer any moderation of this hard line.⁸⁴ It is therefore essential that Israel's deterrent strength be maintained if war is to be prevented, just as it has been the major factor in preserving the cease-fire of the past twenty-one months.

It follows that the United States' role is a crucial one. Our actions can be decisive in averting future war and advancing the process of peace.

I see four major areas in which the U.S. is capable of asserting itself as a force for peace.

—The continued maintenance of the cease-fire and the advancement of the political process depends upon maintaining the balance of power. The structure of any future settlement, partial or total, must be built upon this principle. Therefore Israel must continue to receive from the U.S. the advanced aircraft and other military equipment necessary to guarantee its deterrent capacity. It must be able to count on such ongoing assistance without the Senate having to take the lead periodically in urging this course of action on a hesitant administration.

—Israel must also look to the United States for substantial economic aid. It is strained to capacity by the crushing burden of defense which consumes almost 30 per cent of its gross national product, and is faced with a welcome but formidable influx of Soviet refugees. It is through such American aid—particularly credit loans and supporting assistance—that Israel will be able to meet the high cost of its defense procurements and its minimal development needs.

—American diplomatic support is the third essential point. An administration that would abandon the doctrine of a non-imposed settlement or that would compromise the goal of a genuine binding peace agreement between the parties.

would be striking a disastrous blow at the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Israel must depend upon the United States to assert vigorously its influence in international and bilateral forums, including the United Nations.

—Finally, we must recognize that the Soviet Union remains the ultimate obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Through massive arms supplied to certain Arab countries, through its own considerable direct military involvement, and through its unswerving support for the Arab cause, the Soviet Union has fueled and sustained a dangerous military condition which could not exist for a single day without such involvement.

The United States is the only nation with sufficient resources to counter such pressure. We must therefore make plain through all channels that our resolve will not be shaken; that we will never waver in our determination to preserve a secure Israeli nation.

Israel considers its military defense to be its own responsibility. Israeli leaders have made it very clear, in public and in private, that they do not want a single American soldier ever to come to Israel's defense. They assert that if they ever have to rely on direct American support, not only will their policies have failed, but they will also have lost their own freedom and independence.

Israel is confident of shouldering its defense responsibilities against any combination of Arab forces. In the past Israel has certainly shown how well and how swiftly it can do this.

I am equally convinced that the danger of an Israeli confrontation with Soviet armed forces will be radically reduced so long as the United States continues to maintain Israel's strength through arms assistance, economic aid and political support.

In order to give credibility to such policies of support for Israel, I am prepared, as I have already said, to visit Israel as President of the United States. No American President while in office has ever traveled to Israel. It is time that this visit takes place, not only as a demonstration of America's commitment to Israel's survival, but as a tribute to a humane and courageous ally and as a reaffirmation of the ideals our nations share.

In the years ahead we will have to make difficult choices as to how, when and where to wield our influence and power. If we choose wisely we can be a dynamic force in the creation of a saner, safer world. My distress over some of the choices of the

⁸⁴ See document no. 79 above.

present Administration is not only because of their failure to assess the moral consequences of their actions, but because they weakened our resolve and ability to move on to more pressing international business.

I think we can do better than we have in the past. I think that the American people and the rest of the world deserve better. America must pursue its "new involvement" in the world with compassion and with optimism, but also without weakness or naiveté. We must learn from our past mistakes and begin the process of involving ourselves in the destiny of this planet as wisely and humanely as we know how.

83

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of U.S.S.R. Defence Minister Grechko⁸⁵

Cairo, May 18, 1972

In response to an invitation by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Soviet Defence Minister, Andrey Grechko, heading a Soviet military delegation, paid an official and friendly visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt from 14th to 17th May.

During the visit, Marshal Andrey Grechko held talks with President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat, the Deputy Premier and Minister of War and War Production, General Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq and senior armed forces officers. He also visited an air force base. The Soviet guest and the accompanying delegation were accorded a warm welcome, expressing the feelings of sincere friendship which the Egyptian people have towards the people and armed forces of the Soviet Union.

The talks were conducted in an atmosphere of understanding and mutual friendship. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the growing co-operation between the Soviet and Egyptian armed forces and exchanged views on the strengthening and developing co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt in

order to enhance the fighting capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces in accordance with the Egyptian-Soviet joint statement issued on 29th April 1972 following President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat's visit to the Soviet Union,⁸⁶ the statement which asserted that the Arab countries which had been the target of the June 1967 aggression had every right to use various means to regain the Arab territories usurped by Israel.

The views of the two sides were in agreement regarding the appraisal of the current tense situation in the Middle East which emphasizes that Israel's aggressive policy, which is backed by US political, military and economic support, is still the main cause for the exacerbation of the grave situation in this area.

Marshal Andrey Grechko and the accompanying delegation were seen off with the same warmth and appreciation with which they were received.

Marshal Grechko has extended an invitation to General Sadiq to visit the Soviet Union. General Sadiq accepted the invitation and the visit will take place in the near future.

84

Press conference statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the place of the Middle East in the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow⁸⁷

Washington, May 19, 1972

Q, Mr. Secretary, will the Middle East be on the agenda in Moscow and, if so, what approach will the United States take toward that subject in the discussions? What goals can reasonably be achieved vis-a-vis the Middle East in this summit?

A. Well, we don't have a fixed agenda, so I don't want to start answering questions about what's going to be on the agenda; but obviously the Middle East is a subject that will be discussed. No doubt about that.

I don't want to get into exactly what our approach is going to be, but I can repeat what our general policy has been toward the Middle East.

⁸⁵ Text of the communiqué broadcast on Cairo Radio in Arabic: English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3994/E/1; reprinted by permission.

⁸⁶ See document no. 79 above.

⁸⁷ Excerpted from the transcript of the press conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1719 (June 5, 1972), p. 782.

And I'll state it without any particular effort to suggest the approach that we're going to take with the Soviet Union. We do not believe that a settlement between Israel and Egypt—nor, for that matter, between Israel and Jordan, but in this case particularly between Israel and Egypt—can be imposed by outside nations. We think that the settlements have to be worked out among the nations involved. On the other hand, we think that it is vitally important for negotiations to start, and we think that the framework for a settlement is spelled out in Security Council Resolution 242. So, we are prepared to discuss with any nation the possibilities of getting negotiations started, and that remains our policy.

85

Section on the Israeli-Arab conflict from a report on Europe and the Mediterranean adopted by the Eighteenth Assembly of the Western European Union⁸⁸

May 23, 1972

5. The Israeli-Arab conflict

71. Your Rapporteur has not had time to consider this conflict closely. In the main, he will abide by the report which Mr. Nessler submitted to the WEU Assembly last year on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. The situation does not seem to have changed greatly since then and most of the conclusions drawn by Mr. Nessler are still valid.

72. Like Mr. Nessler, your Rapporteur does not believe that a global settlement is likely in the near future, but he considers that the possibility of settlements on a specific point concerning one or other or all the countries involved and Western Europe must not be excluded. Thus, further consideration might be given to the possibility of building a pipeline along the west bank of the the Suez Canal, not only because of its economic interest but also because it would compel Israel

and Egypt to agree on a specific matter and help to ward off the threat of resumed hostilities in the Canal area.

73. Your Rapporteur is also convinced that a number of Arab countries are at present seeking a solution and contacts which one or other of them may have had with the Israeli authorities have so far allowed the conflict to be contained. But these countries have to take account of public opinion which would accept none of the concessions on which peace might be based. Proof of this is the fate of King Hussein's proposal to the Arab countries in March 1972.⁸⁹

74. It is therefore unlikely that the Arab governments will manage to conclude a final agreement with Israel in the next few years, but this does not mean that fighting is likely to be resumed. The danger inherent in the present situation is that the tension which is still there may incite one of the great powers to intervene because it considers its interests to be directly threatened.

75. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that anything which might lead to neutralisation and disarmament, even partial, in the dangerous area, would help to reduce the danger of the conflict spreading. After the 1967 war, a number of powers decided to place an embargo on arms for the Middle East. However, there was no international agreement and the fact that the Soviet Union installed arms on Egyptian soil, some of which were manned by Soviet troops, led the Americans to concede certain arms deliveries to Israel. The European countries adopted various approaches to the embargo they were to apply in the Middle East. The French Government, for instance, limited its embargo to the so-called "battlefield" countries, i.e. Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. It therefore saw no reason why it should not deliver arms to a number of Arab countries far from the area of fighting even if they were radically hostile to Israel. Other European countries have delivered arms or are preparing to do so to countries for which France has maintained its embargo. The United States is supplying both Israel and Jordan.

76. No European country can be expected to comply with a European policy which has not even been defined. For instance, the French Government has been criticised for concluding an

⁸⁸ Text of section on the Israeli-Arab conflict excerpted from the report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur, *Europe and the Mediterranean* (Document 576), pp. 12-14.

⁸⁹ See document no. 187 below.

agreement with Libya for the supply of a large number of Mirage aircraft. Your Rapporteur first wishes to recall that this is a long-term contract which should have no impact on the present dispute since, together with the supply of armaments, it provides for the training of personnel for the Libyan air force which at the present juncture is far from capable of intervening in the Middle East conflict. But what your Rapporteur really does not understand is how France can be blamed for not applying international legislation which does not exist. Similarly, in March 1972 it was announced that British shipyards were building submarines for Israel. Your Rapporteur does not think the United Kingdom can be blamed either for not applying an embargo in accordance with terms which have not received international approval.

77. Your Rapporteur is therefore entirely in agreement with the Council's reply to the Assembly's Recommendation 202:

There is no reason to suppose that the prospects for achieving international agreement on the limitation or cessation of military assistance to the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute are now better than they have been in the past. Both sides consider it essential to maintain and increase their military strength lest hostilities should be renewed.

78. However, frontier incidents between Israel and Lebanon in February show how serious the situation still is and how necessary it is for the Council to pursue its discussions on the Middle East situation in connection with which it should be stressed that the WEU member countries seem basically to agree that Resolution 242 of the Security Council should be applied. Any differences over the application of this resolution, particularly with regard to arms supplies, should not conceal the fact that in this specific case the WEU countries have a joint position.

86

Press interview statement by Deputy Prime Minister Allon of Israel assessing the security, demographic and historical factors in border demarcation⁹⁰

Late May, 1972

Q. Mr. Allon, what relative importance do you attribute to the security factor, the demographic factor and the historical factors in the demarcation of peace frontiers?

A. It is not a matter of any of them being more important than the others as a matter of principle. I maintain that we must be directed by all three of them in drawing the future map of the state of Israel.

Historical rights are required by us as a moral basis. Therefore, God forbid that anyone who is prepared for territorial compromise should abandon the principle of historical rights. This is the moral programme that distinguishes a people returning to their homeland from a people occupying the country of others.

As for the demographic problem, I have always opposed the idea of a binational state. I have always wanted a Hebrew state, although of course I have always been aware that a large Arab minority would live in the Hebrew state and that its full civil rights must be ensured. Therefore the demographic problem is extremely important and cannot be left out of account, not only from the realistic political point of view, but also from the point of view of Jewish interests.

The following has been said: If we had imposed Israeli law on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip immediately, we should have been obliged, in conformity with democratic principle, to grant that large Arab population the full rights we granted the Arabs of Galilee in the war of liberation. This in itself would automatically have turned the state of Israel into a binational state; even though there was in it a not inconsiderable Jewish majority. But with the passage of time demography would have done its work. Even had we ensured that there should be a Jewish majority for a long time, this would not have altered the

⁹⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text of the interview conducted by Yosef Eshkol, *Bemahane* (Tel Aviv), May 24, 1972.

binational character of the structure of such a population, in which the Arab citizens would be in great density, deeply rooted, and with a tendency to very great natural increase—among the highest in the world. On the other hand, had we unified all parts of Eretz Israel under the flag and the sovereignty of the state of Israel, without allowing the Arabs any rights, we should have ceased being a democratic state. I myself want a state that will be democratic and also Jewish.

As for strategic considerations, these, in my view, are no less important. There must be no thought of returning to the 1949 armistice lines, that is, to the lines that existed before the Six Day War. These lines in themselves would call for another war; this time it is permissible for us, as a consequence of the aggressive Arab war of 1967, to make for ourselves self-defence lines, that is to say, lines by which we can defend ourselves with our own unaided strength, lines which by their very existence increase the possibility that the Six Day War will have been the last of the wars between us and our neighbours.

I therefore want a map that will ensure us security and also ensure the Jewish character of our state, through insistence on the Jewish people's historical link with their historical country.

87

Message from the World Peace Council on the fifth anniversary of the June war of 1967⁹¹

Brussels, May 25, 1972

MESSAGE OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL
TO ARAB PEOPLES AND TO ALL PARTISANS
OF PEACE IN THE WORLD ON THE 5TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE ISRAELI
IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

Five years have gone by since the Israeli aggression of June 1967, supported by the United States of America. Yet the aggression continues,

and the U.S.A. continue to give their political, military and economic support to the aggressors, allowing them to retain the usurped occupied territories, and to deprive the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, foremost among which is the right to return to their homeland in conformity with the U.N. resolutions.

It has become perfectly clear to world public opinion that Israel planned its aggression with the connivance of American imperialism, with the aim of striking a blow at the Arab national liberation movements and at their political and social achievements, and with the aim of putting a stop to political and social development in the Arab countries. By doing so, the U.S.A. could maintain its oil monopoly in the Middle East, and Israel could obtain new territories for expansion, thus weakening the progressive Arab countries and seeking to reimpose imperialist domination on this region.

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt made concrete attempts to reach an acceptable political agreement on the basis of the 1967 (No. 242) U.N. Security Council Resolution, and other Security Council and U.N. General Assembly decisions. For the establishment of a just peace would serve the interests of all the peoples and countries of the area. Yet the Israeli government, aided and abetted by the U.S. government in its policy of aggression, continues to obtain more armaments and aid, a fact which has transformed it into a military arsenal. The Israeli government refuses to comply with reason and rejects all political efforts to reach a just and acceptable agreement. Thus Israel has refused talks with Gunnar Jarring, the U.N. representative, which were to be based on the December 1971 resolution.⁹² Israel also refuses the 4-great powers negotiations and their guarantees, announcing that it intends to annex more territories and to colonize them, opening them to Israeli settlers and driving out their original inhabitants.

The efforts undertaken by world public opinion to reach a just political solution must be continued. It is also very important to broaden the campaign aimed at isolating Israel and the U.S.A. internationally. The Arab countries whose territories have been occupied cannot accept such a shameful state of affairs forever. These countries

⁹¹ Text provided, on request, by the World Peace Council; the message was sent by the Council's Presidential Group, meeting May 24–25.

⁹² U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI), printed as document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

are entitled to resort to all available means in order to recover their rights, supported by the progressive and liberation forces of the world, as well as by international law as represented by the resolutions of the Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly, the latest being the December 1971 resolution.

The Arab peoples, including the Palestinian people, do not stand alone in the struggle. With them stand all the forces of peace, liberation and socialism throughout the world, foremost among them the Soviet Union whose material and moral support sustains the position of the Arab governments in the face of political and military aggression. The friendship and cooperation treaty with the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1971 and a similar treaty signed with the Iraqi Republic in 1972 constitute two very important steps for the consolidation of Arab-Soviet friendship, a friendship that reactionary imperialist circles continuously attempt to shake in order to sap the strength of the Arab countries in the face of aggression.

The unity of struggle of the Arab liberation movement in the face of Israeli-imperialist aggression, and its alliance with the forces of peace, liberation and democracy in the world are the basis for victory over aggression and occupation. Further efforts on the part of peace partisans in the world to unmask the objectives of Israeli and American leaders will result in the powerful unity of all the peace forces in all countries, including Israel and the U.S.A., to stand against the Israeli-imperialist aims of aggression.

The five years that have elapsed have not been wasted. Israel and the U.S.A. are becoming increasingly isolated, and the unity of the forces of peace with the Arab peoples is being constantly strengthened. The power of the Arab countries in the face of aggression is materially and morally consolidated with the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Democratic forces in the Arab countries must unite in a common front, together with their allies, the world-wide anti-imperialist front, because this is the only way to bring the hour of victory nearer.

We are confident that our joint efforts to mobilize world public opinion, and morally and materially consolidate the forces of the Arab peoples to help them build their national unity, will prevent the Israeli-imperialist aggressors from

reaping the fruits of their aggression. Peace and Justice will prevail in the Middle East, thus removing the dangerous threat to world peace.

88

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Nixon of the U.S.A. (excerpt)⁹³

Moscow, May 29, 1972

By mutual agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the USSR, President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

The two sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general, Ambassador Jarring, the USSR and the U.S. confirm their desire to contribute to his mission's success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the USSR and the U.S., the achievement of such a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.

⁹³ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5641 (June 6, 1972), pp. 184, 185.

Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel calling for tighter security measures and international action against states giving aid to "terrorists" after the Lod airport attack⁹⁴

Jerusalem, May 31, 1972

The Government feels duty-bound to make a statement in the Knesset and, by means of the Knesset, to the nation and the world throughout. I have nothing to add to the details which, so far as they have been verified, were made public. What happened last night at Lod Airport was a foul, murderous deed, premeditated, with total disregard for human life and with one sole aim: to murder and to kill indiscriminately.

What happened yesterday caused the death of 23 and the wounding of 78 persons. Among those killed, identified so far, there are five or six Jews and twelve non-Jews, mainly Puerto Ricans, pilgrims who came to visit the Holy Land in good faith—and they had reason to believe that they would enter in peace and depart in peace. As far as Israel and the Jewish people are concerned, this is the way it could and ought to have been—but for the crime plotted abroad.

There are some elements in this crime which point to "a war of liberation," as it were, of the terrorist organizations, their war on imperialism, and their linking-up—according to them—with the progressive revolutionaries throughout the world. And the proof of it: yesterday Japanese turned up. The Arabs in the terrorist organizations found a way, not only to kill and wreak bloodshed, but also to do so by emissaries. And all this in the name of war against imperialism. What did the Japanese who was apprehended say: "world revolution." Woe betide such "world revolution" and local revolution, built on bloodshed and based on murder for its own sake.

As soon as the news of what happened broke, joy broke out in Cairo and in Beirut as well over the "great victory." Dozens of people were killed and scores of others wounded—and there is no end to the rejoicing. Those who were unable to stand up against us on the battlefield are great heroes at hiding explosives in planes, at assaults

on planes and passengers, and in their readiness to blow up a plane with a hundred people aboard—as they did two years ago in the Swissair disaster. This indeed takes great "courage." And if the little "courage" needed for that is lacking, foreigners are recruited for the purpose—still, the joy is great.

There is no need to tell ourselves that Israel shall not be deterred by this act. We have borne the brunt of many attacks and terrorist acts, and we have always found a remedy to overcome them. I am certain that this time, too, we shall find a way. Two years ago, after the Swissair disaster, I made a statement to the Knesset, in which I said, *inter alia*:

"We are convinced that the international community is capable of putting an end to piracy and terrorism in the air by taking practical steps against the terrorist organizations, their emissaries and their accessories, and against those Arab states from where they set out, in whose midst they operate, on whose soil they train, and whose governments supply them with arms, funds and refuge. Indeed, those very Arab capitals, which harbour the headquarters of the terrorist organizations and their camps, continue to be visited by the planes of international aviation companies."

This was two years ago. Who can recall all those dozens of hijackings and attempts at murder, which have taken place since, not only in our region but throughout the world. This thing has spread like an infectious disease the world over. Unfortunately, what happened then, still goes on today. It is no secret that Beirut is openly enabling the centres of the terrorist organizations to reside in its midst. There they plot, from there instructors set out to various countries, and from there come the broadcasts of their "great successes." Can it be possible that governments, that aviation companies should acquiesce in this state of affairs, on the presumption that they would emerge unscathed?

Is it possible that there is no power in the entire world, in dozens of countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere—is it conceivable that there is no power in this world to put an end to this? Will it not be elementary justice to say, that a state which harbours and abets the plotting of such crimes—where the terrorists are free to plot, to set out, to hit and return safely with impunity—is it at all conceivable, that on the

⁹⁴ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, June 1, 1972, p. 5.

soil of such a country foreign planes will continue to land?

And now, it seems to me, we may already conclude that not only Israelis are the target. But even if Israelis were the sole target, our demand would be justified. When an Israeli plane is not safe, no plane can be safe—and this has been proven, on both domestic and international flights. Yesterday it was a group of Puerto Ricans. Twelve of them were hit, maybe more. There are still seven casualties unidentified, and we do not know who they are. This hits every one of us. Those organizations, the pioneers in murder and lawlessness, have placed a question mark against safety in the air.

We, in Israel, shall do all we possibly can to safeguard our planes—and, indeed, they are secure. We have taken all the necessary steps to make sure that everybody coming to Israel or leaving Israel in our planes can fly in safety. We shall do everything that can be done, but I have not the slightest doubt that unless other governments and airlines will cooperate and consider this as their concern—and not merely for our sake—the scourge shall remain to plague all.

I am certain that even after this murderous crime, arrivals in Israel will not cease—neither of immigrants nor of tourists—and we shall find a way to vouchsafe this. Still, I feel duty-bound to appeal today once more to governments and aviation companies to cooperate, to take precautions, to make sure who boards every plane and not to take matters lightly.

Only a short while ago, we had the Sabena affair, in which security checks somewhere failed to be carried out. Yesterday, the same thing happened. What occurred yesterday could have easily been avoided, if the airline concerned had paid proper attention and carried out a check. I am aware that for El Al passengers, too, this is a nuisance and a loss of time, but against this, they are secure.

On behalf of the Government and myself, I wish to express our heartfelt condolences to all those who suffered, both Jews and non-Jews, and to voice our appreciation to the medical staff. Yesterday I was at Tel Hashomer hospital. I believe that during the night they carried out 40 operations, and other hospitals did likewise.

To Japan I want to say: We do not consider the Japanese terrorists who came last night as

representatives of Japan. The ties of friendship which link us to the Japanese people and the Government of Japan shall endure.

I am confident, and I believe that this certainty is shared by us all, that Israel will find a remedy and a way to make sure that this shall not recur. Let us hope that the baseness of this crime and this trend of the terrorist organizations will be pilloried by governments throughout the world—and that Arab states, who join in the great rejoicing over the massacre, will carry the full responsibility for these acts.

90

Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the CENTO Council of Ministers (excerpt)⁹⁵

London, June 2, 1972

8. Expressing their concern at the continuing tense situation in the Middle East, the Ministers reiterated their hopes for an early resolution of the Middle East dispute and for the continuation of efforts aimed at attaining a just and enduring peace in the area, in accordance with the principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November, 1967.

9. The Minister also discussed other problems of peace and security in the area, including subversive activities. They expressed the hope that efforts would continue to be made to find solutions to these problems in order to contribute to stability and progress for the nations of the area.

10. Concluding the review, the Ministers reaffirmed their faith in the importance of the Organization for its partners, especially for peace and progress in the Region.

⁹⁵ Excerpted from *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVII, 1723 (July 3, 1972), p. 25.

91

Letter from Prime Minister Sato of Japan to Prime Minister Meir of Israel apologizing for the Lod incident⁹⁶

Tokyo, early June, 1972

I have the honour to send Your Excellency my most sincere greetings through Mr. Kenji Fukunaga, a member of the House of Representatives, whom I am dispatching to your country as Ambassador on Special Mission.

Through him I hasten to express to you and the Government and people of Israel my profound apology on behalf of the Government and people of Japan for the dastardly act of terrorism committed by three Japanese nationals at Lod Airport, which must have caused indescribable anger and sadness among your people.

They have only wanted to kill and injure many innocent people. It was an act of insanity beyond the comprehension of the Japanese people, who have been angered and saddened, no less than any other peoples of the world, at the crime of the three, who have brought such a disgrace upon them. We are determined to do our utmost to prevent a recurrence of such a crime.

In the name of the Government and people of Japan, I extend my heartfelt sympathy and condolences to those who suffered injuries or lost their lives by this crime. For the consolation of the injured and the families of the deceased, I am considering to take an appropriate action.

I read the news with deep gratitude that you stated at the Knesset⁹⁷ that Israel did not regard the criminals as representative of Japan and that the friendly relations between Israel and Japan would remain unhampered. That is also what I believe.

I avail myself of this opportunity to reassure Your Excellency of my highest consideration and my constant wishes for your continued good health and the ever-increasing prosperity of Israel and her people.

92

Press interview statements by Minister of Defence Dayan of Israel on conditions in and the future of the West Bank and the form of the next confrontation⁹⁸

June 5, 1972

Q. Following the recent elections in Judea and Samaria, is Israel's position in the West Bank stronger? Is there more co-operation between the Israeli authorities and the Councillors elected on the West Bank? And what are the next moves planned by the Government?

A. The importance of these elections lay in the fact first of all that they produced results. One should remember that both the terrorist organizations and the Arab states called on them to boycott the elections. For the inhabitants of the West Bank, the internal struggle was whether to respond to that appeal or to say: "It's all very well for you to give us advice from across the border but we've got to live our own lives, and we're going to the elections."

I would say then that the recent elections were significant more as an indicator of the situation then as a basis for any kind of a new period.

But one could say that today it would be feasible, or possible, to move forward in the direction of certain components of normal life which for some reason could not be realized in the past.

For example, there was a time when the authorized representatives in the Gaza Strip said that they would rather have fewer doctors and fewer hospitals, and more Gazans sick or dying, than more doctors, if those additional doctors are going to be Jews, if this would be connected in any way with Israel. I think that today you would not hear such a thing in Gaza.

Also as far as services such as electricity, water, roads, highways linking with Israel—the Gazans, and to a great extent, the West Bankers are prepared to go the whole way, their main purpose being to provide a sound basis for normal life for their citizens.

As far as elections specifically are concerned (this depends very much on the wishes of the local inhabitants) possibly towards the next elections it may be possible to take another step

⁹⁶ English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, June 5, 1972, p.9.

⁹⁷ See document no. 89 above.

⁹⁸ Excerpted from the partial English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, June 6, 1972, pp. 5-6.

forward and to improve, and reform the constitutional law, and give women the right to vote as well as those who have no property. For today it is only a small percentage of the population which has the right to vote—only those who own property and land, and so on.

Q. Since the war, Israel has been talking of returning territories in exchange for a stable peace. Does not the increasing of settlement in those territories, the extension of the educational system, make such declarations ring rather hollow?

A. Israel has never said, and should not, that so long as the Arabs do not sit at the negotiating table with us, we will do nothing in the territories. Because that would mean accepting in advance the formula of the Arab states which says: not an inch of ground.

So I see nothing wrong with setting up settlements and in my view permanent settlements in accordance with a well thought-out plan, according to lines that the Government considers right. I have not seen a network of settlements alongside the strongholds at the Suez Canal, but in places which the Government has decided should be settled—the Jordan Rift, the Golan Heights, the Rafiah salient, the Gaza Strip. I do not think that any settlements have been founded in contradiction to the Israeli stand that we shall not return to the former boundaries.

If Israel set up no settlements across the former boundaries, this would imply that she was accepting the Arab map, and in my view, Israel should not accept it.

Q. Is the forthcoming confrontation between Israel and the Arabs, about which one hears so much, likely to be a repetition of the war of attrition—that is with bombardments in depth, clashes along the Canal line, or limited tactical raids, or are there new ideas on the subject?

A. I assume that the war would not repeat the patterns of the past again. Things have changed, weapons have changed and above all, the Arab attitude has changed. The Arabs lost the war of attrition, and have not resumed the war because they knew that it would not be worth their while to resume it in the same form as in the past.

There are two principles in this matter which I personally think we should bear in mind. The first is that in war we have to win. And we have

to avoid any structure of war based on different considerations—political or other considerations which might lead us to a situation of losing a war.

If it became necessary to cross the Canal for example, and I could give more examples. By the term “necessary” I mean that without this it would not be possible to win the war. The first condition is to win the war, and this doesn’t necessarily mean to reach the enemy’s capital but to lead to a situation in which he is defeated and raises his hands, in which he will want to end the war.

The second point, on the other hand, is that in so far as it will be possible to achieve victory without extending the war and not reach a greater confrontation, or greater Russian involvement, we should not seek to exacerbate or spread the war.

On this point I refer both to the Russians and to the Arab countries, and if there are Arab countries that will not join in re-opening fire, we should conduct such a policy as will not obligate them, from their standpoint, to join in.

93

Statement by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs de Lipkowski of France denying that Mirage jets have gone to Egypt⁹⁹

Paris, June 6, 1972

Despite Mr. Sadat’s statement I can say that no delivery [of French arms] has taken place in breach of the embargo which has been strictly applied by France. We have never received the slightest protest from Israel. On May 2 the Chief of Staff stated before the Knesset that he could not confirm the rumours of a transfer of Libyan Mirages to Egypt. Do you believe Mr. Elazar, if not me? As for the statements of an Israeli diplomat in an Israeli newspaper they are nothing against an official denial on the part of the French government. I leave to Mr. Ben Natan the responsibility for his remarks.

⁹⁹ Statement made in response to a question posed in the French Senate by Socialist deputy Pierre Giraud; excerpted and translated from the partial French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), June 9, 1972, p. 8.

Mr. Giraud invites us to preach moderation to the Arabs. As if we are inciting them to war! Mr. Rogers is the one who said that the Egyptians had agreed to all that they could agree to, and that no more can be asked of them. Egypt's desire for peace is shown particularly by her acceptance of the Jarring mission, now rejected by Israel. It is clear on which side is the desire for peace and on which side the inflexibility.

94

Press interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban explaining his dissatisfaction with U.N. Special Representative Jarring and reiterating Israel's interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242¹⁰⁰

Stockholm, early June, 1972

In the debate between Israel and Egypt Ambassador Gunnar Jarring has, on a most important point, adopted a stand which Israel finds impossible to accept. In his memorandum of February 8, 1971¹⁰¹ Jarring asked Israel to commit herself to withdraw all military forces to the old international border, i.e. to the ceasefire line which existed before the Six Day War of 1967. It is not legitimate to seek such a commitment from Israel. How can we commit ourselves to withdraw to the old border when such a retreat would involve our surrendering control over the maritime traffic at Sharm al-Shaik? Without such control a new war would break out. An international force? That was exactly what existed in 1967 and the result was war. We are not looking for solutions which lead to war but for solutions which create peace.

To sum up: since February 1971 Jarring's activity has been suspended due to his request for a negotiating commitment which Israel cannot make. I should add that what must happen now is that Egypt and Israel, with no previous subsidiary arrangements, should put forward their points of view and subsequently negotiate in a common effort to reach agreement.

Jarring's activity can continue if it is based exclusively on the original terms of reference as they were formulated in Security Council Resolution 242. An arbitrator should be bound by no document other than the one on the basis of which he was appointed.

We were given explicit assurances that there was no question of evacuating those areas we had administered since 1967. The resolution [U.N. Security Council Resolution 242] assumed negotiations over the borders. Great Britain and the U.S.A. got our support for the resolution by giving us an assurance on this point, confirmed by the wording of the resolution. And in 1969 the British Foreign Secretary explained that the omission of the word "all" (in connection with the evacuation of the occupied territory) was deliberate.

95

Statement by former ARAMCO chairman Brougham at a Congressional hearing warning of the possible use by the Arabs of oil as a political weapon¹⁰²

Washington, June 7, 1972

The ability of the Middle East countries to halt oil exports to one or more of the consuming nations must be viewed against the background of Middle East politics and the normal reluctance of the conservative Arab States to take such a step.

The use of oil as a political weapon has long been advocated by radical elements in the Arab world. In reply to a question on the nationalization of British Petroleum, Colonel Qadhafi of Libya replied, "We nationalized BP for political reasons. We hope that this reason will not occur in the future between Libya and America." It will be

¹⁰⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Swedish text of an interview conducted by Ulf Brandell, *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), June 8, 1972, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁰¹ Printed as Annex I to document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹⁰² Excerpted from *U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972; February 2, June 7, August 8 and 15, 1972, pp. 51, 52.

recalled that the reason announced for this nationalization was the occupation by Iran of two small insignificant islands in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. Libya took the position that this action was only possible because the British, traditional custodians in the gulf, allowed this to happen. Influential voices in Egypt have been calling for a ban on new concessions to American companies. The Iraqi Government and the Helsinki-based World Peace Council announced recently that they were jointly sponsoring a seminar to be held in Baghdad in November on "The Use of Oil as a Weapon in the Struggle Against Imperialism and Israeli Aggression." The moderate Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, more conscious of their commitments and responsibility to the consumers, would be reluctant if not completely opposed to use oil as a weapon, but we must be cognizant of the potential for concerted Arab action to that effect or potentially explosive public opinion demanding such action once it becomes apparent that there are no alternative sources of supply available—a situation with which we have not been heretofore confronted.

96

Interview with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco on American attitudes to a Middle East settlement and support for an interim agreement¹⁰³

Washington, June 8, 1972

Q. Prior to President Nixon's visit to Moscow, there was a good deal of speculation that the United States and Russia might come to some sort of arrangement over the Middle East. What in fact were the conclusions reached in Moscow?

A. The principal conclusions were contained in the communiqué, in which both sides reconfirmed their support for a political settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The fact that both sides endorsed on a continuing basis the idea of a political settlement is significant in that it reflects their desire not to see another outbreak of Arab-Israeli fighting in the Middle

East. This parallelism does not mean, however, that we and the Soviets have the same interpretation of Resolution 242.

I think that the statement of principles agreed upon in Moscow—particularly those which pledged the US and USSR to avoid military confrontation and to prevent situations arising which would increase international tensions—also have a very special relevance to the Middle East. In fact I think the Middle East will be a significant test of those principles.

Q. To what extent was the Middle East a subject of discussion during President Nixon's visit to Peking?

A. The Soviets, of course, have a substantial and direct interest in the Middle East—as we do. The discussion of the Middle East at the Moscow summit was thorough and detailed, but because the Middle East conflict is one that can only be resolved through agreement between the parties involved, it would have been unrealistic to expect that we and the Soviets could have effected any dramatic changes in the situation. At Peking—and without getting into specifics—the Middle East was a more marginal matter than in Moscow. This reflects the realities of the situation with respect to the relative positions of the major powers in the Middle East.

Q. So far this year, public reference to the Middle East by Moscow and Washington has been limited. Does this imply that a settlement in the area is no longer regarded by the superpowers as a high priority?

A. I don't think it is necessarily a question of priorities. I think there was a recognition by the United States and Russia—before and during the summit—that the differences between the Arabs and the Israelis on the question of an overall settlement are very considerable indeed—in other words, that it is a wide chasm. And I think it was accepted that it was unlikely that the major powers could bridge this chasm.

Q. Would you sum up the Nixon Administration's Middle East policy?

A. Our objective has been and continues to be to do everything we can to promote a stable peace agreement, because we feel it is not in the interest of the United States or of the West—and in fact, it is not in the interest of the countries in the area—for the 'no war and no peace' situation, unstable as it is, to continue. It increases the risks of Arab-Israeli hostilities, and we think it

¹⁰³ Interview conducted by William H. Dorsey, *New Middle East* (London), no. 46 (July, 1972), pp. 4–6.

increases the risk of an involvement of the major powers. Now because in our judgement the differences between the Arabs and the Israelis are very fundamental—and very considerable—we think the most feasible approach is the idea of an interim Suez Canal agreement which would involve some Israeli withdrawal, the re-opening of the Suez Canal, and a further extension of the ceasefire.

This is a more modest approach than attempting to work out an overall settlement, but one which we feel has greater prospects in the short term—and it would be an important first step toward the overall and final peace settlement that remains the ultimate objective. Indeed, our hope would be that talks on an interim agreement could get started in the foreseeable future.

Q. Explicitly as possible, would you sum up the arrangement favoured by the Nixon Administration on two basic points: the extent of Israeli withdrawal required and the nature of the guarantees given in return?

A. Well, first of all, there are really a number of elements that need to be resolved by the two sides on an interim Suez Canal settlement—and the question of the zone of withdrawal, or the extent of Israeli withdrawal, is one of a handful of such elements.

Let me try to be concrete. The first question is what would be the relationship between an interim Suez Canal settlement and an overall settlement. This is a key question—considered key by both sides. Secondly, how much of an extension of the ceasefire are both sides willing to agree to. Third, how much of a withdrawal would the Israelis be willing to make. Fourth, what would be the nature of any Egyptian presence East of the Suez Canal. This is a very critical question. The Egyptian government has adopted the view that there must be an Egyptian military presence; equally vigorously, the Israelis have adopted a view to the contrary. Fifth, there is the question of what the practical supervisory arrangements would be.

This leads me to the question you have put on guarantees. The prime element of any guarantee has to be the formal and binding agreement between the two sides bulwarked by the best on-the-ground supervisory arrangements that can be conceived. Our own judgment is that the greater the participation of the parties themselves in the supervisory arrangements, the more con-

fidence the parties will have in them and in the agreement itself. We do not believe—and this is relevant to either a partial or an overall settlement—that any major power guarantee could be anything more than supplementary.

Q. What would the Nixon Administration regard as a reasonable Israeli withdrawal in any Suez Canal agreement?

A. We have not adopted any specific notions in this regard as they relate to the interim agreement. We feel such a decision could only come in the process of negotiations, and would be influenced, I think, by a number of considerations such as the kind of Egyptian commitment to the ceasefire, the relationship between the Suez Canal agreement and an overall settlement, resolution of the question of any Egyptian presence East of the Suez Canal, supervisory arrangements, and so on.

Let me add here that when I was in Cairo last year, I informed President Sadat that the Israeli government had not then taken any decision as to the number of kilometres it was willing to withdraw from the Suez Canal. Nor have they taken such a decision now. We ourselves have not adopted any *a priori* judgment simply because in any role as the middle man, our job would be to achieve some common ground on this point—without having any rigid, fast, preconceived notion about the thing ourselves.

Q. How does the Nixon Administration define a just and equitable solution of the issues raised by Palestinian Arab nationalism?

A. It is difficult to answer this question concretely. There are divisions of opinion not only within established Arab governments as to what should be the elements of a fair and equitable solution for the refugees, but also among the Palestinians themselves. I would just say this: that we don't see how a peace agreement that is stable and will stick can be achieved unless the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians have been met. The specifics of how these concerns are met must, I think, be a question of negotiations.

Q. What do you regard as the strategic aims of the Soviet Union in the Middle East?

A. Historically, the Soviets have always had a very direct interest in the Middle East for economic, political and strategic reasons. And there is no doubt that the Soviets do have a substantial

position in the area. The conclusion of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty¹⁰⁴ and the Soviet-Iraqi treaty,¹⁰⁵ is a process of consolidation by the Soviet Union of that position.

From the point of view of the United States, this situation insists that our presence in the Middle East must be a substantial presence, a presence of strength, one which backs American diplomacy in a meaningful sort of way. The answer to Soviet strategy in the Middle East is primarily political. From the point of view of the United States, the most satisfactory way to cope with the Soviets is a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute based on Resolution 242.

Q. What is the effect of American involvement in South-East Asia on the implementation of this policy?

A. I think the problem of coping with the Soviet presence in the Middle East is a problem that we would face with or without Vietnam.

Q. How would you define the nature of America's commitment to Israel?

A. It comes as no secret to anyone, within or outside of the Middle East, that the United States does have a special relationship with Israel. One need only go back to the role played by the United States in the creation of Israel to point this up. However, we feel there is nothing inconsistent with maintaining this special relationship and at the same time pursuing a policy of better relations with Arab countries in the area. Our interests go beyond any one country in the area. We have interests in the political independence and territorial integrity of other states in the Middle East—and we have important *overall* economic, political and strategic interests in that area. And that means broadly speaking.

Beyond that, we have been interested in maintaining an arms balance in the area which helps to assure the security of Israel, but a balance at the same time which is a deterrent to any renewal of hostilities.

The arms question goes beyond the immediate concerns of any of the principal parties in the area. Matters have become more complicated. We have to consider not only the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also certain intra-Arab differences that contribute to instability in the area. Superimposed

on these difficulties is the role of the major powers. We would like to see arms limitations achieved, so far as the Middle East is concerned, but the Soviets have never been willing to engage in talks on arms limitations in the absence of an overall political settlement. We have sought to try to engage them in talks, feeling that such talks would in and of themselves help to bring about a diminution of tensions in the area. But the arms policy of the Soviet Union in the area is an important instrument of policy from their point of view.

Q. What is the present state of relations between the Nixon Administration and Egypt?

A. Not so good as we would like; a resumption of diplomatic relations would be in our mutual interests. In recent weeks, we have been charged by our Egyptian friends with having been deceitful over this past year. I regret this very much, because I don't think that any misunderstandings between Egypt and the United States in this regard are either in our mutual interest or in the interest of peace in the area. If there has been any loss of confidence in the United States, my hope would be that this could be set aside. Trying to find a scapegoat is no answer. I would like to see the Egyptians ask themselves the following question: objectively speaking, what is the national interest of the United States in this situation? I would suggest that if the matter is approached on this basis, that the answer to this question is that our objective interests are to help promote either a partial or an overall settlement. Trust or lack of trust need not hamper diplomacy. Now we happen to believe that the most feasible approach at the present time is an interim agreement. And I think that the question of trust or mistrust ought to be set aside. I think everybody would be going into even proximity talks a bit on the wary side, whether it be the principal parties in the area, or whether it would be the United States trying to play the role of constructive catalyst. I think that any decision to engage in this process ought to be based on this kind of analysis of what the respective interests are—of everybody concerned—setting aside the question of trust or lack of trust.

Q. But the United States has recently concluded a major agreement to supply additional Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. Isn't this action inconsistent with the

¹⁰⁴ See document no. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹⁰⁵ See document no. 72 above.

emphasis of your present remarks—that the Nixon Administration wishes to improve its relations with Egypt?

A. We have said all along that the United States intends to maintain the arms balance in the Middle East, and that this is a question which not only involves the parties in the area but also the major powers. The question of arms in the area is a reality that both sides have to live with.

In so far as our relations with Egypt are concerned, I don't happen to believe that it is in the Egyptian interest, or in the United States' interest for there to be a lack of contact. I happen to believe that the national interest of the United States is directly involved in promoting an agreement that meets at least the minimal conditions of both sides. We are available to play this role, and I think the question of past or future disappointments ought not to be relevant to the decision of whether one takes part in proximity negotiations or not. Both sides owe it to themselves—and to the future generations of their citizenries—to explore through negotiations what can be achieved by political means. The situation in the Middle East must not be allowed to drift, for drift plays into the hands of the forces of instability, and this is not in the interests of the people and the countries of the Middle East or the major powers.

Q. One final question. The last Presidential election year, 1968, saw a sharp rise in Palestinian extremism and the establishment by the Soviet Union of a very strong Middle East position. Do you see any signs that 1972 will also be—as it was called then—'a long hot summer'?

A. I would hope not. There's a reasonable chance that the ceasefire will hold, because it is in the interests of both sides. Also I think there is a myth in the Arab world that in an election year the United States is inhibited in pursuing its role in trying to promote a peace agreement within the framework of Resolution 242. Actually, the fact of the matter is that the pursuit of peace, whether it be in the Middle East or elsewhere, is a very popular thing in our country. And therefore there are no real inhibitions. My final comment would be this: we are ready and available to play a role in trying to promote an interim Suez Canal agreement.

97

Radio interview statement by Israel's Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin on Israel's attitude to the U.S. Presidential candidates¹⁰⁶

Washington, June 10, 1972

Q. The election campaign is currently under way in the U.S. and complaints have been voiced that you are dropping hints to American Jews that it would be better were Nixon to continue in his post.

A. I believe that the Israel Ambassador in the U.S. has to understand the internal political set-up in the U.S. The Israel Ambassador has to rally as best he can the maximum support for Israel over and beyond the exclusive Jewish support.

Every President, on making a positive decision, did so generally in opposition to the views of most of the experts responsible for foreign and security affairs. It is my view, therefore, that we have to display gratitude to those who acted in support of Israel and not only spoke in Israel's support.

We must express thanks for words, too, but more than that it is important that there be an awareness among American politicians that Israel and the friends of Israel demonstrate gratitude to anyone who stood the test of action, who decided and assisted Israel, who was ready to assume the commitment to help Israel.

Israel must thank those who help her, be they of this camp or that camp, be they of one viewpoint or another, in whatever the area relating to internal American policy.

Israel has to have one criterion: what is their relationship to Israel—and one has to express and find means to demonstrate gratitude. This is what has determined my behaviour and I suggest to everyone to judge by decisions.

¹⁰⁶ English text as distributed by the Embassy of Israel in Washington and published in *The Jerusalem Post*, June 13, 1972, p. 10; this text was issued as a correction to a statement by Ambassador Rabin allegedly expressing support for the candidature of U.S. President Nixon.

Resolution on Israeli aggression against Egypt adopted by the Organization of African Unity¹⁰⁷

Rabat, June 14, 1972

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its ninth ordinary session in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco, from 12 to 15 June 1972,

Having examined the report of the outgoing Chairman of OAU on the implementation of resolution AHG/Res. 66 (VIII),

Having heard the declaration of the Head of the delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt,

Recalling all the previous resolutions relating to the Middle East and in particular resolution AHG/Res. 66 (VIII) entitled "Continued aggression against the United Arab Republic" calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories to the pre-5 June 1967 lines,

Reaffirming its solidarity with the Arab Republic of Egypt,

Taking into consideration United Nations General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971,

Deploing Israel's rejection of General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), as well as its refusal to respond favourably to the initiative of OAU, in particular OAU's demand concerning the reaffirmation of the principle of non-annexation of the occupied Arab territories,

Considering all the efforts exerted by the OAU Committee of Ten for the implementation of resolution AHG/Res. 66 (VIII),

Considering the substance of the Egyptian and Israeli replies to the memorandum of the OAU Committee of Ten,¹⁰⁸

1. *Takes note* of the report of the outgoing Chairman of OAU and keenly appreciates the efforts exerted by the Chairman and members of the Committee of Ten;

2. *Congratulates* Egypt for its co-operation with the Committee of Ten, its positive attitude and its continuous efforts for the restoration of peace in the region;

3. *Deplores* Israel's negative and obstructive attitude, which prevents the resumption of the Jarring mission;

4. *Invites* Israel to declare publicly its adherence to the principle of non-annexation of territories through the use of force;

5. *Invites* Israel to withdraw immediately from all the occupied Arab territories to pre-5 June 1967 lines in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967;

6. *Reaffirms* in the name of African solidarity and in pursuance of article II, paragraph (c), of the OAU Charter, its effective support to the Arab Republic of Egypt in its legitimate struggle to recover totally and by every means its territorial integrity;

7. *Urges* all member States of OAU to give Egypt every assistance and calls on all Members of the United Nations to intensify their action, in both international forums and the Security Council and General Assembly, to take all initiatives for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories and the condemnation of Israel's attitude which impedes the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) based on the United Nations Charter, which forbids, under any pretext, the acquisition of territories through the use of force;

8. *Requests* all States Members of the United Nations to refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons, military equipment or moral support likely to enable it to strengthen its military potential and to perpetuate its occupation of Arab and African territories;

9. *Decides* to follow closely the development of the situation in the Middle East.

¹⁰⁷ English text as transmitted to the Secretary-General of the U.N. on June 23, 1972, by the representative of Egypt; issued on June 23, 1972, as annex to U.N. doc. no. S/10717 (A/8735), *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, pp. 138-139.

¹⁰⁸ For text of the O.A.U. memorandum and the replies of Egypt and Israel see document nos. 225, 233, 393 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

99

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain (excerpts)¹⁰⁹

Amman, June 22, 1972

Responding to the invitation of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, His Excellency Gregorio López Bravo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, paid an official visit to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from June 20 to 22, 1972, having the honour of being received by His Majesty King Hussein, and having held a meeting with His Excellency the Prime Minister, Ahmad Lawzi.

1) During the talks both ministers reaffirmed the confidence of their respective states in the principles and the Charter of the United Nations, of resorting neither to force nor to the threat of force and of the necessity for employing peaceful methods, as included in the United Nations Charter, for the solution of international disputes.

2) Both ministers spoke about the problem of the Near East. The Spanish minister reiterated the permanent, friendly attitude of Spain towards the Arab cause and the position of his country in favour of the evacuation of all occupied territories in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and the resumption of international negotiations for the application of the said resolution.

3) The Jordanian minister explained to his Spanish colleague the measures which Israel has carried out to annex the city of Jerusalem in contravention of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of the Security Council, and in erecting buildings in that city to the detriment of its historic and religious character. The Jordanian minister explained in detail the importance of reestablishing the status of Arab Jerusalem as it was before June 5, 1967. He stated the readiness of Jordan to consider a formula which would guarantee free access to the sacred places in

the Holy City to all the communities of the world without this affecting Jordan's sovereignty over those places.

100

Radio interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel justifying military action against Lebanon, and discussing her recent visit to Rumania and Israel's mistrust of the U.S.S.R.¹¹⁰

Vienna, June 23, 1972

Announcer: ...Concerning the latest border incidents between Israel and Lebanon, Golda Meir responded to the question of whether she envisaged an escalation of Israeli retaliation, perhaps a temporary occupation of South Lebanon.

A. We have no desire to occupy any part of Lebanon. But we see ourselves obliged to do everything we can without endangering the local population so far as that is possible given our responsibility. But so long as al-Fatah shoot across the border, lay mines, and interfere with civilian traffic, and so on, we have to do anything that we can do, that it's absolutely essential for us to do, in order to make that border quiet. We hope that the Lebanese government will make it possible to see to it that they themselves do it. That would be much more preferable.

Q. In his most recent speeches President Sadat has repeatedly spoken of a new war. On the other hand, during your stay in Bucharest you were informed by President Ceausescu of President Sadat's peaceful intentions. So which Sadat do you believe, the one who wants peace or the one who talks of war?

A. That's the question. That's the big question. When does Sadat say what he really means? At any rate I appreciate that President Ceausescu extended the invitation. I came to Bucharest. He spent many hours discussing the Near East problem with me. The message which he had to pass on to Sadat was that we really want peace

¹⁰⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Spanish text, *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), no. 122 (July-August, 1972), p. 298.

¹¹⁰ Transcribed, excerpted and translated from the German tape recording of the interview conducted by Ursula Stängzel and supplied, on request, by Austrian Radio.

and are prepared to negotiate about peace at any moment and at any level.

Q. Don't you think that, due to the military engagement, the growing military engagement of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the Mediterranean, the status quo ante borders of 1967 are safer than at that time, before the Six Day War?

A. Because the Soviet Union is so friendly to Israel—and therefore they will that we should be dependent on the Soviet Union which delivers arms to Egypt! Every one of our men that was killed in the '67 war was killed by a Russian weapon. Since then Russia has delivered more and better weapons in larger quantities and has adopted an extreme anti-Israeli attitude. Russian pilots and several thousand military advisers are in Egypt. And our security should be dependent [on the fact] that the Soviet Union will help protect Israel?

101

Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on the U.N. Security Council debate and its Resolution 316 of June 26, 1972¹¹¹

June 27, 1972

Eban: As usual and as expected, the Security Council adopted an unbalanced, one-sided and unjust resolution. The resolution arbitrarily affects the Israeli victims of the terrorist aggression from Lebanon, since this resolution refuses to condemn clearly the murder of Israelis and devotes clear condemnation to the means adopted by Israel to avoid being killed. The flagrantly unethical nature of this text does no honour to the majority in the Security Council, which lent a hand to this text.

A final remark with regard to prisoners of war: men, officers and soldiers in captivity for months and years, even if their rank is low, have no lesser right than Syrian generals to be exchanged and

returned to their countries in accordance with international convention. Their low military rank does not deprive these prisoners of their basic right to international attention and concern. In any event, Israel will continue to work for the release of all the prisoners.

Q. Mr. Eban, I want to ask you a question with regard to another matter connected with the Israeli operation in Lebanon, and that is the attack on the village of Hasbaya. Different things have been said regarding the statement of the Acting Premier on this matter. What is your own opinion regarding the operation and Mr. Allon's statement?

A. I am very surprised at reports in the press and remarks in the Knesset which have raised the possibility that the statement of the Acting Premier could do political damage to Israel. I absolutely reject any such evaluation. Since our policy is to make a distinction between terrorists and villagers and since we are doing our best to maintain this distinction in all our actions, why not explain this policy first of all to the people in Israel, who are entitled to know the calculations, considerations and principles which constitute the basis of our security policy, and, second, to the people and Government of Lebanon. We want them to understand that we only fight those who attack us. We do not want to attack Lebanon as a state and certainly not to attack peaceful civilians in villages.

With regard to the Security Council, I do not consider it the principal address for our statements. However, even there there is no reason why other states which are interested in the nature of our actions and wish to understand them should not understand that the objective was to attack buildings, commands and bases of terrorists, and that if a bomb fell and killed innocent people, it was by mistake and not intentional. I cannot understand how such a statement can be harmful in any international forum. In my opinion, it can only be beneficial and put things right.

¹¹¹ Interview conducted by Arye Mekel, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4027/A/5; reprinted by permission; for the text of the resolution see document no. 16 above.

102

Letter from Afghanistan Foreign Minister Shafiq to Lebanon Prime Minister Salam condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon¹¹²

Kabul, late June, 1972

The news of the savage and brutal military aggression by Israel against the defenceless and innocent people of Lebanon has caused great pain and concern in Afghanistan. We have all been shocked by the audacity of Israel's barbaric and inhuman crime.

By means of such squalid actions Israel wishes to deny our Arab brothers their rights, but I am convinced that it will not attain its purpose.

The people of Afghanistan support the rights of our Arab brothers as they always have in the past, and they feel sorrow and grief over the latest events in Lebanon.

I therefore convey to Your Excellency my profound sympathy and that of the Afghani people.

Yours sincerely,

MUHAMMAD MUSA SHAFIQ
Foreign Minister of Afghanistan

103

Press interview statements by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco reviewing the prospect for negotiations and the possible extent of U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvement in talks¹¹³

Washington, June 30, 1972

Q. Perhaps we had better start this interview by defining—or redefining—United States policy as regards the Arab-Israeli problem.

A. Let us put it in the following form: Our goal in the Middle East is to find a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem on the basis of United Nations Resolution No. 242. Why? Because this, in my judgement is, firstly, in the interests of the

safety and security of the United States, in addition to the fact that the present situation of no peace and no war is a threat to the stability of the area. Moreover, it is in the interests of the peoples of the area that they should not waste their potentials and resources as they are doing at present, but put these resources and potentials to better use.

Q. But how to get out of this state of no peace and no war, which has been going on for more than five years? And how is it possible to break the stranglehold of the stagnation at present prevailing?

A. Here two basic things are required:

- a) The ceasefire in the area must be maintained.
- b) Meaningful diplomatic steps must be taken in the area. Regrettably the inability to achieve a settlement is due to two factors: the first is the suspicion and lack of confidence prevailing in the area, and the second the basic differences between the parties as regards, basically, the territorial conflict.

We still feel that there is a great opportunity if Ambassador Gunnar Jarring succeeds in breaking the present deadlock and finding common neutral ground between the Israeli and Arab parties, because the great gulf between the two parties makes it difficult to reach a really meaningful settlement. We feel that one possible trend is to attempt to take action on practical diplomatic lines as a first step. This step might take the form of opening the Suez Canal along with a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Here it must be said that we do not see this temporary settlement as an end in itself. Indeed, the opening of the Suez Canal is only a step—although a practical step—towards a comprehensive settlement of the problem on the basis of Resolution 242.

Q. Do you not think that the Arab side has made the utmost concessions, and that it is Israeli obstinacy and arrogance that are making it difficult to reach a settlement, and even to take the first practical diplomatic step you are talking of?

A. The problem as regards Resolution 242 is that the two sides have from the start offered different interpretations of it. Ambassador Jarring, the American government and the great powers have been faced with different views held by each side as regards the interpretation of this resolution. For the Arab side the resolution has meant complete withdrawal, whereas for the

¹¹² Translated from the Arabic text as published in Lebanon National News Agency *Bulletin* (Arabic edition), July 1, 1972, p. 37.

¹¹³ Translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Riyad al-Rayysi, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 1, 1972, pp. 1, 12.

Israeli side it has only meant substantial frontier modifications.

We must not forget that Resolution 242 is not in itself a peace agreement. It must be made easier for the two parties to reach a settlement through negotiations on the basis of the Security Council resolution.

Q. How are such negotiations to start? On what basis? Have facilities been prepared for them?

A. We must remember that both sides have accepted the Security Council resolution, and that the Arab states' readiness to enter into a peace agreement is clear. I tend to think that people on both sides are in agreement on seeking a way to coexist. But the important points are: firstly, territorial matters related to the land and, secondly, discussion of practical steps to ensure that the peace agreement respects the acquired interests of both parties, which will give it more meaning and mean that it is more susceptible of being implemented.

Q. Do you mean by that the idea of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel meeting in New York, or what has come to be called proximity talks?

A. Yes, but unfortunately we have not been able to get positive answers from both parties at the same time. President Sadat answered positively in October 1971 to our proposal for proximity talks to be held in New York, and Israel had reservations. Israel wanted to promote the idea of bilateral talks with the Egyptian side along with the basic proximity talks. In January 1972 Israel accepted the invitation to take part in the proximity talks in New York, while Egypt had reservations.

Q. Do you not think that the Egyptian refusal was due to inequity of American policy as regards Egypt, especially since Golda Meir's visit to Washington in November 1971 and America's agreement to give Israel more Phantoms?

A. Our call for the talks to be at close quarters was fundamentally only to restrict them to areas on which there are only a few differences. The other problems must be dealt with through negotiations. The problem of arming has always been a factor on both sides. And the problem of arming is a reality, for which we are trying to find a solution.

We have always been ready to discuss with the U.S.S.R. restrictions on arming at any time, but

the U.S.S.R. has not agreed to discussion of restrictions in the area of arming as part of political discussions or as part of a political solution of the Arab-Israeli problem.

Q. Let us return to the question of the prevailing stagnation. How can the great powers intervene?

A. Regardless of the difficulties, it is in the interests of both parties that talks should start. Positive factors emerged at the Moscow summit conference, and the attitudes established at the summit disclosed a desire to coexist. Moreover, the longer the occupation lasts the more difficult it will be for Israel to withdraw.

But the great powers must not impose a solution. The U.S.S.R. and the United States must help in efforts to reach a settlement.

The declaration of principles issued by the Moscow summit makes this very clear.

Q. But the Moscow summit said very little about the Middle East problem in itself.

A. From our point of view the great powers can help to find a settlement, but they cannot be a substitute for the parties themselves in reaching a settlement in the area through negotiation.

Q. What are your reactions to Israel's constant threats to Lebanon, especially since the Lod airport incident?

A. We disapprove of all kinds of violence, and we condemn the attack of Lod airport, recalling that there were sixteen American victims of the incident. We in particular are in the ranks of the moderate forces, and against the forces of violence and extremism. We have constantly affirmed our support for the independence and honour of the states of the area. The interests of the United States in the area lie in supporting and strengthening the independence of those states which call for prudence and moderation in the face of any threat.

104

Statement by Uganda's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Ondoga outlining Uganda's attitude to the Middle East crisis¹¹⁴**Moscow, early Julv. 1972**

Some time ago the Uganda government severed relations with Israel. We were compelled to take this drastic measure because Israel was using her military and civilian personnel for subversive activities against Uganda and other African countries, trying to influence Uganda's foreign policy and involve our country in her aggressive policy in the Middle East. Israel caused serious damage to Uganda's economy in order to take advantage of our economic difficulties to foster her own interests.

Uganda's position on the Middle East crisis is well known. Guided by the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other nations, she is against the seizure of the territory of one country by another and stands for détente and peace throughout the world. The Ugandan government invariably support the U.N. and OAU resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. It was this independent policy of the Ugandan government that evoked the resentment of Israel and caused her to interfere in our affairs.

105

Statement by U.K. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Godber justifying the U.K. vote for U.N. Security Council Resolution 316 in response to a Parliamentary question¹¹⁵**London, July 3, 1972**

9. *Mr. Clinton Davis* [Lab.] asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what plans he now has to seek to pay official visits to countries in the Middle East.

Mr. Godber: My right hon. Friend has no such plans at present.

Mr. Davis: Does the right hon. Gentleman think that it is a pity that he is not going to Israel, for example, so that he could explain to the Israeli Government how it came about that Britain sponsored an inequitable and selective resolution at the Security Council which condemned Israel for taking steps to safeguard herself against gangster attacks from the Lebanon and yet at the same time had not a word to say about the massacre at Lod?

Mr. Godber: My right hon. Friend visited Israel in April. The Security Council resolution to which the hon. Gentleman refers was directed towards the attacks made by Israel against Lebanon during the preceding days. Her Majesty's Government felt it right to participate in this. It is not correct to say that there was no reference to other matters, because paragraph 2 of the resolution profoundly deplored all acts of violence, obviously including the Lod affair.

Sir Gilbert Longden [Con.]: Would it not have been better for the Government to include a specific condemnation of the guerrillas for what they have done and a specific injunction upon them not to repeat it?

Mr. Godber: Her Majesty's Government's view on this is that these are matters in relation to sovereign States. This resolution was not directed to guerrilla activities but to the action of one State against another, which must be put in a different category. This is an important distinction to maintain. We have, however, made clear our attitude with regard to the Lod incident. My right hon. Friend has expressed in this House the horror of this Government and our sympathy with those concerned. There is this distinction, however, which I must draw.

¹¹⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *New Times* (Moscow), no. 27 (July, 1972), pp. 18-19.

¹¹⁵ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, vol. 840, July 3, 1972, cols. 13-14; for the resolution see document no. 16 above.

106

Statement of support for the Arabs made by President Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. at a dinner in honour of visiting President Assad of Syria¹¹⁶

Moscow, July 6, 1972

Dear Syrian friends, you are waging a struggle to accomplish the tasks of economic struggle and cultural development in conditions in which part of Syrian territory is occupied by Israel. This undoubtedly creates considerable additional difficulties for you—difficulties which the Syrian people are making great efforts to overcome.

The people of Syria, like the peoples of other Arab states, have on their side the sympathies and support of the peoples of the whole world and the selfless aid of sincere friends of yours—the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

Voices can sometimes be heard alleging that the Soviet Union is interested in preserving in the Middle East a state of “neither war nor peace.” Such assertions are deliberate lies, a slanderous invention of imperialist propaganda.

The policy of our country and party is one of principle. The Soviet Union comes out firmly and consistently for the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East, which will take into account the interests of all the peoples of that area, including the Arab people of Palestine.

It is precisely for this reason that we resolutely condemn the adventurist course of the Israeli leaders who, relying on the support of imperialist and international Zionist circles, are trying to dictate their will to the Arabs and to extract concessions from them. It is precisely for this reason that we are rendering broad political and diplomatic assistance to the Arab states, helping them to develop their national economy and culture and to strengthen the combat capacity of their armed forces. Life itself provides convincing evidence of the fact that the balance of forces is changing, and not in favour of the aggressor. All this creates reliable prerequisites for eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression, for liberating

the Arab territories seized by Israel, for achieving a just political settlement in the Middle East and for establishing a lasting peace in that area.

As we welcome our Syrian friends, we would like to state with all clarity that the Soviet Union, loyal to the unshakeable principles of the Leninist foreign policy, will go on, as before, firmly supporting the Arab peoples in their struggle for their righteous cause. Our line with regard to close all-round co-operation with Syria and the Arab Republic of Egypt, just as with other progressive Arab states, is unalterable. The Soviet side is also prepared in the future to give most attentive consideration to the vital questions proceeding from this principled line.

We note with deep satisfaction that the Soviet-Syrian talks have begun in an atmosphere of sincere friendship and complete mutual understanding. Once again they demonstrate that our views coincide on basic international problems and they confirm the constructive approach of both sides to the examination of practical problems concerning their bilateral relations.

We are confident that the exchange of views with you, both on questions relating to bilateral relations and on the present Middle East situation, will facilitate the implementation of noble aims—the further strengthening of Soviet-Arab friendship, the solution of the problem of a Middle East settlement, the strengthening of the peace and security of the peoples.

107

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Assad of Syria (excerpts)¹¹⁷

Moscow, July 8, 1972

Hafez Assad, Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, stayed in the Soviet Union at the head of a Party and Government delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic on an official visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central

¹¹⁶ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5646 (July 11, 1972), pp. 231–232.

¹¹⁷ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 28 (July 15, 1972), pp. 6, 7–8.

Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government from July 5 to 8, 1972. The distinguished guest was accorded a warm and hospitable reception.

During the discussion of international problems special attention was given to the dangerous tense situation in the Middle East which is causing growing alarm of the peoples throughout the world as a result of the continuing imperialist aggression of Israel and the United States which supports it.

The Sides condemn the openly expansionist aggressive policy in respect of Arab states in the Middle East pursued by Israel with the growing political, military and financial support of the United States, a policy which is the main reason of the absence of a just peace in that area and which creates a serious threat to the cause of universal peace. Openly challenging United Nations decisions, rudely flouting international law, exercising racial discrimination, mass terror, persecutions and other criminal actions in respect to the Arab population in occupied territories, advancing absurd demands for the annexation of occupied Arab lands, Israel dangerously aggravates the situation in the Middle East.

The Sides again resolutely declare that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be established only on the basis of the speediest, full and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and of ensuring the lawful rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine.

In this connection the Sides again confirm their support for the Palestine resistance movement as a component part of the national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples.

The Soviet Side confirmed its resolution to assist a just settlement of the Middle East problem and also its readiness to further support the struggle of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt and other Arab states for the speediest liquidation of the aftermaths of Israel's imperialist aggression.

The Sides agreed on measures of further strengthening Syria's military potential, on continuing military cooperation between them, on exchanging views and holding consultations in this field.

The Sides noted that unity of action of Arab

states and the strengthening of their cooperation with socialist countries are an important condition for success in the struggle against imperialism, Israel's imperialist aggression and Zionism. The development of cooperation between Arab countries and countries of the socialist community is an important factor facilitating successful struggle by the Arab peoples for strengthening their political and economic independence, for social and economic progress.

The Sides confirmed their determination to further continue consistent struggle against any attempts aimed at undermining friendship and cohesion between socialist countries and Arab states.

108

Middle East section of the platform adopted at the National Convention of the U.S. Democratic Party¹¹⁸

Miami Beach, July 12, 1972

The United States must be unequivocally committed to support of Israel's right to exist within secure defensible boundaries. Progress toward a negotiated political settlement in the Middle East will permit Israel and her Arab neighbors to live at peace with each other, and to turn their energies to internal development. It will also free the world from the threat of the explosion of Mid-East tensions into world war. In working toward a settlement, our continuing pledge to the security and freedom of Israel must be both clear and consistent.

The next Democratic Administration should:

Make and carry out a firm, long-term public commitment to provide Israel with aircraft and other military equipment in the quantity and sophistication she needs to preserve her deterrent strength in the face of Soviet arming of Arab threats of renewed war;

Seek to bring the parties into direct negotia-

¹¹⁸ Excerpted from the text of the platform, "For the People—Platform of the 1972 Democratic National Convention," inserted by Senator Mansfield (Dem.), into the *Congressional Record*, July 24, 1972, p. 25016.

tions toward a permanent political solution based on the necessity of agreement on secure and defensible national boundaries;

Maintain a political commitment and a military force in Europe and at sea in the Mediterranean impels [*sic*] to deter the Soviet Union from putting unbearable pressure on Israel;

Recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths. As a symbol of this stand, the U.S. Embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; and

Recognize the responsibility of the world community for a just solution to the problems of the Arab and Jewish refugees.

109

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Prime Minister Sidki of Egypt (excerpts)¹¹⁹

Moscow, July 14, 1972

Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt Dr. Aziz Sidki was on a friendly business visit in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government on July 13–14, 1972.

During the stay of A. Sidki in the Soviet Union meetings and talks were held with L. I. Brezhnev and A.N. Kosygin.

In discussing international issues and bilateral relations the Sides stressed their determination further to coordinate their efforts in their common struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and reaction, for peace, freedom of peoples and social progress. Special attention was devoted to the dangerous situation in the Middle East which, as a result of the continuing imperialist aggression of Israel, is a source of mounting concern to the peoples of the whole world.

The Sides have unanimously noted that the main obstacle in the way of establishment of peace and security in the Middle East is Israel's obstructive policy towards all the steps proposed so far, aimed at a settlement of the conflict in this area

dangerous to the cause of peace. Impudently ignoring UN decisions, Israel backed by the United States persists in refusing to withdraw its troops from the Arab lands occupied in 1967, makes absurd demands for annexation of these territories, pursues a policy of military provocations on the borders with neighbouring Arab states, thus increasingly aggravating the already dangerous situation in the Middle East.

Resolutely condemning the openly expansionist policy of Israel, the Sides reaffirm their determination to struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East, for the establishment of a lasting peace and security in that area.

The Soviet Side shares the opinion of Egypt and other Arab states that in conditions of Israel's stubborn rejection of a just political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the Security Council Resolution No. 242 the Arab states have every reason to use all the means at their disposal for the liberation of the Arab territories seized by Israel in 1967 and ensuring the legitimate rights of Arab countries and peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine.

110

Statement on the Middle East by President Ceausescu of Rumania, made in his report to the National Conference of the Communist Party of Rumania¹²⁰

Bucharest, mid-July, 1972

As for the Middle East, we declare ourselves in a logical way in favour of a political solution, based on the Security Council resolution of November 1967, and in favour of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. We wish to declare openly that no one should make territorial claims with regard to other states on the pretext that this is necessary for his security and sovereignty. The security and sovereignty of a state cannot be ensured by territorial

¹¹⁹ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 29 (July 22, 1972), p. 5.

¹²⁰ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the report presented July 19–21, *Revue Roumaine d'Etudes Internationales* (Bucharest), VI (1972), 2–3, p. 84.

conquests but only by a policy of friendship and peace towards all neighbouring states. In this spirit, it is our opinion that the political settlement of the Middle East conflict should lead to the guaranteeing and strengthening of the security and sovereignty of each state. At the same time, it is necessary to work towards reaching a solution of the problem of the Palestinian population in conformity with its national interests, by assuring it of the necessary conditions for its independent development.

111

Communiqué announcing the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Egypt, released by the U.S.S.R. news agency TASS¹²¹

Moscow, July 19, 1972

In accordance with requests from the leadership of the Arab Republic of Egypt for help in ensuring its defence potential in the face of Israeli aggression, and specifically through the temporary stationing of a number of Soviet military personnel, the Soviet Union has been giving the Arab Republic of Egypt friendly assistance of this kind over a number of years. Soviet military personnel have been in Egypt for the purpose of helping the Egyptian armed forces to master Soviet military equipment.

Both sides have on many occasions expressed their satisfaction with the effective nature of these measures.

Now Soviet military personnel in the Arab Republic of Egypt have completed their tasks. In view of this, after an exchange of opinions, the two sides have considered it desirable to bring back to the Soviet Union military personnel who were sent to Egypt for a limited period. They will be returning to the USSR shortly.

President Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt said in his speech at the meeting of the central committee of the Arab Socialist Union

on July 18 that the measures now being taken "in no way affect the foundation of Egyptian-Soviet friendship." In this connection the President once again spoke highly about "the great assistance from the Soviet Union" and expressed the desire of the Arab Republic of Egypt for continued friendship between the two countries.

The Soviet Union, for its part, plans to continue developing and strengthening in every way its relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt based on the strong foundation of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and of the joint struggle for the removal of the consequences of Israeli aggression and for peace and security in the Middle East.

112

Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel in reaction to the expulsion of Soviet advisers by Egypt (excerpt)¹²²

Jerusalem, July 26, 1972

On July 18 the President of Egypt announced the following decisions¹²³—and I quote, according to the Middle East News Agency:

"1. To wind up the functions of the Soviet military advisers and experts who came at our request, with effect from July 17, on condition that our sons in the armed forces will replace them in all the work they were doing.

2. The military installations and equipment which were established on Egyptian soil during the period after the aggression of June 1967 shall be the sole property of Egypt and shall be under the administration of the armed forces.

3. To convene, within the framework of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union, an Egyptian-Soviet meeting, on a level to be agreed upon, in order to hold consultations in regard to the next stage."

According to the information in our possession, these decisions are in the process of being implemented.

¹²¹ English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5648 (July 25, 1972), p. 248; the communiqué of the Arab Socialist Union meeting in which President Sadat announced the withdrawal of Soviet personnel is printed as document no. 219 below.

¹²² English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, July 27, 1972, p. 5.

¹²³ See document no. 219 below.

The Government of Israel was in no hurry to draw conclusions from this development and to announce its reaction in public. Even now, it is still premature to make a reliable evaluation of the reasons, scope and results of this decision taken by the Egyptian Government. It may however be said that this highly significant event in the life of Egypt may even contribute to positive developments in the area, on condition that it indeed presages a true turning-point in Egypt's policy from war to peace. We are not indifferent to the developments which may be expected from now on. We must follow with alertness the developments in Egypt and the region, maintaining a positive attitude to trends that advance the independence of the nations and promote the peace of the region.

There are many indications of the feeling of relief that now prevails in Egypt—and no wonder. The decision on the exodus of the Soviet experts and advisers is no doubt due to the response of the regime to the feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment that were rife among the people and the army towards the Soviet presence in Egypt in view of the painful dependence upon the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has extended great and variegated assistance: A wealth of modern types of arms, planes, tanks, ships, sophisticated missiles of various kinds, means of electronic warfare, and so forth. She took part in the defence of Egyptian skies and Soviet pilots participated in operational missions. The equipment was given on easy credit terms and at reduced prices. Thousands of experts and advisers trained troops and helped to build up the Egyptian war machine. I will not go into detail now about Soviet aid in the economic field—and all this to the tune of billions of dollars. It appears that even this extensive aid was not sufficient to lull the resentment. On the contrary, it seems that the presence of the Soviets in Egypt was a source of friction and strain. For the Soviet aid was designed to consolidate on Egyptian soil a permanent Soviet presence to intensify its influence over Egypt's sovereign domestic affairs.

The decision of the evacuation was not the outcome of profound mutual understanding between the Egyptians and the Soviets or of any identity of views between them. From the statements made by the Egyptian President we may

learn of differences of opinion and bitter complaints. It was said that the Soviets did not respond to all of Egypt's requests in the military and political spheres. It appears that the Egyptians blame the Soviet Union for the postponement of the "liberation of the usurped lands" because she failed to respond to all the Egyptian demands. The Soviet Union is charged with responsibility for the continuing situation of "no peace and no war."

We shall not intervene in this debate. According to our experience and conviction, the policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East cannot be regarded as a policy striving for peace. We vividly remember the irresponsible role she played on the eve of the Six Day War. We are well aware that her unreserved support for Egypt's aggressive policy was a factor that sabotaged the prospects of peace.

It is impossible not to be impressed by the fact that the President of Egypt accuses the Soviet Union of "excessive and exaggerated caution." The complaint that the Middle East question is not a matter of first priority for the Soviets is surprising. It is possible that the Egyptian rulers demanded offensive weapons systems and military-operational commitments which the rulers of the Soviet Union were not prepared to grant. It is not to be excluded that they did not agree to take upon themselves the role which the Egyptians earmarked for them in their plans for a renewal of war. If the Egyptians are right in claiming that the Soviets did not respond to demands which, if met, would have caused and made possible renewal of the war—if that really was so—it should not be charged to the discredit of the Soviet Union, for this lack of response contributed to the saving of Egypt from a further defeat and prevented a dangerous deterioration in the region.

The Soviet Union stationed in Egypt more than 7,000 advisers, experts and instructors in all the armed forces, and close to 10,000 additional military personnel to operate squadrons of Mig-21 and other aircraft, SA-3 and SA-6 batteries and personnel in various command formations.

The Egyptian demand for evacuation affects the entire establishment of advisers and experts, but not the instructors. The latter will continue to function. On the other hand, the demand for evacuation also affects the Soviet operational units which are integrated in the Egyptian air defence system. It appears that the SA-3 batteries

and perhaps also the interceptor squadrons have been handed over to the Egyptians.

The evacuation decision does not—at least at this stage—affect Soviet forces and positions in Egypt which serve the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union in the region.

Here and there, in Israel and elsewhere in the world, commentators have hastened to predict the Soviet Union's "Exodus from Egypt." Such haste could be a source of disappointment. According to our information, the Soviet strategic base in Egypt exists and continues unaffected. According to the information we have the Soviet strategic hold on Egypt exists and continues. The Soviet Union has not been told to eliminate her strategic positions. The evacuation of the advisers and the experts, the reduction of the Soviet units which were integrated in the Egyptian system, constitute a significant fact, but do not indicate the cessation of the Soviet Union's role in Egypt.

From the statements of the President of Egypt it is not difficult to see that he is trying to localize and limit the shock, lest it develop into a split. The Egyptians and the Soviets are due to meet and discuss the future, and meanwhile, President Sadat in his speech launched a vigorous attack on the United States, in the hope of thereby satisfying his Soviet allies. The reactions of the Soviet Union have also been most restrained. The Tass announcement of July 19 ascribed to the event the character of an agreed measure.¹²⁴ The statement said that the Soviet military personnel who had been sent to Egypt for a limited period, had completed their assignment, and that both sides deemed it useful that they be returned to the Soviet Union. The statement concludes that: "the Soviet Union plans to continue, in every possible way, to develop and strengthen her relations with Egypt, which are based on the friendship and cooperation treaty and a joint struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression."

As stated, we have not seen the end of the matter. In Soviet-Egyptian relations, an upheaval has taken place the significance of which should not be under-rated, but it is early as yet to appraise its consequences.

It appears that internal ferment and unrest continue to prevail in Egypt. The Soviet experts

and advisers are leaving, but the difficult problems remain unsolved. When the hour of excitement and leave-taking has passed, the problems which are crying out for a solution and require decisions will stick out once more. In a situation like this, we cannot be safeguarded against surprises.

Developments in this or that direction may well take place. Who can guarantee that they will not try to find a solution, or a way out of confusion, frustration and internal strife in Egypt by resuming the fighting? In Egypt, the doctrine of preparation for a military decision still holds sway. The declarations of a willingness to sacrifice a million men still go on.

Hundreds of men are still under arms and tension. In such a situation, for all our readiness for peace, we must be prepared to meet the danger of renewed fighting at any time.

An event has taken place in our region. Egypt is the principal among the Arab states in our region, and the tide of events inside Egypt will not be restricted to that country alone, but will influence the other countries bordering on Israel. Accordingly, although in my address today I have concentrated on Israeli-Egyptian relations, this does not imply any lack of attention to other areas and topics, including weighty domestic issues.

I do not intend to discuss President Sadat's latest speech of July 24 in detail.¹²⁵ I will content myself with a few brief remarks:

Amazingly enough President Sadat reiterates the baseless argument that the United States allegedly gave its approval to our military measures in June 1967, and that "the plan was brought to the attention of President Johnson and he gave his approval to the plan before the aggression..." There can be no greater folly.

I prefer to refrain from referring to the anti-Jewish comments in Sadat's speech. It is a grave fact that in his melancholy speech the President of Egypt brought no message of a turning point nor did he indicate any way out for his people. I read his speech from beginning to end but I did not learn how he intends to terminate the situation of "neither peace nor war." It is a sad thing to see that the Egyptian President did not present his listeners with a brave evaluation of the situation as it really is and did not determine

¹²⁴ See document no. 111 above.

¹²⁵ See document no. 220 below.

conclusions that ought to be drawn from Egypt's position.

Permit me to refrain from entering into polemics with the President of Egypt in the wake of his latest speech. It would seem that this is not a routine time in our area. It would seem that this hour in the history of Egypt can, nay, should be the appropriate hour for change. And if it truly is the hour for change—let it not be missed.

Last month marked the fifth anniversary of the Six Day War. This month is the 20th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. Next month will see the second anniversary of the cease-fire. Since the revolution Egypt has undergone trials and difficulties, and has attained achievements. There was progress and there were regressions, but there is no doubt that the lack of peace between our two countries, and her concentration into aggressive military efforts have diverted precious resources into barren channels and have hamstringing the possible development of Egypt. The hope of subduing Israel has not come true and has no chance of being realized. Israel, though she has overcome her attackers, is not drunk with victory. She is aware of the horror of war and prefers to invest her resources in peaceful and creative goals.

I appeal to the President of Egypt as the leader of a great people, a people with an ancient heritage, whose future is ahead of it, with all the feeling of responsibility which must beat in the heart of a responsible leader. Is it not proper that we decide to halt today and to strike out on a new path, never to return to the course which has led to death, destruction and frustration, without bringing peace?

The people and Government of Israel desire with all their hearts to put an end to the fighting and the conflict and to march together towards peace. Let us meet as equals and make a joint supreme effort to arrive at an agreed solution to all the outstanding problems. When all is said and done, no foreign country or factor can solve for us, or instead of us, the problems which stand between us. The well-being and future of our nations depends upon such a dialogue. Negotiation for the establishment of peace is no badge of surrender or humiliation, as Arab spokesmen are wont to state. Negotiation for peace is a supreme revelation of sovereignty, or national honour and of international responsibility.

In your speech of July 24, you referred to the principle of the revolution which Nasser expressed in his book, and I quote: "The people is the only master, the source of all power and all rule belongs to them. It can create the change and dictate it." Today, perhaps more than ever, it may be possible to direct all of the power, energy and goodwill to bring about the true and longed-for change which could lead us towards peace. Bravery and daring are not only measured on the battle-field, but also in the ability of a people and a leader to blaze a new trail towards new horizons.

Five years have passed since the war. Nevertheless, we have not declared permanent borders, we have not drawn up an ultimative map, we have not demanded prior commitments on matters which must be clarified by means of negotiations. In stating that so long as there is no peace we shall fully maintain the situation determined by the cease-fire agreements, we do not intend to perpetuate the cease-fire lines between us or to freeze the existing situation. Let us sit down together to discuss the peace settlements. Let us search for a way to break the deadlock, to seek a way out of the ossified situation, lest war be renewed between us, and let us advance towards complete peace.

Nor do we close the door on interim moves such as your proposal of February 1971 for a special arrangement for opening the Suez Canal.¹²⁶ Such a settlement could make a real contribution on the road to complete and agreed peace, since we, too, regard such a settlement as a temporary solution—a step towards peace, without fire or fighting. Let us try to reach understanding on reasonable arrangements which would make this initial step possible.

This appeal of ours does not stem from weakness, nor out of any desire to take advantage of an embarrassing situation, but out of a deep awareness of the need for peace, of the advantage of peace and the preferability of negotiation over any other alternative.

It will not run counter to what I have said earlier, if I conclude by stating that two basic qualities are characteristic of and natural to, Israel's policy: constant preparedness to with-

¹²⁶ See document nos. 277 and 279 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

stand aggression, and constant readiness to make peace. These two complement each other.

113

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O.¹²⁷

Moscow, July 27, 1972

A delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) led by Yassir Arafat, chairman of the PLO executive committee, was on a visit to the Soviet Union from July 17 to 27 [1972] at the invitation of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. The delegation included leaders of principal Palestine organisations in the PLO.

The delegation visited Moscow and Leningrad, had talks with representatives of the Soviet public and saw the achievements of Soviet people in accomplishing the plans of building communist society.

The Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries and the PLO delegation held talks to exchange opinions on the present situation in the Middle East and in the Palestine resistance movement as well as on problems of further strengthening cooperation and solidarity in the fight against imperialism and for the liberation of Arab lands seized by Israel.

The PLO delegation briefed the Soviet side about the struggle of the Palestine resistance movement against imperialism and Israeli aggression to restore the legal national rights of the Palestinian Arabs. It expressed gratitude to the Soviet people for their support for the Arab national liberation movement and aid to the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian Arabs' interests. The delegation stressed the great importance of Soviet aid to Arab nations and the Palestinian Arabs for success in the Arabs' struggle against Israeli aggression, for freedom and social progress. The PLO representatives emphasised in this connexion that any attempt on the part of imperialist and reactionary circles to damage friendship between the national liberation forces of the

Arab world and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is alien to the Arab interests.

The PLO delegation noted a surge of activity on the part of imperialist and reactionary forces in the Middle East who are trying to undermine the Arab national liberation movement and liquidate the Palestine resistance movement. The delegation expressed determination to concentrate efforts on strengthening the unity of all the progressive and democratic forces in the Arab world to fight imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Representatives of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries denounced the continued imperialist Zionist aggression against Arab nations and the crimes of the Israeli military on the Arab lands occupied in 1967. They spoke highly of the just fight of the Palestinian Arabs against the invaders and emphasised the anti-imperialist, liberatory character of the Palestine resistance movement enjoying sympathy and support on the part of all anti-imperialist, progressive forces in the world.

The PLO delegation briefed the Soviet side about the recent consolidation, on the progressive foundation of anti-imperialism, of the Palestine resistance movement.

Representatives of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries stressed that the Soviet people would continue to give aid to the Palestine resistance movement in its just struggle against imperialism, reaction and Israeli aggression, for the restoration of the legal rights of the Palestinian Arabs.

114

Resolutions adopted by the third session of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) Central Committee calling for comprehensive political initiatives and demanding that the Bir'im and Ikrit villagers be allowed to return home¹²⁸

July 29, 1972

2. The recent developments render an important political initiative opportune. After all efforts

¹²⁷ *Pravda* (Moscow), July 28, 1972, p. 4; English translation supplied, on request, by Novosti Press Agency, Beirut.

¹²⁸ Excerpted from the English text of the resolutions, *Israel at Peace* (Tel Aviv), no. 7 (August, 1972), pp. 6-7, 10.

have failed to bring Israel down on her knees by military and political means, a new stage has come for political activities that have better chances of leading to practical negotiations. Under these circumstances, the Maki Central Committee holds that the Israel Government should launch three comprehensive political initiatives aimed at extracting the Middle East countries from the present political deadlock and at advancing them toward peace.

a) *Political initiative with regard to Egypt*: The Israel Government must make it clear that, in return for a true peace that puts an end to the conflict between the two parties and abrogates all reciprocal demands in the future, Israel is prepared to withdraw its army from the Sinai Peninsula to borders to be agreed upon at the conference table. The peace settlement must provide for a series of security arrangements that will grant Israel's security without violating Egypt's sovereignty. This means, first of all, the full demilitarization of Sinai under an agreed control system. The solution of various sensitive problems, such as that involved in the guarantee of free passage through the Tiran Straits, can be achieved without violating the sovereignty of Egypt and without a policy of annexation, for instance an Israeli presence at Sharm E-Sheikh—limited in time and agreed in its form. The question of the land communications between Eilat and Sharm E-Sheikh can be settled within the framework of a system of free land passages between Israel and the neighbouring countries: from Jordan (and/or Palestine) to the Gaza Strip; from Egypt to the Lebanon and Syria; from Egypt to Jordan; from Eilat to Sharm E-Sheikh. These passages will be allowed on the basis of the territorial integrity of all countries concerned.

A partial Israel-Egyptian settlement, such as that involved in the re-opening of the Suez Canal for the navigation of all states, is apt to promote the full peace agreement, if it is based on an ad hoc approach, and if no change in the strategical balance of military forces is involved.

Israel must make her utmost political and diplomatic efforts to persuade Egypt that the safest and quickest way to open the Canal and to get back Sinai is the way of an accord with Israel and the establishment of peaceful relations and cooperation with her. Such an accord will pave the way to create a new relationship between

Egypt and Israel; to the solution of the questions in dispute between them; to the establishment of diplomatic relations, trade connections and joint economic enterprises; to the freedom of movement between the countries and the development of cultural relations between them, in short—to a normalization of the relations between the two peoples.

b) *Political initiative with regard to the Palestinians*: This initiative is now a vital necessity for Israel, still more so because the chances of breaking the political deadlock of the conflict are improving. We have to keep in mind that our relations with the Palestinians are the focus of the whole Israel-Arab conflict, and the settling of these relations must be the first component of every peace plan in our region. We should welcome the recent awakening of a realistic political trend among the Palestinian population in the Israel-held areas. This trend declares its desire for peace with Israel and for the liquidation of the conflict between the two peoples. It would be a grave mistake to ignore this factor that has arrived at the conclusion that a complete reconciliation with Israel is necessary. Organized political activities must, therefore, be allowed in the Israel-held areas on the basis of peaceful coexistence, with the aim of creating conditions for the establishment of a democratic, peace-loving Palestinian representative body with whom the Government will discuss the future relations between the two peoples on the basis of mutual recognition of the principle of the right to self-determination. The government must make it clear that it will be pleased if such a representative body takes part in the future negotiations that will put an end to the conflict between us and our neighbours. Israel on her part will not interfere in the relations between the Palestinian and the Jordanian people—whether they want to live in one state or in separate states. It is advisable that Israel announces her readiness to discuss the establishment of federative relations between the sovereign states on both sides of the Jordan.

The Government has also to clarify its intentions regarding the future of the Arab refugees who continue to live in refugee camps in intolerable conditions.

For the sake of a just solution of the Palestinian refugees problem, it is necessary to determine by mutual agreement the areas for their resettlement

and the number of refugees to be absorbed in each area. A regional development programme must be worked out, and regional, as well as international resources must be allocated for development and reconstruction. The State of Israel must contribute its share to an agreed constructive solution of the refugees problem.

In view of the existing reciprocal link between a humanitarian solution of the Palestinian refugees problem and a political solution of the national problem of the Palestinian people, on the basis of self-determination and peaceful coexistence, it is necessary that the settlement and reconstruction of the Palestinian refugees will take place mainly within the national-territorial framework of the Palestinian Arab people.

c) *Political initiative with regard to the Israel-Soviet relations*: In the past, we have rightly rejected every attempt to force upon the region an American-Soviet agreement, as a substitute for an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, and we said that it would be possible to view favourably an agreement between the powers on the Middle East issues only if its aim is to strengthen what is reached in free talks between the two opponents themselves. Starting from this assumption, we believe that an Israel-Soviet dialogue may contribute to advancing the region towards a stable peace. The renewal of the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union cannot come but in the wake of a Soviet initiative in this respect, because the Soviet Union is responsible for the severance of relations. However, Israel's preparedness to renew the ties must find a constant and strong expression in Israeli political activities. At present, the Government is called to make its contribution to creating conditions that will make it possible to improve the relations with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe.

Maki will fight for these three political initiatives and will mobilize broad political forces in our countries. These initiatives that guarantee the vital interests of Israel, are apt to assist the creation of positive conditions in the region toward a break through the straits of hatred and bloodshed into the open spaces of peace and good neighbourhood.

3. Today, more than ever in the past, it is clear that Israel will benefit from the exclusion of the Middle East from the competition between

the power-blocks and from its advance toward a neutral position. The pullout of the Soviet advisors from Egypt has occurred also against the background of a mood of criticism and bitterness among the Egyptian people because its country becomes gradually dependent on a foreign power. Only a short-sighted policy can build our status in the region on the desire that the Soviet presence in Egypt be substituted by an American presence, or by the presence of another power. Israel's basic and long-range interest is that the whole region ceases to be a sphere of big power manoeuvres and rivalry at the expense of the peoples of the region. In spite of the Israeli relations with the United States, we have to tell them and the Soviet Union alike: Don't interfere in the affairs of our region! Let the peoples of the Middle East settle their affairs by themselves! Such an approach, that conforms Israel's basic interests, may forestall in due time a situation when the U.S.A. might demand that Israel pay the price of an American foothold in Egypt.

Various important forces, mainly in some Mediterranean countries, have launched a comprehensive action for the neutralization of the Mediterranean zone, for the evacuation of the foreign naval forces from it and for its demilitarization. This campaign conforms also the interests of our country. Maki will act to gain support for this political challenge among the Israeli public and will start contacts on this subject with various Mediterranean factors.

4. The Israel Government's refusal to respond to the just demand of *the inhabitants of Bir'im and Ikrit to return to their villages*, is very bad for the relations between the peoples of our country. It shows a lack of political understanding, of moral sensitivity and a disregard for Israeli public opinion.

For the sake of justice, of improving the relations between the Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants of the State of Israel, for the sake of Israel's status in the world, it is necessary to revoke the Government's decision and to adopt a new decision enabling the residents of Bir'im and Ikrit, who have proved that they are loyal Israeli citizens, to go back to their villages.

This decision will amend an injustice committed years ago, without harming the Jewish settlers in that area.

Maki calls the enlightened public in Israel to carry on this just struggle.

115

Radio interview statements by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili asserting the continuation of Israeli settlement in the Golan Heights¹²⁹

August 1, 1972

Q. Will the settlement of the Golan Heights continue?

A. Yes, settlement of the Golan Heights will continue. I am convinced that the growth of the Golan Heights population must not be limited to the agricultural resources of the area. In fact, the present settlement trend is to step up the population rate, not only through agricultural activities, but also through industrial activities by setting up industrial projects, as has already been started.

Q. Minister, do you not think the settlement of the Golan Heights will close one of the options for peace with Syria?

A. Up till now, the main impediment to peace with Syria—impediment in quotation marks—has been the fact of Israel's existence. The Syrians were not prepared to negotiate a peace with us before the six-day war, and they are the most extreme of all the Arabs in their refusal to recognize the State of Israel, even to accept UN resolutions recognizing the existence of Israel. Syria is the most extreme of all the Arab states. I believe that our settlements in the country are one of the pillars of our existence and of our security, and anyone who wishes to recognize the fact of Israel's existence must also recognize the fact of the settlements which Israel has established. I am convinced that, in the final analysis, this will hasten and advance peace, and not retard it.

¹²⁹ Interview conducted by Yoel Dar, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4057/A/5; reprinted by permission.

116

Article by Deputy Prime Minister Allon of Israel outlining the strength of Israel's current position (excerpts)¹³⁰

Early August, 1972

I ... do regard it as a real achievement that the ceasefire agreement which was to have run for three months has so far lasted for two years without an agreement, and we hope that it will continue to do so in the future. It is clear that there is truth in the theory that, just as war has its own dynamic, the ceasefire has a similar dynamic, in spite of the fact that it was not for an unlimited period.

The other important achievement is that we are still on the lines that we occupied two years ago, and we are stronger and better prepared to confront every possible development. From the purely military point of view, we certainly could have supported the war of attrition for an indefinite period, but I do not think that I am disclosing a secret if I say that because of the ceasefire it has been possible to strengthen and fortify our defence systems in depth and height, in every sense of these words; there is no comparison between our present strength and our strength at that time.

What I regard to be another important achievement lies in the effect the ceasefire has had on everything that has happened on our eastern front. Terrorism has been eliminated all along the frontiers, stability has increased and the enthusiasts have been dislodged from it, and as a result of this, the eastern front, which was planned to be an important element in the Arab war against Israel, has collapsed. It is difficult to imagine that Amman would have dared, or even been able, to do this in a state of actual fighting, and if the guns were still rumbling on the Suez Canal front. As a result of the quiet that has prevailed along the Canal the two parties have enjoyed quiet on the River Jordan, which has been greatly in the interests of the settlements and their inhabitants on both sides. Because of

¹³⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), August 4, 1972.

the ceasefire it has been possible for us to continue to establish economic and other relations with the Arabs of the area who, from many points of view, were the most extreme in their hatred of us but who with the passage of time have become more moderate and sensible. I am not claiming that they have undergone an emotional revolution, but the quiet that has prevailed has helped them to adopt a more realistic attitude to their own situation and to our presence, a situation which, in practice, enjoins coexistence between the two peoples.

But the great achievement in these two years is to be seen in the fact that the Russians have left Egypt, which would never have happened in the form and to the extent that it has happened but for the ceasefire, which created a lasting and insupportable situation for the Egyptians—a state of no peace and no war.

The Soviets are well known for their obstinacy from the political point of view, but they are very cautious in their military moves, and it is now clear to all that they did not want an all-out war between Israel and the Arab countries, because they were well aware of what its consequences would be. It was clear to the U.S.S.R. that in the event of an all-out war it would be confronted with a difficult and embarrassing choice whether to intervene or not to intervene. If it did not intervene the Egyptians would accuse it of abandoning its allies, while if it intervened with limited forces Israel would defeat them, which is something a great power like the U.S.S.R. cannot allow to happen to itself. And if it intervened with massive forces it would be incurring the risk of a real worldwide clash. And this too is something it does not want.

In the new situation that has emerged we must remember that the ceasefire is not a peace, and that in the event of there being no solution it is not inconceivable that the Egyptians might again be drawn into another war.... The possibility of war still exists, as long as Egypt maintains an army of hundreds of thousands, and it is too early to forecast which way the unequally balanced scales of the Egyptian leadership will incline.

117

Radio interview statements by Israel's Ambassador to France Ben Natan on France's arms embargo in view of the proposed merger between Egypt and Libya¹³¹

Lod airport, August 10, 1972

Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you share the view that failure to impose an embargo on Libya after the unity with Egypt constitutes a further hardening in French policy to Israel?

A. So far as France is concerned, the unity has not yet been established. The interesting thing is that in France when they want to prove that there is no unity yet between Egypt and Libya and that not much importance should be attached to this, they quote the Israeli press. They claim that on their part nothing has changed yet since the unity has not been established and it is still not certain whether it will be established. For example, they have completely disregarded the fact that the unity announcement mentions the establishment of a committee for co-ordination of security policy. They ignore what it suits them to ignore.

Q. Do you, therefore, believe that this constitutes a further hardening in the French attitude?

A. Yes. We have often said, even before the unity announcement, that we view the supply of aircraft to Libya—and the knowledge that the pilots receiving training on the aircraft are Egyptian—a violation of the embargo. It will be difficult for the French to explain this when the unity is established or when further stages on the path to unity are taken. Then they will certainly find new pretexts, even though, if the unity is really established and there is a united military command, their position will not be comfortable.

Q. Yesterday you met with the director of foreign relations in the Quai d'Orsay. What did you discuss?

A. I met the political director of the Foreign Ministry before my departure for home and

¹³¹ Interview broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4065/A/3-4; reprinted by permission. The proposed merger was announced on August 2 after talks in Benghazi between Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi; for an English translation of the announcement see *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4058/A/1-3.

reviewed the situation in the Middle East and the attitudes of Israel and France.

Q. Can you give details?

A. I cannot give details about such talks. Comparing our impressions of what has taken place in the region after Sadat's statement on 18th July and after the announcement on unity between Libya and Egypt, I would say that the assessments are not so far apart, but the conclusions are different.

118

Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries (excerpts)¹³²

Georgetown, August 11, 1972

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and in accordance with the decision made by the Ministerial Consultative Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries in New York on 1 October, 1971, a Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 11 August, 1972.

5. The Foreign Ministers recalled that in September 1970 the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries had agreed at Lusaka on concerted action required to implement the principles of non-alignment. The Ministers examined the developments which had since taken place in international relations and observed that the Lusaka Declaration had not only maintained its validity but had substantially contributed to the more favourable of these developments and continued to reflect the aspirations and programmes of the non-aligned movement.

6. Examining the changing international situation, the Foreign Ministers found that the bipolar power structure was continuing to give way to

an expanding multipolar system. While the super-powers continued to have strategic preponderance of power, other centres of power were emerging. This development was producing increased interdependence in international relations. At the same time, the aspirations of many countries for independence and the strengthening of their sovereignty over their natural resources were becoming stronger and more articulate. The Ministers considered that these trends offered significant opportunities for further advancement of the objectives of non-alignment. But as against this there were new hazards and challenges which required the full solidarity and energy of the movement if they were to be overcome. The non-aligned countries should be vigilant and wakeful about the new centres of power and encourage settlement of bilateral problems which might arise in the future bilaterally and peacefully without outside intervention and in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

7. The Conference noted the progress made by the national liberation movements which are struggling against imperialism and neo-colonialism, and their resistance to aggression. It noted the growing solidarity, cooperation and collaboration linking these movements to the non-aligned, peace-loving nations which, taken as a whole, represent a powerful combination of forces struggling to liberate subjugated peoples and to consolidate national independence, safeguard world peace and security and promote social progress. The Non-Aligned Countries expressed their intention to continue to work with a view to strengthening and broadening the existing solidarity and cooperation among all anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces.

8. The Ministers welcomed the emergent improvement in the relations among the big powers and noted with satisfaction the new orientation towards negotiations and bilateral agreements. But while these changing conditions diminished the threat of nuclear conflict, their effects were geographically limited. For, in spite of the fact that a relaxation of tension in the relations among the great powers and an improvement of the situation in Europe were taking place, there was increased competition among them in some other regions and especially in the seas and oceans. There was need for continued efforts to bring about the dissolution of military alliances con-

¹³² Excerpted from the English text of the declaration adopted by the political committee of the conference as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), no. 538 (September 5, 1972), pp. 17-18, 20.

ceived in the context of great power conflicts. Détente in its present manifestation did not ensure that while peace was being promoted in certain areas, interventions, subversion and great power rivalries were not being pursued elsewhere.

9. The Foreign Ministers drew attention to the continuation of aggression in various parts of the world, particularly in Indo-China, in the Middle East and in Africa. The forces of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism continued to hold in subjection peoples struggling for freedom and independence. The lesson had not been learnt that military superiority was ineffectual to impose unilateral solutions of any kind on peoples who were prepared to sacrifice all for the right of self-determination. Nor were those challenging the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force or those bent on maintaining unequal relations by brute force abashed by the circumstance that they were also fostering conditions of crisis which were constantly threatening the security of other countries and peace as a whole.

27. The Conference has given special attention to the examination of the dangerous situation in the Middle East. It condemns the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel and affirms its unswerving support of the just cause of the Arab countries and the rightful struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the recovery of their national rights.

119

Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries¹³³

Georgetown, August 11, 1972

The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 11 August 1972.

Recalling all previous Non-Aligned Countries resolutions drawing attention to the dangerous situation in the Middle East;

¹³³ English text as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), no. 539 (September 20, 1972), pp. 18–19.

Reiterating its view that the persisting Israeli military occupation of the territories of three non-aligned countries constitutes a violation of United Nations principles, a challenge to the aims of non-alignment and a grave threat to peace;

Reiterating further that the full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine is a pre-requisite to peace in the Middle East;

Having clearly followed all efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful and acceptable settlement,

Deploing Israel's negative and obstructive attitude which has prevented to bring about peace based on justice;

1. *Acknowledges unequivocally* that the acquisition of territory through force is wholly impermissible;

2. *Declares* that it is inadmissible for Israel to keep the territories of three sovereign and non-aligned countries under occupation and to use such occupation as a means of pressure for imposing unequitable solutions that cannot serve peace and security in the region;

3. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories to pre-June 5, 1967 lines;

4. *Further calls for* the full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in their usurped homeland and reaffirms its support of their struggle for national liberation and against colonialism and racism;

5. *Affirms* on behalf of non-aligned solidarity its full and effective support to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in their legitimate struggle to recover entirely and by every means their territorial integrity;

6. *Declares* that it will intensify its assistance in all international forums, and in particular the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, to take all necessary initiatives for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories including a recommendation to the United Nations to take adequate measures against Israel should it persist in disregarding United Nations efforts;

7. *Urges* all members States of the United Nations Organisation to refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons, military equipment or other material or moral support likely to enable it to strengthen its military potential and perpetuate its occupation of Arab territories;

8. *Declares* that pending the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the occupied Arab

territories, all measures taken by the Israeli occupying authorities with a view to changing the demographic, ethnic or political structure of the occupied areas are to be considered invalid;

9. *Decides* to follow closely the evolution of the situation in the Middle East.

120

Resolution on the kidnapping by Israel of Syrian and Lebanese military personnel adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries¹³⁴

Georgetown, August 11, 1972

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 11 August, 1972;

Expressing deep concern over the kidnapping of a number of Syrian and Lebanese military personnel on 21 June, 1972, by the Israeli authorities, and

Pointing out that such acts could lead to the most serious consequences;

1. *Strongly condemns* the repeated acts of aggression against Southern Lebanon, destruction of houses, expelling of the population and the kidnapping of Syrian and Lebanese military personnel by the Israeli authorities—all of which constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of International Law and of international agreements and practice—as well as Israel's failure to implement Security Council resolutions on this matter and its total disregard of these resolutions;

2. *Expresses* its full solidarity with Syria and Lebanon in their request for release of the military personnel kidnapped;

3. *Demands* immediate and unconditional release of kidnapped personnel and the implementation of Security Council resolution 316 of 26 June, 1972 and resolution 317 of 21 July, 1972 on that matter;¹³⁵

4. *Requests* the Security Council to take effective and practical measures to ensure implementation of its above-mentioned resolutions.

¹³⁴ English text as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), no. 539 (September 20, 1972), p. 19.

¹³⁵ The texts of the two resolutions are printed as document nos. 16 and 17 above.

121

Press conference statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers commenting on the Middle East situation after the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt¹³⁶

Washington, August 11, 1972

Q. Mr. Secretary, we haven't had an opportunity to talk to you since the Russian forces were moved out of Egypt. And I would like to know what you think about this. Were you gratified by Sadat's action in forcing them out? What do you think of the situation as it exists now? And what is the United States diplomatic stance with regard to the Middle East at this time in the light of the recent developments?

A. Well, the decision, of course, to reduce the Soviet presence in Egypt was an internal matter, a decision made by the Government of Egypt, and I would not want to comment on it.

I said after the decision was announced by President Sadat that we would have no comment on it because it is a matter for the Government of Egypt to determine.

At the moment it is too soon, I think, to make any analysis or assessment of the situation as it presently exists, and I think it would be a bad time to do it.

We continue to hope that the Security Council Resolution 242 can be implemented. It provides the foundation, I think the only foundation, for the possibility of a peaceful solution in the area.

We also continue to favor, and particularly continue to favor at this time, active negotiations between Egypt and Israel, because unless there are active negotiations undertaken, the prospects for settlement are very dim.

Now, as I said on my trip, and some of you heard this, I said that it is the only area in the world where there have been longstanding hostilities, where wars have occurred, and where there is a continuing state of hostility, where discussions are not undertaken by the parties. As you know, discussions are being undertaken in Korea, between the two Germanys, in Cyprus, India-Pakistan, in Viet-Nam—so that the only area of the world is the Middle East.

¹³⁶ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVII, 1731 (August 28, 1972), pp. 221-222.

Now, I am not necessarily at this stage talking about direct face-to-face negotiations, but negotiations, active negotiations. If progress is made in those negotiations, then the parties would have to negotiate eventually directly, because it makes sense if they are going to get along together to negotiate directly. But in any event, we think it is vitally important now that active negotiations be undertaken.

I want to close this answer by saying that we are particularly gratified, pleased, that the cease-fire which was initiated by the United States is now entering its third year. And it is certainly to everyone's interest that that cease-fire continue. And we are going to do what we can diplomatically to be sure that the cease-fire does continue. If we can play a useful role in negotiations, we are prepared to play it.

On the whole, we think that the situation is relatively stable, and we hope the cease-fire continues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nixon and President Sadat have recently exchanged messages in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. President Sadat's message seemed to be a rather warm one. And I wonder if the administration attaches any significance to it, whether it considers it a signal from President Sadat for any sort of action from the United States with regard to the Middle East.

A. Well, we were pleased at the tone of President Sadat's letter, and of course President Nixon's letter was a very friendly letter. We think it is essential in the implementation of the policies that we have been following in this administration to seek to have good relations with all countries. I would not want to give any interpretation to the meaning of the letter beyond its words.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you, in talking about negotiations in the Middle East, said nothing about an interim settlement. Can you say whether you think prospects now for an interim settlement are any brighter with the move that President Sadat has taken, and do you think Israel can afford to make greater concessions in a territorial pullback with the absence of the Russians?

A. Well, on the latter part of your question, I wouldn't want to make comments. That is a matter for the Government of Israel to decide.

On the first part of your question, addressing my comments to the first part of your question, we continue to believe that the so-called proximity

talks hold out a prospect for a successful beginning to a complete solution in the Middle East. And we would hope that somewhere along the line the parties will agree to proximity talks.

As you know, Israel has indicated a willingness to undertake such talks, to take part in such talks. And we would hope that for the reasons that I mentioned earlier, that such talks will begin.

We do think that that provides maybe the most bright prospect for progress in the area.

We have some reservation about whether a complete solution can be achieved in early negotiations. But we think a step should be taken, an interim step should be taken, and this is one that the parties have both indicated that they would be prepared to consider. Therefore we do hope that they will begin at some point.

122

Statement by Israel Minister of Defence Dayan, emphasizing Israel's demands for "secure borders," made during an address at a Command and Staff School graduation ceremony¹³⁷

Tel Aviv, August 17, 1972

Whatever may be the diplomatic moves, the negotiations, the (partial or over-all) agreements—the ABC of our life during this period is a strong Israel Defence Force (I.D.F.).

Both the repulsing of attacks upon us and the prevention thereof are to be achieved by virtue of our military power. We must safeguard this power carefully and ensure its superiority under changing circumstances. We must cultivate its quantity, its quality and its development. The primary condition for 'peace and quiet' in our reality is a strong I.D.F. During the five years that have elapsed since the Six Day War, we have reinforced, innovated and developed our force.

The key to security is a desert, the Sinai desert. The attempt to base Israel's security on 'guarantees'—undertakings given by the powers, the

¹³⁷ Excerpted from the partial English text, *Israel Digest* (Jerusalem), XV, 18 (September 1, 1972), p. 3.

Security Council, etc., is unrealistic. The U.S. does not want to accept military responsibility for frontiers and agreements among other nations, and Israel does not want to rely on Soviet Russia. Even Egypt has now practically foregone Soviet guarantees of her skies, and preferred to take the risks involved, rather than entrust its security to Soviet pilots. In the Sinai desert it is possible, by agreement between Egypt and Israel, to draw a dividing line, temporary or permanent, which would give the populated areas, both of Israel and of Egypt, a range of security.

The stand of the State of Israel has been, for a long time, that we would only exchange the cease-fire lines for 'secure, recognized and agreed borders, determined under a peace treaty.' The U.S., too, has supported this stand and the government of Israel has received backing for its stand that not a single Israeli soldier will retreat from the cease-fire lines till a contractual and binding peace agreement.

123

Address by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco: The Step-by-Step Approach to Peace in the Middle East¹³⁸

Houston, August 19, 1972

Mr. Plofsky [Ralph Plofsky, a past national commander, Jewish War Veterans], distinguished guests, and friends: First let me say thank you for your very generous introduction. I cannot help but recall the story of the man who fell off the 20th story of a building. After he passed the 10th floor, a friend stuck his head out of the window and shouted, "Joe, so far you are all right." There are times that in this job, which has been very challenging, I have felt a little bit like the fellow who fell off the 20th floor. But nevertheless it has been a labor of love, a labor of deep commitment to a political settlement which would result in a durable peace in the area.

There are three aspects of the Middle Eastern

problem that help explain the continuing danger in the area.

There is the Arab-Israeli dispute, where the fundamental chasm is still deep, where mistrust between the parties remains.

There are the differences within the Arab world itself, the intra-Arab disputes that, in addition to the difference over the Arab-Israeli dispute, contribute to the present instability in the area. The objective of Arab unity still remains elusive.

And as if this were not enough, the fact that the Middle East is an area of potential conflict between the major powers helps to explain why it is high on the agenda of world trouble spots.

In my judgment, there is no satisfactory answer to the situation other than a stable and durable peace between the two sides—a peace agreement that will replace the 20 years of de facto cease-fire, a peace agreement in which each side undertakes obligations to the other, not a scotch-tape armistice arrangement, not undefined lines, but a peace agreement based on the fundamental philosophy of live-and-let-live.

As we look at the situation today, there are several positive elements.

The first is the cease-fire that has existed in the area well over two years. There are many things that can be said about the cease-fire, but I would single out one in particular: The people on both sides have experienced a period of over two years of reduced violence. This period, I hope, in time will help create a new atmosphere in the Middle East, a new atmosphere which has begun to emerge—not only an atmosphere of live-and-let-live but an atmosphere where there can be deep and meaningful coexistence; where people can move freely; and where each side can have confidence that agreements entered into will be kept because they will be agreements serving the interests of both.

The second positive element is that the balance in the area has been and will be maintained. I am convinced that for American diplomacy in the area to be effective it has to be based on the maintenance of the balance within the region, as it has been these past years, and the maintenance of the global balance. It must also continue to be bulwarked by a strong American presence in the Mediterranean. Diplomacy must have teeth to be credible in the area.

A third element in the present situation has been

¹³⁸ Text of address made before the national convention of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVII, 1735 (September 25, 1972), pp. 350–353.

the development of greater realism in the Arab world. I say this with some caution. Certainly the elements of violence in the Middle East are there. Certainly the people and the forces who see the military option as the answer still remain. But the forces of moderation are slowly getting the upper hand. The people in the area have an opportunity over the next three or four or five years to strengthen those voices of moderation; to move toward a peace shaped principally by the people and the countries of the area.

I am mindful of the fact that my words here tonight will be heard and scrutinized both in Cairo and in Tel Aviv. I hope you will bear this in mind. I have probably spoken to President Sadat for a longer period of time than any other official American since he has assumed the Presidency of his country. I want to say to this Jewish audience: I believe he wants a peaceful solution. I believe he has unleashed certain expectations in his country which the people of his country want satisfied. I believe he wants to satisfy those expectations, both in terms of peace and the welfare of his people. I believe that a part of the greater realism in the Arab world, regardless of the strident rhetoric we hear daily, is the appreciation that going to war would not solve anything. It would not solve anything for the people or the countries in the area, nor would it get at the key issues of a binding contractual peace agreement or resolving the territorial issues that divide the two sides.

What's our objective? It is a stable peace in the area. We have in the Security Council resolution of November 1967 the framework of a binding peace agreement. But this Security Council resolution, important as it is, is no more than a bareboned framework. A basic assumption of that resolution was that there would be negotiations between the two sides in order to arrive at an agreement. Such negotiations would seek to resolve the key questions of withdrawal, of territory, of borders, of the opening of the Suez Canal, the question of the right of each state in the area to exist, and the problem of refugees. It is, as I say, a bareboned outline. It can have no lasting meaning in terms of implementation unless the details are filled out and agreed to by both sides and unless the resolution, in fact, in detail, and in reality, leads to a binding peace agreement arrived at by the two sides, not imposed from the outside. We have

influence that we can bring to bear on the situation, but no major power has the capacity to impose a solution.

Where do matters stand? At the May summit in Moscow, the Middle East was not a primary item, though it was discussed thoroughly and in detail. The communiqué endorsed a political solution based on the November 1967 resolution. We all know the 1967 resolution is interpreted differently in Israel and in the Arab world. The Egyptians have always insisted the resolution means total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before the June war of 1967. Israel has never agreed with this interpretation. The resolution does call for withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the June war. But it also calls for secure and recognized boundaries. The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes the 1967 lines as the final lines. The assumption was that the final lines would have to be agreed between the two sides. I helped negotiate that resolution; and I am therefore fully familiar with its legislative history. The phrase "secure and recognized boundaries" is in the resolution, and it was adopted by a unanimous vote of the U.N. Security Council with each side applying its own interpretation in the explanations of vote. The Security Council did not endorse any specific lines as the final lines. This was and is a matter for the parties themselves to decide in the context of real negotiations, whether under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring or under other auspices.

In addition to the endorsement of a political solution in the summit communiqué, an important set of principles was adopted: that each side should avoid confrontations over various trouble spots, that each ought to resort to peaceful means, that each should try to resist the temptation to derive unilateral benefit from one given trouble spot or another. There were no new departures. The communiqué tells the story: Neither major power wanted or wants to see the present situation break out again into hostilities between the two sides. Both sides remain committed to a political settlement based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

Since then there have been significant developments in Egypt. I am not in a position to say much about these developments. The events speak for themselves. This is an internal matter

for the Egyptian people to decide. Moreover, not all of the facts are in; and before any firm judgments and conclusions can be drawn, we will want to be clear on what the situation is. That there has been a substantial reduction of the Soviet presence in Egypt has been confirmed. What it will mean in the future, what it will mean in terms of the "no war, no peace" situation in the area, what it will mean in terms of the possibilities of future negotiations, is difficult to predict at this point. At present the position on the substance of a settlement between the two sides remains unchanged.

There are diplomatic opportunities available. Ambassador Jarring has just concluded two weeks in New York. The United States has supported both the November 1967 resolution and Ambassador Jarring's mission. If Ambassador Jarring can break the impasse, it would be fine with us. But we have doubts on this score for one simple reason: Egypt says there must be total Israeli withdrawal to the lines which existed before the June war; Israel is equally insistent that there must be substantial change in the lines. Because this difference is fundamental at this stage and not bridgeable in the near future, we continue to feel the more practical approach is the step-by-step approach.

You will recall that a year ago both President Sadat and Prime Minister Meir indicated a willingness to explore the possibilities of a so-called interim Suez Canal agreement. We, the United States, over the past year have tried to get these talks started, and we have not been successful. In October 1971 Egypt was favorable, Israel was not. Last February Israel took an affirmative decision to enter into so-called proximity talks under the aegis of the United States. The present Israeli position, in simple terms, is that it is willing to enter into these talks without conditions. The present Egyptian position is that before Egypt is willing to enter into such proximity talks it wants a prior commitment on the part of Israel to the memorandum submitted by Ambassador Jarring in February of 1971, which would amount to a prior commitment to withdraw to the line with Egypt that existed before the June war of 1967.

In the last few weeks the Prime Minister of Israel has stressed once again and reaffirmed the desire of Israel to enter into these talks. We noted

in particular that in her most recent speech she placed a certain amount of stress on the fact that Israel conceives of any interim Suez Canal agreement as temporary. A few days later Defense Minister Dayan placed similar emphasis on the desirability of such an interim agreement, indicating also some willingness to consider, in his words, "a line in the Sinai, temporary or permanent."¹³⁹ The Israeli emphasis on the temporary nature of any interim Suez Canal agreement seems, in my judgment, to reflect a recognition on the part of Israel that one of the difficulties which Egypt has with the notion of an interim agreement is that it not become a new indefinite *de facto* status quo. Egypt is understandably concerned that any interim agreement not become a final agreement with Israel remaining in occupation of territory.

I can recall, since this has already been in the public domain, having visited Israel a year ago in May and having had long discussions with the Prime Minister. We discussed this particular point of Arab concern—that an interim agreement not be the final agreement. I was authorized at that time by the Government of Israel to communicate the following to President Sadat: First, that Israel would be willing to withdraw in the context of any interim agreement to whatever line is agreed to and that that line would not be the final line. And secondly, I was also authorized to communicate to President Sadat that Israel would be willing to withdraw in the context of an overall peace agreement to such other line that might be agreed to in the context of those negotiations. This is not news, because the Foreign Minister of Israel indicated what I just said in these terms in his speech before the General Assembly a year ago. But these two points, in addition to the emphasis on the temporary nature of any interim Suez Canal agreement, are intended, I believe, to try to reassure Egypt that an interim agreement, in fact, would be considered by Israel as a partial step—a partial step which would open the resources of the Suez Canal to Egypt, since Israel has never questioned the sovereignty of Egypt over the Suez Canal; a step that would mean an extended cease-fire, would mean that the combatants in the area would be separated, would offer new opportunities for further efforts

¹³⁹ See document no. 122 above.

to achieve overall settlement. In short, it would be an agreement in the mutual interest of both sides because it would be a practical and realistic test of peace on the ground. It would give a practical meaning to signed pieces of paper.

Let me leave you with one concluding thought. The "no war, no peace" situation in the area gives continuing opportunity to our adversary for penetration in the area, regardless of the recent developments that have occurred in Egypt. There is no satisfactory alternative to the unstable "no war, no peace" situation other than a stable peace agreement. The key is negotiations. Unfortunately, the concept of negotiations does not have the same meaning in the Arab world as it does in the Western world. Negotiations are the key because the day is long gone when the Middle East can claim to be unique in this regard. There have been three wars in the last two decades in the Middle East. If North Korea can talk to South Korea and the East Germans can talk to the West Germans, if the Indians can talk to the Pakistanis in the aftermath of a war, just a few months after a war, if we can talk to Peking when there has been no dialogue for 20 years, if we can talk to the Viet Cong every day in Paris—then the force of the argument that the Middle East must remain a unique exception in this regard is weak and unrealistic. I do not mean that such negotiations need start face-to-face at the outset. But there is need for a negotiating process to begin; proximity talks on an interim Suez Canal agreement are still the most feasible approach. So I hope as we look ahead that opportunities in time will develop. I believe the minimal conditions exist in the area for such opportunities to evolve in time. We remain available to play a role in promoting an interim Suez Canal agreement. I hope I can get together again with this audience, a year, two, three years from now, and find in existence not only a cease-fire but a peace meeting the legitimate concerns of both sides. I am convinced this is a do-able proposition.

124

Statement of support for Israel contained in the policy platform of the U.S. Republican Party as adopted at its Thirtieth National Convention¹⁴⁰

Miami Beach, August 22, 1972

We support the right of Israel and its courageous people to survive and prosper in peace. We have sought a stable peace for the Middle East and helped to obtain a cease-fire which contained the tragic conflict. We will help in any way possible to bring Israel and the Arab states to the conference table, where they may negotiate a lasting peace. We will continue to act to prevent the development of a military imbalance which would imperil peace in the region and elsewhere by providing Israel with support essential for her security, including aircraft, training and modern and sophisticated military equipment, and also by helping friendly Arab governments and peoples, including support for their efforts to diminish their dependence on outside powers. We support programs of economic assistance to Israel pursued by President Nixon that have helped her achieve a nine-percent annual economic growth rate. This and the special refugee assistance ordered by the President have also helped to provide resettlement for the thousands of immigrants seeking refuge in Israel.

We will maintain our tactical forces in Europe and the Mediterranean area at adequate strength and high levels of efficiency. The irresponsible proposals of our political opposition to slash the defense forces of the United States—specifically, by cutting the strength of our fleet, by reducing our aircraft carriers from 16 to six and by unilateral withdrawals from Europe—would increase the threat of war in the Middle East and gravely menace Israel. We flatly reject these dangerous proposals.

With a settlement fair to all nations of the Middle East, there would be an opportunity for their peoples to look ahead to shared opportunities rather than backward to rancorous animosities. In a new environment of co-operation, Israel

¹⁴⁰ Middle East section excerpted from the text of the Republican platform, "A Better Future for All," inserted by Senator Dole (Rep.) into the *Congressional Record*, September 11, 1972, p. 30032.

will be able to contribute much to economic renaissance in the Mid-East crossroads of the world.

125

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to India of Foreign Minister Abd al-Baqi of Iraq (excerpts)¹⁴¹

New Delhi, August 26, 1972

With a view to strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the Republic of Iraq and India and in response to a cordial invitation of Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of External Affairs of India, H.E. Mr. Murtadha Saeed Abdul Baqi, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq, paid an official visit to India from August 20 to 26, 1972.

.

The two Foreign Ministers reviewed the tense situation in West Asia. They condemned Israeli aggression against Arab countries.

The two Foreign Ministers reiterated full support of their Governments to the legitimate rights and struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their homeland.

The two Foreign Ministers expressed their deep concern at the continuation of this dangerous situation. They reiterated their belief that a just and durable peace in this area could only be established by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories and restoration of legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

.

126

Communiqué issued after the meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers (excerpt)¹⁴²

Helsinki, September 2, 1972

.

The Ministers emphasised the importance of speedy progress towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967. In regard to this matter the Ministers again emphasised that they gave their full support to Mr. Jarring in his mission.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is still in financial difficulties. In the Ministers' view it was vital that all countries should respond to the UN Secretary-General's appeal for the largest possible contributions to the UNRWA so that it can continue its humanitarian work for the refugees in the Middle East.

.

127

Statement by the Israel Cabinet issued in reaction to the Munich incident¹⁴³

Jerusalem, September 6, 1972

At a special meeting of the Cabinet, a report was submitted on the murderous incident in Munich. With anger and abhorrence the Government of Israel condemns the murder perpetrated by Arab terrorists against 11 people from Israel—members of the Israeli team to the Olympic Games. This bloody attack, which proves the criminal character of the Arab terrorist organizations, constitutes a danger not only to Israel and its citizens but to all nations.

The people of Israel and their government share the heavy sorrow of the families whose

¹⁴² Middle East section excerpted from the English text, *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1972* (Stockholm: Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1973), p. 99; a similar passage appeared in the communiqué issued after the meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik, April 25, 1972 (*ibid.* p. 96).

¹⁴³ Statement broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4087/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

¹⁴¹ Excerpted from the English text, *India News* (Beirut), no. 31/72 (August 28, 1972), pp. 1, 3.

dear ones fell victims to the murderers. The government will hold a funeral for the victims of the attack. A special announcement will be made later about the time and the arrangements for the funeral.

The state of Israel will continue its activities, its self-defence and its persistent efforts to strive for peace, and will not be deterred by terrorism and blackmail. Israel will persist in its fight against the terrorist organizations and will continue to hold those who assist them responsible for the acts of terrorism. The Government of Israel will appeal to governments and political groups, requesting that they take effective measures against the nests and the arms of terrorist organizations in order to paralyze their activities and eliminate their bases.

The Premier noted with appreciation the decision of the authorities of the Federal German Republic to work for the release of the Israeli hostages and to use force for that aim. She expressed regret over the fact that this aim had not been achieved.

It was decided to compile general and precise information regarding the security measures adopted in Munich both by the authorities of the German Federal Republic and by the Israeli institutions charged with that task and also the efforts and experiences of the German government to bring about the release of the Israeli hostages. In this connection, the representatives of the Israeli branches concerned were asked to report to the Cabinet at its forthcoming session to draw the necessary conclusions.

The Deputy Premier and the Minister of Culture and Education stated that the Israeli team had ended its participation in the Olympic Games and its members were returning to Israel.

128

Radio interview statements by Israel Herut Party Chairman Weizman placing the responsibility for the Munich incident on Egypt and Syria¹⁴⁴

September 6, 1972

Weizman: I think it is quite obvious that the Arab governments, especially Syria and Egypt, harbour these terrorists, pep them up—you only have to look at the reactions of the Egyptian papers today—and praise their action in Munich, and therefore any Arab country that harbours these murderers is responsible.

Q. Are you in other words calling for an Israeli retaliation against these countries?

A. Look, I am. We are at war with them and in war there is no retaliation. In war there is battle after battle, unfortunately. I think that the responsibility of the Israeli Government is to safeguard all Israelis, not only within the borders of the State of Israel but all over the world. And God help us if our lives would have to be dependent on the German policeman, or Japanese policeman or Turkish policeman, with all due respect to them. And I think that most likely the German police did their best, and I don't think that we should blame them. The responsibility is ours and we should see that the governments in Cairo and Damascus feel the responsibility. If we have to exert pressure on them and make it hurt so that they will understand it, then we shall have to make it hurt.

Q. Do you place any of the blame on the German Government for what happened?

A. Look, basically any country that does not safeguard the population that lives in it is to a certain extent blamed. But what happened in Munich is not one solitary tragedy that happened. We had tragedies before. We have the tragedy of Lod. We have the tragedy—a pilot killed in Zurich. We had lots of things happening. And therefore this is one link in a chain of campaign against us that has originated in Cairo and Damascus. Our battle is with Cairo and Damascus and the Arabs and not with the Germans. And I

¹⁴⁴ Interview broadcast on Israel radio in English; text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4087/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.

am not defending the Germans but the responsibility is the responsibility of Cairo and Damascus, and so the responsibility of the Israeli Government is to see that Cairo and Damascus both feel the responsibility even if it has to be felt physically by Cairo and Damascus.

Q. Bluntly, Mr. Weizman, are you calling for an Israeli action against Cairo and Damascus?

A. Bluntly, I am calling for the Israeli Government to make Cairo and Damascus understand more than they have understood up to now that they are responsible.

Q. Thank you very much, Ezer Weizman.

129

Resolution condemning the Black September action in Munich adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives¹⁴⁵

Washington, September 6, 1972

Whereas with profound sorrow and deep alarm the House is informed of the events surrounding the killing of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team participating in the Twentieth Olympiad at Munich, and

Whereas such actions are to be condemned as inimical to the interests and aspirations of the civilized world, be it hereby

Resolved, That the United States joins with the world in mourning the loss of Israel's athletes and extends its deepest sympathy to the people of Israel and to the families of those so tragically lost, and be it,

Further resolved, That all means be sought by which the civilized world may cut off from contact with civilized mankind any peoples or any nation giving sanctuary, support, sympathy, aid, or comfort to acts of murder and barbarism such as those just witnessed at Munich and that the Clerk of the House be directed to communicate these sentiments and expressions to the Secretary of State for appropriate transmittal.

130

Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Scheel of West Germany, commenting on responsibility for "terrorism" and reasserting his government's balanced policy towards the Middle East¹⁴⁶

Bonn, September 8, 1972

Q. Foreign Minister, the terrible events in Munich inevitably have a foreign political perspective. How can the responsibility be defined taking into account the foreign political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany? This is a question not only of our image in the world as a whole, but also of the formation of our future relationships with many Arab States.

A. . . . We must, above all, not generalize. It would be unfortunate, were we now suddenly to say that the Arabs are guilty of everything. We must make a distinction in this. We are dealing with a terrorist group whose action is detested by people, civilized people, all over the world.

If individual Arab states do not express their views on these acts of terrorism, because they feel unable to do so for reasons of internal Arab politics, then naturally this is most regrettable. But such Arab states must show themselves understanding if German public opinion reacts to this with great resentment.

One would expect that the whole world would condemn crimes and if Arab countries do not, public opinion in the whole world will be critical.

But we must, on the other hand, not ignore the fact that the Arab governments are in no way directly involved in the events at Munich, that they are in no way responsible.

I do, however, consider what the President of the Federal Republic has said to be correct. We must appeal to all countries and states to be conscious of their responsibilities and to ensure that terror is removed from the relationship among countries and states.

On this point we can without any doubt justifiably ask whether those who fail to express their views on such matters and even publicly tolerate them, do not thereby clearly become responsible.

¹⁴⁵ *Congressional Record*, September 6, 1972, p. 29544; the resolution was adopted by 346 votes to none, with 85 not voting (*ibid.* pp. 29565-29566).

¹⁴⁶ Excerpted and translated from the German transcript of the interview conducted for Südwestfunk, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 123 (September 12, 1972), pp. 1531-1532.

Q. Deciding on a balance of interests among Egypt, the Arab states, and Israel is one of the feats of German foreign policy and of German policy towards the Near East; perhaps you see the relationship to Israel strained. How can such a strain be checked while preserving the balance of German interests?

A. Our relationship to Israel has not been strained by these regrettable events, at least not in the sense that relations between the states will suffer. The Israeli government has approached the Munich events with remarkable objectivity. But we cannot exclude the possibility, indeed the probability, that public opinion in Israel will be influenced by emotions. This is where diplomacy with an attitude of wisdom and prudence must compensate for the unavoidable changes in relations between the peoples.

In recent years we have successfully reestablished a balanced relationship to the Near East by cultivating good relations with Israel and by resuming relations with the Arab states without jeopardizing those with Israel in the process. Surely, to continue to do so is in the interests of the Federal Republic.

131

Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel reporting on the Munich incident¹⁴⁷

Jerusalem, September 12, 1972

On that fateful day, the 5th of September, when I informed the Knesset of the events in Munich, I opened my statement as follows: "To my great regret, I am again obliged to give the Knesset very grave tidings." I spoke of the murder of the coach Moshe Weinberg and of 10 Israeli sportsmen who were still being held hostage. At that time we did not know what was in store for us at the end of that day.

During many hours of anxiety and tense expectation, as the terrorists were laying down new deadlines from hour to hour for the massacre of the hostages, millions of people in Israel and throughout the world sat glued to their radio and television sets. Whilst all of Israel was receiv-

ing the tidings from Germany announcing the rescue of the hostages, our Ambassador kept on warning us over the telephone from Munich not to trust the optimistic version transmitted over the communications media. He advised us to wait until the rescue operation was completed, and until we received confirmation from the control tower at Munich airport that our men had indeed been rescued.

This confirmation failed to arrive. The entire world was misled and subsequently dumbfounded at the tragic end of nine of our beloved ones, in addition to the two who had been murdered previously—all victims of the heinous Arab terrorism.

Now, before the conclusion of the seven-day mourning, we are meeting once again in the Knesset, after having buried our dead. Once again we express to the bereaved families the sentiments of solidarity of the nation with each and every one of them—with the widows, the parents, the orphans and other relatives. Every one of the bereaved families bears a deep wound in its heart. The entire nation is united in this pain, which rallies us and strengthens us to go on building and defending ourselves undauntedly.

Members of the Knesset: At the Cabinet session of September 6, 1972, it was resolved to gather full and accurate information concerning the security precautions adopted in Munich, both by the authorities of the German Federal Republic and by the Israeli institutions in charge. Information will also be obtained on the attempts made by the Government of the German Republic to effect the release of the Israeli hostages.

The representatives of the Israeli bodies concerned have accordingly been requested to report to the Government in order to enable us to draw the necessary conclusions and to learn the resultant lessons.

Yesterday the Government heard reports from the heads of the Security Services and from our Ambassador in Germany, Mr. Eliashiv Ben-Horin. The Government charged me with completing the accumulation of all pertinent information and to submit to it the findings of the inquiry as well as conclusions and recommendations. This task is now being fulfilled and as soon as it is completed, without delay, it will be possible to fully and faithfully reconstruct the sequence of

¹⁴⁷ English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, September 13, 1972, p. 5.

events, so that the Government can take whatever action is necessary.

As has always been our practice, we shall continuously report to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. The essence of the findings, as well as such conclusions which need not be classified for reasons of security, will be made public.

However, Members of the Knesset, even before the inquiry and the reconstruction of events have been completed, I feel duty bound to clarify—without delay—a number of matters.

After the news was received, the Cabinet went into session at 9 a.m. and heard as much detailed information as was then available.

Furthermore, the following directives were drawn up and transmitted to our Ambassador in Bonn, to be conveyed to the West German Government:

The Government of Israel does not enter into negotiations with the terrorists. Responsibility rests with the West German authorities. The Government of Israel expects the German authorities to do everything possible to rescue the hostages and save their lives.

Israel will take an understanding attitude if a promise is made to the terrorists that they will be allowed to go free, if such a promise is likely to increase the chances of ensuring the safety of all hostages.

We rely on the German authorities that in their contacts with the terrorists everything necessary will be done to ensure the safety of the hostages.

Our Ambassador, Eliashiv Ben-Horin, arrived in Munich at about 11 a.m. and conveyed this message to the German authorities. He maintained constant contact with the authorities and was kept informed of all developments, passing on all this information to Israel.

We sent to Munich a representative who holds a senior position in Security Services. He and his assistant reached the site at 9.15 p.m. When he arrived, the German authorities had already worked out a full plan of action. He was a witness to the events from the time the hostages were transferred from the Israeli pavilion in the Olympic village to the airport.

No plan whatsoever was brought before him for his cognizance, approval or comment. He was not involved in directing the operation. He was a witness to what occurred at the airport. His

informative evidence on events at the airport is a valuable part of the information which we are now collecting.

In the late afternoon, Ambassador Ben-Horin had reported to us that the authorities had informed him that they had learned it was impossible to rescue the hostages by means of negotiations with the terrorists, and that there were no reasonable prospects of overcoming the terrorists within the Olympic Village. That was why they planned to ostensibly accede to the terrorists' request to fly them to Cairo together with the hostages, to transfer them from the pavilion to the airport, where they would employ force to free the hostages.

The Israeli Government was not asked to approve this decision of the German authorities. From the Government statement of September 5, you know that we appreciated the German Government's decision to try to rescue the hostages—even by force. I repeat and stress once again that we attach great positive value to the fact that a foreign government decided not to give in to terrorism and—for lack of any alternative—to attempt to free hostages by force.

This aim was not achieved and the outcome was indeed terrible. From the operational aspect there is room for criticism, but nevertheless, this does not void the great value of the decision itself, taken by the German authorities.

Neither the German Government nor any other political factor at any stage demanded of Israel to accede to the terrorists' demand to release Arab terrorists detained in Israel.

These dreadful events took place in Munich and the Government of Israel had no possibility of activating its forces there. No Israeli forces—neither of the I.D.F., the police or snipers—are stationed in Munich and none were stationed there at the time. It follows that no Israeli forces of any kind were involved in the attempt to rescue those dear to us.

No Israeli representative was requested to—nor did—conduct negotiations with the terrorists. The negotiations were conducted only by authorized representatives—and on behalf—of the German authorities. During a lull in the exchange of fire between the German police unit and the terrorists—when the danger to the hostages' lives became extremely grave—our representative's suggestion that the terrorists be addressed in their own language—Arabic—was

accepted. Our representative's assistant, who speaks Arabic, appealed to the terrorists over a loudspeaker and attempted to persuade them that their fate was sealed, and that it was therefore preferable for them to lay down their arms rather than be killed. They would be permitted to leave Germany for whatever destination they chose. This approach was tried as a last effort to rescue our men, without bloodshed.

The decision, the planning and implementation of the operation was made solely by the German security forces, without recourse to the consent of any Israeli representative whatsoever.

The responsibility for safeguarding the delegations to the Olympic Games rested, of course, with the German authorities. Even prior to the opening—and during the course—of the Olympic Games, authorized Israeli bodies contacted the German authorities concerning the measures required to safeguard the Israeli delegation. To our profound sorrow, it transpired that the security arrangements did not prevent the terrorists from breaking into and taking over the Israeli pavilion at the Olympic Village. As already stated, a painstaking investigation is being conducted into all the facts relating to the security measures adopted by the German authorities, as well as by the responsible Israeli bodies, and we shall draw the necessary conclusions.

We attach great importance to any expression denouncing terrorism on the part of Arab rulers and statesmen. I refer particularly to the declaration made by the King of Jordan. To my regret, the rulers, statesmen and communications media in the Arab countries continue to utter jarring sounds of praise and encouragement to the murderers and their deeds. I shall not at this time enumerate or quote these shameful utterances. It is sufficient only to mention the conference of Arab foreign ministers.

These expressions reveal in all their depth the hatred, cruelty and mockery of all human criteria that still continue to characterize the Arab rulers' attitude towards Israel. These voices only serve to emphasize that we were right in placing the responsibility for terrorism not only on the terrorist organizations, but also squarely on those Arab countries which encourage their activities and provide them with training bases and funds as well as moral and political support.

There is nothing more terrible and shocking

than the fact revealed by the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic. He stated publicly that, in an effort to save the lives of both the hostages and their kidnappers, he phoned and requested to speak to President Sadat. Upon being told that the Egyptian President was out of town and could not be reached, Willy Brandt contacted Sidky, the Egyptian Premier, to request his assurance—in the event Germany should fly the terrorists and the hostages to Egypt—of the immediate release of the hostages and their immediate and safe departure from Egypt.

The Egyptian Premier immediately replied: "We don't want to get involved at all." To wit: not to be involved in the rescue of human lives.

Members of the Knesset: I shall not elaborate on the latest session of the Security Council. Much to our regret, this institution—which sets itself up as guardian of world peace—has again revealed itself as serving those interests opposed to peace, as being lenient towards violence and disregarding all differences between a murderer and his victim, between assailant and attacked. Against this background, it can be stated that the U.S. Government's decision to exercise its veto right is of universal human value, worthy of appreciation.¹⁴⁸ I am convinced that in this I express not only an Israeli interest. I am certain that the move taken by the United States is one which might possibly save not only the honour but also the future of the international organization.

What happened at the Olympic Games is a link in a terrible chain of bloody terrorist assaults, directed against the State and the citizens of Israel. This is a criminal method, which makes no distinction, which lacks any human criteria whatsoever. The front is everywhere, encompassing every site where people from Israel are to be found, whose blood may be shed. The upsurge of terrorism must be viewed against the background of the defeat of the Arab armies and the paralysing

¹⁴⁸ At a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on September 10 the U.S. vetoed the following draft resolution (U.N. doc. no. S/10784):

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,

Calls on the parties concerned to cease immediately all military operations and to exercise the greatest restraint in the interest of international peace and security.

of terrorist activity in the areas under the control of the Israel Defence Forces. The murderous deeds are perpetrated at a distance from our country, in places where the Israel Defence Forces and the Israeli Police cannot protect our people, cannot avert terrorist activity, and cannot give chase to murderers, apprehend or punish them. Such actions do not testify to a substantial popular force possessing any realistic prospect of success. These are acts of insanity, rooted in frustration and despair.

We are aware of this manifestation and its inherent dangers.

The fight against terrorism is a complex task, involving perseverance, stratagems and resourcefulness. Quite a number of dangerous actions have been thwarted by our people and our security services. The Knesset, however, does not expect me to elaborate in public on such matters which are not for publication for reasons of security. We are convinced that the situation calls for alertness and greater efforts, but we shall not pretend that every plot hatched from afar and in secret can indeed be forestalled and foiled. Only by daring to take risks for the sake of our country and our rights, can the danger be overcome and eliminated.

Members of the Knesset: It is our plain duty to fight the anti-Israel terrorist organizations to the very end. Terrorists alter their methods and stratagems and we must deploy ourselves for this warfare even more than we have done up till now—methodically, with knowledge and resolution. This must be done with all possible zeal and self-dedication for the defence of human lives—men, women and children—and with all the assiduity and skill our people are capable of.

Although this duty is ours to perform, no law-abiding and justice-pursuing state is exempt from this same duty. We cannot exempt any state from the duty to combat terrorism. This is not only the demand of elementary justice and morality towards us but anti-terrorist warfare is also a vital precondition for orderly life in every single state. The criminal violence aimed against Israel imperils every country within whose boundaries terrorism is being waged. From the bloodstained history of the Jewish people one can learn that every violence which begins by killing Jews ends up by spreading and turning into universal danger to all men and nations.

I shall not enumerate from this rostrum our detailed demands from the various governments concerning security arrangements in the face of the danger of anti-Israel violence. I shall not go into details here as to what is required in order to prevent freedom of movement, to curb and liquidate the terrorist bases.

This is being done and will continue to be done, through contact with every one of the governments concerned, according to the actual circumstances. Still, I can say with full certainty: it is clearly possible to adopt measures which have not yet been taken, to put an end to the criminal activities of the Arab terrorist organizations. No government is entitled to absolve itself of this responsibility which falls on every member of the universal community of nations.

The duty of every law-abiding state to take action against the anti-Israel terrorist organizations is becoming most vital in view of the fact that the terrorists have succeeded in utilizing irresponsible elements of various nationalities and various underground movements. They exploit innocent girls as living booby traps. They activate mercenaries, adventurers and criminals. We know of the links of the Arab terrorist organizations with various underground groups in several countries. The danger inherent in this phenomenon is not limited to Israel alone.

Members of the Knesset: The new wave of Arab terrorism is aimed at thwarting peace efforts and destroying the prospects for peace. Still, the Arab terrorism will not succeed in warping our human and political essence. The terrorists will not be able to weaken our desire for peace. They will not alter our peace policy. I believe that the acts of terrorism will open the eyes of an ever-growing number of people throughout the world as to who and what the terrorist organizations really are, and how unworthy of support and trust they really are. More and more people in the world will find out how great is the gap between the atrocities committed by the Arab terrorists and their attempts to don a mantle of progress and liberation. We have no choice but to strike at the terrorist organizations wherever we can. This is our duty towards ourselves and towards peace. We shall fulfil this duty with all our might.

132

Resolution passed by Israel's Knesset after debate on the Munich incident¹⁴⁹**Jerusalem, September 12, 1972**

The Knesset states that—

1. The bloody atrocity perpetrated by murderers sent by Arab terrorist organizations, which resulted in the killing of eleven members of the Israel Olympic team in Munich, will be an eternal shame to humanity.

2. The Knesset, together with the entire nation, shares the grief of the bereaved families.

3. The Arab terrorist organizations have proven with their criminal act, that they are the enemies of mankind as a whole, and that they undermine all hopes for peace.

4. Responsibility for the crime in Munich, as for other similar crimes committed by the terrorist groups, rests with the Arab countries which provide these groups with bases, means, political support and the weapons they need for their crimes.

5. The State of Israel will fulfill its obligation and exercise its right to defend its representatives and citizens, and will act against the terrorist organizations, their bases, and those who aid them, until an end is put to their criminal activity.

6. The Knesset demands that all states and governments act efficiently to put an end to the terrorists' activities and to liquidate their bases.

133

Statement by U.S.S.R. President Podgorny expressing disapproval of the Munich incident and support for Arab unity in the face of the alliance of Zionism and imperialism, made during a dinner in honour of visiting President Bakr of Iraq¹⁵⁰**Moscow, September 14, 1972**

There are a good many pieces of evidence

¹⁴⁹ English text, *Israel Digest* (Jerusalem), XV, 20 (September 29, 1972), p. 3.

¹⁵⁰ *Pravda* (Moscow), September 15, 1972, pp. 1, 4; excerpted from the condensed English translation, *The Current Digest*

indicating that recently imperialism and reaction have been trying to step up their subversive activity against the national-liberation movement, especially against the progressive states in the Near East. As before, the role of strike forces is being assigned to Israel, which is aggravating the situation in this region and organizing military provocations against the neighbouring Arab states. A few days ago Israeli aircraft carried out barbaric bombing raids over the territory of Syria and Lebanon, as a result of which scores of Arab civilians were killed. The Israeli extremists are trying to explain this crime by citing the tragic events in Munich. Needless to say, we cannot take a positive attitude toward actions to which certain elements resorted, thereby damaging the Palestinian movement. However, what took place in Munich can in no way serve as justification of the Israeli leaders' marauding, perfidious acts. They talk at great length about their supposed love of peace, but in reality they are trying to suppress the will of the Arab peoples, to sow sentiments of despair and hopelessness among them and to impose their own terms for a solution to the Near East crisis.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that lasting peace in the Near East cannot be established as long as the occupied Arab lands are under the heel of the Israeli aggressors. The solution of the Near East problem is being delayed through the fault of Israel, which enjoys the support of the United States. In these conditions, it is important for the Arab countries, while persistently continuing efforts aimed at a political settlement of the conflict, further to augment their forces in the struggle against the aggressor, to develop their national economies and to strengthen the combat might of their armed forces. The all-round consolidation of an anti-imperialist basis of the unity of action of the Arab states and the cohesion of the progressive forces within each Arab country are also of paramount importance.

The Palestinian resistance movement plays an essential role in the Arabs' common front of struggle against imperialism, against Israel's aggressive policy. The U.S.S.R. and other socialist

of the Soviet Press, XXIV, 38 (October 18, 1972), p. 22. Translation copyright 1972 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission. The joint communiqué arising from the visit is printed as document no. 138 below.

countries have been and remain reliable friends of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, in their struggle for the liberation of the occupied territories and the satisfaction of their legitimate rights and national interests.

Imperialism, Zionism and reaction are unable to turn back the irreversible process of national liberation and social progress in the Arab East. There is no doubt that, by building up their economic and military potential, strengthening their solidarity and unity of action and relying on the broad support of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and other peace-loving and democratic forces, the Arab peoples will be victorious in their just struggle....

134

Appeal to Christians issued by the Second World Conference of Christians for Palestine—"The Canterbury Message"¹⁵¹

Canterbury, mid-September, 1972

Since the first World Conference for Palestine, held in Beirut in May 1970, the situation of the Palestinian people has continued to weigh on the world's conscience. In the territories occupied by Israel, a policy of oppression in the form of population transfer, expulsion, torture, and imprisonment has hardened. The Palestinian resistance, moreover, has been dealt severe blows, especially in September 1970 and July 1971. However, despite the real difficulties, the Resistance movement as a militant expression of the Palestinian people continues its struggle for liberation.

Facing this situation, the second World Conference of Christians for Palestine, meeting in Canterbury on the 11th to 15th September, 1972, renews the appeal to the Christians of the whole world begun at Beirut more than two years ago¹⁵² and adds:

1. The right of the Palestinian people to national existence and self-determination on its own

territory must be recognized. This right has been denied for more than 25 years despite constant international and diplomatic activity. Today the Palestinian people seek this right by an autonomous struggle which takes various forms.

The injustice perpetrated since 1947 and the institutionalized violence of the Zionist state against the Palestinian people have led to the present situation in which the revolutionary violence of a people is a reaction to the violence of a state of a colonial sort.

The bloody episodes which mark the course of this struggle provoke the emotion of world opinion. But Western Christians must not be allowed to forget that everywhere in the world a genuine peace can only be established on the basis of justice and respect for the human rights of oppressed and exploited peoples, especially the rights of the Palestinian people.

2. Our solidarity with the Palestinian people and our total opposition to Zionism should be placed in a broader human context: that of opposing all racial, religious, or cultural discrimination and, more particularly, all explicit and implicit forms of anti-semitism and anti-Arab racism.

We would also like to give particular recognition to those Jews who courageously denounce Zionism as a tragically dangerous threat to Judaism; their activity parallels the fundamental objective of the Palestinian Resistance: to create in Palestine a secular democratic state in which citizens of all faiths will live together as equals.

3. Our churches must work, in season and out of season, for justice and peace in the Middle East. The Gospel of Peace sets us free from all discrimination and every barrier, for it proclaims that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is the Father of all mankind.

Strong in these convictions and mindful of the demands of the Gospel, we mean to reinforce and to extend our action, and we invite all Christians to take part.

¹⁵¹ English text of the message issued by the conference, held September 11-15, *Al Montada* (Beirut), no. 55 (September-December, 1972), pp. 42-43.

¹⁵² See document no. 109 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

135

Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban on Israel's foreign policy in the context of Palestine guerrilla activity¹⁵³

September 16, 1972

Eban: There was a period in which whenever they were struck they could get a condemnatory resolution from the Security Council, whereas it was impossible to get any international judgement against them. Well, here the American veto was an international event of the greatest importance. It helped to restore the international equilibrium and it would cut off one of the consolation prizes whereby Arab terrorists and supporting Arab governments used to console themselves for our action against them. In a sense action against them has become more legitimate in the eyes of many people in recent times.

Then there is the aviation front. Here we are giving our full support to the efforts made in Washington by the United States and Canada to get, not merely an expression of opinion against hijacking—that isn't difficult—but to get automatic penalties and sanctions. Then there are other measures that we are suggesting, especially in European countries: tighter control of the movements in and out of these countries for Arab nations, a closer look at their offices and headquarters. We therefore welcome an initial progress in the willingness of the Federal Republic of Germany to make proposals to the 10 governments—members or future members of the European Economic Community—on certain stringencies that are to be applied, and I think they are applying some of them in their own country.

And finally at home, where we have our own policy which I can sum up by saying, by describing in the following words: The PLO and Fatah say that they are at war with us, and they are at war with us. Very well, then, we owe them no indulgence and we owe them no immunity, and that was the significance of the operation that we carried out a week ago. In other words we ourselves, in the Middle East, have an opportunity which we must use whenever we effectively can, whenever circumstances demand, of seeing

that life is not easy for them, that they are harassed, and that they are limited, and that they are not immune from punishment and resistance. These are the lines on which our work is developing and it has to be thought about in a centralized way and as part of a coherent plan, and perhaps I'll be able in the General Assembly to suggest a broad programme of international action, and of national action, things that should be done and things that should not be done if we want terrorism eradicated.

Q. Mr. Eban, how about carrying the war outside of the Middle East? This idea has been suggested in Israel by several quarters and I understand that it's disturbing the British. What do you think of this?

A. Well, I was told that this was disturbing the British Government, but I must say that there was no hint of any such scene in the discussions of the British Foreign Minister with our Ambassador yesterday. Well, as far as fighting terrorism outside Israel is concerned, I as Foreign Minister must be concerned with the action of the sovereign governments and with our own efforts and by consultation and exhortation to stress the need for vigilance and stringent action because we have no sovereignty outside the area of Israeli jurisdiction and we have no police and we have no forces outside the area, and therefore, whatever I have said is within the framework of the concept of the sovereignty of states.

Q. Mr. Eban, you said this week that under the grief of the Munich outrage the idea of peace in the Middle East was not uppermost in your mind. Do you think that what has happened in Munich affected the prospects of peace in the Middle East?

A. Certainly, because the pursuit of peace is carried out by human beings and not by machines, and, therefore, the degree of their credulity and their willingness to believe in the peaceful intentions are factors in the situation. Let us take Egypt for example. What is the meaning of a peace agreement with Egypt when it cannot even express an elementary human solidarity with the victims and their families, when it cannot even carry out humanitarian prisoner exchanges, and when its controlled press is full of exultation and joy, leaping on the fresh graves of our kinsmen. Surely that entitles us to be more skeptical even than before about how genuine and authentic their peace professions are. The Foreign Minister

¹⁵³ Interview broadcast on Israel radio in English; excerpted from the text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4096/A/25-26; reprinted by permission.

of Egypt, Mr. Az-Zayyat, is going to European capitals. I have not heard him say a single word of reservation about this horror that has convulsed the imagination and the opinion of all the peoples of Europe.

136

U.S.S.R. government statement warning of the dangers arising from Israeli raids on Syria and Lebanon and calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory¹⁵⁴

Moscow, September 17, 1972

Reports are coming in from the Middle East that Israel has launched new criminal actions against the Arab nations. Following Israel's piratic air raids over Syrian and Lebanese territory on September 8 this year, when the blood of hundreds of civilians—women, children and old men—was shed, the Israeli ruling circles on September 16 undertook another act of aggression in this area. Israeli armoured and mechanized troops, supported by aircraft, have invaded southern Lebanon and keep advancing deep into the country. Lebanese villages have again been subjected to shelling and bombing with the use of napalm, resulting in the death of inhabitants. A state of emergency has been declared in the Lebanon.

The smokescreen of Israeli propaganda, raising a ballyhoo round the known tragic incident in Munich, can deceive no one. Neither the Lebanon nor Syria bears any responsibility for this happening. It is impossible to conceal the obvious fact of Israel's preplanned military operations against the Arab peoples. Reports are arriving from Tel Aviv that fresh acts of brigandage and violence against the Lebanon, Syria and other Arab countries are in the process of preparation.

So, a dangerous escalation of aggression is taking place, which is exacerbating the Middle East situation, and posing a serious threat to peace and security.

Acting with boundless cynicism, and disregarding the protests and indignation of world public opinion, the Israeli ruling quarters are brazenly violating the UN Charter and decisions, the truce agreement and the commonly accepted standards of international law.

One cannot bypass the fact that Israeli expansionist actions are encouraged by certain quarters in the West which, in pursuit of their selfish ends, are playing a dangerous game with fire in the Middle East. Those openly or tacitly opposing, especially in the UN, the adoption of resolute measures against the Israeli invaders, assume a grave responsibility towards the Arab and other peoples.

Peace-loving countries and peoples, and all who share the conviction that aggression must be repulsed, cannot remain aloof, in view of the difficult and crucial situation in the Middle East. They should demand from Tel Aviv that it immediately put a stop to aggression and withdraw its troops from Lebanese territory.

The Soviet Union, true to its principled policy of supporting the righteous struggle of peoples for freedom, independence and territorial integrity, was and remains on the side of the Arab nations seeking elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression. The Soviet Government still believes that there is only one way to a detente and stable peace in the Middle East: the complete liberation of the Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967 and the assurance for all the peoples in this area that they can live in peace and security.

Strongly condemning the Israeli armed invasion of the Lebanon, the Soviet Government backs up the demand for an immediate end to aggression and for an Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanese territory.

The Israeli Government is completely responsible for the criminal actions against the Arab countries and for the life of Lebanese civilians, including Palestinian refugees on Lebanese territory.

Along with the other peace-loving countries, the Soviet Union will continue to direct its efforts towards the cessation of Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples and the establishment of a just, lasting peace in the Middle East.

¹⁵⁴ English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 38 (September 23, 1972), p. 2.

137

Speech by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home deploring violence in the Middle East and stressing the role of Security Council Resolution 242 in the search for a settlement, made at a luncheon in honour of visiting Foreign Minister Zayyat of Egypt¹⁵⁵

London, September 18, 1972

I come now to the wider problems of the Middle East. They were emotional, difficult and dangerous enough before. The situation has been infinitely more tense by the ruthless killings at Munich, by the severe reprisals against Lebanon and Syria which have followed. There has been horrified world reaction to the Munich killings which Britain shares to the full. This led the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place terrorism on the coming Assembly agenda. Action there must be collective, otherwise terrorist activity will undermine and destroy the authority of governments and the law. We trust that the representatives of every government at the Assembly will join to outlaw the terrorist movements. It is equally necessary to get at the root cause of the cycle of violence and reprisal in the Middle East. Because the future is clearly dangerous, we, in Britain, are profoundly interested in trying to find a solution to the Middle East problems which will remove historic grievances and establish a durable peace.

On a material level we have major economic and commercial interests in the area. More important we have as great an interest in peace as any country in the world. As a permanent member of the Security Council earnestly aware of its responsibilities on the world stage, we are obviously concerned in any dispute so tense, so persistent and so dangerous—posing as it does the threat of a wider conflict. We think it a sad and bitter thing that both sides to the dispute should have to devote to the means of military confrontation great human and material resources which ought to be contributing to the well being of the peoples of the area.

There are those who say that the present situation of no peace and no war is the best for which anyone can hope: that the problem is insoluble, insuperable and interminable. Anyone who has lived through the events of the past few weeks must reject such a counsel of despair. The present situation must give way to a peace—a just and lasting peace. This goal my government still believes can best be advanced on the basis of Resolution 242 of the Security Council.

It may be argued that since over the last five years all attempts to put that resolution into effect have failed, we should now consign it to the dustbin. That would be wrong. The resolution's real significance, which perhaps was not generally realised at the time, lay in this: it was the first serious attempt by the international community since 1947 to find a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. It enshrines the basic principles which must be honoured if a real settlement is to be achieved. The deadlock is not in fact complete.

A closer look at developments since November 1968 shows that some progress has been made. There has been the Egyptian government's public acceptance of the commitment to peace with Israel. That includes the idea of demilitarized zones and U.N. guarantees. These were considerable advances on your part on anything which had gone before and we in Britain have acknowledged them as such. On the other side of the ledger, we have noted with interest Mrs. Meir's restatement of Israel's willingness to negotiate a measure of withdrawal in advance of a peace settlement. That need not be inconsistent with 242. I hope that it may be possible for Israel to go further and say that they have no desire to annex Egyptian soil, though they will require adequate arrangements in Sinai to safeguard her security. Such a declaration, unequivocally stated, could unlock the door to a settlement.

Likewise, as you well know, I have long held the view that progress can be achieved only if at the right moment some clear and effective method of communication can be established between the parties to the dispute. In the past I have used the word "dialogue." That is shorthand: for your government has clearly stated the need for an intermediary. Ideally this should be Dr. Jarring: but if not, then through some other acceptable person or agency. Efficient and

¹⁵⁵ Excerpted from the text of the speech supplied, on request, by the British Embassy, Beirut; Foreign Minister Zayyat visited the U.K. September 17–20.

quick and businesslike communication is essential if the processes of peace are to start and maintain momentum.

That remains the best hope. The alternative of a peace conference has been suggested. I certainly would not rule this out. The difficulties confronting a conference, even before it actually began, would be plenty. But if Britain could help in any way and if both sides were agreeable, we should be ready to do whatever we could.

On the ingredients of a settlement, the position of my government remains as I set it out in my speech at Harrogate in October 1970. I am well aware that a peace cannot be imposed but I believed then and have not changed my mind that this contains the essentials for a fair settlement. Both sides genuinely want peace. The tragedy is that neither side believes this of the other. The Arabs want withdrawal: the Israelis want security. Within the framework of Resolution 242, these two aims can be reconciled. Indeed the strength of the resolution is that the one is balanced by the other. That is why even though the slowness tries the patience we must all work to see that Resolution 242 is implemented. In this task, the British government remain determined to help in any way they can.

138

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Bakr of Iraq (excerpts)¹⁵⁶

Moscow, September 19, 1972

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath), President of the Revolutionary Command Council, and President of the Republic of Iraq, was in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit from September 14 to 19, 1972, at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government.

The Sides thoroughly discussed the situation in the Middle East and pointed to the dangerous escalation of imperialist Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples, to the attempts at the perpetuation of Israel's occupation of the Arab lands and at the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance movement. The Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq declare that this situation means a gross encroachment on the rights of the Arab peoples and heightens the threat to peace in this area and throughout the world.

This is a direct result of the continued Israeli aggression against the Arab states in which Israel receives the political, financial and military support of the United States. World imperialism seeks to undermine the progressive regimes in the Arab countries, and to prevent the Arab liberation movement from achieving its legitimate goals.

It was stressed in this connection that it is very important to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the Arab states, for the Arabs to make use of every possibility in the struggle against imperialism and reaction, and to strengthen cooperation with the friendly and socialist states, above all the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union again confirmed its support for the peoples of the Arab countries and its adherence to Soviet-Arab friendship.

The Sides stressed the need for intensifying the struggle against the aggressive policy of the imperialist forces in the Middle East and against continued Israeli aggression.

The Soviet Union and Iraq resolutely denounced the new criminal aggressive acts by Israel which has made piratic air raids on Syria and the Lebanon and carried out armed intervention in the south of the Lebanon. The Sides demanded that Tel Aviv should stop its aggression and that all the Israeli troops should immediately be pulled out of Lebanese territory.

The Sides reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the area cannot be established without the liberation of all the Israel-occupied Arab territories, and without securing the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Sides stated their full support for the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their legitimate rights. "They regard the Palestinian resistance movement as a component of the Arab national-liberation movement and declare that they will continue to render

¹⁵⁶ English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 39 (September 30, 1972), pp. 2, 3-4.

material assistance, and moral and political support to that movement.

139

Press interview statement by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel outlining the limitations to the Palestinians' right to self-determination¹⁵⁷

Late September, 1972

[Questioned about the possibility of an increasing Palestinian role in future developments and of encouraging Palestinian institutions in cooperation with Jordan, and the identification of Jordan with King Hussein's policy, Foreign Minister Eban replied:]

We have clear indications that Hussein has a specific idea but I have no evidence of support for his attitude on the part of other quarters in Jordan. This should increase our caution. All our Arab experts would have great difficulty in pointing out a dozen persons who would express Hussein's attitude if they were free, and this is an important obstacle. There is also another obstacle which is that, although it is a pioneer as regards readiness for peace, Hussein's regime is regarded throughout the Arab world as symbolizing the "foundations," not the "future," and what we hope is that we shall hear good news of moderation and peace from other regimes also. In spite of this Hussein exists. There is constant talk about his instability, but in the last 18 years he has attended the funerals of many "stable" regimes. . . ., from Nuri [al-Said] and al-Shishakli to Abd al-Nasser, Qasim and Arif. All of them have gone with the wind and Hussein remains. This is an indication that his regime meets specific historical requirements. Our attitude is that we are ready for peace with every existing Arab regime as long as the conditions for our security are met in the peace treaty.

There is a Palestinian people who are part of the Arab people. This does not mean that this people should be allowed self-determination one

hundred per cent, because Palestinian self-determination is restricted by two things. There is the fact that the whole of the Arab people enjoys a great amount of self-determination and this affects the Palestinian Arab demand. It would be nonsense to say that the independence of the Arabs in sixteen states does not affect the right of yet another Arab group to self-determination. What I say is, had there been sixteen Hebrew states in the area in 1947 this would certainly have influenced our demand for the establishment of another state. I believe that in that case the people would have said, "You must be content with these sixteen states, and the Jewish people do not lack independence." This is one of the restrictions. . . . The other is the self-determination of Israel. It is not Arab existence that is in the balance. Israel is the only people whose existence is in the balance in this conflict. These are restrictions. Hence my conclusions that the Palestinians must be granted the greatest amount of self-determination that is compatible with these two restrictions. In view of the fact that we do not have sixteen states, Israeli self-determination takes moral and historical precedence over Palestinian self-determination, though it does not rule it out entirely.

We want territorial modifications involving this group being deprived as little as possible of self-determination. Would it be so terrible if there were in Israel some hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living among us as a minority, while the [other] Palestinians become citizens of their state east of Israel after peace frontiers had been established? In peacetime Israel's security does not require that another million Arabs should have Jordanian nationality and Israeli rule, and I do not believe that that is a realistic solution in the long run. Not only from the Jewish demographic point of view, but also from the point of view of Arab rights, we must be moderate in our annexation of Arabs—that is to say, areas inhabited by Arabs, for vital security requirements, and this makes me support the ideas and proposals that demand changes in the frontiers in the uninhabited areas by maintaining an option to achieve an Arab political goal for the majority of this group. It has to be said that the political goals of the majority of the Arabs of the occupied areas will be an Arab, not an Israeli goal, for Jewish considerations. There is also the principle that if it is impossible to grant this Arab group self-

¹⁵⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text of the interview conducted by Shlomo Sapir, Ahud Yaari and Teddy Preuss, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), September 22, 1972.

determination one hundred per cent, that does not mean that we must be content with zero per cent. There is a point of equilibrium in the middle; politics is the art of the possible.

140

Press conference statement by President Pompidou of France deploring Palestinian "terrorism" and asserting that only a solution to the Palestine problem will stop it¹⁵⁸

Paris, September 21, 1972

Q. After the Munich attack and the reprisals which followed it, don't you think, Mr. President, that we are moving towards a worsening of the situation in the Middle East?

A. I haven't been spared difficult questions! But I shall answer yours. France has taken up a position, in the clearest possible way, against the Munich incident, and so have I. Moreover, I have had occasion, in connection with an incident which had nothing to do with this one, to tell you, as you may remember, of the horror I feel over this question of hostages, whoever they are. The taking of hostages is, in my view, the worst possible thing, and all those who knew the occupation and the lists of hostages shot by the Nazis will understand me.

Having said that, we condemn terrorism, insofar as it strikes blindly at innocent people everywhere. But let us have no illusions, Palestinian terrorism will not be suppressed as long as there is no solution to the Palestine problem. A phenomenon of this nature cannot be eliminated without resolving the deep-seated cause of the phenomenon.

I do not think that France is able either to propose solutions, or to cause any to prevail. I do not know if anyone is capable of this, nor do I know if the international community is capable of it. But one thing I am sure of, and that is that if its causes are not eliminated, we can condemn, we can take precautions, but we shall not eliminate

terrorism and we shall not have solved this Palestine problem which, apart from being a political problem, is also a profoundly human one.

I note then that fighting in the real sense has almost stopped in the Near East, but that the terrible complication of terrorist action, which others inevitably call resistance, has begun, bringing with it reprisal measures which, in their turn, and whatever their skill, effectiveness and speed, will provoke new terrorist action. And I am deeply worried when I see this web of terrorism, with no sign of a way out.

141

Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird expressing concern over increased Soviet military involvement in Syria¹⁵⁹

Washington, September 24, 1972

Q. Mr. Laird, I'd like to get you to explore for us the implications of the expulsion from Egypt in July of Soviet pilots and military unit advisers.

To what extent has this reduced the chances of a fourth round of war between Egypt and Israel and, therefore, the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in that region?

A. First, Mr. Beecher, I think it is most important that we continue the fleet presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Those that advocate reducing the number of our carriers from 15 to 6 don't really understand the importance of the fleet in the Mediterranean area and the fact that the Soviet Union has gone up to 20,000 steaming days in the Mediterranean as compared with the 750 steaming days of their fleet back in 1965.

I am concerned about the Russian airlift into Syria at the present time. I do not believe that that adds any stability to the area, particularly at this time, and I would hope that the major powers involved, particularly the Soviet Union,

¹⁵⁸ Excerpted and translated from the partial French text, *La Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd semester, 1972 (Paris: La documentation française, 1973), p. 75.

¹⁵⁹ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview on the NBC program "Meet the Press" as published by Merkle Press, Inc.; text provided, on request, by Merkle Press for NBC.

would use caution in the Middle East at this time. But the presence of our fleet and the presence of our navy in this area, the presence of our forces in Europe are indeed a stabilizing factor and make the opportunities for peace and for the continuation of the limited cease fire in that area a possibility. Without them the possibility, I believe, would be very meager.

Q. If the Egyptian President Sadat should over the next several months fail to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in his negotiations indirectly with the Israelis and if, over the same time, the sophisticated jets and other military equipment provided by the Russians should break down for want of Soviet technical assistance, is there a good chance the Egyptians might invite the Russians back in?

A. I don't want to make any sort of prediction along that line. I think the Russians now are turning to increase their aid and assistance to Syria and, as you know, a military airlift is going on into Syria at this very time.

142

Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on possible ways towards a solution of the Middle East conflict, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly¹⁶⁰

New York, September 25, 1972

And in the Middle East, the momentum towards a peace settlement must be regained. We should take note of two positive elements. First, the cease-fire is now in its twenty-sixth month. Second, the climate for a settlement seemed to improve very much as 1972 progressed. We must, however, recognize that the Munich killings have set off deplorable patterns of action and reaction—and I emphasize that the United States believes that both are deplorable, action and reaction—and that these patterns have seriously clouded prospects of early progress. Nevertheless, neither side has permanently closed the door to future

diplomatic efforts. We believe that forces favouring a peaceful settlement still have the upper hand. Our task in this Assembly, our task individually, representing nations, is to do everything possible to see that these forces that favour a peaceful settlement are supported.

The no-war/no-peace situation which prevails now in the Middle East does not and will not serve the interest of anyone in the area. Certainly a stable, just and durable peace agreement based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) continues to be the objective of the United States. But this, we believe, cannot be achieved without the beginning of a genuine negotiating process between the parties concerned. No settlement imposed from the outside can long endure. Negotiation is not capitulation. Negotiating activity among long-standing antagonists across the world is occurring at present. Why should the Middle East be an exception? When North Korea can talk to South Korea, when East Germans can talk to West Germans, when Indians and Pakistanis can meet in the immediate aftermath of war and prior to the withdrawal of troops, then surely the Middle East should be no exception to the general rule that differences should be reconciled through an active dialogue between the parties concerned.

Let me hasten to add that we do not hold that the process need necessarily begin through direct negotiations. We understand that other diplomatic avenues exist. Ambassador Jarring remains available to help the parties negotiate the terms of a peace settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

Another—in our view the most promising—first step would be proximity talks leading to an interim Suez Canal agreement. What would such an agreement do? It would separate the combatants, restore to Egypt operation of and authority over the Suez Canal, involve some Israeli withdrawal, preserve the cease-fire, and provide momentum for further efforts towards an over-all settlement.

It is encouraging that both sides agree that such an interim agreement would not be an end in itself but rather the first step towards an over-all peace settlement. Such a practical test of peace on the ground would be in the interests of both sides, and the United States remains prepared to assist in achieving it, if that would

¹⁶⁰ Excerpted from the text of Rogers' speech in the general debate of the 27th session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2038, pp. 27–30.

be helpful to the parties. Moreover, an over-all settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) must meet the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Governments on both sides as well as of the Palestinian people.

143

Statement by Japan Permanent U.N. Representative Nakagawa on the Middle East conflict, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly¹⁶¹

New York, September 27, 1972

With reference to the Middle East, there has been an incessant eruption of violence and reprisal, as all of us have observed in the recent series of tragic events. Japan took part actively from the outset in the formulation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967 and has ever since been exerting its maximum efforts, within and outside the Security Council, so that the States concerned may establish a lasting peace through a spirit of self-restraint and accommodation, as promptly as possible. We hope ardently that the United Nations will continue to tackle this question in a most positive manner.

Furthermore, another task, not spectacular but extremely meaningful, that the United Nations can undertake is to create such basic conditions as would be conducive to the establishment of peace in the area. In this respect, I evaluate highly the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is dealing with relief aid for the nearly one-and-a-half million Palestinian Arab refugees. Japan is determined to continue to contribute positively to ensuring peace in the area by strengthening and expanding further the scale of its co-operation with the relief work of UNRWA.

144

Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel surveying the Middle East situation, rejecting the need for a new Palestinian state, and describing the conditions of the Palestinians under Israeli rule, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly¹⁶²

New York, September 28, 1972

I said here last year that the Middle East was the only area in which the parties to a conflict were not engaged in a dialogue to bring it to an end. That is still the situation. Those who will have to live together side by side in our region have still not come face to face at a table of negotiation. This is a primary source of deadlock. In all other international disputes the breakthrough has come on the level of communication, and not through substantive commitments ahead of negotiation. The very decision of governments to make contact with each other creates a dynamic of its own. It transforms the context of their relationships, leads to mutual adjustment of their positions, and thereafter towards binding agreements.

Despite this central disappointment, the Middle Eastern scene has not become darker in the past year. The cease-fire has been maintained. There seems to be less feasibility for full-scale hostilities. Despite deplorable slogans about "inevitable struggle," it is clear that resumed fighting would serve no interest and advance no settlement. The retirement of Soviet forces and equipment from Egypt has stripped the conflict of its dangerous global dimension. Powers outside the Middle East cannot solve our region's problems; they have not fought its wars and they will not build its peace. The idea of a settlement imposed from outside has become visibly weaker. It is explicitly rejected by some of the Powers; and the summit meeting of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in May 1972 revealed what an illusory prospect it is. Once it becomes generally understood that a military solution is not feasible and that an imposed

¹⁶¹ Excerpted from the text of Nakagawa's speech in the general debate of the 27th session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2042, p. 7.

¹⁶² Excerpted from the text of Eban's speech in the general debate of the 27th session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2045, pp. 21-25, 37-39.

solution is excluded by the international realities of our times, a negotiated peace will emerge as the only valid alternative. The central aim of our policy is to create this consciousness: we aspire to break out of deadlock into a new vision and a new hope.

The developments in Egypt during July 1972 made it natural for the Israeli Government to restate its positions on a negotiated peace. Our ambition is to see an end of belligerency and conflict and to advance towards a peaceful future. Negotiation is not an act of "humiliation" or "surrender" for anybody, as some Arab leaders have said. It is a supreme assertion of national sovereignty and of international responsibility. Courage in leadership does not belong to the battlefield alone; it can be put to the service of conciliation and peace.

In maintaining the cease-fire positions until peace is obtained, we do not seek to perpetuate the cease-fire lines or to freeze the existing situation forever. Our proposals for permanent boundaries to be established for the first time between Israel and its Arab neighbours will be determined by the need to ensure security and to prevent new wars such as that which arose from the fragile and vulnerable armistice lines of 1967. The construction of a stable peace and security between Israel and Egypt requires a precise, detailed negotiation on territorial delimitation.

The deadlock on the over-all settlement in this sector arises from the fact that Egypt has so far refused to begin negotiation unless its position on the final outcome is conceded in advance. There is no valid precedent for such an approach. Negotiation creates the final result; the final result does not create negotiation. We seek no binding commitments from Egypt in advance on matters that are subject to negotiation. We have not sought to determine the final peace boundary, and we have drawn no ultimative maps.

It is unlikely that a transition from complete deadlock to complete peace can be made in one stage. Accordingly, the Israeli Government through its Prime Minister, reiterated on 27 July this year its readiness to negotiate a special Suez Canal agreement. Such an accord would be a contribution and a stimulus to an over-all peace. We would consider such an arrangement as a temporary solution and as a step towards peace. In the atmosphere of confidence created by such

an agreement, a momentum for further accords would be generated.

It is far-fetched to assert that the positions which I have briefly outlined today offer Arab Governments no possibility of honourable and meaningful negotiation. These principles correspond to the norms of international conciliation. What is required is the application to the Middle East of the spirit and method that have had successful results elsewhere.

The lack of Egyptian response so far to Israel's willingness to negotiate a temporary Suez agreement has long been an obstacle to progress. So, too, is the deadlock created by Cairo's insistence on determining the boundary and withdrawal issues before and without negotiation. In addition, a new massive barrier to peace has arisen through the resurgence of the Arab terrorist outrages which have sent a shock of revulsion through the civilized world.

The attitude of Arab Governments towards Arab terrorists is today a graver obstacle to peace than the admittedly disparate positions of the parties to the problems of withdrawal, boundaries, navigation, peace, etc. I say in all frankness: I cannot today believe that Egypt and Syria are willing, or that Lebanon is able, to make peace with Israel; and in that profound scepticism the attitude of those movements to terrorism plays the central role.

The discussion must inevitably take us back to a consideration of the word "Palestine" that appears as the title of the terrorist organizations. Now, is it true that there is a distinct people deprived of self-determination languishing in poverty, squalor and humiliation, dependent on organized violence as its sole prospect of redemption? Nothing could be further from the truth.

There are some 2½ million Palestine Arabs in the world today. Three-quarters of them are in the original territory of Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan—that is to say, under Jordanian rule or within the area at present under Israel's jurisdiction. The other quarter are in Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia. One million three hundred thousand now hold Jordanian citizenship, which has been available to them since 1950, when Jordan annexed the territories of the West Bank with the consent of the Palestinian leaders.

For the entire period of the armistice régime between 1949 and 1967 all Palestine Arabs—except a few hundred thousand who are citizens of Israel—were living under Arab sovereignty and Arab flags. In other words, the question of their civic and political identity was a matter for determination by Arab Governments and authorities alone.

The Kingdom of Jordan was a Palestinian State, in the double sense that a majority of its citizens were Palestinians and a majority of all the Palestinians in the world were citizens of that State.

In a final peace settlement a new permanent boundary will be drawn between Israel and its eastern neighbour. Some hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arabs would in all conditions be a community within the State of Israel; this is normal. There is no such thing as 100 per cent self-determination, although the Arab nation comes closer to that figure than any other in history. Those Palestinian Arabs who will be outside Israel's permanent boundary once it is drawn will be free to determine their future in conjunction with the Arab Governments and peoples concerned.

As recently as 8. September 1972, the Israeli Prime Minister made it plain that in her conception of a peace agreement there would have to be important modifications of the previous armistice lines in order to preserve security and to avoid new wars. But she added that it was not her conception that under such an agreement the vast majority of all the Palestine Arabs in the administered territories would have to fall within Israeli jurisdiction.

It follows, therefore, that the political status of the Palestine Arabs would find its solution within a peace settlement. Now, here is the most drastic paradox of all: the "Palestine Liberation" organizations are the implacable opponents of an Arab peace with Israel. Yet nothing but peace with Israel can clarify the political and civil destiny of the Palestine Arabs in a manner compatible with Israel's sovereignty and security, with regional peace and with their own basic interests.

In the meantime, this community is not languishing in despair and poverty: There is a new freedom of movement and contact. The national product of the Samaria-Judea-Gaza areas, administered by Israel since 1967, in which a million Arabs live, has nearly doubled since 1968. The

per capita income has risen from 670 Israeli pounds in 1968 to 1,100 I.L. in 1972. The agricultural product has tripled. There were less than 4,000 private vehicles in 1969; there are nearly 7,000 today. These were 3,000 television sets there in 1967; today are 40,000. Fifty-thousand workers find labour opportunities in the Israeli market, from which they bring back 300 million Israeli pounds a year. There is no unemployment. Wage levels have trebled since 1967. The value of exports from these territories has risen from 220 million pounds to 305 million.

Perhaps more significant than the language of statistics is the spectacle of human contact, commerce and exchange that brings hundreds of thousands of Israelis and hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arabs into a normal and fruitful communion the like of which never existed before.

In the latter half of 1971, 200,000 Arabs from neighbouring countries freely crossed the Jordan bridges towards Israel. It is not inconceivable that when the agreed peace boundary is drawn the relations between Israel and its Eastern Arab neighbours could evolve across open boundaries into something like the community structure in parts of Western Europe today.

So while Arab terrorists in Beirut and European capitals manufacture their bombs and plot their assassinations, the majority of the Palestinian Arabs are living solid lives enriched by a widening contact with their neighbours—still clouded, of course, by a lack of political definition, but nevertheless alive with the hope and prospect of a peaceful regional future.

There is, of course, hardship in every sector of Middle Eastern life. But there is not one single problem of the Palestinian Arabs that can be advanced towards a solution by the action of the terrorist groups. There is not one single legitimate interest of the Palestinian Arabs that would not come to reasonable satisfaction in a negotiated peace settlement between Israel and its neighbours. The terrorist groups are not only the enemies of law and order across the Middle East and in many parts of the world: they also alienate the Palestine Arabs from their true interest and their authentic vocation.

The problem of curbing the terrorists is now our most urgent preoccupation. We are resolved to resist and weaken them in our region. We believe that national, regional and international

action against Arab terrorism is an indispensable prelude to the fruitful exploration of peaceful prospects for the Middle East.

145

Resolution on the situation in the Middle East adopted by the Sixtieth Inter-Parliamentary Conference¹⁶³

Rome, late September, 1972

The 60th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, *Expressing* its deep concern over the situation in the Middle East which continues to represent a threat to world peace,

Deploring the escalation of aggression and acts of violence which make increasingly numerous victims and have the effect of hindering efforts for peace,

Recalling previous appeals by the Inter-Parliamentary Union for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement in the Middle East,

Mindful of the Resolutions adopted by the United Nations on this subject, and especially those adopted by the Security Council, in particular Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967,

Re-emphasizing the importance of respecting the rights of the peoples concerned in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1. *Reaffirms* its support for the rapid achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967;

2. *Urges* all the parties concerned to co-operate with the United Nations and the Secretary-General's representative to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement which would take into account the well-being and the legitimate interests of all peoples concerned;

3. *Expresses* the hope that a rapid solution of the problem will be forthcoming so that the armed conflict will not be resumed.

¹⁶³ English text obtained through the courtesy of Mr. Muhammad Ali al-Halabi, President of the People's Assembly of Syria. The resolution was adopted by 459 votes to 51 with 188 abstentions; the Syrian delegation did not take part in the vote; the conference was held September 19-29.

146

Statement by Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua of China denouncing great power involvement in the Middle East and expressing support for the Arabs, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly¹⁶⁴

New York, October 3, 1972

The present situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East is solely created by the two super-Powers for their respective interests. Taking advantage of this situation, they are using Arab countries' territories and sovereignty and the Palestinian people's right to existence as stakes to strike political deals. The United States is openly supporting the aggression by Israeli Zionism. The other super-Power claims to "support and assist" the Arab people in their struggle against aggression. Has it supported and assisted them? It has indeed sold them no small amount of weapons. But strangely, the weapons supplied are not allowed to be used. Is this not asking people to buy scrap iron? Moreover, it demands privileges and bases, and even attempts to subvert their Government. What kind of "friend" is this? It is more dangerous than an open enemy.

However, recent developments show that the heroic Arab people will not allow others to ride on their backs and lord it over them for long. They have taken determined actions to shake off super-Power domination. This commands admiration. Do not believe the sensational nonsense deliberately spread by a super-Power that no counter-attack should be made against Israel's armed aggression for that would spark a world war. That is meant to scare people. It has been borne out repeatedly by the history of the 20 years and more since the Second World War. We believe that, so long as they strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle, the Arab countries subjected to aggression are fully capable of recovering their sacred territories and the injured Palestinian people regaining their national rights.

The Chinese Government has always opposed assassination and hijacking of individuals as a means for waging political struggles and is also

¹⁶⁴ Excerpted from the translation of Chiao's speech in the general debate of the twenty-seventh session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2051, pp. 71-72.

opposed to terrorist acts by individuals or a handful of people divorced from the masses, because they are harmful to the development of the cause of national liberation and people's revolution. But we strongly condemn Israel for the recent barbarous aggression and massacres it has committed against Lebanon, Syria and other Arab countries on the pretext of the "Munich incident." The Chinese people will always stand together with the Arab and Palestinian peoples in their just struggle against aggression.

.

147

Statement issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of West Germany concerning the prohibition of Palestinian student and labour unions¹⁶⁵

Bonn, October 4, 1972

The Federation and the States have adopted extensive security measures to prevent further threatened acts of terror. They are determined to thwart violent conflicts on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany with all the means of a free constitutional state.

In doing so the Federation and the States remain conscious of their responsibility for those law-abiding foreigners resident in the Federal Republic. Like the Germans themselves, they are threatened by terrorist attacks. In addition there is the danger that, due to the activities of a few foreign terrorists and small radical organizations, mistrust of all foreigners or of foreigners from certain countries will be stirred up.

We must therefore emphatically point out that the overwhelming majority of foreigners living amongst us and working in our country—whose cooperation we cannot and will not renounce—are just as law-abiding as the citizens of our country. This goes without qualification for foreigners from the Arab countries too. It is stressed that they will therefore not be exposed to any discrimination measures.

The measures adopted by the Federation and the States have as their aim to make residence impossible for those persons who are likely to support terrorist organizations, as well as to prevent the activities of radical organizations which sympathize with terrorist aspirations and give them support.

On October 4, 1972, in agreement with the Federal States, the General Union of Palestinian Students (G.U.P.S.) and the General Union of Palestinian Workers (G.U.P.W.) have consequently been prohibited.

The prohibition is not an evaluation of the political aims of these radical organizations. This is solely a question of preventing—out of consideration for the internal security of the Federal Republic—the G.U.P.S. and the G.U.P.W. from transferring violent conflicts onto the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Federal Government regrets the misuse by the above-mentioned organizations of the right of hospitality, especially since the German internal authorities have been especially generous, particularly towards the Palestinians, in authorizing residence in the Federal Republic. The contingent of Palestinian students at German universities is larger by 800 than that of any single Arab state. Since the June War of 1967, hundreds of these students have received scholarships from us, after the financial support from their families in the occupied territories had been cut off. Apart from the students several thousand Palestinians have found work in the Federal Republic. In these circumstances it can only be termed irresponsible when a few radicals thoughtlessly create problems for their fellow countrymen.

.

¹⁶⁵ Excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 140 (October 6, 1972), p. 1699.

148

Statement by Prime Minister Meir of Israel doubting whether peace is possible¹⁶⁶**Mid-October, 1972**

I am very sorry to say that—never mind immediate, but if there was at least some sign that somewhere in the near future, not the immediate future—there would be a possibility either for an overall peace with Egypt or for a Suez settlement, which would not have been the final settlement of the problem between us and Egypt but we accepted it and have the support of the United States Government. I don't see even any hope for that in the near future. Various things may happen, and miracles may happen, but as of now, and I believe for at least the next five or six months, certainly nothing will move.

The trouble is that Abd an-Nasir before Sadat and As-Sadat now—Abd an-Nasir did not have the courage nor has As-Sadat the courage to say: All right, we have made war upon the Israelis once, and twice, and three times. We can't make it. Doesn't make any sense why we fail. We have so many more people. We have so many more weapons in 1967 than the Israelis, but here they are again and they won again. Now we ought to make peace and we are going to meet them and negotiate with them and fight for the best conditions that we can get for, after all, it was we who made the war. Too bad we lost. And we have to be realistic.

No Arab leader—to a certain extent, and only to a certain extent, the exception is Husayn. Husayn at least is not afraid to say that he wants to make peace with Israel, is not afraid to say that war—another war—will not solve anything. There is only one aspect which makes things difficult. He wants peace on his terms, as though nothing happened in '67. I always wonder when people say to us: Go back to the '67 borders. I say: That's wonderful. That's exactly where we were in '67. So why was there a war? Why were we attacked?

As-Sadat does not want to make really peace

with us. He is prepared to sign some agreement which would be very similar to some armistice agreement, but not a peace treaty because he has not yet made up his mind for himself. Certainly he is not prepared to say to his people: Israel is here whether we like it or not. We wish it had never been born, and when it was born I wish we could have destroyed it. We can't do it. We have to live with Israel, for the sake of the Egyptian people, not only for the sake of Israel. He hasn't the courage to do it. So what do they do—what are they still doing? They escape to a corner and say somebody has to solve the problem for us. So now let's look around: who is the best candidate for squeezing Israel? Somebody has to squeeze Israel to force Israel to accept the Egyptian conditions.

149

Television interview statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers outlining U.S. moves to combat "terrorism"¹⁶⁷**Washington, October 15, 1972**

Mr. Schoumacher: Mr. Secretary, Arab terrorism, which has always been something of an abstract concern to Americans, has come home in this past week with several mail bombs addressed to Hadassah women. One blew up, injuring a postal employee. What are you going to do about it?

A. Well, it is not only Arab terrorism, but there is a good deal of terrorism in the world—some related to the Middle East and some related to other political problems. We have taken a number of political steps, as I am sure you are aware of, in the United Nations and other places to do what we can to outlaw this kind of conduct internationally, and we are making some progress.

Mr. Schoumacher: Well, we are in the same position, apparently, are we not, that Israel is—that, how far can you hold these other countries, these, say, Egypt,

¹⁶⁶ Excerpt of statement made to a United Jewish Appeal mission, broadcast October 14, 1972, on Israel radio in English; text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4120/A/6; reprinted by permission.

¹⁶⁷ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by Ted Koppel and Dave Schoumacher of ABC News, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVII, 1741 (November 6, 1972), p. 521.

Syria, responsible for these acts? Are you trying to?

A. Oh, sure. Well, we are trying to apply sanctions to countries that continue to give support to this kind of activity. For example, in the hijacking field, we are trying to get the international community to agree to sanctions which would in effect say that any nation that accepts hijackers without either extradition or prosecution would not have commercial aviation available to them. In other words, planes would not fly to that country, if that country accepted hijackers. Now, that is a very practical suggestion, and I think it has some possibilities of success.

150

Statement by U.S.S.R. Prime Minister Kosygin affirming full support for Egypt's policy, made during a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt¹⁶⁸

Moscow, October 16, 1972

Our friendship with the Egyptian people and the peoples of other Arab countries is not just a tradition. It was born and grew stronger as a natural result of common vital interests in building a new life and in the struggle against the forces trying to prevent this. Our friendship was born and tempered during hard times for the peoples of Arab countries, and they have always seen, and they see now that the Soviet Union is guided in its relations with them by a desire to support them in the struggle for progress, for the freedom and independence of the peoples, and for a position of equality for themselves in the world.

In the struggle to achieve these aims, a struggle which knows no pause or respite, the peoples of our countries are marching together and are tackling common tasks.

There were many trials for Soviet-Egyptian friendship in the past year. Not a few attempts were made to keep this friendship from growing stronger, precisely because this friendship is a

factor supporting the struggle of the peoples for national independence and progress.

Opponents of our friendship tried to scare the Arabs with socialism, but they failed, at a time when socialist ideas are gaining ever wider recognition among the peoples of Arab countries. They failed because the ideas of socialism are a sure and powerful means of helping the peoples to rise up from the depths of exploitation and poverty so as to become architects of their own destiny.

Now they are circulating the invention that the Soviet Union has, so they allege, arrived at some kind of "collusion" with the imperialists concerning a Middle East settlement to the detriment of the interests of the Arab countries. We emphatically reject such inventions. The Soviet Union has one foreign policy, one political line in Middle East affairs. This is the line of all-out support for the Arab peoples and progressive regimes in the Arab countries in their struggle against Israel's aggression. This line is pursued by the Soviet Union in all its foreign policy moves and other steps relating to the Middle East situation.

Our Egyptian friends, and not only they, know full well that in developing co-operation with the Arab Republic of Egypt and other Arab countries we are not pursuing any selfish interests. Moreover, the Soviet Union voluntarily assumed commitments and responsibility with regard to many aspects of the Middle East situation after Israel's aggression. We did so because the principle of internationalist solidarity with the peoples and states fighting against imperialism is one of the guiding principles of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union. At a time of grave danger for Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries, the Soviet Union did everything it could to restore their defence capacity.

We are supporting our friends by carrying out the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation¹⁶⁹ which has become a political and legal basis for our relations. On the basis of this treaty the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt can confidently develop their relations in the spirit of mutual confidence. This is a reliable and principled basis meeting the interests of both countries.

The peace-loving public throughout the world are anxious to see how the issue of war and peace

¹⁶⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5659 (October 17, 1972), pp. 333, 340.

is settled in the Middle East. The leaders of Israel evidently think that they will place the Arabs in a hopeless position by their aggressive policy and force them into abandoning their just demands. Those are dangerous illusions. In fact, Israel's policy, which is supported by imperialist circles, is aimed at blocking a political settlement in the Middle East by continuing her aggression. But such an adventurist policy can only worsen the dangerous crisis in the area.

We believe that a just settlement in the Middle East in keeping with the well-known resolution of the U.N. Security Council remains a feasible aim. The way to achieve this aim is through the close unity of Arab countries and the strengthening of their solidarity with the countries of the socialist community and with all the progressive forces in the world.

But as long as aggression continues, as long as the rights of peoples and states are being violated, Arab countries have the right to fight with every means against the aggression, against the encroachments upon their independence and territorial integrity. We fully agree with our Egyptian friends that concessions to the aggressor would only encourage him to commit new crimes.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and all the peoples of our country firmly side with the Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and other Arab states in their just anti-imperialist struggle. We shall continue to do our utmost to achieve the complete withdrawal of Israel's troops from all the occupied Arab lands, to achieve respect for the legitimate rights of all the peoples of the Middle East, including the Arab people of Palestine.

151

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt (excerpts)¹⁷⁰

Moscow, October 18, 1972

The Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Dr. Aziz Sidki, was on an official visit in the Soviet Union from October 16 to 18, 1972, at the invitation of the Soviet government.

During the talks, which passed in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, the Sides exchanged views on questions of Soviet-Egyptian relations, as well as on the Middle East situation.

The two Sides state that Soviet-Egyptian friendship is permanent and proceeds from the unity of purpose of the Egyptian and Soviet peoples in implementing universal peace, prosperity, social justice for the two friendly peoples. It also proceeds from their loyalty to the principles of socialism, respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations Organization, respect for the freedom of the peoples, for their legitimate rights to freedom and independence.

The two Sides state that the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation is a basis for the further strengthening and deepening of friendly contacts and cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet Union in every field.

Proceeding from the common position in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, the Sides state that with the passage of more than five years after Israel's armed aggression against the Arab states, and the occupation of Arab territories by Israel in accordance with its expansionist plans, despite the Security Council Resolution 242 condemning the capture of alien lands by force, despite the decisions of the United Nations Organization calling on Israel to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territories, despite all the attempts to attain peace either through Egyptian peace initiatives or through the efforts of the UN, of the powers—permanent members of the Security Council—of all peace-loving forces, Israel, with the support of imperialist forces,

¹⁶⁹ Printed as document no. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹⁷⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 44 (November 4, 1972), p. 2.

rejects all the attempts to attain a just peace, fully ignoring the decisions of the Security Council.

More than that, Israel openly announces its expansionist plans and tries to carry out a policy of accomplished facts, based on the continuation of the occupation of the Arab territories and eviction of thousands of Arab citizens from the occupied lands.

Israel has intensified its policy of military terror in the Middle East, having made a number of military attacks on the Arab countries, the latest of which was armed aggression against the Lebanon and Syria, that represents a challenge to all peaceful countries and the United Nations, a threat to international peace.

The Egyptian and the Soviet Sides consider that all states of the world and peace-loving forces should exert pressure on Israel to make it fulfil the Security Council's resolution and the United Nations' decisions on the withdrawal of its troops from all occupied Arab territories in order to achieve a lasting and just peace. The Soviet Side again confirms that the Arab states have a full right to liberate their territories, using any means in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the legitimate right of states to defend their freedom.

The Soviet Union will continue to do everything possible to ensure the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and also to protect the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

Both Sides state their conviction that Soviet Egyptian friendship is an important factor in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism. They believe that the unity of progressive anti-imperialist forces to fight against Israeli aggression, international imperialism and Zionism, against the attempts to weaken Soviet-Egyptian friendship is an urgent necessity.

The Egyptian Side expressed its gratitude to the Soviet Union for its great help to the Arab Republic of Egypt in developing its economy, in strengthening its military might and in other spheres.

152

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran (excerpts)¹⁷¹

Moscow, October 21, 1972

His Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shahinshah of Iran, and Her Majesty Farah Pahlavi, the Queen of Iran, stayed in the Soviet Union on an official visit from October 10 to 21, 1972, at the invitation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government.

In discussing the strained situation in the Middle East, the two Sides expressed concern over the dangerous situation in the area. They consider it necessary for all states concerned to make efforts to achieve a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. It was also pointed out that the withdrawal by Israel from the territories it occupied in 1967 is the prime condition for a settlement of this crisis. The two Sides reaffirmed that they will continue to give assistance to the special representative of the UN Secretary-General Jarring in his activities aimed at enforcing the Security Council's resolution. They stressed that the search of ways to a lasting settlement of the conflict in the Middle East is possible, provided the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, are respected.

¹⁷¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 44 (November 4, 1972), pp. 3, 4-5.

153

Recommendation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe calling for coordinated action against "terrorism"¹⁷²

Strasbourg, October 23, 1972

The Assembly,

1. Denouncing the increase in Europe and throughout the world of terrorist activities of which the Munich tragedy is a particularly horrifying example;
2. Noting that such acts, which are in utter conflict with the traditions and practices governing international relations, raise, in entirely new terms, the question of the responsibility of governments to put an end to them;
3. Noting with satisfaction that when the Foreign Ministers of the enlarged Community met in Rome on 11 September 1972, they also recognised Europe's responsibility in this undertaking of vital importance to our society;
4. Stressing that, although responsibility in this matter is universal, the forces involved in the conflict on either side make it logical for a practical orientation at European level to be found under the political guidance of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, this being the body composed of the greatest number of European States resolved to exert their efforts in the same direction;
5. Recalling Resolution (54) 16 of the Committee of Ministers, urging the governments of the member States of the Council of Europe to harmonise the attitudes adopted by the European countries within the United Nations and other international organizations;
6. Deploping the fact that the political and material support of a certain number of governments and organisations permits, or facilitates directly or indirectly, the preparation of terrorist outbreaks, or offers refuge to their authors or instigators,
7. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

(a) work out, in close co-operation, a joint European front to combat terrorism, and make

this a permanent item on its agenda as from its 51st Session in December 1972;

(b) invite, without delay, the governments of the member States to prevent the use of diplomatic missions or agencies for the preparation of, or as cover for, terrorist activity;

(c) invite the governments of member States to use all their political and economic influence to dissuade the States concerned from pursuing a policy which allows terrorists to prepare their acts or to reside or find asylum on their territory;

(d) invite governments of member States which have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify most urgently the three conventions (the Convention on Offences and certain other Acts on Board Aircraft, Tokyo 1963; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 1970; and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal 1971) against hijacking of aircraft and securing international air transport;

(e) invite the organs of the Council of Europe not to maintain relations with organisations that consider terrorism as a legitimate method of action.

154

Press release issued by the Foreign Ministry of West Germany, reporting Germany's protest to Ambassador Daghily of Libya after the hijacking of a German airliner¹⁷³

Bonn, October 31, 1972

On October 31, 1972, the Libyan ambassador, Jalal Muhammad Daghily, was called to the Foreign Ministry, where State Secretary Frank of the Foreign Ministry discussed with him all questions arising out of the hijacking of the Luft-hansa airliner to Libya. It was pointed out to the ambassador that, for the sake of orderly relations with Libya, the Federal Government looks forward to Libya joining in the efforts of the international community to combat terrorism, and expects that the two hijackers be made to bear the

¹⁷² Recommendation 684 (1972) adopted at the 16th sitting of the 24th session; text supplied, on request, by the Council of Europe.

¹⁷³ Translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), No. 153 (November 3, 1972), p. 1818.

consequences of their actions within the terms of the Hague Convention of December 16, 1970, for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

It was pointed out to the ambassador, as to other Arab ambassadors before him, that further acts of terror on the part of Palestinian groups on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or against German installations and persons abroad must lead to serious damage to German-Arab relations.

155

Radio interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel detailing Israel's attitude to Egypt, Jordan and Libya¹⁷⁴

November 11, 1972

Q. And the Arabs, Mrs. Meir, after the six-day war you said that peace was not a gift the Egyptians would give us, and you added that for the sake of the future of the children of the Egyptian President and for the sake of the future of the children of his country, Egypt needed peace no less than us. I ask you, madam, what else must take place so the Arabs will understand this?

A. I would say immediately that this is the problem. This is because if the Arab states really had had leaders who cared for their people in the first place I imagine there would have been no wars and peace would have been achieved a long time ago. I definitely believe that peace between us and, let us say in this case, Egypt, or between us and any other Arab state, is something desirable for us. We want it. Why do we want it so much? It is not only because every decent man must live in peace, but also because we have domestic concerns. We always say to ourselves what could we have done with all the money we spend on military equipment, because we have the desire and the plans on what we could have done, and everything we have to give up for the sake of security is painful.... Had Sadat felt the same thing, he would have understood that peace was necessary for him.

At any rate, it is impossible to imagine in any constellation or formation of government in Israel that a Premier or a President of the State of Israel would say: We are prepared to sacrifice 1,000,000 people—it is not important if this is a relative matter—when every man wounded in Israel is something painful.

Q. You know there is a feeling that Sadat is as incapable of defeating us in war as he is lacking in courage to make peace with us. The question is: Which do you need more courage for, to go to war against Israel or to conclude peace with it?

A. ...It is not he alone who lacks courage. I want to defend him a little. Did Abd an Nasir have courage?...

Q. Let us take King Husayn as an example on this point. We here speak about signs. I do not know exactly what are signs between politicians, but judging by his recent public pronouncements it is possible to understand that a change is beginning to take place in the King's thinking and that he is apparently prepared to enter into negotiations for peace with Israel. Do you feel a change in his attitude?

A. This is a king who has courage. Courage is needed in the circumstances of our region when an Arab leader stands up and says: No wars. He has learnt this lesson. He has suffered. He went to war without any reason. The results were as they were. And he has not reconciled himself to the results. However, he learned at least one thing and he says this in public, that another war will be another great catastrophe for the Arabs, and now it is necessary to search for a way to peace. So far all this is very nice, but I think he must learn another thing: one cannot twice start a war against Israel, twice lose and then request that everything should return to the way it used to be....

Q. Mrs. Meir, you yourself have said that it is very difficult for an Arab leader in this or that country to stand up today and declare that he is even prepared to sit down for peace talks with Israel. This definitely also applies to Husayn. Now, if we take for example Husayn's vigorous condemnation of the murderers in Munich and the condolences he sent to the families of the victims, do you not think that this gesture serves as some sort of a sign with regard to us?

A. I have no doubt regarding what I heard.

¹⁷⁴ Interview conducted by Gideon Livari, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4144/A/8-10; reprinted by permission.

Moreover, I believe that it is not merely words. I think it is true. First of all, he has learnt almost from personal experience what these terrorists are, and he drove them out. It was not easy, nor was it easy here, but nevertheless it took at least two years and we suffered. I believe in the sincerity of his words that he wants peace. I believe in that.

Q. That is a lot.

A. It is a lot. But it is not all, because what he says, in effect, in his statements is that he wants peace but he also wants the clock to be put back to 4th June 1967, and that is impossible.

Q. It is, indeed, impossible. But the question is whether this is not an opening and whether Israel should not officially react to it in any way. We have waited for a telephone call from Husayn for a long time, and now when he has dialled, Israel has not lifted the receiver.

A. If you want to translate this into reality, he has not dialled the telephone. But I do not think we must wait for a telephone call. He knows that we are prepared at any time to sit down and conduct peace negotiations. He also knows that we cannot accept what he wants. For example, when he came out with his federal kingdom plan, our opposition was not to the announcement of the plan. It is not our business and we must not interfere in the way he wants to construct the Jordanian Kingdom. If he wants to construct it into a federation, he is welcome. If he wants it in two parts, let it be. Our objection was to the fact that he actually determined the borders of his kingdom. . . . If this plan was in the nature of an ultimatum, it was not a peace plan for us. We must make a distinction between two things: I certainly appreciate both his desire for peace—and I believe in that—and his courage to say so in public and repeat it. This is a good start. Now a little more progress is needed—perhaps great progress: an admission that it is impossible to go back as though no war had taken place. I always say—and perhaps it is occasionally necessary to mention this to our people, but also certainly to the outside world—when people say: Well you have won the war. You are strong. It is true we are strong, thank God, but even a party which wins in a war pays for the victory. Not only do those who lose in a war pay, but also the winners. We do not want this any more.

Q. You say that this is certainly a first step. If so, he made one move. Perhaps we should make a second move now.

A. He made a move by saying he wanted peace. When he says he wants peace, this is something almost revolutionary. We say three times or thirteen times a day that we want peace, we want peace, we are prepared to hold negotiations, we want secure borders but also agreed ones. We say all the right things. If an Arab leader says he is prepared to hold negotiations with us about agreed borders, then this would really be a revolution. But when we say it, it is taken for granted. He has not phoned, but we hear him, and he hears us.

Q. You once said that you would be prepared to go anywhere to meet any Arab leader, and here you met the grandfather.

A. I went and met him [King Abdullah]. It is possible that for me to travel today to Amman [words indistinct] may be less risky than on that night. But I went, anyway. I am prepared to do that any time, even to go to Cairo. But Sadat says he does not want me to go to Cairo. Really this is not the important thing. The issue is much more important than that. I wish there was a chance to sit and talk objectively. . . .

Q. Today, 25 years after the State of Israel came into existence, gangs of Arab killers are committing acts of violence in Europe and striking at our citizens, gangs whose ideology is to annihilate the State of Israel. Can we say that Israel has entered a stage of pursuing Arab terrorists wherever they operate?

A. We decided to and began pursuing, finding and striking at them, but I must say that if anybody says that he knows how to protect every Israeli abroad from harm and every Israeli institution, he either has no idea what he is talking about, or I do not want to say what he is, but he is deceiving himself and the public. We are making immense efforts, and nobody can imagine what these efforts involve—manpower, vast amounts of money—but none of this is important. Everything possible is being done. We are employing the most gifted people. And we do have people whose names are not known, whose pictures do not appear in the press, and whom you do not interview, because they will not and need not be interviewed.

Q. I would have liked to.

A. Of course. They are people who have worked anonymously for years, who are in danger almost every day, both here and abroad. This is an unparalleled and grave problem. They [the terrorists] do not want to annihilate the State of Israel, they want physically to annihilate each and every Israeli, and [words indistinct] every Jew as well. The shocking thing is that there are people abroad who consider this a revolution, a liberation movement.

Q. Did you see the three Munich killers at a press conference in Libya?

A. No, I did not see them, but I read their statements. I saw on television how the coffins were received in Libya, as if they were international heroes. And Qadhafi, or somebody else from his Government, I do not remember, said that actually the gold medal of the Olympic Games should be awarded to them. For what? For murdering 11 people.

Q. And all this is happening in Libya, a member country of the UN, a country which gives shelter and bases to the terrorists and which openly supports them with money and other means. Madam Premier, how long will this gentleman from Libya remain in the clear, safe from Israel's response?

A. That is a Libyan problem—as they say in the army, that is their problem. We know that Libya is also our problem. It is one of the sources—not the only one—but one of the sources [of Arab terrorism]. There are training camps in Cairo as well. We know that they exist in Lebanon and Syria too. Libya is undoubtedly a large centre. This is one of the injustices of the world, the fact that vast oil resources should exist in such a country, under such a leadership. He has money and he wastes that money. For anybody who wants to destroy something in the world, the address to write to is Qadhafi, who has money. We are aware of Libya, of the camps and everything that happens there.

156

Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel confirming that the villagers of Ikrit and Bir'im will not be allowed to return to their villages, made in response to a question by Knesset Member Avneri¹⁷⁵

Jerusalem, November 13, 1972

Uri Avneri [Member of the Knesset]. It has come to my attention that the citizens of Ikrit in Galilee, who were expelled from their land at the end of October 1948, have decided to carry out the Supreme Court decision of 1951 which allows them to return to their village.

It has also come to my attention that the Adviser for Arab Affairs in the Prime Minister's office interfered to prevent that.

I want to know:

1. Did the adviser interfere in the Ikrit case? if so, what was the purpose and nature of this interference?
2. Has a policy been formed in the Prime Minister's Office regarding the demands of the people of Ikrit to be allowed to exercise their legal rights in their village?

Meir. According to the decision of the Supreme Court of 1952, after the decision mentioned in the question, the inhabitants of the villages have no right to return to their villages.

The Adviser on Arab Affairs has explained that to the inhabitants of the villages and told them that the police will be obliged to prevent any attempt to return and live in the village.

The government has again decided that the people of Ikrit and Bir'im will not be allowed to return to their deserted villages, and that they should complete their settlement at their present places of residence.

¹⁷⁵ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records* (Hebrew), Seventh Knesset, Fourth Session, vol. V (November 13, 1972), p. 368; the question was first tabled on June 8, 1972.

157

Statement by Foreign Minister Schumann of France confirming the arms embargo on belligerents in the Middle East conflict, noting Europe's growing support for French Middle East policy, and emphasizing U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as the basis for a solution¹⁷⁶

Paris, November 16, 1972

In the Near East, application of the same principles has not yet brought the same results. However, I imagine that no one will dare to accuse us again of having applied a unilateral embargo to one of the belligerents, by ceasing all arms sales to the countries in the field of operations. These days there are other places where we sometimes wish to deplore such a lack of discrimination. Here again, events have proved that people have unwittingly attacked a policy where we shall maintain a difficult but necessary balance so as to respect all our commitments, beginning, of course, with those we have entered into with public opinion and the French parliament. But now we are already receiving a first justification: the attitude of our European partners is moving closer to our own. The members of the European community, from the end of 1967 to the beginning of 1971, were voting without mutual coordination every time a resolution relating to the Near East was put to the vote, either in the U.N. General Assembly or in the Security Council. Recently, things have been different; this has been particularly noticeable in the Security Council when the case of Lebanon has come up, which is a country doubly dear to us by its history and by its structure. If we apply ourselves to maintaining and strengthening this growing solidarity, it is so that Europe may, when the time comes, act as France has been able to do in South East Asia. For lack of this support, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his special representative, Ambassador Jarring, run the risk of remaining con-

demned to a powerlessness which is both harmful and undeserved. Do people realize that if France had chosen another line of conduct, the whole world would be resigned to seeing the Holy Land torn apart indefinitely and prey to either rivalry or complicity, both equally foreign to the interests and rights of all the nations who inhabit it? We must choose: either to allow, explicitly or implicitly, a new frontier of cold war to perpetuate a focus of restlessness and violence in the Near East; or to keep to the balance established by the resolution of November 22, 1967, a balance between evacuation of the occupied territories and conditions effective for a guaranteed security. France, for its part, has opted for stability—that is, for a real and lasting peace. We believe that our duty is to keep to this choice. Through the President of the Republic, we have unreservedly condemned terrorism, and stressed that this condemnation would be in vain if it were not accompanied by a search for the causes of terrorism, and the methods most likely to eliminate those causes. In particular, M. Pompidou himself has pinpointed the Palestine problem as “a human problem, and therefore a political one.”¹⁷⁷

158

Statement by President Senghor of Senegal in support of Security Council Resolution 242, made during a dinner in honour of visiting King Faisal of Saudi Arabia¹⁷⁸

Dakar, November 21, 1972

Your Majesty knows the attitude of my country Senegal. In the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity it continues to be in support of the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and the reactivation of the Jarring mission aimed at securing a permanent peace unaffected by the annexation of territories by armed force.

Your Majesty, we are looking forward to the

¹⁷⁶ Excerpted and translated from the French text of Schumann's speech to the French National Assembly during the budget debate, *La politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd semester, 1972 (Paris: La documentation française, 1973), p. 159.

¹⁷⁷ See document no. 140 above, for Pompidou's statement.

¹⁷⁸ Excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), November 22, 1972.

day when a just and permanent peace will return to the Middle East, the cradle of messages of love and peace, for the benefit of all its peoples.

159

Telegram from Foreign Minister Winzer of East Germany to the President of the Twenty-seventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly, stating East Germany's attitude to the Middle East crisis¹⁷⁹

East Berlin, November 30, 1972

Consideration of "the Situation in the Middle East" by the Twenty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly gives me occasion to corroborate the view of the Government of the German Democratic Republic that the conflict unleashed in the Middle East through the Israeli aggression against the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on 5 June 1967 is a permanent source of dangerous tensions and seriously hampers international cooperation.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has attentively followed the efforts made by the United Nations Organization to create the prerequisites for a peace based on a long-term and just solution to make its way to the Middle East, too.

The German Democratic Republic concurs with the majority of United Nations member states in noting that the responsibility for the fact that up till now these efforts have failed rests solely with the Government of Israel and the imperialist circles supporting it.

Even now the Government of Israel refuses to withdraw its troops from the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 and thus to comply with resolutions adopted by the United Nations Organization. In defiance of the fact that in so doing Israel is acting contrary to the generally accepted principles of international law and the

Charter of the United Nations, which prohibit the occupation or acquisition of foreign territory by use of force, its government is carrying on its aggressive policies vis-à-vis the neighbouring Arab states as has been illustrated by the most recent Israeli raids against Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic holds the view that a political settlement of the Middle East conflict is possible and it emphatically stands up for the implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967. It demands the complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 as well as a durable and just peace settlement in the Middle East brought about by the unreserved recognition of and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Arab states.

The Government of the GDR is guided by the consideration that peace in the Middle East can be restored only if the rights of each people, including the Arab people of Palestine, are taken into account and implemented.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic will give its support to any decision of the United Nations General Assembly that will cause Israel to evacuate the occupied Arab territories without delay and that will serve to bring about a durable and just peace settlement in harmony with corresponding UN resolutions.

160

Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on the current U.N. General Assembly and looking forward to 1973¹⁸⁰

December 2, 1972

Q. Mr. Eban, what do you expect to come out of the current debate over the Middle East in the UN General Assembly?

A. I expect a resolution which will do no good

¹⁷⁹ English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XII, 35 (December 8, 1972), pp. 270-271. The telegram was released under U.N. doc. no. A/8930 on December 4, 1972.

¹⁸⁰ Interview conducted by Andrew Meisels, broadcast on Israel radio in English; partial text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*; ME/4162/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

and which may do harm. That's inevitable in the light of the arithmetical composition of the General Assembly and the fact that no proposals are before it with a constructive purpose.

Q. You indicated this week, [? to the Dutch] Ambassador, I believe, that if the General Assembly should attempt to change the meaning of Resolution 242, Israel would no longer be bound by it. Would you elaborate on that?

A. It really ought not to require elaboration. I think it's quite obvious. If you have signed or accepted a contract in daily life which commits you to pay a thousand pounds for something and then somebody comes along and puts in just a few figures, a few naughts, as a result of which you are represented as being obliged to pay 100,000 pounds, can anybody seriously say that that forged document commits you because of your signature to the authentic document? But that's exactly what's happening here....

Let me give an immediate example. The draft that the Egyptians are putting around—I don't know what its status is now—but the one that they are putting around, based on the formulations of the Rabat conference, calls on Israel for immediate and unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territory in conformity with Resolution 242. Now, Resolution 242 says nothing whatever of the kind. It does not call for immediate withdrawal at all, but only for withdrawal in the context of a just and durable peace in parallel with a whole list of undertakings and obligations which the other states have not yet adopted. It does not call for unconditional withdrawal, but only for a withdrawal conditional on the establishment of peace and fulfilment of all the other parts of the resolution, including the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

And it does not, of course, call for withdrawal from all the territories but from territories, and the authors of the resolution have told us quite plainly that the omission of the word "all" was deliberate. So here you have a triple falsification, and yet, with superb effrontery, a text totally contradictory to the Resolution 242 is presented as though it were Resolution 242....

Q. Mr. Eban ... how do you see the chances for peace in the Middle East in 1973?

A. Well, they would be just as good or bad as

they are at the moment. The hope that 1973 might see some progress is not reinforced by anything that was heard from Arab capitals. I've studied the speeches of the Foreign Minister of Egypt and the Permanent Representative of Jordan and it's impossible to find there any real readiness to embark upon free negotiations for peace. If Dr. Zayyat had said anything constructive which seemed to give an opening for negotiations, I would have been in New York within 24 hours to try to find out what the implications were. What I have been doing here with our ambassadors in European and other countries has been to work in the capitals to mobilize opinion against the resolution, especially against those parts of it which would have pernicious operative effects.

In 1973, all that we have heard is that the United States believes that a diplomatic process should be set afoot. And a diplomatic process means an attempt to get a temporary partial settlement of the Suez Canal which would stimulate further agreements and which would reserve the position of the parties on the overall settlement. I think that's a good approach because I can't imagine in a conflict like this that we could get a transition overnight from complete deadlock to complete peace. That hasn't happened in any of the recent conflicts in which there has been an improved situation in the past year or two. You have to proceed by stages and there is an inherent logic in the idea that the first stage should be attempted in the Egyptian-Israeli sector. And if such an agreement were achieved, I think it would encourage some movement of opinion and thinking which seem to be arising in the mind of the Jordanian King.

161

Statement by Permanent U.N. Representative Huang Hua of China confirming China's full support for the Arabs, made before the U.N. General Assembly¹⁸¹

New York, December 5, 1972

The Chinese delegation would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the following: The Chinese Government and people have consistently held that Israeli Zionism must completely withdraw from Egypt, Syria and all other Arab Territories it has occupied; the Palestinian people must restore their right to return to their homeland and their right to national existence. The Chinese Government and people severely condemn Israeli Zionism for its crimes of carrying out barbarous aggression with the support and connivance of the super-Powers, firmly support the peoples of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and other Arab countries in resisting aggression and recovering the lost territories and firmly support the Palestinian people in their just struggle to restore their right to national existence. The Chinese Government and people earnestly hope that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples will further strengthen their unity and support and assist each other in the struggle against their common enemies. The Chinese Government and people firmly believe that, by relying on their own strength, the one hundred million Arab people will certainly frustrate the aggression and schemes of imperialism and Zionism and win final victory in their struggle to safeguard national independence, recover the lost territories and restore their right to national existence.

162

Statement by Permanent U.N. Representative Malik of the U.S.S.R. suggesting that continued Israeli disregard of U.N. decisions should be met with sanctions and expulsion, made before the U.N. General Assembly¹⁸²

New York, December 5, 1972

In conditions where Israel continues to sabotage a peaceful settlement and stubbornly pursues its policy undermining international peace, continuing its policy of aggression and force in international relations, in violation of resolutions adopted by the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, against other countries of the Near East, many countries are rightly raising the question of taking effective steps against the aggressor in accordance with the United Nations Charter. According to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council, if its measures to maintain international peace should prove inadequate, is empowered to enact appropriate sanctions. If, therefore, Israel should continue to ignore the decisions and demands of the Security Council, the Council is entitled to apply sanctions to Israel as the aggressor. This is required by the United Nations Charter. It is required by the interests of all peace-loving countries, and it should be done in the name of peace—the peace and welfare of all nations.

Israel has boycotted the United Nations. Is it not time for the United Nations to think not only of boycotting Israel but of expelling it from the ranks of the Member States of the United Nations as not belonging there? One of the important tasks confronting the United Nations in connexion with the situation in the Near East is the need to intensify the efforts of the Security Council to bring about a political settlement in the region, and particularly efforts by its permanent members in accordance with resolution 242 (1967).

¹⁸¹ Excerpted from the English translation of a speech delivered during the General Assembly's Middle East debate, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2099, pp. 28–30.

¹⁸² Excerpted from the English translation of the speech delivered during the General Assembly's Middle East debate, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2099, pp. 63–65.

163

Statement by Foreign Minister Singh of India on the Middle East, made in his foreign policy speech to the Lok Sabha¹⁸³**New Delhi, December 7, 1972**

The situation in West Asia still continues to be a source of anxiety, and the Israeli forces still continue to be in illegal occupation of the area that came in their possession as a result of their aggression. We have supported throughout, and we continue to support, a unanimous Resolution of the Security Council in this respect which has called upon Israel to vacate aggression. The situation there in the Arab-Israel conflict, at the present moment, is highly unsatisfactory, and there is no significant move which has been initiated recently that might raise some hope that a solution of this problem is in sight.

164

Press conference statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers reiterating U.S. hope for negotiations towards an interim settlement in the Middle East¹⁸⁴**Brussels, December 8, 1972**

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you indicated to the Council that during the end part of the ministerial you would be initiating another effort to get things going on an interim Suez settlement.

A. The United States continues to believe that Security Council Resolution 242 is the basic framework on which an agreement should be worked out. I think because of the complexities involved that it's unlikely that a complete and final settlement can be worked out pursuant to Security Council Resolution 242 very soon. We think it's very difficult to imagine negotiations

which could be conducted which would lead to settlement of all those problems. And if nothing has happened for a while—and since 1967 nothing has happened as a practical matter—then it becomes more difficult. The situation is one of tension. We think there should be an attempt made to figure out a way to make some progress, with a full understanding that that progress would be merely interim progress, that what everyone is seeking is a final solution based on 242.

Now, President Sadat suggested the interim settlement which is his proposal, and the Prime Minister of Israel indicated that she thought it was an interesting proposal which deserved consideration. What we have in mind is that negotiations should start. We recognize the difficulty in starting direct negotiations. We are going to be active diplomatically to see if there is some way to get negotiations started of an indirect nature, at first, with the idea of making some progress. And we think that that progress should be related to Security Council Resolution 242, in its final implementation. Now, that doesn't suggest that the United States is necessarily going to take any public initiative. But we're going to do what we can to stimulate interest and discussions. As I've said on previous occasions, this is really the only area of the world where no negotiations are being conducted in areas of tension. The two Koreas are talking; we're talking about Vietnam; Pakistan and India are having discussions; the two Germanys are discussing matters; and we are certainly discussing matters with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. So the only area where there are no real negotiations conducted is in the Middle East. We think that it's not only illogical that no discussions are being held, but we think it's highly desirable that a serious attempt be made to make some progress. We think that an interim agreement linked to final settlement pursuant to 242 is the best prospect.

¹⁸³ Excerpted from the English text of the speech supplied, on request, by the Embassy of India, Beirut.

¹⁸⁴ Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers' press conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1749 (January 1, 1973), p. 9.

165

Press interview statements by Israel Absorption Minister Peled discussing the current and future pattern of Jewish immigration to Israel¹⁸⁵

Mid-December, 1972

Q. How many immigrants will the government be prepared to absorb in the coming year without emergency measures?

A. If immigration in 1973 exceeds expectations and totals sixty thousand we shall certainly have to take extraordinary measures, such as importing houses and calling on the public to bear part of the burden by temporarily absorbing the families of immigrants on their arrival.

Q. As against the increase in immigration from the East, from the West it is diminishing. What do you think are the reasons for this?

A. There are certainly several factors: the economic situation in the West, and especially in the United States, has improved and there are more opportunities for work there. The incentive provided to many Jews by the Six Day War is now less strong. There are implications for Israeli society's view of immigration, and there are now also difficult problems of accommodation and the problems of finding employment for the members of certain professions that are becoming more acute. But despite all this it would be wrong, I think, for us to neglect immigration from the West because of the pressures of immigration from the U.S.S.R.

Q. Many people say that the majority of the immigrants from the U.S.S.R. tend to engage in political activity with Herut. Does immigration from the U.S.S.R. indicate a new political trend among immigrants in Israel?

A. I think it is certainly a mistake to think that most of the immigrants go to Herut. It is true that a number of activists have declared that they have joined this party, and that some of them came from Latvia, where the Revisionist Movement had great influence before the Second

World War. But through daily contact with the immigrants I have not reached this conclusion. The majority of them think about life in Israel and study the situation, and their trends will be to a great extent dependent on which parties take an interest in them and the way they do so.

Q. Eighty per cent of the immigrants have been sent to live in the big towns in the coastal area, and only twenty per cent to the development areas. Have there been changes in population distribution policy this year?

A. This year there has been a rise in the proportion of immigrants who have been settled in the development areas—it has risen to thirty per cent, and it is intended to increase it to forty per cent. Beersheba has occupied first place as regards the settling of immigrants—678 flats. After it came Nazareth (612), Ashdod (594), Karmel (418), Askalon (390), Kiryat Gath (240) and Yamuna (203), and after these al-Affula and Mijdal Ha'imaq, the place where immigrants refused to live at first and which is now considered one of the most desirable places in Israel.

166

Statement on the Middle East made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home during his introduction to the House of Commons foreign affairs debate¹⁸⁶

London, December 14, 1972

The situation in the Middle East continues to give grave concern to us all. We believe that it is necessary to bring to an end, if possible with international help, the dangerous cycle of violence and reprisal which has characterised the Middle East dispute, particularly in recent months. Nobody has thought of any better way than to implement the Security Council Resolution 242, with all its faults. We believe we shall never get anything like unanimity on anything else. It provides a framework within which contacts can be made at any time with third parties who are anxious to assist towards reconciliation.

¹⁸⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text of the interview conducted by Nahum Barnaa, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), December 15, 1972.

¹⁸⁶ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, vol. 848, December 14, 1972, col. 652.

The stubborn repetition of entrenched positions does not allow of optimism, but there have been some changes. The Egyptians have introduced a new element into the situation by dispensing with their Soviet military advisers. This presents an opportunity, which we hope will not be lost, for a fresh look at the possibilities of a solution. This is surely something of which Israel should take account.

The American presidential elections are now over and President Nixon has said that he attaches high priority to the need for a settlement of the Middle East problem.

167

Statement on the Middle East made by General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Brezhnev in his report to the joint meeting of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the Supreme Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and the Russian S.S.R. on the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.S.R.¹⁸⁷

Moscow, December 21, 1972

We have broad and versatile relations with a number of Arab countries. The entire course of events has shown that friendship with the Soviet Union assures the progressive Arab states the necessary support and aid in their most difficult hour. This is well known in Egypt and in Syria, in Iraq and the Yemen. We have treaties of friendship with Egypt and Iraq, and shall develop our relations with these countries on the basis of these documents. We are firmly resolved to strengthen friendly ties also with Syria, Algeria and other Arab countries.

The present international situation is such that all who want a real strengthening of world peace should multiply their efforts aimed at extinguishing the hotbed of war in the Middle East and

eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab states. Many countries have declared in favour of resolving the Middle East problems on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, but regrettably words are not enough. If they were buttressed by concrete political actions, Israel would be compelled to agree to a peaceful settlement, to recognise the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples. As concerns the Soviet Union, our readiness to contribute to this is well known.

168

Statement by Pope Paul VI regretting that the ceasefire has not been strengthened by moves towards a permanent peace in the Middle East¹⁸⁸

Vatican City, December 22, 1972

That a virtual suspension of military activity has been prolonged in the Middle East can undoubtedly be interpreted as a positive development. But this protraction of the state of war without effective steps toward seeking peaceful solutions, while the effort to increase military potential remains unchanged, constitutes a grave permanent danger in a very sensitive and delicate area. This danger threatens not only the tranquillity and security of the area's peoples; it also threatens values cherished for many reasons by a large part of humanity.

It goes without saying that the gradual acceptance of situations lacking a clear juridical foundation that is internationally recognized and guaranteed, can only render more difficult, rather than facilitate, a just, acceptable solution which takes due account of the rights of all. We are thinking in particular of the Holy City, Jerusalem, which is often in the thoughts of Christ's followers at this season, and of which they too should be able to consider themselves full "citizens."

¹⁸⁷ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, Supplement to no. 51 (December 23, 1972), p. 7.

¹⁸⁸ Excerpted from the English translation of the Pope's address to the Sacred College of Cardinals, *The Pope Speaks* magazine (Washington, D.C.), XVII, 4 (winter, 1973), pp. 351-352.

We therefore renew Our hope and fervent encouragement for sincere, willing efforts toward a just and speedy peace. Among those who seek this together with Us, but who justifiably feel a still greater urgency, are the sons and daughters of the people of Palestine, who for so many years have been waiting and calling for a just recognition of their aspirations, not in opposition to the rights of other peoples, but in necessary harmony with them.

169

Statement by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH) protesting the demolition by Israel of parts of Arab refugee camps in Gaza¹⁸⁹

Tel Aviv, December 24, 1972

The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel categorically protests against the renewed demolishing of hundreds of houses in the refugee camp at Rafah by the Israeli occupation authorities.

The claim of the authorities, that this was done out of an alleged concern for security and for the improvement of the living conditions of the refugees is a cynical argument. The destruction of refugee homes and their evacuation are a coarse violation of the rights of the inhabitants of the occupied areas; they are a new link in the chain of creating accomplished facts, in order to facilitate the policy of annexation; they are further breach of the rights of the refugees.

The authorities have already announced that they will carry out similar actions in the other refugee camps, situated in the north of Rafah, Khan Younis and Jabaliyeh near Gaza. They have also stated that those actions will lead to the uprooting of half the inhabitants of Rafah—who number more than 40 thousand persons.

The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel categorically denounces these steps which are one more link in the policy of ignoring the rights of the Palestine Arab people, and of negating their rights, including the right of the refugees. These are further obstacles heaped by the Israeli Government on the road of the efforts for a peaceful solution of the crisis in our region.

More dangerous is the timing of these actions. They have come immediately after the termination of the UN General Assembly's session which adopted a series of resolutions condemning the stubborn refusal of the Israeli Government to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 242. These resolutions of the UN Assembly call upon the Israeli Government to withhold any steps which would constitute a change in the physical and demographic situation of the occupied territories. The activities carried out in the Gaza Strip are a grave and rude violation of the Assembly Resolution of December 14, which was adopted by 95 votes against 6, and condemned the Israeli authorities precisely for demolishing houses in the Gaza Strip.

The Political Bureau warns against continuing the policy of provoking international public opinion, and ignoring the decisions of the United Nations which reiterated the demand for respect of the rights of the Arab people in the occupied areas. By this adventurist policy the Israeli Government leads the people and the State into the gravest perils.

Consequent upon the decision of the UN Assembly of Dec. 8, 1972, which renewed the call for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the Political Bureau appealed to the forces of peace opposed to the adventurist policy of occupation and annexation, to act in greater unity for the implementation of that Resolution, and thereby attain a just and lasting peace in our region.

The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel reiterates its call upon the partisans of peace in Israel to intensify their struggle against the policy of annexation and negation of the rights of the Palestine Arab people, and express their protest against acts of oppression and against the demolition of refugee homes in the Gaza Strip.

An end to the demolition of homes and violation of the rights of the refugees!

¹⁸⁹ English text in Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH), *Information Bulletin* (Tel Aviv), no. 12 (December, 1972), pp. 39–40. Arabic text in *al-Ittihad* (Haifa), December 26, 1972, p. 6.

For peace—the Israeli Government must respect the legitimate rights of the Palestine Arab people, in accordance with the UNO decisions.

170

Statement by U.K. Labour Party leader Wilson supporting Israel's interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242¹⁹⁰

Tel Aviv, December 27, 1972

[Israel's interpretation of Resolution 242 is] fully consistent with what the British Labour Government had meant when it drafted it.... If our Government had meant all, we would have said all. We would never have wanted to say it anyway. And if we had, it would not have been passed.

171

Proposed principles for peace negotiations adopted by the sixth convention of the United Labour Party of Israel (Mapam)¹⁹¹

Tel Aviv, late December, 1972

The State of Israel did not embark upon a war of conquest in June 1967. The war was forced upon her by enemies who sought to annihilate her. Israel's victory saved her from that fate.

Peace should be Israel's most important political goal. But because it has not yet been achieved, she must carry on her struggle for peace while retaining her security.

The following propositions represent certain principles which Mapam will endeavor to have the Government of Israel accept as a basis for negotiations.

1. The state of Israel does not desire annexation. She requires border-amendments as a means

to guarantee her security. There will be no return, therefore, to the borders which were in force prior to June 5, 1967.

2. The land of Israel on both sides of the Jordan River is the homeland of both Jews returning to their country and of the Arabs already dwelling there. Consequently, Israel will regard with favor a political solution based on the existence of two independent and sovereign states in this homeland: Israel on the one hand, and an Arab state on the other.

The self-determination of the Arab-Palestinian people will be realized in this neighboring state. Israel will honour every decision reached by the Palestinians and Jordanians in respect to their self-determination, sovereignty and independence outside Israel's borders—on the condition that their relationship with Israel is based upon peace agreements and neighborly relations.

3. The national character of each state will be allowed to develop without any mutual interference in the life and form of their respective regimes.

4. In arriving at the border-amendments outlined in this program, Israel will be guided by its concern for the preservation of her character as a Jewish State. It is for this reason that we regard the annexation of areas apart from those required for security as dangerous to the Jewish character and the Zionist aims of the State of Israel.

5. Israel will not retreat from the borders reached during the Six Day War until a peace agreement and mutually recognized and accepted security borders are established. This fundamental position does not rule out the possibility of a partial agreement according to which the Israel Defence Army will establish itself along a new, mutually recognized and accepted defence-line as a part of an intermediate stage in negotiations.

6. Direct negotiations are the conventionally accepted means for reconciling differences between states. Israel, however, will be prepared to accept other forms of negotiations if they prove capable of shortening the road to peace.

Israel will be ready to conduct unconditional negotiations either with all the Arab states or with each of them separately. She will be ready to reach a comprehensive, permanent peace, or a partial, temporary arrangement which will be a step in that direction. So as not to place

¹⁹⁰ As reported in *Labour Weekly* (London), January 5, 1973, p. 5; the statement was made in a speech to the Israeli Labour Party.

¹⁹¹ English text, *Mapam Bulletin* (Tel Aviv), no. 26 (April, 1973) pp. 5-9; the Convention was held December 27-30, 1972

obstacles in the way of a political settlement, no "facts" which do not derive from real security needs will be established before a peace agreement is signed.

7. The establishment of a genuine peace between Israel and her neighbors will bring about the liberation of enormous human and economic resources in the nations of this area. With peace it will be possible to achieve greater political and economic independence, and to free the area from foreign intervention. Poverty, ignorance and disease will be eliminated, and a higher standard of living for the masses will result. The entire region will benefit, as well, from the mutual exchange of knowledge, the planned exploitation of natural resources, and the creation of various development projects.

8. Israel's long-term security will be based on the following principles:

- (a) The careful preservation of the Israel Defence Army's superiority in the balance of power between Israel and the Arab states.
- (b) The effective demilitarization of all areas to be evacuated by the Israel Defence Army.
- (c) A peace agreement with Israel's neighbors which will guarantee the elimination of enemy activities against her, from whatever direction they may come.
- (d) Mutually acknowledged and agreed upon border adjustments based on Israel's security needs.

BORDERS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

Israel will conduct negotiations for a peace settlement with all the Arab states, or with each of them separately. It will do so within the framework of the Security Council's resolution, number 242 of November 22, 1967.

A. The Golan Heights

To insure the security and welfare of the settlements in the Galilee and Jordan Valley, the border between Israel and Syria will pass through the Golan Heights. The remaining area will be demilitarized when a permanent border is established.

B. Jerusalem

1. United Jerusalem is the capital of the State of Israel.

2. A peace agreement will guarantee Moslems and Christians special rights to and control of their holy sites. When peace is achieved, Israel will not oppose transferring control of Moslem holy places to the governing bodies of the neighboring state.

3. The rights of the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem will be acknowledged and municipal service will be guaranteed to them in the framework of the united city.

4. The Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem will be allowed to choose either Israeli citizenship or that of the neighboring state. Those who choose the latter, will continue to enjoy all their rights as inhabitants of Jerusalem.

5. Mapam supports the development program which aims at ensuring Jerusalem's status as the capital of Israel and the cultural and spiritual center of the Jewish people. However, development and construction in united Jerusalem should be carried out with extreme care so that the image of the city, its beauty and its historical values, are protected.

6. A policy should be promoted which honors civil and religious rights and encourages mutual understanding and neighborly relations between all parts of the population. This policy will help establish a bridge to peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs.

C. Egypt

1. Israel will be prepared to negotiate with Egypt either for a comprehensive peace, or for a temporary agreement until border amendments necessary for Israel's security have been established. Israel will be ready to reach an agreement to open the Suez Canal for free navigation for all states, including Israel. If a partial agreement is arrived at, Israel will be prepared to retreat to a recognized line while continuing to negotiate for a comprehensive peace settlement.

2. Israel will demand that a peace settlement be based upon the demilitarization of the Sinai Desert until the time when security border-amendments are created.

3. The Gaza Strip will not be returned to Egyptian rule, for it has neither belonged to

Egypt, nor was it annexed throughout the 19-year Egyptian occupation.

When conditions permit, the status of the Gaza Strip will be determined according to the nature of Israel's security requirements, the wishes of the population, and the necessities of finding a solution to the refugee problem.

4. Mapam supports the establishment of security-settlement outposts in the Rafah Approaches according to the needs of Israel's security and its future security borders. Mapam demands that restitution be made to the Bedouin of the Approaches for the severe injustice done to them through their arbitrary eviction by the Government of Israel.

Mapam is convinced that security-settlement outposts in the Rafah Approaches can be maintained and expanded without harm to the rights of the Bedouin, and with improvement of their lot. This means assisting their economic and social progress, in the best tradition of Zionist settlement. Mapam will campaign for restitution, either through the return of part of the Bedouin to the Approaches, or in some other way, thus making further security settlement possible there.

5. Free navigation in the Suez Canal will be insured by a peace agreement. Free navigation in the Tiran Straits will be guaranteed by a peace agreement and by some form of Israeli presence there.

D. Jordan

1. Negotiations between Israel and Jordan will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined above. An agreement between the two nations will be based on a non-aggression pact and upon economic and cultural cooperation. Once amendments indispensable to her security have been determined, Israel will retreat to mutually recognized borders and the West Bank will be returned and demilitarized by means to be agreed upon. The Jordan River is a natural barrier. No military forces will cross it.

2. Co-operation between the two nations will help promote a solution to the refugee problem. The majority of the refugees will be rehabilitated in Israel's neighboring Arab State. Both nations will work together to mobilize from international sources, the means to further agriculture, industry, building-construction and irrigation projects.

3. In negotiations to be conducted between

Israel and Jordan, Israel will be prepared to accord representation to those Palestinians in the Administered Areas who are genuinely interested in peace.

MILITARY SETTLEMENTS

1. In pursuing its settlement enterprise, the Zionist Movement has always taken care to avoid the expropriation of Arabs. If this principle was observed during the Mandate period, it is even more important that it be observed today when we are a sovereign state, for the State of Israel is responsible for the realization of the aims of Zionism.

2. Mapam will continue to fight every kind of injustice and expropriation, and strive to carry on the traditions of progressive Zionism which have proven that Jewish settlement need not involve expropriation, but has, on the contrary, the power to grant Arabs as well as Jews, the blessings of socio-economic progress and prosperity.

3. Although Israel's security situation requires the establishment of temporary military settlements in the Administered Areas, no permanent settlements should be created there which might become obstacles in the way of peace negotiations.

THE ADMINISTERED AREAS

1. In the transition period until permanent peace agreements are obtained, Israel will work towards strengthening the economic structure of the Administration Areas in the spheres of agriculture, industry and building. It will act to insure full employment, the development and regulation of health, education and social services, and normal municipal activities, including the holding of regular elections. All of this will further mutual understanding and co-operation with the inhabitants of the Administered Areas, help eliminate mutual prejudices and enmity, and lay the foundation for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

2. Israel will insure security and order in the Administered Areas. Terrorism has disturbed normal life in the Gaza Strip. In direct proportion to the elimination of terrorism there, a liberalization policy will be continued which will enable

the population of the Gaza Strip free movement inside Israel.

3. The policy of open bridges and non-intervention in the social and cultural life of the inhabitants of the West Bank must be continued. The possibilities for increased understanding, co-operation and peace between the State of Israel and the Arab State will increase in direct proportion to the growth of the Arab population's experience of freedom in every sphere of life: social, economic and cultural.

With the aim of furthering the development of democracy in the Administered Areas, Israel should grant the Arab population freedom of political organization, on the condition that this does not contradict the security requirements of the State of Israel.

4. Israel should allow the inhabitants of the West Bank to return to their former homes, which they left during the Six Day War. This should be done as a continuation of previously determined policies and on condition that careful security examinations are carried out.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

1. During the transition period, the State of Israel should take practical steps toward a solution to the refugee problem. Although a complete solution to the problem is possible only with the establishment of peace and with the assistance of international funds, it is possible at the present time to absorb a number of refugees into the economic life of the Administered Areas.

2. Israel will initiate a solution to the refugee problem even before peace is obtained. It will do so by continuing and extending its policy of family unification, by working toward the gradual dissolution of the refugee camps by converting part of them into ordinary urban and rural settlements, and by developing agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial enterprises in the West Bank and integrating refugees into them. In the framework of a peace settlement, Israel will absorb a pre-determined number of refugees by a variety of means.

172

Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on the Bangkok incident¹⁹²

December 30, 1972

Q. Let us start, Mr. Eban, with the main question today—why, in your opinion, have the terrorists capitulated?

A. I cannot and I am not duty bound to enter the depths of their thoughts. However, I am sure that one of the principal reasons was the attitude displayed by the Government of Thailand. The Thai Government came to them with a strong and vigorous demand and displayed its ability to control the situation. I have no doubt that this was one of the reasons. What I do not know is the exact role played by Egypt through its ambassador. It is known that he joined the other quarters which proposed that the terrorists accept the outlet offered them.

Q. Did the Thai authorities consult with us at any stage during their negotiations with the terrorists?

A. Yes. They informed us in advance that they had decided to propose to the terrorists that they would ensure their departure without punishment in return for the release of our prisoners. We definitely approved this proposal and they acted upon it with consistency and great efficiency.

Q. Mr. Eban, did the Israeli Government discuss operative plans in order to try and save the members of the embassy if the terrorists should carry out their threat to blow up the building?

A. When such an incident, which is likely to end—as experience has taught us—in disaster, happens, it is clear that the government considers all sorts of possibilities. However, while the Israeli Government was discussing the situation, the Thai initiative was communicated to us and therefore we decided to explore to the end this outlet, which we considered an honourable one. Since we saw that the Thai Government was confident it has a chance of succeeding, we followed this line.

¹⁹² Interview conducted by Yizhaq Feller, broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4182/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.

Q. Nevertheless, was the Government determined not to accept the demand of the terrorists?

A. There was not even a proposal or the slightest inclination to accept their conditions. Our aim was to rescue our people without giving the terrorists what they wanted.

Q. You mentioned the part of the Egyptian Ambassador in Bangkok in the negotiations. Would you say that his very intervention constitutes a shift of any kind?

A. I cannot interpret Egypt's policy. I do not know what it will do in the future. Nevertheless, I can detect a change between the performance of the Egyptian representative on this occasion and what we know, for example, about the unfruitful attempts of the Germans to enlist Egypt's help in the Munich tragedy. There is definitely a change. What is the significance of the change and what is the extent of its firmness, I cannot say.

Q. Mr. Eban, it has been reported that a special envoy has visited our embassies abroad in the past few weeks in order to examine their security arrangements. Is it possible to infer that his recommendations have not stood the test of reality or that his recommendations have not been fulfilled?

A. No. I am sure that all the recommendations have been carried out. There has been an atmosphere of tension in all our missions recently, but there was nothing to make us focus our concern particularly on Bangkok. At any rate, there is no doubt that all preventive means have recently been strengthened. On this occasion I want also to praise the performance of the Israeli Embassy, Ambassador Amir and our service employees who endured horrifying hours of tension and alarm, and the Foreign Ministry, which joined the efforts under the Premier's guidance to bring the incident to a successful end. I do not believe we have any reason to [word indistinct] ourselves.

Section of the Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross relating to the Middle East conflict in 1972¹⁹³

Geneva, 1972

Middle East

The ICRC continued its action for prisoners of war, civilian internees and detainees, and for civilian populations who were suffering as a result of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries. It maintained delegations in Israel and the occupied territories, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. It had twenty-one delegates in the field and a large local staff.

In the Arabian Peninsula, the ICRC concerned itself with the well-being of prisoners of war, refugees and political detainees in the Yemen Arab Republic.

From 20 to 23 April, Mr. Jean-Pierre Maunoir, Assistant Director and acting delegate-general for the Middle East, went to Israel to study current problems and the solutions thereto with the government authorities.

In July, Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocké was appointed delegate-general for the Middle East, succeeding Mr. Maunoir who became acting director of the ICRC Operations Department. In renewed approaches to all States parties to the Geneva Conventions, with a view to increasing ICRC resources, several financial prospecting missions proceeded to the Middle East. The first, from 24 November to 20 December, covered Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It later went to Qatar and Oman, where government authorities were contacted regarding those two States' accession to the Geneva Conventions and the establishment of National Red Crescent Societies.

CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

ICRC as substitute for Protecting Power: In December 1971, three members of the ICRC, Mr. Max Petit-pierre, Mr. Frédéric Siordet and Mr. Victor

¹⁹³ Excerpted from International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1972* (Geneva, 1973), pp. 62-75.

Umbricht, were in the Middle East. The first went to the Arab Republic of Egypt, the second to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and the third to Israel. They informed government authorities in the countries visited that the ICRC was prepared to offer all States parties to the Middle East conflict its services as a substitute for the Protecting Power, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 10 common to the First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions, and Article 11 of the Fourth Convention.

The President of the ICRC confirmed and explained the ICRC's position in the matter at the second session of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, early in June.

In September 1972, the ICRC sent the five Governments concerned a note in which, after stressing that the procedure for supervising the application of the Conventions was not yet being put into effect, it drew the attention of the parties to the conflict to the hardship which this omission caused the victims and formally offered its services as the Protecting Powers' substitute.

PRISONERS OF WAR

The ICRC continued its assistance to prisoners of war in Israel, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Its delegates visited prisoners of war regularly, on average twice a month. They were able to talk with the prisoners without any witnesses. They distributed books, games, food and cigarettes, inquired about their personal needs, and transmitted family mail.

The ICRC constantly reminded the various governments concerned of the obligation to repatriate any prisoners of war still held on either side, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Third Geneva Convention.

Israel

At the beginning of 1972, there were 105 Arab prisoners of war in Israel, namely sixty-two Egyptians, forty-two Syrians and one Jordanian.

In March, with no prospect of an early repatriation of prisoners of war held on either side, and as some had developed physical and psychological ailments as a result of prolonged captivity, the ICRC proposed to the Israeli, Egyptian and Syrian Governments that the prisoners be visited by a

doctor-delegate or a joint medical commission such as provided for in the Third Convention.

The Government of Israel having responded favourably to the proposal, an ICRC doctor-delegate was in Israel from 25 to 29 April. His report was conveyed to the detaining power and to the prisoners' own governments.

On 16 April, three Syrian prisoners of war escaped from a military prison camp. One of them was recaptured on the same day. The ICRC delegates asked to be allowed to visit him on 16 April. They were authorized to do so on 19 April.

On 18 April, during a riot of Egyptian prisoners of war, a prisoner was killed. His body was repatriated under the auspices of the ICRC, at El Qantara on 21 April. On the day following the riot, ICRC representatives went to the prison and heard statements about the incident from the prisoners and the authorities responsible for supervision. A further visit was made on 23 April. The delegates' report was promptly communicated to the two governments concerned. The ICRC subsequently transmitted to the prisoners' own government the official report on the inquiry carried out by the detaining Power, and to each government the communications which it had received from the other.

On 21 June 1972, five Syrian senior officers, one Lebanese officer and one soldier, and three policemen, were captured during a foray into Lebanese territory. Immediately after the event, the ICRC sent the governments concerned various proposals regarding the repatriation of prisoners held on either side. The proposals were not accepted.

The matter was brought before the United Nations Security Council, which adopted resolution 316 of 26 June 1972.

The positions of the Governments of Syria and Israel differ with regard to the status of the prisoners taken by the Israeli armed forces on 21 June. The ICRC, for its part, is not qualified to settle a dispute which has been referred to an international body. It will be recalled that Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war confers prisoner-of-war status and treatment, *inter alia*, to members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who have fallen into the power of the enemy.

On 19 September 1972, five members of the Lebanese armed forces including one officer were

captured by the Israeli army in the course of a raid on Lebanese territory. The ICRC delegation in Tel Aviv visited them immediately and then informed the Israeli military authorities that, under the terms of the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, such army men should be repatriated.

On 27 December, the Israeli authorities asked the ICRC to repatriate three Egyptian prisoners of war for health reasons.

At the end of 1972, there were 114 Arab prisoners of war in Israeli hands, namely fifty-eight Egyptians, forty-six Syrians and ten Lebanese.

Arab Republic of Egypt

ICRC delegates made fortnightly visits to the ten Israeli prisoners of war interned in the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Under the provisions of Articles 109 and 110 of the Third Geneva Convention, the ICRC approached the Egyptian authorities to request the repatriation of an Israeli prisoner of war wounded at the time of capture, in December 1969, and suffering ever since from the sequelae of his wounds. By the end of the year the ICRC had received no reply to its request.

Syria

During the first half of the year ICRC delegates visited once a month the three Israeli prisoners of war in Syrian hands. In the second half, they made two visits a month. On each occasion they interviewed the prisoners privately although, despite their efforts, they did not have access to the actual detention quarters.

Jordan

During the first three months of 1972, ICRC delegates continued to visit, in the Zerka military camp, the four Israelis who had been granted prisoner-of-war status by the Jordanian authorities. The ICRC acted as intermediary between the governments concerned in the repatriation of the four Israelis across the Allenby Bridge, on 17 April. The Jordanian prisoner of war held by the Israelis was repatriated on the same day.

FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION

Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention: During his talks with Israeli authorities, in December 1971, Mr. Umbricht had again stated the ICRC's

position, namely that the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was applicable in occupied territory. The Government of Israel, for its part, again declared that it left the question of the applicability of the Fourth Convention in occupied territory open.

In the circumstances, while maintaining its position, the ICRC continued its pragmatical approach, from one case to another, to ensure as complete as possible an implementation of the provisions of the Fourth Convention. Thus, in several matters, the facilities granted by the Israel authorities enabled the delegates, as in the past, to intervene on behalf of the victims of the conflict.

In some other cases, however, as mentioned further on in this chapter, owing to the stand taken by Israel, the ICRC failed or only partly succeeded in obtaining satisfaction. Its action, therefore, has been confined to remedying for protected persons the effects of measures taken by the Israeli authorities.

Civilian detainees and internees

Arab civilian detainees in Israel and occupied territory: ICRC delegates continued to visit some 2,500 Arab civilian detainees in thirteen places of detention in Israel and occupied territory. They made six rounds of visits, reports on which were sent by the ICRC to the detaining Power and the prisoners' own governments.

At the end of the period of interrogation, usually limited to a month after arrest, the delegates were able to see and talk privately with so-called security cases—whether sentenced, charged or in preventive custody—and with prisoners sentenced or charged under ordinary law.

The ICRC delegates contacted the Israel authorities in various matters connected with detention conditions. With regard to medical care, they supplied dentures, artificial limbs, spectacles, etc. They recommended a larger number of workshops and courses of tuition in places of detention. They continued to supply the necessary books, copy-books and pens, and introduced a method for teaching illiterates. The Israel authorities, for their part, largely complied with the ICRC's recommendations.

The ICRC delegates continued their monthly distribution of parcels to detainees who received no family visits. In 1972, the number of parcels

(containing 5 kg. of fruits, biscuits, cigarettes and soap) exceeded 7,000. Winter parcels (underwear, towels and footwear) were given to all detainees who were nationals of Arab countries or whose family was unable to supply such a parcel. After numerous approaches, the delegates secured permission to transmit individual parcels sent by the Egyptian Red Crescent for civilian detainees in Israel and occupied territory.

The ICRC continued to provide transport once a month for detainees' families. It organized and largely financed more than a thousand bus trips and thus enabled some 39,000 relatives to visit detainees.

ICRC delegates arranged for the repatriation of a number of civilian detainees to neighbouring Arab countries. Before proceeding with the repatriation operations—fourteen to Jordan, one to Syria, one to Iraq and seven to Lebanon—they made sure that the persons concerned wanted to return home.

While the Israel authorities did not consider themselves bound by the provisions of the Fourth Convention in regard to notification, owing to their stand in the matter of the applicability of that Convention, they nevertheless agreed to inform the ICRC delegation, after an eighteen-day inquiry, of the names of Arab nationals arrested by the army or the police. The ICRC delegates visited them in prisons in accordance with the procedure described above.

Palestinian combatants: With the capture of further Palestinian combatants during Israeli armed raids into Lebanon, in September, the head of the ICRC delegation in Tel Aviv renewed his approaches to the Israeli authorities and asked that the combatants be granted prisoner-of-war status or, failing that, treatment such as was laid down in the Third Geneva Convention. The Israel authorities refused to comply, deeming that Palestinian combatants, even if captured wearing a uniform and openly carrying weapons, did not belong to one of the parties to the conflict or conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, in the manner laid down in Article 4 of the Third Convention. The ICRC considered that it should nevertheless pursue its approaches.

Civilian infiltrators in Israel and Lebanon: The ICRC delegates arranged for the repatriation of various civilian infiltrators who had crossed the

frontier between Israel and Lebanon.

Israel civilian detainees in the Arab Republic of Egypt: The ICRC approached the government authorities in the Arab Republic of Egypt and requested permission to visit an Israeli imprisoned in Cairo.

Reuniting of families

In December 1971, Mr. Umbricht reminded the Israel authorities that the ICRC attached great importance to the reuniting of families and that such operations should be actively pursued. He suggested that the criteria adopted by the Israel authorities in the matter be broadened and that the procedure be speeded up.

The proportion of cases submitted by the ICRC in which permission for repatriation was granted was not, however, in keeping with the assurances received by the ICRC representative.

Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza-Sinai: In 1972, six family reuniting operations between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the occupied territories of Gaza and Sinai were organized under the auspices of the ICRC. They enabled some 400 persons from Egypt to join their families in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and 520 from the Gaza Strip and Sinai to join their people in Egypt.

Lebanon and the occupied territories: In August 1972, the ICRC arranged for the transfer, via Ras Nakoura, of fourteen persons from the West Bank of the Jordan to Lebanon, to join their relatives.

Syria and the Golan Heights: In 1972, thirty-six persons were able to join their families on the Golan Heights through four operations organized at El Quneitra (Ahmedia) under the auspices of the ICRC.

Jordan and the West Bank: As in previous years, the ICRC's action was confined to endorsing those applications made to the Israel authorities which were of special humanitarian interest and which had failed under the normal procedure. Fifty-five persons benefited under the hardship procedure during 1972. It should be noted that during the second half of the year the ICRC delegates observed a marked drop in the ratio of acceptances; out of the fifty-six applications submitted, only ten were accepted. In the circumstances, the ICRC decided to resume its study of the other cases with the Israel authorities.

Student travel

Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza Strip: The ICRC succeeded in organizing the passage into the Arab Republic of Egypt of several hundred students from Gaza who, after graduating in occupied territory and intending to continue their studies in Egyptian universities, had been granted the requisite permission by the Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel. Students already enrolled in Egyptian universities and allowed to return to their families in Gaza for the holidays or on completion of their studies also crossed the Suez canal under ICRC auspices.

Five operations took place at El Qantara from 3 to 26 July, enabling 1,652 Palestinian students to spend their summer holidays in Gaza. In four operations conducted between 29 August and 20 September, 1,601 students returned to the Arab Republic of Egypt, while 779 new students went to Cairo on 27 September and 5 October to take up study at the university.

Syria and Gaza Strip: In the middle of June, the ICRC delegates made arrangements at El Quneitra (Ahmedia) for 175 Gaza students to cross over into Syria to attend Damascus university.

Lebanon and Gaza Strip: Again, on 11 January the ICRC delegates arranged for forty-seven Gaza students to cross over into Lebanon to attend Beirut university. They returned to Gaza on 7 August for their summer holidays.

Activities of Central Tracing Agency

In 1972, the ICRC transmitted some 100,000 family messages between Arab countries, on the one hand, and Israel and the occupied territories, on the other. By the end of the year, the number of messages exchanged since June 1967 had reached 1.7 million.

Some 200 inquiries about army men or civilians missing during or following the June 1967 hostilities were taken up with the competent authorities and National Societies. More than thirty persons sought by relatives were found during that period.

Study of health situation in the Gaza Strip and Sinai

From 27 August to 16 September, an ICRC doctor-delegate made a survey of the medical situation in the Gaza Strip and Sinai. In the Gaza Strip, he visited four hospitals administered

by Israel authorities: Shifa Hospital, Khan Younis Hospital, Nasr Hospital and Eye Hospital (formerly Fever Hospital). One of the purposes of the mission was to analyse the steps taken by the Health Services to remedy the shortage of medical and para-medical personnel and the obsolescence of hospital installations.

The doctor-delegate's mission to Sinai comprised the following tasks:

- In Northern Sinai, first and foremost a survey of health conditions at El Arish, followed by surveys at Massoura, Sheikh Zwayed and places visited by the mobile clinic;
- in Central Sinai, four-day trips by mobile clinic to El Bakna, Tamad, Bir el Hissi, Khassam, Taref, El Sura, Ain Furtaga and Wasset;
- in Southern Sinai, visits to medical installations at Abu Rodeis, Sharm El Sheik and St. Catherine, and a trip to Wadi Firan with the doctor in charge of the mobile clinic.

The observations and recommendations made by the ICRC doctor-delegate regarding the installation and modernization of some hospitals, the establishment of infirmaries and the need to remedy the shortage of nurses, were embodied in a report sent to the two Governments concerned.

Action for the disabled

The German Red Cross in the Federal Republic of Germany having made a further financial contribution to Magen David Adom (MDA), the ICRC delegates in Israel pursued their activities on behalf of the disabled in the territory occupied in March 1972.

Relief

Under its relief programmes, in April the ICRC shipped 300 tons of flour donated by the Swiss Government for civilians on the West Bank of the Jordan—in the Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem and Hebron areas. Some 30,000 needy persons (old people, sick persons, pregnant women, widows and orphans) received 10 kg. each.

A further 300 tons of flour from the Swiss Government was shipped in September, and 200 tons of unskimmed powdered milk from the same donor, left for Ashdod in November.

In December, the ICRC sent 2,000 tons of flour, a gift from the European Economic Community, to the civilian population of Jordan.

In September, two donations of the Egyptian

Red Crescent, totalling 650 tons of food and 40,000 metres of fabric, were transmitted by the ICRC to the Gaza Strip and Sinai. They were distributed to the needy population during the following month.

Expulsions

While the ICRC received no assurances in response to repeated requests to the Israel authorities to put an end to the expulsion of nationals of occupied territories suspected of activities against the State's security, no further cases were brought to its notice after July 1972.

Earlier, delegates in Jordan had access to provisional internment centres for those expelled. They visited the Mahatta prison, in Amman, and the Ma'an and Zerka prisons nine times. The ICRC delegation in Israel dealt with one case after another to ensure that persons expelled were allowed to return to their families in occupied territory.

Expropriations

In its concern regarding the principle and the human implications of expropriation, the ICRC repeatedly drew the attention of Israel civil and military authorities to the effect of expropriating land under cultivation or fixed property and establishing Israel settlements in the occupied territories.

As the Government of Israel declared that it did not want to enter into any discussion in the matter, the ICRC delegates were compelled to submit human problems to the authorities as and when they arose.

Destruction of houses

The position of those victimized by the Israel Army's destruction of houses in occupied territory was a matter of continued concern for the ICRC, which regarded such action as being contrary to Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

In February, the delegation learnt that twenty-eight families had been evicted in an operation involving the destruction of forty-three houses lying near the El Arish Military Governorate.

On numerous occasions, the delegation expressed its serious concern about the destruction and asked the Israeli authorities to ensure that adequate steps were taken to provide the victims with alternative accommodation.

In 1972, some twenty cases of destruction

designed to counter subversive activities and affecting almost 170 persons, were reported to the ICRC delegates in Gaza. On the West Bank of the Jordan, fifteen destruction operations affecting about a hundred persons were reported.

As the position of the Israel authorities remained unchanged, the ICRC delegates concentrated on assistance to the victims. In 1972, with the agreement of the Israel Ministry of Social Welfare, 47 tents and 525 blankets were distributed to the homeless.

Transfer of population

Sinai: Early in February, the ICRC delegation received many complaints about population transfers from the Massoura and Sheikh Zwayed areas to Rafah, in the north-eastern part of Sinai. Fourteen Bedouin tribes, a population of around 10,000, were affected.

A few days later, the delegation learnt that in January twelve tribes living in the Kusseima area (Central Sinai) had been forced to move to a rocky zone further south. The transfer, involving about 6,000 persons, had been due to Israel army manoeuvres in the area. Despite the assurances they had been given, the tribes were not allowed to return to their land when the manoeuvres ended.

Following the transfers, a number of approaches were made through Israel's permanent mission in Geneva and the ICRC delegation in Tel Aviv. The ICRC expressed deep concern about the plight of the displaced tribes and the hope that they would soon be allowed to return to their land. Further, it asked that tribes whose dwellings and cisterns had been destroyed should receive adequate compensation and be provided with new means of subsistence.

The Israel authorities replied that the transfers had been necessary for security reasons, adding that those expropriated would be compensated and helped to settle elsewhere. After a talk between the Israel Minister of Defence and an ICRC representative, on 22 April, the 6,000 Bedouins from Central Sinai were allowed to return to their land.

ICRC delegates made several visits to the displaced Bedouin tribes. They continued their efforts, particularly on behalf of the 10,000 Bedouins from Rafah who were not allowed to return to their land.

West Bank of the Jordan: The ICRC delegates endeavoured to improve living conditions for a Bedouin tribe of about 260 who, in December 1971, had been moved from an area near the Dead Sea to the Bethlehem district. The delegates noted that the Israel authorities had provided them with materials for the construction of permanent dwellings.

Hijacking of aircraft to Lod airport

In the afternoon of 8 May, four members of a Palestinian resistance organization hijacked an airliner to Lod airport (Tel Aviv). At the Palestinians' request, the ICRC agreed to act as intermediary between the two parties, and the Israel authorities did not object. Members of the ICRC delegation in Tel Aviv therefore proceeded to Lod airport in the night of 8 to 9 May and began to transmit proposals and counter-proposals regarding the release of the hostages. In the afternoon of 9 May, however, Israeli armed forces boarded the aircraft by surprise and took control.

Following the event, the ICRC stated its position in a press release issued on 10 May. . . .¹⁹⁴

In September 1972, after reconsidering its position regarding the taking of hostages, the ICRC adopted the following line of conduct:

1. The ICRC condemns acts which violate the principles of law and humanity, particularly acts which destroy or threaten innocent lives. In this, as in every other sphere, it is guided solely by the interest of the victims and its desire to aid them.

2. ICRC delegates may, if need be, render material assistance or, by their presence, moral comfort to hostages. As a general rule, however, the functions of delegates do not include participating in negotiations between the authorities concerned and the authors of such acts.

3. If the victim's interests should require it and provided there is no direct contact or any other intermediary, the ICRC may, as an exception, deal with the matter at the request of one of the parties concerned and with the agreement of the other parties. The parties concerned must undertake not to resort to force, take any steps detrimental to the hostages or hamper delegates in their freedom of action, for as long as contacts are established between them.

4. The delegates shall request full facilities in assisting the victims and shall ask that, wherever possible and advisable, those in need of special care (wounded or sick persons, children, etc.) be removed to safety.

5. Whether delegates take part in negotiations or merely serve as intermediaries, the parties concerned shall alone be responsible for any proposals transmitted, decisions taken or acts committed. The delegates shall not guarantee the execution of the decisions or of the conditions fixed by the parties.

JORDAN

ACTIVITIES OF CENTRAL TRACING AGENCY

ICRC delegates in Jordan continued to visit all refugee camps on the east bank of the Jordan twice a month, to maintain contact and perform the various duties of the Central Tracing Agency, such as tracing missing persons, reuniting families and, above all, transmitting family messages. For the same purpose, the delegates made weekly visits to Zerka and Irbid, in the north, and monthly visits to Ma'an, Karak and Aqaba, in the south. In these activities it co-operated with the Jordan Red Crescent.

As the ICRC delegates on the West Bank regularly sent the Amman delegation a number of permits for visits, the latter informed recipients in Jordan or any other Arab country that such permits were deposited with it.

PERSONS DETAINED OWING TO THE EVENTS

The ICRC delegates again asked the Jordanian authorities for permission to see persons detained as a result of the events. On several occasions, they sent the competent services parcels, items of clothing and family messages for detainees in the Mahatta Jafr and Irbid prisons.

In December, they were authorized to distribute 250 standard parcels direct to detainees in the Jafr prison.

The ICRC delegation in Amman endeavoured to secure permission to visit detainees regularly. The Amman delegation made arrangements for about thirty bus trips for families who could not afford the fare to visit detained relatives. This action, which started in June 1972, provided free travel for 1,500 relatives of detainees.

¹⁹⁴ For the text of the press release, see document no. 80 above.

ACTION FOR THE DISABLED

The residue of the funds for relief action undertaken at the time of the September 1970 events was used for financing the extension of the Cheshire Home orthopaedic centre for the disabled, in Amman.

A project for the extension of the premises was drawn up with the aid of a Finnish expert, and on 5 November an agreement on the project was signed by the Jordanian Ministry of Health, the ICRC and CARE.

The agreement provided that:

- the Ministry of Health shall be responsible for the construction of the centre and shall, if need be, meet expenditure exceeding the estimates;
- the ICRC shall make a financial contribution of up to 20,000 Jordanian dinars to the construction of the centre;
- CARE shall supply building material.

RELIEF

In February, the ICRC shipped 500 tons of flour, a gift from the European Economic Community, to Aqaba. It was distributed to needy families by the Jordan National Red Crescent Society.

SYRIA

In March, the ICRC sent medical supplies

including 100,000 Mexaform tablets to Syria for persons displaced from the Golan Heights. In August, 540 tons of wheat donated by the Swiss Government were shipped to Latakia, for distribution by the Syrian Red Crescent to some 54,000 persons displaced from Golan as a result of the June 1967 conflict.

LEBANON

Following raids which Israel armed forces carried out in Lebanese territory, the ICRC handed over medical supplies, in particular to the Lebanese Red Cross, in support of its action on behalf of the victims.

In September, the ICRC received two complaints from the Lebanese Government regarding the Israel army's violations of the law of war and, in particular, of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of poisonous substances for military purposes. In reply to the second communication, the Israel authorities categorically denied that their troops had used such substances.

ICRC delegates in Lebanon visited several refugee camps to ascertain medical and other needs and make the family message system better known. Medical supplies were provided for dispensaries operated by the "Palestinian Red Crescent."

.

Arab World

Press interview statements by President Numairi of Sudan concerning his country's commitment to the Arab confrontation with Israel¹

Khartoum, early January, 1972

Q. Many people have been asking why Sudan has stayed outside the Federation of Arab Republics, but now this situation is also being exploited to cast doubt on Sudan's commitment to the Tripoli Charter,² and to allege that Khartoum has now completely withdrawn from the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and, consequently, will have nothing to do with the next battle.

A. First of all, let me say that Sudan's commitment to the Tripoli Charter is unconditional; it is impossible that we should in any way shirk the duties imposed on us by that pact. Concerning the battle of destiny expected to break out as a result of developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict I do not think that I need to emphasize that Sudan is as strongly committed as many other quarters to take part in the war. Some of our forces are still on the battlefield, and all state institutions in our country are in a [virtual] state of war with Israel. Even our relations with other states are determined by the extent of their aid to our immediate enemy. For example, we have refused to resume diplomatic relations with the United States of America, because its attitude to Israel has not changed since the 1967 war.

There are some things which the Arabs forget, but which we cannot forget. We are as committed as Arabs within the framework of the League of Arab States. We are committed to any war that involves or harms the Arabs. There are also military agreements that oblige us to intervene in the case of our neighbours being exposed to any danger. However the fundamental question that has to be posed in this context is: How capable are we of entering the war? In fact it is precisely this question we are answering in a practical

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Sayyad* (Beirut), no. 1426 (January 13-20, 1972), p. 22.

² See document no. 462 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1969.

manner, through our constant efforts to expand our potential in both the military and economic fields. War does not only require soldiers, but also a strong economy.

Resolution of the Third Conference of the Lebanese Communist Party on the Palestine problem (excerpts)³

Beirut, January 10, 1972

The Third Conference of the Lebanese Communist Party affirms its attitude to the Palestine problem, as stated definitively in its Political Programme, as being a problem of the national liberation of a people who have been evicted, whose land has been usurped, and who have been prevented by force from exercising their natural and legitimate right to self-determination. It also regards the struggle of the Palestinian people as part of the Arab national liberation movement directed against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Zionism, the instrument and agent in this area of the world and, in particular, American imperialism, makes a move whenever there are signs that the Arab national liberation movement is again becoming active and taking new steps to liquidate the economic, political and strategic positions of imperialism. Its role is to act as watch-dog for the interests of the imperialist oil monopolies, to keep the Arab world subservient and backward, by virtue of its organic links with imperialism, with a view toward realizing its ambitions as regards territorial expansion and the establishment of a "Greater Israel."

It is in this context that the Zionist-imperialist aggression of 1967 is to be seen, and in this context that we must explain the attempts to hold on to the territories of the Arab countries occupied in the June War, the failure so far to submit to the will of world public opinion and the failure to imple-

³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Akhbar* (Beirut), January 15, 1972.

ment the Security Council resolution which affirmed the illegality of usurping Arab territory by brute force.

The Third Conference considers that the struggle to perform the principal task at the present stage—the task of forcing the aggressor to withdraw and liquidate the traces of his aggression—is, within the framework of the present balance of forces, part of the general struggle of the Arab liberation movement for the just solution of the Palestine problem on the basis of safeguarding all the rights of the Palestinian Arab people in their territory and their homeland.

176

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt surveying recent attempts at negotiations, explaining the cancellation of the “year of decision” and stressing the significance of the Federation of Arab States (excerpts)⁴

Cairo, January 13, 1972

What is the American attitude toward the conflict today? It can be summed up as follows: We started with the Security Council resolution in 1967, Resolution 242, which we still recognize and accept. They said that this resolution was a package deal, meaning an overall process, and was to be implemented as a whole. We said that there was no objection. But the first thing in the resolution is Israeli withdrawal and condemnation of the forcible occupation of the territory of others. We accepted this resolution and we still accept it. Well then, what has happened to this resolution? What developments have there been? After saying that the resolution was a package deal, to be implemented all at once, America started manoeuvring, and did so all through last year, to turn the resolution into a separate and independent solution with each Arab state individually.

That means a separate solution with Egypt, a separate solution with Syria, a separate solution with Jordan, with King Hussein.

When I submitted my initiative in February of last year,⁵ America was delighted and said, that is fine. Why was that? As I said to the *New York Times* editor, Sulzberger,⁶ for the last six months America and I had been playing hide-and-seek. They have something in mind and I have something in mind; they know what I am thinking and I know what they are thinking and for eight months each of us was trying to out-manoeuvre the other. I submitted my initiative as a prelude to a comprehensive Arab solution—not a solution for Egypt alone—but a comprehensive solution of the problem of peace in the Middle East. They welcomed it, but I know the background since the days of Mr. Rusk. After they said the solution was a package deal, it did not turn out to be so. No, as I told you, they began taking the second step by calling for a solution with each Arab country separately. They said, let's start with Egypt, for of course she is the stronghold, the foundation—if we start with her it will be easy for us to finish with the others. There were even some who had already prepared the agreement.

When I proposed my initiative they said, that's fine. Instead of the solution with Egypt or with each Arab country separately, they turned it into a solution with Israel by Egypt first. Of course I understand, as I said, its hide-and-seek; we're playing blind man's buff. I understand.

So it was to be an Egyptian solution with Israel first, and then, after that, they would be able to finish quickly. As I told you some had an agreement already prepared. Then there was another step forward—it was no longer a solution with Egypt. No, they took my initiative and twisted it and turned it upside down into a partial solution with Egypt. It is no more a question of even a complete agreement with Egypt. They have turned it into a partial solution with Egypt.

As the negotiations progressed a little, they became more ambitious. It was no longer a question of a partial solution with Egypt, but a partial solution of a partial solution with Egypt. What does this mean? It means that I should have been pleased and happy when they told me they would open the Suez Canal, and nothing else. They even named this solution “the Opening of the Canal.”

⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 14, 1972.

⁵ See document no. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁶ *New York Times*, December 13, 1971.

I said to them, that's enough. We've been playing hide-and-seek for eight months, that's long enough. From the start I proposed this initiative of mine as a step towards a comprehensive solution for the whole of Arab territory, not only Egypt. But it was first turned into a separate solution with each Arab country, and then a partial solution with Egypt, then a partial solution of a partial solution with Egypt. I told them, no, that's enough, and as I said to my armed forces at the last feast, I have ended all contacts with America. I said to them, that's enough hide-and-seek, I know what you want, and you know what I want.

I want my territory and the Arab territories, I don't want more than that.

Let's return to the present situation. What is the attitude of America today? They declared it frankly at the beginning of 1972 when they said they were giving Israel Phantoms although the balance of forces has not been upset and Israel still has superiority. This is a challenge to us as a people and to the whole Arab nation. If you like it, well and good, if not you can go and turn somersaults—frankly, just like that.

I said that 1971 would be the year of decision and, as I said at the start of my speech just now, I had actually taken the decision at the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, in the presence of all. My instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, General Sadiq, were prepared and were carried out to the last stage. But I stopped, as I told you, because of the confusion that occurred, the same confusion that occurred here on Sunday, July 9, 1967,⁷ but it occurred in South East Asia. And the U.S.S.R., our friend that has supported us, was in that battle. The subject had to be reviewed.

The question is not, as King Hussein, may God reward him, has said—that to save his face Sadat will go into the battle unprepared. Not at all. It is not a question of face for me, it is the question of a people, my people here in Egypt, and my armed forces, and the question of Arab territory. It is absolutely not a question of face. I actually

stopped [war preparations]. It is not a question of a decision I have issued, so that I must carry it out, come what may and so lose my people, lose my armed forces and lose our aims and objectives. No, certainly not. I stopped for a reappraisal, and while we were making our reappraisal—and we have not yet finished—along came Rogers on the first of January and openly declared—of course with the support of the American President—an American position: We are giving Israel Phantoms although the balance of forces is in her favour. We shall give more. Why am I speaking to you today? As I have told you, in everything, in every decision and at every stage, we must work together; we must work together and we must all of us know what the position is and what we are facing.

I did not waste the past period. I started with the Presidential Council of the Federal State, with President Hafiz Assad, and President Muammar Qadhafi. We discussed the strategy of the present stage and our present situation. We ended our discussions by reaching a specific analysis and a specific decision.

What I am pleased to tell you is that for the first time in the history of the Arab nation there is a federal state directed against the will of Israel, against the will of America and the colonialists who have objectives in this area. This is because the second or third objective of Israeli strategy is that the Arabs should never come together in a union. We have smashed this objective of Israel's strategy, and established the unionist state. The first thing we studied in the Presidential Council of this state, as I have told you, along with President Assad and President Qadhafi, was the Israelis' strategy that has been in implementation since the 1897 Basle Conference, and is still being implemented step by step to this day. And where is the Arabs' strategy to confront it? We developed this strategy as a base, as being the first Arab unionist grouping to be established on a real base. From this starting point we turned to the stage we are now living in and its requirements. We discussed this in the Presidential Council, and not content with this I studied it with the Central Committee. During the last stage I studied it with all the constitutional bodies of this country—with the National Assembly, with the Council of Ministers, with the National Security Council, whose last meeting

⁷ A series of clashes across the Suez Canal during the first days of July 1967 led to a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on July 8–9. It was agreed that a U.N. observer force be stationed on the cease-fire line, a proposal which the U.A.R. (Egypt) accepted on July 10. [Keesing's Research Report, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The 1967 Campaign* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 44–45]. The Security Council decision is printed as document no. 258 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

I held yesterday with my friend and colleague in struggle, Dr. Mahmud Fawzi.

I want to take this opportunity to say that we are not hypocrites. What I say here and announce to the people I also announce to the whole world. We are not two-faced or two-tongued—we speak with one tongue.

In this battle there are two principles on which there can be no discussion. The first principle is: No relinquishing of a single inch of our territory. The second principle is: No bargaining over the rights of the people of Palestine.

There can be no discussion of these principles, and the Americans can stop saying that we are afraid to find a solution. What I say does not mean that political action has stopped. No, political action is continuing. But what we want to say now in this present stage is that whoever wants to take political action should look to Jarring; we support the latest United Nations resolution and we support Jarring in his efforts, and abide by the two principles: No surrender of a single inch of Arab territory, and no compromise over the rights of the people of Palestine. Whatever state wishes to speak within the framework of these principles is welcome to do so. But, as I said, questions which are settled in lobbies no longer exist. Jarring is doing his duty in accordance with a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Today it is everyone's duty to support Jarring. Western Europe adopted an excellent attitude to us in the latest resolution. We welcome this resolution, and we welcome this initiative taken by the countries of Western Europe. We take this opportunity to thank France in particular. It may be true that Britain took the initiative in the latest resolution, but we believe that it was the unshakeable attitude of France that was the pivot of Western Europe's success. All the same, we thank all the countries of Western Europe who supported us in this resolution and promise them that we shall always be responsive to any sign coming from them.

But today it is a matter of a challenge to the destiny of all of us, to the Arab nation, to the people of Egypt first and foremost, as being the mainstay, the citadel, as being the basis of the struggle of the Arab nation.

Statement by the Popular Resistance Front in the West Bank on the municipal elections to be held by the Israeli Military Administration in the occupied territory⁸

Mid-January, 1972

Masses of our people in the steadfast West Bank;

The Zionists are proceeding with their conspiracy to hold municipal elections with the object of perpetuating their occupation of our land and of legalizing all the crimes they have committed including the annexation to their empire of the Arab territory they have seized. It is also one more attempt to confront us, and the world, with a new *fait accompli*, by giving the impression that the people of the occupied territory have accepted occupation by the Zionists and surrendered to their will.

Because our people frustrated all the Zionists' attempts to show that this conspiracy of the elections conforms to the wishes of the people of the occupied territory, the Zionists issued a military order to the effect that elections were to be held. They are now engaged in frantic activity, including moves by their Minister of the Interior, Hillel,⁹ contacts made by the Military Governors and articles published in the newspapers that are the organs of the occupation. In all this activity they are employing a futile weapon—the weapon of using first inducements and then threats and intimidation. For purposes of inducement they talk of Israel's democracy and of their non-interference in the elections, while for purposes of intimidation they threaten to imprison and expel to the East Bank all who oppose the elections and to stop all movement between the two banks. Finally, they have openly threatened to appoint Israeli officers to head the municipal councils if the election conspiracy fails.

Our people's reply has been adamant: most of the existing municipal councils have declared their rejection of the decision to dissolve the municipalities and their intention to boycott the elections, in spite of the Zionists' threats. In addition, all nationalist forces, personalities and

⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 1, 1972.

⁹ Thus in the Arabic text; in 1972 Shlomo Hillel was Minister of Police while Minister of the Interior was Yosef Burg.

parties have clearly expressed their opinion that this conspiracy is to be rejected and condemned.

Our fearless masses have not been deceived by the manoeuvres and activities of the infamous Zionist agents whose moves since the first days of the occupation have been accompanied by propaganda and publicity on behalf of their suspicious projects, or by the rumours released by the press: its allegations that certain patriotic personalities intend to take part in the elections, and its repeated appeals that old faces must be replaced by young, new ones, and its calls for women to be granted the vote.

The agents of the occupation are resorting to the basest means to achieve their goal, instigating family quarrels, causing divisions between the original inhabitants of towns and strangers, and trying to represent the situation as an opportunity to pay off old scores.

These criminal attempts will never deceive our people. Those who imagined that it was possible to take advantage of these elections to get patriotic elements into the municipalities are realizing their mistake more clearly every day. For the aim of the Zionists is, first and foremost, to put their own agents into these councils to act as their instruments in securing the implementation of their criminal projects; participation in this conspiracy by honourable elements will be welcomed by the Zionists as a cover for their evil conspiracies.

We warn certain elements with limited horizons against falling into the Zionists' trap, for it is no small responsibility they are taking on themselves; they should reconsider their attitudes, for our people will not forgive those who act in collusion with the occupiers and who are blindly subservient to them.

The Popular Resistance Front comprises all nationalist forces, parties, resistance organizations, personalities and trades unions, and represents all the forces for good in our people and speaks on their behalf. Having studied all aspects of the municipal elections conspiracy this Front has decided to issue this statement to the masses of our people in the West Bank as a call to them to frustrate this conspiracy. We also appeal to all honourable men in our homeland to close ranks and speak with one voice in rejecting and opposing the occupation and to continue the struggle until our land is purged of this foul pollution. Our people

are not alone in the battle; they enjoy the support of our brother Arab peoples and all forces of good, freedom and progress in the world.

Victory to our people and their unified nationalist forces. Humiliation to the Zionists and defeat to their occupation and all their suspect projects.

178

Statement by the government of Egypt on a U.S.-Israel agreement for the production of arms¹⁰

Cairo, January 17, 1972

The statement by the official spokesman of the American State Department, that last November the American government reached an agreement with Israel on the production of certain American-designed armaments for Israel, marks an important turning point in Arab-American relations; it is also to be regarded as an escalation in the military role of the United States in the Middle East.

This development discloses a new anti-Arab American policy which is different both in extent and purpose from the American policy, both declared and secret, that has prevailed since the June War, for the following reasons:

1. The United States has concluded a secret agreement with Israel, without specifying the extent of American responsibility in this agreement.

The unlimited commitment between America and Israel, which has now been revealed, does not specify, either for the world or for the American people, the extent of American responsibility. This policy is again a repetition of the dangerous precedents which, under a similar understanding, involved America in the Vietnam War.

2. The United States is now not only exporting Phantoms and instruments of total destruction on the pretext of defending Israel; it has now taken a step further than this by making Israel an agent in the production of American-designed armaments, thereby further escalating America's military role in the Middle East.

3. The United States is trying to maintain an increasing arms superiority for Israel so that she may impose any solution for the Middle East

¹⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 18, 1972.

problem, since the mere giving of armaments becomes ineffective in the long run and results in the level of armaments in the area being lowered. But this agreement achieves the exact opposite by ensuring the continued escalation of arms manufacture in Israel.

In this way possibilities of any independent step towards disarmament in the area are diminished.

4. This new agreement is not restricted to the production of arms in Israel; it also makes Israel a source and distributor of American armaments to many parts of the world, including Africa and Asia.

This agreement constitutes a serious precedent by permitting the dissemination of various kinds of armaments, through Israel as intermediary, without the process made public; it also enables the American government to avoid Congressional supervision.

This is certainly a new role for Israel, in addition to her new task of cooperating with the military-industrial complex in the United States.

5. When on previous occasions the United States has entered into this kind of agreement, it has been with states linked to America by specific obligations. These agreements have been concluded publicly and have defined the responsibilities of each party, whereas the agreements concluded with Israel have always been shrouded in secrecy and have not involved any clearly defined responsibility or obligation.

6. None of the states with which America has concluded agreements of this kind have occupied the territories of three of its neighbour states, nor have they pursued a policy of territorial expansion through force.

7. The timing of this agreement—November 1971, followed by the Phantom agreement published at the beginning of 1972¹¹—was indisputably responsible for Israel's obstinate refusal to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of its resolutions on the Middle East.

This new development in United States policy is a grave challenge not only to the Arabs but also to the countries of the Third World, and especially the countries of Africa and Asia.

It is an irresponsible proliferation of armaments of mass destruction. It is also a challenge to the

great powers since while America is explicitly declaring its intention of creating an atmosphere favourable to cooperation and coordination between the great powers, it is, at the same time, intent on escalation in the Middle East.

America has chosen a policy of polarization and confrontation instead of abiding by its obligations as a member of the Security Council, as do the other great powers.

The United States has unilaterally adopted a policy which has led to its acting against the will of the international community, thereby undermining the efforts of the United Nations to reach an early and durable settlement in the area.

179

Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya warning of the possible use of oil as a political weapon and discussing Libya's relations with West Germany¹²

Benghazi, late January, 1972

Q. The greatest enemy of the Arab nation, as you always stress, is Israel. If a new war with Israel takes place will Libya take part in it with all its armed potential—including the Mirage fighter aircraft received from France?

A. I will not answer this question.

Q. Soon after you seized power, you expelled the British and American soldiers from their bases. Now you are seeking to do the same on Malta. Is that not a dangerous policy for a country like yours which sells its oil exclusively to the West?

A. For hundreds of years, the imperialists have been causing us harm. Things have now changed and we are hurting imperialism for once. Whatever conflict may arise, we don't have as much to lose as the West. The reasons are easily recognizable by anyone. Therefore we do not fear conflict with those powers—on the contrary: those powers fear conflict with us.

¹² Excerpted and translated from the German text of the interview conducted by Wolfgang Kaden and Dolmetscher Volkhard, *Der Spiegel*, no. 6 (January 31, 1972), p. 83.

¹¹ See document no. 23 above.

Q. The European states especially depend on Arab oil. Do you think you can allow a policy of strength?

A. No. We do not deal in policies of strength but in policies of justice.

Q. In the final analysis it is your key position as oil supplier on which you are building. The Federal Republic, for example, receives 80 per cent of its oil from the Arab countries.

A. We are confident because we are in the right. The Western governments have for long not been used to us insisting on our rights. But now we insist on them.

Q. You also consider it justified that you nationalized the oil installations of the British company BP last December. After that nationalization do other companies need to fear similar actions?

A. As long as the companies remain reasonable they have nothing to fear. And if they are so worried they can always do something additional: they can influence their governments to balance their policies towards the Arabs. The more successful they are in this, the less they have to worry about.

Q. So you do want to use oil in politics.

A. Till now we have not used oil as a political weapon. If we are forced into war by the enemy, we would use oil as a weapon.

Q. The Federal Republic receives around 40 per cent of its oil from your country and is consequently particularly dependent on your oil. Are you satisfied with the relations between the two countries?

A. No. The possible expansion of German-Libyan relations has not been exhausted in this connection. One point especially should be noted: The relations between Bonn and Israel can damage those between us.

Q. Bonn is seeking to keep out of the Middle East conflict and to take a neutral position. Do you want more? Do you want Bonn to side with the Arabs?

A. In the past, the Federal Republic sided completely with Israel and gave her significant quantities of arms. However, the present Federal Government is following a balanced policy. We hope this attitude will be strengthened in the future.

180

Statement by spokesman for the P.L.O. Executive Committee Nasir on the subjects discussed during recent Executive Committee meetings¹³

February 10, 1972

The Palestine revolution has once again affirmed its absolute and definite rejection of all political liquidation proposals, including the "Palestinian State" proposal, the aim of which is to prejudice the indivisibility of Palestinian soil and the rights of the Palestinian people to the territory of their homeland. The Executive Committee has also discussed the action taken by the Israeli authorities to hold so-called municipal elections in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Their intention is to carry out part of a Zionist-colonialist scheme aimed, among other things, at luring the Palestinian people into positions where they participate in liquidating the Palestine problem and prejudicing the future and the destiny of the Arab nation. In drawing attention to the danger to the Palestinian and Arab cause inherent in these elections, the Executive Committee warns all who support them or take part in them that it will not stand idly by while the Zionists and colonialists—and the traitors who cooperate with them for the achievement of their goals—attempt to liquidate the Palestinian cause.

In this connection the Executive Committee wishes to stress the following facts:

1. By urging the Palestinian people to hold so-called municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Zionist occupation hopes to carry out its plan to impose coexistence between the people and the occupation and to legalize the occupation, thereby making permanent the occupation of the part of Palestine occupied in 1967.

2. In a state of occupation nothing is legal but resistance; the actions of the occupation authorities and of those who cooperate with the occupation run counter to resistance and legality.

3. The immediate aim of holding these so-called elections is to transform the contradiction between the people and the occupation into a conflict

¹³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Fateh* (Damascus), no. 325 (February 16, 1972), p. 5.

between different groups of the people, so that the Palestinians may fight each other instead of fighting the enemy.

4. The immediate aim of holding these so-called municipal elections is not only to arouse contention among the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but also to create conflict between the Palestinian masses at home and those abroad.

5. The occupation, which is at present trying to delude certain groups of the Palestinian people living under occupation by inducing them to take part in these so-called municipal elections, is planning to move on to a higher level of delusion by trying to make the protégés of the occupation participate in the final liquidation of the cause of Palestine.

6. There can be no doubt that the Jordanian regime's massacres of the forces of the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian-Jordanian masses provided the occupation authorities with an atmosphere favourable to the schemes of the Zionists, colonialists, agents and secessionists.

Our people must rise above their injuries and maintain the national interest and inflexible principles. They must rise above their resentments and keep to the road of national liberation.

7. At a time when, through the deaths of its martyrs and its other sacrifices, the Palestine revolution has succeeded in inducing world public opinion to affirm the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, Zionism's attempts to invalidate this right by its so-called municipal elections under the shadow of occupation must be resisted.

8. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization once again warns traitors and agents against stepping up their cooperation with the occupation to the extent of facilitating its task of holding municipal elections in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It calls on all patriotic and honourable forces to lose no time in taking action to frustrate the Zionist-imperialist scheme directed against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation by boycotting these so-called elections and by confronting all those who are agreeable to the realization of the schemes of Zionism and imperialism.

The Executive Committee also declares to honourable patriots that they will not be alone in performing the duty of overthrowing the schemes of Zionism and colonialism and affirms the indivisibility of Palestinian soil and the full right of the Palestinian Arab people to their land.

Resolutions adopted by the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt (excerpt)¹⁴

Cairo, February 18, 1972

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, the ASU National Congress, having held a special session from 16th to 18th February 1972 in order to look into political and military developments involving the problem of liberating Arab territory, the continuation of Israeli aggression against this territory since 5th June 1967 in the light of international changes, of recent world events and of the conditions involving the domestic situation; having listened with open hearts and minds to the statement of His Excellency the President and Chairman of the ASU and to the statements of the Deputy Premier, the War Minister, the Foreign Minister and the ASU First Secretary; having profoundly and carefully discussed the analyses and views submitted to it in an atmosphere characterized by freedom of expression and democratic dialogue, thereby asserting the effectiveness of the participation of our broad masses in determining the nature of this stage; having studied the situation thoroughly because of its awareness of the gravity of this stage with respect to the present and future of Egypt, the Arab world, and even with respect to world balances;

The National Congress, having set as its first objective the trust of liberating the land and the responsibility of creating the necessary atmosphere in order to launch the battle of liberation and destiny, has studied the situation from its various aspects and its domestic, national, and international fields, followed carefully and thoroughly the attempts to which the idea of peaceful solutions has been subjected, the shattering of every constructive idea for the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the rock of the expansionist and adventurist policy based on arrogance and deceit which is being followed by Israel with the help of the military, political and economic support which the United States is providing it with total disregard and indifference to its responsibility to the international community and world peace.

All this has rendered the peaceful proposals

¹⁴ Text as broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3920/A/8-10; reprinted by permission.

submitted by the United States as false facades concealing behind them a plan to liquidate the problem, violate Arab rights, and realize the aspirations of Zionist expansion.

Bearing in mind all the previous considerations, the National Congress declares its belief that the liberation battle is the inevitable and natural means to recover all the occupied Arab territory and end the state of no-war and no-peace, in whose whirlpool both Israel and the United States are trying to drown Egypt and the whole Arab nation.

The National Congress realizes that we are living in a world whose size is diminishing and whose events affect its countries one and all. This fact is aggravated by the importance of the area to which we belong and the land which we are responsible for defending. The congress realizes that the world is linked to this area because it is influenced by it and influences it.

In view of the fact that the decision of the battle springs from our responsibility and from the reality of our life in the defence of our right, the timing to implement this decision must take into consideration international changes, world events and requirements of the battle from all its aspects and dimensions.

In today's world there are major struggling powers whose movements we must carefully calculate and understand.

The United States has thrown all its support and political, military and economic backing behind Israel in a manner exceeding all the aid and support it gave it in the previous stages of the struggle. The United States today is adopting a covert, hostile attitude to us.

The West European countries today are playing an effective part in world politics. They have become more positive in their policy towards the Middle East problem and more aware of the ambitions and dimensions of Israeli policy, as well as of the dangers and pitfalls of US policy. This attitude, which France has initiated in Western Europe out of its support for the peoples' rights, adds a new, shining chapter to its glorious past.

The congress realizes that since the first hours of the Israeli aggression, the USSR, leading the socialist bloc states and the world anti-imperialist forces, has supported Arab rights and is still assisting us politically, militarily and economically. This

stand has not only been dictated by Soviet philosophy and principles but has also been strengthened by a common belief in the cause of international peace and a common hostility to world imperialism.

Arab-Soviet friendship is a firm foundation representing firm strategy, and not a temporary stand. We must be completely alert and cautious to the enemies' attempts to cast doubt on or undermine this friendship.

The congress is also appreciative that this friendship extends to all the socialist countries in Europe and Africa and to the Asian states, with Peking at their heart. The congress praises the part which was played by the OAU in liquidating the effects of the aggression peacefully, and also the Third World's understanding of Israel's real ambitions.

The congress, aware of the US scheme which seeks to establish Sixth Fleet bases in the eastern Mediterranean at this particular stage to threaten the peoples of the area, to consolidate Israel's expansionist ambitions, and to confirm the US attempts to impose its domination on the Arab area, calls on all the peace-loving peoples of the world, and particularly the peoples of the Mediterranean, to join it in condemning and resisting these aggressive schemes.

Even though efforts towards a peaceful solution have reached a deadlock and the battle has become the only solution, this does not mean that we should cease the political efforts, which will back our military action and serve the objectives of the battle. We are not seeking war for the sake of war or fighting for the sake of expansion. What we are seeking is a legitimate means to proclaim justice, to liberate our territory, and to assert the rights of the Palestinian people. This makes the political leadership responsible for mobilizing the resources of the masses and for co-operating with them so that the masses of the people will experience the battle psychologically, mentally and in principle and really understand that present sacrifices are an investment for the future and that today's fighting is an insurance for tomorrow.

The National Congress understands the importance of achieving a balance between the requirements of the battle and those of development. Development is a buttress for the battle today and a cornerstone for reconstruction after the battle. The congress also understands the importance of

strengthening our socialist line and enriching it from our historical legacy and spiritual values.

The congress greets the armed forces and appreciates the hard efforts which have been exerted in preparation for the battle and also the high spirits and morale of the men of the armed forces. The congress praises their capacity to master the means and weapons of modern warfare, a capacity prompted by their boundless faith in the inevitability of the battle and the necessity to triumph.

The National Congress, aware of the importance of the increased efficacy, both in quantity and quality, of Arab strength in the field of actual battle with the enemy, calls on all the Arab forces and various Arab regimes to formulate a unified Arab strategy taking into consideration today's reality and its calculations.

The Federation of Arab Republics is without doubt considered as a new, real dimension of significance in the crucial battle. The congress asserts the importance of the participation of the Palestine Resistance and fida'i action in the crucial battle.

The congress greets the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and condemns all Israeli imperialism's attempts to falsify the will of the Palestinian people by holding sham municipal elections in the West Bank through terrorist and suppressive means.

The congress realizes that the political and military situation demands that we take into consideration the seriousness of the current stage and the need for all fields of political, popular, executive and military action in order to be conscious and responsible for everything affecting the unity of our people's masses and the security of our political and military movements.

After studying the situation of the young people and their part in the national action in all its dimensions, the congress renews its great confidence in our young people, who represent a complete sector of the sons of the working people's forces and the tool of the future movement of society as a whole and its march towards its goals.

The congress also hails the wise diplomatic and paternal way in which His Excellency the President dealt with the recent students' movement and his referring the entire issue to the universities and their organizations. Acting on the above and in confirmation of it, the congress in addition decides:

(1) In the field of mobilization for the battle. The basic and main action on which we must concentrate all the potential of the national action in this stage, popularly, organizationally and governmentally, is the preparation of the state and society for the state's requirements for the fierce and protracted liberation battle with the greatest degree of effectiveness, experience and vitality. This requires: firstly, the state must double the rate of speed in implementing the full and continuous plans to protect the public utilities and organizations of strategic importance and simultaneously draw up alternative plans for them in cases of destruction or partial damage and plans for their repairs. Secondly, consolidate the full plan for civil defence on a basis which minimizes the losses which might result from enemy air raids as much as possible. Thirdly, the stockpiling of all the necessary commodities from the strategic and supplies point of view. Fourthly, co-ordination among hospitals and first aid organizations, increasing their effectiveness, and training of manpower to carry out such duties.

182

Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt warning that U.S. policy is forcing Egypt towards a military solution and reviewing the state of negotiations and relations with the U.S.S.R.¹⁵

Cairo, late February, 1972

Q. Your recently concluded National Congress closed all doors before "the illusion of American solutions." And it took the decision to resume war—a decision from which we are told there is no retreat. Is that correct?

A. I didn't take the decision. Your Administration and Israel did. You misled me and then betrayed me. The failure of the political solution lies squarely with you. You even told me that I had done as much as could possibly be expected of me and that it was now up to you and Israel.

I simply cannot understand why—despite the

¹⁵ Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave for *Newsweek*; transcript supplied, on request, by Mr. de Borchgrave and reprinted by permission. A shortened version of the interview was published in *Newsweek* (International), LXXIX, 10 (March 6, 1972), p. 47.

fact that your government said only a few weeks before that the balance of power was overwhelmingly in Israel's favor—you went ahead and suddenly increased Israel's air force by one third. It is this escalation that wrecked the political solution. Walter Lipmann once said that the failing of American policy is that you want to have American solutions for every problem in the world. You can't even find a solution in Vietnam after ten years of fighting. How can you expect to solve other peoples' problems if you can't solve your own. Once you've straightened out your own mess, I'll listen to what you have to say.

Q. How soon do you expect war to resume? In a few months? A year or two?

A. Much sooner than you seem to think.

Q. You told the Congress that when the home front completes its preparations, Egypt will immediately plunge into battle. And before the Congress you said the home front wouldn't be ready until it could withstand up to 1,200 air raids a day. Won't this take a long time?

A. We have had experience with many Israeli air raids in 1970. It won't take long. And then we will choose a suitable time.

Q. You mean you think Arabs and Israelis will be fighting again in a few months? Is it now inevitable?

A. From what I told you during our last talk three months ago, it has become quite evident that the U.S. wants to force an American solution completely to Israel's benefit. If these are facts, which I believe they are, a war of liberation is inevitable.

Q. Well, if you were an Israeli reading this statement, wouldn't you be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike—before Egypt has a chance to strike first?

A. Maybe. Why not? It's even a probability. But they must think twice. Because this time they will really get hurt—and hurt badly.

Q. Your last speech seems to indicate that you feel caught between the geopolitical exigencies of the two superpowers. Why, then, not launch a strictly Egyptian peace initiative—for example, the demilitarization of Sinai in return for the recognition of Israel?

A. My original initiative was not dependent on anyone. The U.S. rushed in and said it was great and that they could now do something. You said I had made the sort of concessions that

would break the deadlock. You failed. And now you're trying to get me to make more concessions. Sinai is Egypt. And I will agree to demilitarize the same portion of Sinai as Israel agrees to demilitarize on its side of the border. No more.

Q. You have said that America's solutions are designed to bury the Mideast issue. But at the same time you say the U.S. is trying to maneuver you into direct negotiations with Israel. Surely direct negotiations would be a dramatic way of keeping the issue alive?

A. If Roosevelt on Dec. 7, 1941 after Pearl Harbor had agreed to negotiate with Japan—despite the fact that no American land was occupied at the time—and if Churchill had accepted to sit down with Hitler while Europe was occupied, even though no part of Britain had been lost, they both would have been accused, correctly, of capitulation. You talk about demilitarization of Sinai and direct negotiations—which, of course, means more concessions. What about my own security?

Q. I have heard a surprising number of Egyptians, many of them supporters of yours, who feel the time has come to cut out the U.S. middleman and deal directly with your opponent. What's wrong with direct negotiations with Dr. Jarring at the same table?

A. Jarring's mission is to implement the U.N. resolution (withdrawal in return for recognition). Whenever Jarring feels this can be done, we will come to the table. But first Israel must answer Jarring's letter of Feb. 8, 1971.¹⁶

Q. Golda Meir says it isn't true you said "yes" to everything in Dr. Jarring's famous letter.

A. She's a liar—and a conceited one at that. Our answer is in Dr. Jarring's briefcase. He has my permission to publish it. The facts will speak for themselves.

Q. Wouldn't a peace initiative have a better chance of success if it were not coupled with statements about the "inevitable coming battle?"

A. Israel now says unequivocally that it won't return to its old borders. That's expansion in anyone's dictionary. And you still want me to make concessions. There were no threats in my letter to Jarring—and none in the proposals I made in my first interview with you a year ago.

¹⁶ Printed as Annex I to document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

Q. How would you rate the chances of an interim settlement for the reopening of the Canal at this point?

A. Insofar as so-called "proximity" or hotel talks with Mr. Sisco as a go-between are concerned, it's a dead horse. Under Jarring, and if linked to a final solution, the idea is still alive.

Q. Can the U.S. still be the key to peace in the Mideast—despite what has recently been said, following the Phantom decision, about the U.S. now being a partner with Israel in aggression against Egypt?

A. The U.S. has to be a partner in the solution—if only because you are Israel's principal supplier of sophisticated weaponry. But after the way you misled me and then let me down in 1971, an American solution is clearly unacceptable to us.

Q. If Egypt cannot make peace because the U.S. let you down and cannot make war because Russia won't give you the offensive weapons you feel you need, where does that leave Egypt?

A. In principle at least, the question is wrong. America stabbed us in the back. But Russia is still cooperating with us. And the main point I want to impress upon you is that the decision to liberate our land is strictly ours—not in any way dependent on the U.S.S.R.

Q. Do you feel Egypt could resume hostilities despite Soviet objections—and in the event of massive Israeli retaliation do you feel there is a point beyond which the Soviets would intervene directly?

A. The decision is entirely ours. Why should we involve the Soviet Union? When we take the decision, we will accept all the consequences.

Q. You told the Congress that Egypt has a power of veto built into the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty.¹⁷ What does that mean—a power of veto over what?

A. We don't have a veto. We are not a superpower. But I know they will be on our side and are supporting us politically, economically and militarily.

Q. How can you sustain a long fight without a steady stream of Soviet supplies and spare parts?

A. You want to put us in a state of despair. But it won't work. North Vietnam is not in despair despite terrible punishment and casualties inflicted by America. Israel will pay. Mark my words. They are in for a big surprise.

Q. Has the Soviet Union agreed to help you set up the production means for sophisticated weapons and aircraft, as it has already done in India and as the U.S. is doing in Israel?

A. Patience and silence, my friend. You will see what you will see.

Q. Egypt now has a cabinet of so-called "total confrontation" with a mandate to put the home front on a war footing. What can it do that previous governments haven't done during the last four and a half years?

A. Lots. The home front must become completely integrated in the military chain of command to be ready to face any consequences. The dimensions of the conflict have suddenly become much bigger. The U.S. has now swung all its weight behind Israel. You are trying to compensate for your setback in the subcontinent. You have abandoned any pretense of an even-handed policy in the Middle East. There is now a serious risk that the U.S. will be involved on Israel's side—to help Israel hang on to our occupied land. So we must take more precautions. Israel is becoming more greedy—encouraged by you.

Q. In your speech you also said that Egypt should not overlook Europe with Paris at its heart and Asia with Peking at its heart. What did you mean?

A. The European alternative is very important for Egypt. America has become a hopeless case. Especially in an election year with so many candidates dependent as they are on Jewish financing. Look at what Nixon said about the Mideast in his state of the world message. A mental aberration. Presumably Mr. Kissinger's. Nixon did not speak the truth. He knows all the details about the Soviet presence in Egypt. He knows that I don't wish to be involved in the Soviet-American confrontation. I wrote him about this and he knows that if Israel were to withdraw, the situation would be quite different. So why does Nixon (talking about the Soviet presence in Egypt) say it's too late?

Q. De Gaulle, Willy Brandt, Mendès-France and Nixon all broke out of seemingly insoluble problems by doing what was then considered politically "unthinkable". Isn't there a lesson for Egypt?

A. I did the politically unthinkable a year ago this month. And where did it get me? Nowhere. You yourself advised me that if only Egypt would formally state its willingness to offer Israel a peace

¹⁷ The treaty is printed as document no. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

treaty and recognition in return for withdrawal to its old borders, everything would change. Nothing changed—except that the U.S. turned against us which was the last thing I expected.

183

Speech by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia at the opening of the Third Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (excerpt)¹⁸

Jidda, February 29, 1972

Two or three days ago there was a Zionist aggression against Lebanon. What is the Zionists' excuse for this? They ask why our Palestinian brothers are fighting and struggling for their rights, for their homeland, and for their honour. But do they expect any man in the world to relinquish his responsibility? Our Palestinian brothers, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere, have done nothing but defend their legitimate rights, defend their homeland and defend their honour.

Therefore it is the duty of all of us, brothers, to stand by our brethren in Lebanon, and beside our brothers in the Palestinian resistance, to enable them to hold out against their enemies and to fight for their rights and their honour. It is not only, brothers, a matter of our Palestinian or Lebanese brothers; it concerns all Muslims, both Arabs and others, because all of them have their share in the responsibility. Certainly the Arabs are in the forefront as regards the issue of Palestine, but our Muslim brethren certainly also bear a responsibility, because the Arabs are their brethren, the Arabs homeland is their homeland, theirs is the cause of right and justice, and they are the victims of injustice and aggression. Our Shari'a and our creed always urge those who believe in God to fight and struggle and ward off aggression from all who are its victims. Almighty God has said, "Whosoever attacks you, do you attack him."¹⁹ Therefore it is our duty to close our ranks as firmly as a rock against the enemies of religion, against the enemies of the Muslims, and against

the enemies of right and justice. Certainly you are as well aware as I of our responsibility and of the duty required of all of us, but I wanted the world to understand that the Muslims, God be praised, are now one power, one nation, and Almighty God has described the Muslims as one nation: He is our Lord, and He has called on us to worship Him.

184

Speech by Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia at the opening of the Third Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (excerpt)²⁰

Jidda, February 29, 1972

What is most grievous to our hearts as believers is that we should be meeting at a time when our noble Jerusalem, our Holy Places and our Arab and Islamic territory are still in the hands of the evil Zionists who have usurped and desecrated them, and who persist in challenging all the forces of good in the world and in making light of all the principles, values, ideals and virtues which mankind has come to recognize as fundamental, desirable and essential to life. These men persist in subjecting all forces and energies to the service of their base and evil designs, the most recent and most conspicuous example being their continued occupation of the territories of Arab countries and their continued efforts to perpetuate this occupation and to make it a *fait accompli*, their continued expulsion of the people of Palestine, and infringement of their legitimate rights to their land, their homes, their crops and their possessions. They have done all this while disdaining the United Nations and its resolutions, its envoys and its principles with an insolence unequalled by that of the devil and with shamelessness and arrogance.

Otherwise how are we to interpret and understand the many conflicts that Israel has produced and continues to produce on the international stage in this period of her ill-omened history?

¹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), March 1, 1972.

¹⁹ Koran, II, 194.

²⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), March 1, 1972.

Her frontiers are the frontiers of her military power and her security is like a ripple which, when a stone falls in water, spreads unhindered and unrestricted until it covers the whole surface. She talks loud of peace and practises war.

She sheds crocodile tears for her security and robs others not only of their security but of their whole lives.

She tramples on the established fundamental rights of others in the name of maintaining her own alleged rights.

She arouses the world in indignation against the persecution the Jews have suffered, which her propaganda and mouthpieces have grossly exaggerated, while at the same time persecuting, in a manner that puts to shame all those who have practiced persecution in the whole history of the world, a people unparalleled in history for the tolerance they have shown to the Jews.

In the name of protecting international interests in the Middle East she brings the whole world to the brink of war, destroys all interests and scoffs at all values.

Every day she makes a new demand and submits a pretext for its realization, while her goal is only too obvious—expansion, expansion and more expansion, until her dream comes true and she grows as large as the whole of the Middle East, playing the role her leaders have wanted her to play for a century.

It is hopeless to believe that she has ever thought or is now thinking of peace. Have not some of our brethren given more than has been asked of them, more than was in their power to give on behalf of peace. In return neither they nor the world have met with anything but a greater measure of that scornful obstinacy vis-à-vis all efforts, values, resolutions and concessions. Behind these are concealed Israel's real designs against the whole of Islam, in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and in every inch of its territory.

185

Charter of the National Progressive Front of the Syrian Arab Republic (excerpt)²¹

Damascus, March 7, 1972

The Tasks of the National Progressive Front at the All-Arab Level

Belief in unity of destiny, unity of soil and unity of history, and action with a view toward realizing the same goal, the goals of unity, freedom and socialism, make it incumbent on the National Progressive Front of the Syrian Arab Republic to adhere, in its all-Arab policy, to the following principles:

1. The unity of Arab destiny and the aspirations of the masses for unity are the general framework for the construction of a unified Arab socialist society liberated from colonialism, exploitation and backwardness and capable of confronting the challenges of the age and participating in building human progress and civilization. Therefore the Arab policy of the Front is based on the achievement of steps towards unity in the light of the present situation, taking advantage of past experiences and taking into account:

a.) The fact that Arab unity can only come about as an expression of the free will of free peoples. Therefore the unity for which the Front is struggling is a unity established between Arab regions liberated from foreign domination and struggling against colonialism and Zionism. It is a unity established between progressive Arab regimes that believe in the exercise of national and socialist struggle as the principle and the method of building the state and society.

b.) The confrontation of the grave circumstances of the present stage, especially since the June aggression, requires that every step towards unity on behalf on the battle be supported. The Front therefore is doing all it can to support and strengthen the Federation of Arab Republics, as being the the Arab nation's main instrument in the battle of liberation, and is struggling to strengthen and promote this unity so that it may be the nucleus of

²¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 8, 1972. The Front was formed of the following political parties and organizations: the Baath Party, the Arab Socialist Union Party, the Syrian Communist Party, the Organization of Unionist Socialists, and the Arab Socialists' Movement.

comprehensive Arab unity and the establishment of a unified socialist Arab society.

2. The Front believes it essential to achieve serious Arab cooperation in all fields, political, economic, military and cultural and as regards everything that is of service to the tactical and strategic goals of our nation.

3. The oil wealth of the Arab nation cannot be a regional question dealt with on the basis of the present situation of fragmentation. It is an all-Arab question linked to the freedom of the Arab homeland and the major issue of Palestine. The Front therefore refuses to isolate the question of oil from the national goals of the Arab nation and is committed to the struggle to employ this great economic force in the battle of liberation against colonialism.

4. The unity of the national progressive Arab forces is a strategic goal based on a scientific analysis of the development of Arab society and is imposed by the objective circumstances of Arab struggle. The Front, therefore, believing as it does in this goal, regards it as essential to make every effort to achieve the closest cooperation and links between these forces, with the object of establishing a progressive national front that will lead the way to the establishment of a single Arab movement.

5. The Arab policy of the Front, which believes in the unity of the soil of the Arab homeland, unreservedly opposes in all fields all separatist movements; it believes that attempts to arouse racial, religious or regional distinctions between the citizens of the Arab homeland is a colonialist and reactionary weapon employed to impede the progress of our people and to split their unity.

6. The cause of Palestine is the cause that affects our destiny at the present time. Therefore the Front's policy vis-à-vis the Palestine problem is based on the following principles:

a.) That all resources, energies and efforts be mobilized for the battle of liberation and that our relations and the extent of our cooperation with Arab states be determined in the light of their commitment to the problem of liberation and the Palestine problem.

b.) The national rights of the Palestinian Arab people are sacred rights which cannot be relinquished or bargained over.

c.) No peace and no negotiation with the Zionist state and no cession of a single inch of the occupied Arab territories.

d.) Full support for the Palestine Resistance as being a section of the Arab liberation movement, and adherence to the principle of helping and cooperating with it, striving for its unity and protecting it from the conspiracy against it and allowing it freedom of movement, on condition that all such activity strengthens and serves the strategy of Arab struggle.

186

Press conference statements by General Secretary Habash of the P.F.L.P. outlining the conclusions of the Front's Third National Conference and discussing the strategy of "revolutionary violence"²²

Beirut, March 14, 1972

Faced with this new stage, with this complicated and difficult situation with its interlocking battles, the Conference has agreed on the following points:

1. To regard the problem of organization as a central problem. The new stage requires that the organizational structure of the Front be turned into a revolutionary ideological and class structure. The new situation can only be confronted through a revolutionary instrument based on Marxist-Leninist theory and what it has to say on organization. The issue of building the Marxist-Leninist Party is now a central issue for the Palestinian revolution.

The Third National Conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine regarded the organizational programme to be as important as the political programme.

2. The broad Palestinian national front, and similarly the Jordanian-Palestinian national front. Within the framework of agreement on a political programme establishing a clear and radical attitude to the reactionary regime in Jordan, liquidation and surrender plans and the necessity to uncover them, and the project for a Palestinian state and unambiguous and resolute rejection of it, the Front will be fully prepared—indeed it will regard

²² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), no. 143 (March 18, 1972); the conference was held in Tripoli, Lebanon, March 7–11, 1972.

this as one of its basic tasks—to take the initiative in forming the broad Palestinian national front to lead the masses in the coming stage.

3. It is the masses that constitute the force capable of extricating the resistance movement from the crisis it is now in. The mobilization of these masses, through political and military struggle, will be one of the most important problems we have to face in the coming stage. The Front will reconsider all its modes of action, so that it may always be in the midst of the people, struggling with them, through them and for their goals.

4. The line of revolutionary violence will continue to be the basic line in the confrontation of the enemy camp, and our practice of revolutionary violence will be the culmination of a comprehensive struggle carried on by the masses, not a substitute for it. Similarly, in our practice of violence we shall take advantage of all past experience and the lessons it teaches.

5. The Palestine revolution's whole future depends on its being fused with the movement of all the Arab masses and with the Arab national liberation movement, and participation in building the broad Arab anti-imperialist national front will be one of the principal tasks facing us in the coming stage.

6. The reinforcement of our revolutionary alliances at world level with all the socialist countries, national liberation movements and workers' forces throughout the world will enable us to confront the world imperialist camp and all its plans to strike at the movement of the peoples of the world.

These are the main outlines of the subjects dealt with by the Third National Conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. They will form the basis of the campaign of party indoctrination that the Front will carry on through its publications and the activities of its cadres and bases in the ranks of the masses.

These subjects will be covered by the comprehensive report issued by the Conference, which we regard as complementing the report issued by the February 1969 Conference.²³

Q. Do you still maintain your attitude or your decision that henceforward no planes will be hijacked?

A. This is an opportunity to clarify the views

of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on this matter. The first three operations against planes were against Israeli El Al planes, and I think that we all agree that this Israeli civil aviation fleet is part of the Israeli military aviation fleet. You certainly know that these operations were enthusiastically supported by our masses in general.

But any of our tactical or strategic lines may be revised in the light of the consequences of its implementation. As regards this particular line, the policy of hijacking planes, I have found, during my visits to a number of socialist countries, that this subject—which is understood by us and by our masses—is not understood by our friends. Our revolutionary alliances throughout the world are something extremely fundamental for us; we cannot see ourselves triumphing over the camp of Israel, imperialism, Zionism and reaction unless we are an integral part of the camp of world revolution that is hostile to the camp of imperialism. In the light of this, and out of concern for our alliances, especially our international revolutionary alliances, at the session of the Central Committee held on November 11, 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine dealt with this subject and decided to stop these operations.

We shall therefore take every precaution to ensure that our pursuit of the line of external operations may always result in the strengthening of our national and revolutionary alliances, and not the opposite. We shall also make every effort to ensure that this line is completely linked to and in no way contradicts, our basic strategic lines in revolutionary action. This line must be of service to the building of the revolutionary party, the building of the broad Palestinian national front, and the building of Arab and world alliances. Only the creation of a world front can promote and set in motion the movement of the masses. In the light of our discussion of this subject, this is the attitude adopted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at its session on November 11, 1970.

Q. Some time ago the Front struck at certain American interests in the area, in particular the Tapline pipeline. Will the Front continue with operations of this kind?

²³ See document no. 379 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

A. Yes, this is a case in which all revolutionary, nationalist and progressive forces support us, both locally and throughout the world. This is something different from the hijacking of planes. The choice of a target that is clear and unanimously agreed on by revolutionaries throughout the world, and involves their common enemy as represented by American imperialism, will be accepted and supported by revolutionary forces at all levels.

Q. You said in your statement that the line of revolutionary violence will continue to be a fundamental line in the Front's strategy for the confrontation of the enemy camp. Could you explain to me what you mean by the words "revolutionary violence" in this context?

A. The meaning is just the same as when we talk of a people's war. However, at this stage of the revolution we shall not be able, in fact, to wage wide-scale armed battles against our enemy. Thus we must carry out this revolutionary line in the light of the balance of forces between us and our enemies.

I do not ask you to expect, in the foreseeable future, major pitched battles. What you should anticipate is the practice of violence against the imperialist enemy, in accordance with the principles and laws of secret warfare in its first stages.

Q. Would you tell us your views on and your attitude to the municipal elections Israel is holding in the occupied West Bank?

A. Our attitude here is very clear. We realize that Israel will claim that the candidates who win the elections represent the people of Palestine. The elections will only bring to the fore persons such as Jaabari, Rashad Shawwa, Anwar Nusaiba, and so on—traitors, historical traitors to our masses and our goals. It is these who will come to the fore as a result of the elections, and Israel will use them, claiming that they represent the Palestinian people and that they are capable of coming to an agreement with her as regards a solution of the Palestine problem. Thus these traitors, and when I say traitors I mean exactly what I say, will be Israel's instruments for the creation of a subservient state established with a view to liquidating the problem of the people of Palestine.

187

Speech by King Hussein of Jordan announcing his plan for a United Arab Kingdom²⁴

Amman, March 15, 1972

My dear brethren,
Dear Citizens,

It gives me great pleasure to meet with you today and to talk to you and to the nation about the affairs of the present, the past, its experiences and our aspirations and hopes for the future.

The establishment of the state of Jordan in 1921 was the most important phase in the life of the Arab Revolt after the plot against it by its allies in the first World War was uncovered. With the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the formation of the state of Jordan gained yet a new dimension, in that it made it possible to exclude the land east of the Jordan River from the application of the Declaration and thus save it from the Zionist schemes of that period.

In 1948 when the Arab armies entered into Palestine, the smallest among them was the "Jordan army"; yet it was able to save that part of Palestine which extends from Jenin in the north to Hebron in the south and from the Jordan River in the east to a point lying not more than 15 kilometers from the sea-shore in the west. The Jordan army was also able to save Jerusalem—the Holy (old) City—in its entirety and other areas outside the city wall to the north, south and east, all of which came to be known later as Arab Jerusalem. That area which came to be known as the "West Bank" was all that remained to the Arabs from the whole of Palestine together with a narrow area now called the "Gaza Strip."

After a brief temporary administration, the leaders of the West Bank, and a selected group of leaders and notables, representing the Arabs of Palestine who had left their homes in the occupied territories, found the union with the East Bank was a national demand and a guarantee in the face of the constantly expanding Israeli dangers. They therefore called for two historic conferences, the first of which convened in Jericho on December 1, 1948 and the second in Nablus on December 28, 1948. Representatives of all sections of the population including leaders and men of thought, both young and old, labourers and farmers.

²⁴ English text supplied by the Jordanian Embassy, Beirut.

all attended the two conferences. Resolutions were adopted calling upon His Majesty King Abdallah bin al-Hussein to take immediate steps to unite the two Banks into a single state under his leadership. His Majesty responded to the appeal of the nation and ordered that constitutional and practical steps be taken to realize this important national desire; steps included that elections be held to choose legal representatives of the people of the West Bank to sit in Parliament. On April 24, 1950 the new parliament representing both Banks with its senators and deputies, held a historic session in which the first real step in contemporary Arab history was taken on the road to unity, which the Arab Revolt proclaimed on the dawn of its inception. This was achieved by the declaration of the union of both Banks and by their fusion into one independent Arab state, with a democratic parliamentary monarchy to be known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The union sailed into seas which were neither calm nor smooth. There were many underhanded currents stirred up by external hands attempting to create tempests in the face of the ship to force it slowly towards the rocks. But the awareness of the people in both Banks, their firm belief in the unity of their land and their recognition of the dangers lurking behind the frontiers, were the basic guarantee for the union and for its salvation from all the evils that beset it.

Foremost among the realities which the union of both Banks evolved day after day was that "those living therein are one people, not two peoples." This reality became first clear when the Ansars (the supporters)—the inhabitants of the East Bank—welcomed their brethren, the Muhajereen, (the emigrants)—the refugees from the territories of Palestine in 1948—and shared with them the loaf of bread, the roof and both the sweetness and bitterness of life. This fact of life was emphasized and deepened by every step the government took and was clearly reflected in everyone of its institutions: the armed forces, the ministries and the various government departments. This reality became also clear within all sectors of life: be it economic, agricultural or social. The day came when it was impossible for anybody to distinguish between a person from the West Bank and one from the East, unlike the way a Palestinian is distinguished from a non-Palestinian in other parts of the Arab World.

The unity of blood and destiny between the people of both Banks reached its peak in 1967 when the sons of both Banks stood on the soil of the West Bank as they did for over twenty years, kneading its sacred soil with their blood. But the struggle was stronger than their power and circumstances were bigger than their courage. And the catastrophe occurred.

In the midst of this sea of suffering created by the June calamity the aims of the Jordan government in the period which followed the war were summed up in attaining two goals: a brave and steadfast stand in the face of continuous and unceasing aggression against the East Bank, and a strong determination to liberate the occupied land and free our kin and brethren in the West Bank. All our efforts were directed to achieve both these goals in an atmosphere of confidence that the Arab States would support Jordan in its predicament, and with an unlimited trust that the unity of Arab destiny had become a deeply rooted reality in the conscience of the whole Arab nation, a reality which cannot be shaken by regional interests however great, and which cannot be reached by vicious plans and evil intentions, however underhanded.

Suddenly, Jordan found itself facing a new catastrophe which, if allowed to befall the country, would have resulted in the loss of the East Bank, and would have laid the stage for a final liquidation of the Palestinian case forever. The forces planning for this calamity had mobilized many an element to serve their purpose. Other elements also fell into the nets of these forces. Many of these elements claimed the Palestinian identity of the sacred cause and thus played their roles under its guise. The contradictions and conflicting currents prevailing in the whole world found their way into the ranks of these elements.

It was only natural that Jordan should rise up to confront the impending tragedy. The challenge was faced by the stand of the unique combination of its people: the Muhajereen and the Ansars. This evil subversion was shattered on the rock of the firm national unity who, born in 1950, grew and flourished amidst the challenges which he had to face during the past twenty years.

During all that period, and especially after the June war in 1967 or even before it, the leadership of Jordan was thinking about the future of the state and was planning for it. The leadership based its

thinking on the faith in the message of Jordan, which message found its roots in the great Arab Revolt, and on the confidence in the man living on both sides of the river and his ability to play his role in serving its message and its aims.

The manner in which the fulfillment of the Palestinian cause was viewed carried in its folds the far reaching scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestine had always been the first goal of Zionist plans. The people of Palestine were its first victims, and were to be followed by the people of both Banks. Even if Zionist expansionism was to end at some limit, Zionist interests would not rest except by keeping the Arab World weak and disunited in order to be able to safeguard its territorial gains forever. Because the opposite camp stands as one united force, it thus becomes incumbent on all Arabs to also stand united. Even more, unity in itself is not sufficient unless it comprises a real understanding encompassing all modern methods and aspects of modern development.

Jordan had always understood the magnitude of the tragedy that befell the Palestinians. After the Zionist plot had dispersed them in 1948, no country, Arab or non-Arab, offered the Palestinians what Jordan provided for them in the way of an honourable life and decent living. In Jordan, and under the auspices of the union of both Banks, the genuine Palestinian community found amongst the overwhelming majority of the people who live in both Banks, the appropriate framework in which to live and move as well as the real starting point for the will of liberation and all the hopes it embodied.

The Palestinians existed for hundreds of years before 1948 and still continue to exist since then. But the events which started to prevail throughout the Arab World and all the forces and currents which manipulate them started to overlook these facts and to ignore them in conformity with the state of indecision which our nation has been undergoing since years. This artificial status was given further impetus by the various conferences, plots, public speeches and vociferous attacks we have lately been watching and listening to. It appeared as if it was intended for the Palestinian to disassociate himself from his national identity and to place himself in a small separate flask which can easily be destroyed at any moment. Surely, this appeared to be another plot hatched in the long chain of plots against the people of Palestine and the whole Arab nation.

These dubious movements were not only directed to the minority of the Palestinians living outside both Banks, but were also aimed at their majority here in the hope of forcing the people of the West Bank into a state which would cut them off from all that surrounds them. If some of these forces that encourage the growth and spreading of these currents do not conceal their desire to abandon their responsibilities toward the Palestine cause and the Palestinians, by pushing them into separation, however attractive their brilliance may seem to them, they, however, should not conceal from us the danger of their reaching a situation which would make the Palestinians an easy prey to Israel's unlimited greed. These dubious movements try to make the regime in Jordan appear as attempting to seek gains and benefits. They thus seep into our national unity in an attempt to weaken it and create doubts about it. Attempts are also being made to exploit some people's desire to obtain material gains to the extent of pushing them to play such roles as will attain their ultimate vicious ends.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and other Arab territories dear to us has managed to continue due to the disintegration of the Arab front, the lack of coordination, the struggle to establish opposite axes and camps, the abandonment of the essence of the Palestine cause and its needs, the concentration on talking in the name of the Palestine cause rather than exert consorted action, in addition to the attempt of certain groups to attain power through internal strife. All this also led to deepen the suffering of the Palestinians and to push them into a state of utter confusion and loss. The talk about municipal elections in the West Bank is merely an example of such a tragedy which certain quarters are trying to exploit to their own interests.

And yet, Jordan has never ceased to call for a united front that needs full mobilization and coordination of efforts. Jordan has never hesitated to stretch its sincere and able hand to all its Arab brethren, as it stems from our deep belief in the unity of our cause, destiny and future. Jordan did not spare any effort towards liberation, although the above realities existing in the Arab world retarded it. Yet serious planning for the future of the state went on, as all the events and positions taken against this country have failed to weaken its belief in the imperativeness of our final victory in liberating the land and the people. This belief

is based not only on our faith in the justice of our cause, but is also based on our faith in our country and people in both Banks of the river and in our Arab nation as a whole.

It was thus decided to move on with the state into a new phase based in its essence on liberation, its concept reflecting the aspiration of our people and their sense of belonging to it. In addition to all that, it is based on our absolute determination to regain the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, and it is directed to place them in a position to enable them to regain and safeguard these rights.

This was the pledge we made, to allow our people the right of self-determination. This is now our answer to all those who close to doubt that pledge and void it from its essence. Today the pledge will find its way to every citizen in this country, to every individual in this nation and to the world. It is now expanding to exceed the limits of words in order to face every possibility of disunity and to embody all national aims and goals.

We wish to declare that the planning for the new phase has come as a result of continuous meetings, discussions and consultations which were held with the representatives and leaders of both Banks. There was unanimous consensus that the main shape of the new phase should include the best and most developed concept of a modern democratic state. In addition to that, it will help to create a new society, built by a new man to forge a driving force which will put us on the way to victory, progress, unity, freedom and a better life.

We are pleased to announce that the basic principles of the proposed new plan are:

1. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom, and shall be thus named.

2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:

- A. The Region of Palestine, and shall consist of the West Bank and any further Palestinian territories to be liberated and whose inhabitants opt to join.

- B. The Region of Jordan, and shall consist of the East Bank.

3. Amman shall be the central capital of the Kingdom and at the same time shall be the capital of the Region of Jordan.

4. Jerusalem shall become the capital of the Region of Palestine.

5. The King shall be the Head of the State and

shall assume the Central Executive Power, assisted by a Central Council of Ministers. The Central Legislative Power shall be vested in the King and in the National Assembly whose members shall be elected by direct and secret ballot, having an equal number of members from each of the two regions.

6. The Central Judicial Authority shall be vested in a "Supreme Central Court."

7. The Kingdom shall have a single "Armed Forces" and its "Supreme Commander" shall be the King.

8. The responsibilities of the Central Executive power shall be confined to matters relating to the Kingdom as a sovereign international entity insuring the safety of the union, its stability and development.

9. The Executive Power in each region shall be vested in a Governor General from the Region, and in a Regional Council of Ministers also formed from citizens of the Region.

10. The Legislative Power in each Region shall be vested in a "People's Council" which shall be elected by direct secret ballot. This Council shall elect the Governor General.

11. The Judicial Power in each Region shall be vested in the courts of the Region and nobody shall have any authority over it.

12. The Executive Power in each Region shall be responsible for all matters pertinent to it with the exception of such matters as the constitution defines to be the responsibility of the Central Executive Power.

It is obvious that the implementation of this proposed plan will require the necessary constitutional steps and the Parliament shall be asked to draw up the new constitution of the country.

This new phase, which we look forward to, will guarantee the rearrangement of the "Jordan-Palestinian home" in a manner that will insure for it additional innate strength and thus additional ability to enable us reach our hopes and aspirations. This plan will strengthen the fabric and sinews that tie both Banks and build up their brotherhood and their unity as it deepens the sense of responsibility in the individual in both regions of the Kingdom, in order to best serve our cause without prejudice to any of the acquired rights of any citizen of Palestinian origin in the Region of Jordan or any citizen of Jordanian origin in the Region of Palestine. For this proposed plan collects but

does not disperse; it strengthens but does not weaken, and it unifies but does not disintegrate. It does not allow any changes to occur to the gains that our citizens have acquired as a result of twenty years of union. Any attempt to cast doubt on all this will [be] tantamount to treason against the unity of the Kingdom and against the cause, the nation and the homeland. The citizen in our country has suffered such experiences as to achieve a level of awareness and ability which qualifies him to cope with the up-coming responsibilities with greater confidence and determination.

If ability is a bliss which should grow to become man's responsibility toward himself and toward others, if his awareness is a weapon to be used for his own good and that of others, then the time has come for our citizen to stand face to face with his responsibilities, to discharge them with honesty and practice them with courage and honour.

Thus, the above formula becomes a title for a new page, brilliant and confident, in the history of this country. Every citizen has his role and his duties in it. As to the armed forces, which have marched right from the start under the banner of the great Arab Revolt, that included and shall forever include in its ranks the best elements of our sons from both Banks, these armed forces shall always remain ready to receive more of our sons from both Banks, selected on the basis of the highest level of efficiency, ability and organization. It shall always be open to welcome any one who wishes to serve our nation and our cause with absolute loyalty to the eternal goals of our nation.

This Arab country is the home of the cause, just as it is from all the Arabs and for all the Arabs. Its record of sacrifices for our nation and our cause is full and well known. Its pages were inscribed by the blood of its gallant armed forces and its free people. The more the positions taken against it change into more positive brotherly assistance and support, the easier it will be for it to continue its glorious march with more sacrifices, more ability and hope, until it restores for our nation its rights and attains victory.

This Arab country is the country of all Jordanians and Palestinians alike. When we say Palestinians we means every Palestinian, be he in the East or West of this great world, on condition that he should be loyal to Palestine and should belong to Palestine. Our call is for every citizen in this country to rise and play his role and shoulder his responsibilities in

this new phase, it is also addressed to every Palestinian outside Jordan to answer the call of duty, far from appearances and free from ailments and diversions and to proceed joining hands with kin and brothers to go ahead on the single path, united in one front, clear in aims, so that all should cooperate to reach the goals of liberation and to build up the structure to which we all aspire.

"God will aid those who aid his cause."

188

Statement by the National and Regional Commands of the Baath Party and the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan²⁵

Baghdad, March 15, 1972

Mighty people! Masses of our fearless Arab nation!

The subservient regime of Jordan has today confronted us with a timid and surrenderist plan involving peace with the Zionist enemy and the renunciation of the interests and rights of our Arab nation and our people in Palestine. This step taken by the Jordanian regime is one of the short-term results of the surrender plans announced since the Rogers plan.²⁶

Gallant masses! Your struggling Party and the revolutionary government in the Iraqi Region long ago drew attention to these plans, their sources and consequences and has repeatedly warned against falling into the trap into which various imperialist quarters have tried to lure certain Arab circles.

Mighty people! In moments of trial it becomes clear how important it is to perform the fundamental national tasks, and in days of setback it becomes clear how especially important it is to affirm the strategic goals of the people and the nation. The leadership role is established in a responsible manner in the eyes of the nation and of coming generations.

²⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), March 16, 1972.

²⁶ The Rogers plan is printed as document no. 142 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

Your great Party has led the struggle for a quarter of a century, and willingly sacrificed the lives of thousands of martyrs, while you fought with it as trusty soldiers. There is thus no question of its being loyal to you and to your principles and being determined to affirm its leadership role, whatever the dangers and however great the sacrifices. On this basis a joint meeting was held this evening in the Palace of the Republic by the National Command, the Revolutionary Command Council and the Regional Command, at which the following was decided:

1. To condemn and resist the timid attitude of the subservient Jordanian regime and all similar timid and surrenderist solutions.

2. In response to the great and grave tasks that confront the Arab nations today, and from our appreciation of the leadership role that we must play by strengthening steadfastness, preventing collapse and checking deterioration, we have decided to take action to meet our brothers in the regions of Syria and Egypt, and to submit to them a plan for immediate unity to reinforce steadfastness, to check tendencies to collapse, to abort conspiracy and to nullify all surrenderist plans and solutions. This plan for unity is directed first and foremost toward these two regions, for reasons that are known to all, but it will remain open to every Arab region to which the conditions for joining it apply, and which is fully prepared to accept its basic principles and ideas.

Masses of our glorious Arab people! Fearless Iraqi People! In spite of all failures and trials, the hope for victory will remain firmly established in our hearts and the flag of struggle will remain flying as long as we believe in the justice of our cause and the aspirations of our nation as it pursues its legitimate struggle. Your Party, the Baath Party, will ever remain true to these goals, actions and aspirations. Let us smash the conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism and their supporters! Forward!

Statement by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan (excerpts)²⁷

March, 16, 1972

To the masses of our Palestinian people;
To the masses of our Arab nation;
To all free men in the world;

After a series of meetings of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization from March 14 until this morning, and after comprehensive and intense study of King Hussein's plan and of the statement published in Amman on March 15, and after a series of contacts made by special delegates of the Committee at the Palestinian, Arab and international levels; and after studying all the reactions evoked by the said plan, especially in our brothers and members of our people in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and all places in the Arab homeland where Palestinians are gathered together and, finally, after consulting the opinions of all the leaders of commando organizations, cadres of combatants, students' and workers' federations and all the various Palestinian popular organizations;

After all this, and because of our people's concern for their future and the future of the Arab nation around them, and their loyalty to the Arab cause in Palestine, without going to extremes or overbidding, the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the legitimate command responsible for the destiny of the people of Palestine and their cause, has adopted the following attitude as a final and decisive response to King Hussein's plan. It will abide by this attitude and struggle in defence of the challenges and obstacles, however great, that are now becoming so numerous on the course of Palestinian popular struggle.

Therefore the Executive Committee's decisive and final rejection of King Hussein's plan is not an emotional decision; it is a decision based on comprehensive and intense study and inspired by the essential interests of the Palestine revolution,

²⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), March 17, 1972.

which are of necessity the interests of the people of Palestine wherever they may be.

The Executive Committee's decision to reject and condemn King Hussein's plan is based on the following considerations:

1. The people of Palestine alone, and in the necessary atmosphere of freedom, can decide their own future and the future of their cause. In the absence of this atmosphere, and in the atmosphere of terrorism, injustice and tyranny that prevails in the East and West Banks, the resistance movement alone can have any say on self-determination. It alone can freely express what is in the minds of our people without anxiety or fear of bearing the responsibility for expressing its views truly and freely.

2. In spite of all the Palestine Resistance has said about itself, from the day its first shot was fired until Black September 1970—i.e. that it came into existence to liberate Palestine and the Arab territories while maintaining the attitude, and suffering the consequences, that the central contradiction it sought to confront was the Zionist presence and the Israeli occupation—in spite of all this, the Jordanian regime has insisted on offering itself as a reserve for the Zionist enemy.

King Hussein's plan and statement only confirm this fact to those who are not yet convinced. There is a great deal of talk in the plan about a problem which, in spite of its importance especially since the September and Jerash massacres, in the final analysis is not a central problem. King Hussein concentrates in his plan on relations between the one people in the Jordanian-Palestinian arena, without any serious reference to the central issue, the issue of liberation. But the essence of the struggle, both in theory and practice, lies in the contradiction of the attitude of King Hussein and his regime to the attitude of the Palestinian people and their commands regarding the issue of liberation and the recovery of Palestinian rights. This is a contradiction that concerns not only the strategic goal, but also the methods that must be followed with a view toward realizing that goal.

In this connection the Committee wishes to reaffirm what it has already said many times, to the effect that this contradiction is absolutely not between Jordanians and Palestinians, but between a subservient, collusive regime and a struggling people who have adopted armed struggle as the way to realize their will and to recover

their rights. The clearest proof of this is that while King Hussein is finding certain Palestinians who are prepared to go along with him, the resistance movement is finding in its ranks thousands of genuine Jordanians bearing arms with their brother Palestinian fighters. Indeed King Hussein has the best of reasons for knowing that he has in his palace Palestinians who are conspiring against their own cause, a handful of traditionalist traitors whose only predecessors in such treachery were brothers and relations of theirs who are now directly cooperating with the Israeli regime. Doubtless among both of these groups there are many who are linked, both in ideas and organization, within the framework of contacts with a view to coordination between the agents of the King and the agents of Israel.

Therefore our basic difference and our historical contradiction with the regime centres on the issue of liberation. As regards the problem of relations between the two peoples, the only thing wrong, the only thing that threatens them is the Jordanian regime and the King himself, who has always tried to exploit regional feelings in this hateful way. For those who have been brought together by companionship in arms, prison, affliction and common hopes can never be set apart by the constantly repeated themes of a suspect information service inspired by a spirit of odious tribalism.

3. King Hussein and his regime have long accused the resistance movement of striving to create a tiny Palestinian entity rule. In connection with this fallacious charge both the King and his regime have issued statements and communiqués to justify their brutal massacres of members of our people.

And now the King is revealing himself and his collusion by announcing, though in different words, the birth of this "tiny entity," after bargaining with Israel that he should be a partner in it, in return for concessions in Jerusalem and in the Triangle and as regards real sovereignty and, of course, for recognition and peace with Israel, and the creation of a bridge over which it could cross into all parts of the Arab homeland.

The Resistance believes that the unity of the peoples of the two Banks can be restored through its rejection of the regime, its feudal system and its subservience to Zionism and colonialism.

In the past the Resistance's rejection of the attitudes of the Jordanian regime has been based

exclusively on its reading of the history of the Hashemite family and its clear perception of what that regime was capable of doing. But today the Resistance declares its rejection of the regime, the King and his plan, because it is in possession of damning documentary evidence proving how closely the subservient regime in Jordan is identified with the Zionist regime in Palestine.

4. By his plan—or deal—King Hussein has not only defied the Arabs and all their institutions, both official and popular; he has not only left the fold of Arab unanimity and the resolutions of the Arab nation for fifty years. He has gone further than this, by playing in the Arab area the role of go-between to break the isolation of the Israeli beast and to release it on our nation and the rest of the Arab regions through a kingdom that is Arab in name and constituents, but Israeli in mind and will. Thus King Hussein, by his plan, is defying not only the people of Palestine and the Resistance, but also the whole Arab nation and the destiny of the liberation movement in its territory. He has not only betrayed the history of our nation and its glorious struggle, but also imperilled its future and condemned it to perpetual subservience.

In thus declaring its historical position, the Resistance has never for a moment forgotten the misery and despair that the Jordanian regime, in cooperation with Zionism and world imperialism, has inflicted on us, and this applies in particular to our people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But, aware as it is of the movement of history, the Resistance realizes that such conditions are in themselves sufficient to spark off the Arab struggle against Zionism, treachery and colonialism, as it should be.

The Resistance therefore turns, in all seriousness and good faith, to the masses of our Arab people, their revolutionary vanguards, and their nationalist and democratic forces, and calls on them to take immediate action to frustrate the Hashemite liquidation plan and to redouble their struggle to confront every person with authority from the Atlantic to the Gulf with the responsibility of ensuring that we exist as a free nation rejecting defeat and surrender.

190

Statement by the National Command of the Syrian Baath Party rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan (excerpts)²⁸

Damascus, March 18, 1972

Fellow Arab citizens!

In this difficult and complex situation the Hashemite King Hussein has published what he calls his plan for the future in the form of a proposal in which he sets out his ideas on the solution of the Palestine problem on the basis of the West Bank becoming the Palestinian region and the East Bank the Jordanian region of what he calls a "United Arab Kingdom."

This new royal plan has been timed to appear when the Arab situation is extremely critical and the international situation very difficult. It also comes at a time when our people in Palestine are living under Israeli occupation while our people in the East Bank are groaning under the yoke of a terrorist, tyrannical and subservient regime. This is a situation which tempts the advocates of surrenderist solutions to propagate their views which are an expression of their own interests and those of their colonialist and imperialist masters.

The choice of this particular time to put forward the plan was not accidental. The elections which the enemy intends to hold in the West Bank will be given a bogus legality by this plan, which is also intended to enlarge the split brought about by the way the royalist regime and its various organs have treated the masses in Jordan and their nationalist forces which believe in the goal of liberation. It is also intended to make a new gap between the people of Palestine, with the object of removing the true representatives of the people from the scene, creating further contradictions and encouraging opportunists and agents.

Arab fighters!

The National Command of the Baath Party is closely following the course of events and developments in the area. It has carried out an exhaustive study of the new royal plan and the developments in the Jordanian area in the last stage which led up to it, also the various proposals, contacts and consultations with the object of establishing

²⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 19, 1972.

a Palestinian state of one kind or another, it has analysed the background of the plan and the motives that led to its being put forward, and deduced its probable consequences. It is our firm conviction that the challenges that face our nation at this stage of its struggle can only be confronted and resisted by a unified Arab attitude in which the energies of the Arab nation are mobilized for specific goals, which are the confrontation of aggression, resistance to the Zionist occupation of Arab territory and unremitting struggle to liberate it and to recover the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland. Moreover the resolutions of the Eleventh National Conference of the Party²⁹ established that the pivot of contemporary Arab struggle is the Palestine problem and that the extent to which any regime and any political movement can be regarded as truly nationalist is to be judged on the basis of their attitude to that problem.

In the light of the above the National Command reaffirms the Party's previous attitude of rejecting all liquidation proposals, supporting the unity of Palestinian soil and rejecting suspect proposals for the establishment of a Palestinian state, because these proposals frustrate the aspirations of the masses to liberation and return.

From our appreciation of our national responsibilities at this stage, we place on record the following points:

1. This plan decides the destiny of the Palestinian Arab people instead of their doing it themselves, without reference either to them or to the Arab nation as a whole.

2. In the view of the Party this plan is only the proposal for a Palestinian state in a new form, which proposal was aimed at the liquidation of the Palestine problem by putting an end to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, after which the problem of the Zionist occupation of the Arab territories would be turned into a mere dispute over frontiers, like any other dispute between two neighbouring states.

3. The United States of America, with its history of conspiracy against the Arab nation, with all its military, political and economic aid to the forces of Zionist aggression, and with all its means of representation and deceit, is behind this plan, its object being to increase the disunity of our forces

and impede every effort to create a unified Arab attitude for the confrontation of aggression.

4. This plan is intended to perpetuate the regional differences that were behind the September massacres, to deepen the gulf that those massacres created between the members of the one homeland, dividing them into Jordanians and Palestinians, and to impede Arab attempts to bring the Palestinian fighters back to their bases so that they may exercise their legitimate right to play their role in the battle of destiny.

5. This plan is no more than an attempt to frustrate the efforts that are being made to mobilize the energies and capacities of the Arab people, and to pave the way for the signing of a separate peace with the enemy within the framework of a new plan to weaken the nationalist and progressive forces and isolate them from the masses of the people, and to strike at the progressive Arab regimes, in particular the Federation of Arab Republics.

Therefore the National Command of the Baath Party, while declaring, on behalf of the strugglers of our Party, its absolute rejection of this plan, which it regards as but one more link in the chain of Zionist and imperialist conspiracies to check the struggle of our masses for liberation, calls on the masses of the Arab people, all their nationalist and progressive forces and all responsible Arabs, to reject this plan and shoulder their responsibilities as regards resistance to all plans aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem.

191

Statement by the Presidential Council of the Federation of Arab Republics rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan³⁰

Cairo, March 18, 1972

At the second session of the meetings of the Presidential Council of the Federation of Arab Republics, held in Cairo, the capital of the Federation, from March 11-14, 1972, the Presidential Council studied and analysed the present Arab situation in the light of developments in the

²⁹ See document no. 379 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

³⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 19, 1972.

political and military situation in the area, with a view to laying the foundations for a comprehensive Arab plan to confront the Zionist and colonialist challenges that threaten the existence of the Arab nation.

It was the view of the Presidential Council that the forces hostile to our Arab people are increasingly concentrating their forces on the implementation of their plans against the Arab liberation movement, and that American imperialism is disclosing its presence in the Mediterranean area by concentrating its Sixth Fleet there, by giving Israel more military and economic support and by establishing new military bases from which to exert pressure and intimidation against the countries and peoples of the area. These hostile forces are also escalating their psychological warfare against the Arab people by casting doubts on their ability to repel aggression and to liberate their territories.

This is the situation in which King Hussein has announced proposals for the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom, choosing the time when Israel is holding elections in the West Bank to establish a Palestinian entity under her control, so that the proposal may appear to be the best alternative to all the suspect proposals made for the solution of the problem.

The Presidential Council studied this plan, in full awareness of its national responsibility in the critical circumstances through which our Arab nation is passing, and reached the following conclusions:

1. King Hussein's plan constitutes the basis for the implementation of the movement of imperialism and Zionism and their plans to liquidate the Palestine problem, to tear apart the Arab homeland and to open the door to Zionist-colonialist penetration, with a view to the restoration of imperialist domination of the whole area.

2. This plan decides the destiny of the Palestinian Arab people for them without reference to them or, indeed, to the Arab nation as a whole.

3. This is only the proposal for a Palestinian state in a new form, which is aimed at the liquidation of the problem completely by creating a Palestinian entity which would be in Israel's sphere of political and economic influence. It would also be in confrontation with the movement of the Palestinian Arab people along with their

organizations and groups that are struggling to liberate the land.

4. This plan is aimed at destroying the all-Arab character of the problem, by diverting the Arab liberation movement from its all-Arab course and turning the Palestine problem, and the consequent occupation of other Arab territories after the aggression of 1967, into a mere territorial dispute over frontiers.

5. The United States of America, with its history of conspiracy against the Arab nation, with all its military, political and economic aid to the forces of Zionist aggression, and with all its means of misrepresentation and deceit, is behind this plan, its object being to increase the disunity of our forces to impede every effort to create a unified Arab attitude to confront aggression.

6. This plan is intended to perpetuate regional differences, to deepen the gulf created by the September massacres between the members of the one nation and to split them into Palestinians and Jordanians, and to impede Arab attempts to devise a formula for the return of the Palestinian fighters to their bases so that they may exercise their legitimate right to play their role in the battle of liberation.

For all these reasons, the Presidential Council of the Federation of Arab Republics declares its unequivocal rejection of this plan and calls on the Arab Kings and Presidents, all nationalist Arab forces and all the masses of the Arab nation to reject it, confront it and to stand up to the plans of Zionism and imperialism aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem.

We firmly believe that the challenges facing our nation at this stage of its struggle can only be confronted and resisted by a unified Arab stand, in which all the energies of the Arab nation are mobilized for a single goal—the confrontation of aggression, resistance to the Zionist occupation of Arab territory and unremitting struggle for its liberation and the recovery of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland and their territory.

The studies of the Presidential Council resulted in the drafting of a clearly defined plan for our struggle in the coming stage. In that struggle our political moves, at the Arab and international levels, will be based on our legitimate right to liberate our territory, the nobility of the goals we

are struggling for and the inflexibility and steadfastness of the forces that support our position.

In declaring this attitude the Presidential Council calls on all Arabs to shoulder their national responsibilities and to join ranks in their just struggle against aggression and occupation, on the basis of the following facts:

—The aim of the struggle of our Arab nation at this stage is to achieve two inseparable goals:

a. The rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their territory and their homeland.

b. The liberation of the Arab territories occupied since June 5.

—This goal can only be reached if all Arab energies are mobilized to that end.

—The cause of Palestine and the occupation of the other Arab territories is a perfectly clear one and consequently no quarter whatsoever has the right to devise either a partial or comprehensive solution to this problem on its own.

—The Palestine problem, which is the pivot of our nation's struggle, can only be seen in the context of a strategy of Arab struggle comprehending all the national problems of the Arab nation. On this basis the Palestine resistance movement can only be regarded as an integral part of the comprehensive strategy of Arab struggle. Similarly, the Palestine resistance movement can only be regarded as a section of the Arab liberation movement and one of the instruments of the Arab nation in the battle of liberation.

Arab people:

The Federation of Arab Republics, which bears the principal burden in the confrontation of the enemy and which is mobilizing all its resources and energies for the battle of liberation, hereby declares that it places all its capacities at the disposal of the Arab nation for the frustration of all colonialist plans and the achievement of victory for our nation in its national battle for Arab rights.

Victory is God's; He grants it to whom He will.

192

Statement by President Bakr of Iraq on the proposed union with Syria and Egypt³¹

Baghdad, March 20, 1972

By announcing its plan for the so-called "United Arab Kingdom" Jordanian reaction has disclosed its determination to implement a dangerous colonialist and Zionist plan to liquidate the Palestine problem, and to perpetuate the Zionist occupation of Palestine and all the other occupied Arab territories, at the expense of the established historical rights of the Arab people to their territories.

By announcing this plan Jordanian reaction, and the forces of imperialism, colonialism and Zionism that are behind it, have taken a most serious step towards turning the present disastrous situation into permanent defeat. It ensures the goals of imperialism, Zionism and reaction at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland and the aspirations of the Arab masses to liberation and independence.

To confront this dangerous liquidation plan, it was necessary to put forward a counter-plan. This was the plan for union with the sister regions of Syria and Egypt. This was to check the tendency toward deterioration and collapse and to ensure that the Arab regions adjacent to the occupied territory have all they require for confrontation and endurance.

We have always been convinced—and especially since the disaster of June 5—that the union of these three particular Arab regions has always been the loftiest goal of the Arab masses in all parts of the Arab homeland. This is because, in view of the nature of the battle that is being fought between our nation and imperialism and Zionism in Palestine and the neighbouring Arab regions, and to ensure that the Arab nation is in a position to hold out and be victorious over its enemies, the minimum requirement is the union of these three regions at least.

Therefore this call of ours is not intended to compete with any other Arab effort or with any kind of constitutional entity presently existing

³¹ Translated from the Arabic text of the statement made to *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), March 21, 1972. The proposal was first announced in the statement of March 15 printed as document no. 188 above.

in the Arab homeland, but is committed to struggle to achieve the aspirations of the Arab masses to liberation.

It is the requirements of the battle of destiny alone that decided that the call for union between the regions of Egypt, Syria and Iraq should be made. However, this call is not closed, nor can it ever be so. Nor will it necessarily take any particular form. It is open to every Arab region whose circumstances qualify it to join. Moreover, its form can be modified in accordance with the free will of the parties to it and in the light of the requirements of both regional and national circumstances. But the essential reason for this call is to ensure the necessary conditions for endurance and liberation. Consequently, any participation in it and any modification of its political and constitutional form can only be accepted if their object is sincere commitment to this basic reason—that is to say, providing, ensuring, and reinforcing the necessary conditions for endurance and liberation, and absolute preparedness to take permanent action to raise the level of resistance and confrontation until final victory is achieved.

The unity we call for with all our forces and energies is a union based on the logic of national struggle and adopts armed struggle at both the official and popular levels as being the way to liberation. It is a unity of the masses in which the masses and their vanguard forces, represented by the nationalist and progressive parties, directly perform their effective vanguard role and raise unionist action to the level of ensuring the requirements of confrontation with the enemy, and creating a wide revolutionary Arab front to support the armed struggle of the sections of the resistance.

The masses of the Arab nation are looking to all of us for unified action against the reactionary plan for surrender to the Zionist enemy. Arab unity between Iraq and the two sister regions, Syria and Egypt, based on popular, democratic and revolutionary foundations, is an urgent requirement of the masses. This unity acts as a prop and a support for the Palestinian revolution and absorbs any Arab region that contributes to the national battle and is committed to the course of resolute struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories. It is the historical action that all of us want to participate in and whose objectives we want to achieve.

We hope that along with our brothers, the

authorities in the sister regions of Syria and Egypt, we may achieve practical results commensurate with the trust that has been confided to us by the masses, for this is the only way to protect the existence of our nation, its freedom and its honour.

193

Statement by Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Hussein of Kuwait on his government's rejection of King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan³²

Kuwait, March 22, 1972

At its meeting on March 16, 1972 the Cabinet reviewed the proposals published by His Majesty King Hussein on the Palestine problem and decided to define the government's attitude to them, considering the details given by the Jordanian delegation and considering the contacts and consultations it intends to conduct with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Now that the government has made these contacts and studied the proposal, and in view of its known attitude to this, it affirms that the first requirement is the liberation of Arab territory. When the territory of Palestine, which is groaning under the yoke of occupation, is liberated, the Palestinian people alone will have the right to decide their own future. We shall support any decision that derives from the free will of the Palestinians themselves. We therefore do not approve of the plan submitted by His Majesty King Hussein in his recent statement and see no point in propounding a point of view which neither takes into account the views of the Palestinian people nor satisfies or convinces the Arab nation.

³² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), March 23, 1972.

194

Television interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan commenting on his United Arab Kingdom plan and on possible future relations with Israel³³

Washington, April 2, 1972

Rosenfeld: Your Majesty, you recently proposed the creation of a federal Jordanian kingdom to be made up of an autonomous East Bank and an autonomous West Bank with Jerusalem as the West Bank capital. Now, since the Israelis who hold the West Bank and Jerusalem oppose this plan and so do some of the Arab states, how would you implement it?

A. This plan as a concept and as a plan is not a new one. Throughout the late '50s and the '60s it was a subject of discussion and study between the members of our families, so to speak, Jordanian and Palestinian alike. However, pressures and difficulties prevented us from moving any further.

This plan is visualized in terms of the future, in terms of peace, in terms of the better future that must be for all who live in our part of the world. But, as a side effect, it also puts the problem in the proper context, the problem of the people of Palestine. They are yearning to have their identity, they are yearning to come together on the land of Palestine, and it offers opportunity to the world, the Israelis included, to redress the wrongs committed against them and to begin an era of peace, properly—and a lasting peace.

Rosenfeld: You speak, sir, of this plan as something to be implemented after there is a peace settlement, so I suppose one must turn to that problem. The Israelis have said they will not withdraw, even partially, unless there is a peace agreement, and they have said that the road to such agreement is through negotiations without preconditions. How do you see it? Are you prepared for such negotiations?

A. We have always been prepared for negotiations without prior conditions, but we have adhered to principles contained in Security Council Resolution 242 and the various American initiatives. On the other hand, our Israeli neighbors speak of the need to talk without prior conditions,

yet at the same time they say Jerusalem is theirs and is not negotiable; they speak of secured boundaries that to our way of thinking might mean the mutilation of the West Bank of Jordan, and equally so on the Syrian positions and on the Egyptian side. It is this problem and this dilemma that has prevented us from moving any further, and when they are ready to reconsider their position and be more positive, I am sure progress could be made towards the establishment of a lasting peace.

Trewhitt: Your Majesty, the great powers will have something to say, I suppose, about the sort of settlement that ultimately is reached in the Middle East. I wonder if you have an expression yet from the President of the United States and, in the alternative, the Soviet Union, as to the feasibility of the proposals you have made?

A. The proposals I have made have received the backing of the overwhelming majority of our people, and the Palestinian people in particular. We addressed ourselves to them, and at the same time the intellectuals in the entire Arab world, and hopefully many more to come. I have been in touch, at the time when I made the plan public—in point of fact just prior to that—with the ambassadors of the Big 4 and equally with all the heads of government with whom we have diplomatic relations, explaining our proposal, our ideas, and from the reactions I have received until now, it seems that in the world as a whole there is understanding and sympathy for this new approach.

Trewhitt: Your Majesty, does one conclude from the fact that you brought this proposal forward now that you believe the possibility of an interim solution on the Suez Canal in the area to your south and west is now frozen?

A. No, not necessarily so. Unfortunately we are not coordinating as we used to with friends in Egypt, and we are, in other words, unaware of our progress or the lack of it on that particular aspect of the problem. But we believe at the same time that the majority of difficulties inherent in any attempt to achieve a final peace really centralize in Jordan itself and Palestine, so to speak. We are not against any progress in the direction of a solution from any quarter, on any side, but we hope that it will not be a limited progress, [that] it will be part of a general attempt to establish a durable lasting peace in the area.

³³ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by Henry Trewhitt, Carl Rowan, Terence Smith, and Alvin Rosenfeld for the NBC program "Meet the Press" as published by Merkle Press, Inc.; text provided, on request, by Merkle Press for NBC.

Smith: Your Majesty, one of the hardest perennials in the Middle East are the reports of your meetings in secret with Israeli leaders—first with Yigal Allon and then with Premier Golda Meir. We have heard so many of these, I wonder if you can tell us now whether you have ever met with any leaders of Israel?

A. I have denied these rumors, and so have the Israelis on their side, but we have attempted throughout the past to get an understanding of the thinking of each other, and this has been done through various means, with the help of the United Nations. Ambassador Jarring, for example, is a perfect example in that respect, and our people in the occupied territories, and so on. But there is no meeting of minds unfortunately up until now.

Smith: Looking ahead to the future, Your Majesty, would you be willing to meet with Premier Golda Meir?

A. We are not in a position where we are against any meeting on principle, but what we are seeking always is a basis for any meeting, and in that respect we feel the acceptance of the principles contained in Security Council Resolution 242 and the American initiatives—if these are generally accepted by both sides, then obviously progress could be made towards a solution.

Smith: But that is, is it not, setting preconditions before you sit down and talk? Five years after the war in 1967, isn't it time to simply sit down without preconditions of any kind and talk? The United States after all, after its wars talked with Germany, talked with Japan. Isn't it in everyone's interest in the Middle East?

A. We are not laying the preconditions. We are hanging on to the principles which we feel must be accepted. The preconditions probably come from the Israeli side in regard to their position of a Jerusalem and secured territories and many other points predated to the territories they occupy until now. If this were to change I think the prospects of progress would be much greater.

Smith: But not before?

A. Not before, unfortunately.

Rowan: Your Majesty, you say there is no meeting of the minds. Egyptian President Sadat keeps talking about new military action to resolve the situation. Do you think the Arabs are strong enough to attack Israel without suffering humiliating defeat?

A. I do not believe that the Arab strength is a

match to the Israelis at this time. And beyond that I do not believe that war is a solution to the problem. I believe that there have been enough losses and there is enough of a tragedy that must be avoided in the future at all costs, and—a problem that must be resolved. I believe in peace and moving towards it, and so far as the future and what it might bring, if it is to consider a solution in terms of the use of force, this is and should be the very last resort of anyone.

Rowan: Is it Arab military weakness or pressure from the Soviet Union that causes President Sadat to keep backing off of his threats of military action, in your opinion?

A. President Sadat probably could answer that better than I.

Rowan: Do you think it is a mistake to continue to talk of solving this through new military action?

A. As far as we are concerned in Jordan we do not believe that military solutions are the ideal ones or should be pursued.

Rowan: One more question about military strength. There is talk of Israel moving to nuclear weapons, to steel herself against the day when the Arabs may be stronger militarily. Do you think this is a danger, a real danger?

A. I think it is a danger, and from all I know I think there is progress in that particular field.

Rosenfeld: Your Majesty, you yourself mentioned the changes that have occurred in the area since the '67 war, particularly on the West Bank. In those years, as we all know, the Israelis have built a dozen paramilitary settlements, and they have flanked Arab Jerusalem with apartment houses on the one hand. On the other hand, thousands of Palestinian Arabs work in Israel, and there is a lot of trade with Israel. To those of us who have been there, these seem almost as if they are permanent facts. If you got your lands back, would you attempt to change this situation? Would you uproot these villages? Would you close the borders as they were closed before the Six Day War?

A. No. We are talking of total peace, of a solution that will be accepted not only by us but, more importantly, by the generations that are to come. A solution that would be acceptable to them and would not be contested, and if peace is achieved I do not foresee a return to conditions that existed up to '67 in any way, form or respect.

Rosenfeld: And the villages and the apartment houses around Arab Jerusalem, what happens to them?

A. There will probably have to be some adjustments, I suppose, if we reach that point, but we are trying our best.

Trewhitt: Your Majesty, I recognize you are not going to expound on your terms for negotiation here with me today, but I wonder nonetheless if the following might be something like the kind of negotiations which might take place with Israel. Would you consider in any way satisfactory the kind of relationship in which the West Bank province, or state, in political liaison with the East Bank, might nonetheless have Israeli security forces on its territory?

A. No, I do not foresee this happening, and I think here we are facing a basic problem: Does Israel wish to continue to remain a fortress, so to speak, living in isolation from the area and its neighbors, or are we seeking a peace that means the diversion of all the energies and the peace forces toward building and attaining a better future? If the latter is the case, and certainly that is what we feel and we are dedicated to, there shouldn't be any signs on the ground so to speak that would be contested sooner or later. What we want is the ideal solution, and it may be far and difficult to achieve. It might be like reaching for the stars, but nonetheless we will keep trying for it. We believe that this is our duty.

Trewhitt: We are really talking about total withdrawal of Israeli forces?

A. Total withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Trewhitt: I suppose one should put the same question with regard to Jerusalem, then, to further clear the air in that respect. Would you—

A. In regard to sovereignty and the recognition that there is an Arab part of the city, a Palestinian part, so to speak, this is a must, but following that, we are open-minded to anything and everything that would make Jerusalem the meeting place of all. Jerusalem after all is a unique city. Some may say that people of the Jewish faith should have Jerusalem as the Moslems have Mecca and the Christians have Rome, but I believe that Jerusalem belongs to Abraham, Jesus and Mohammed, and this is the only city that does. Its history has been a tragic and sad one. Once and for all it must be the meeting place of all believers in God, under conditions of peace.

Smith: Your Majesty, that is very interesting because you seem to be talking about something quite different than what prevailed before the 1967 war. I want to try to understand exactly what you envision in Jerusalem. You are speaking of a united city, if I follow you, with a recognition of Arab sovereignty and that there is an Arab part of the city. But what about the actual administration of the city?

A. In regard to the past, prior to June of '67, a part of Jerusalem was the capital of Israel, nonetheless. I do not see why the Arab part of the city should not also house the government seat for the Palestinian province, so to speak, why the two should not be together. As for administration there are many ways of solving that particular problem, and we are open minded. Jointly, separately, there could be ways and means. But Jerusalem could be, really, the meeting place, and should be.

Smith: This would be a fascinating concept because it would mean in one city you would have two capitals, the capitals of two separate states. This is what you are imagining?

A. This is a possibility that we think of seriously.

Smith: In an open city?

A. In an open city.

Rowan: Your Majesty, the Times of London makes this observation. It says: "Israeli Prime Minister Mrs. Meir dismissed King Hussein's proposals in tones of the most patronizing contempt."

Do you feel that this proposal has been rejected with contempt?

A. That appears to have been the case regarding the statements of the Israeli Prime Minister. but I would like to point out here that my concern is not with the present, where people are a passing phase. My concern is with the future generations and the chances we must provide for them. I believe in what I said, not because I want to dominate Jerusalem or to be a part of Jerusalem, but to serve the people of that area, to avoid further disaster and to give them the opportunities and the chances we never had.

Rowan: Another newspaper observes that in talking about getting Jerusalem back, it is like two Indian chiefs in the United States talking about how to take the United States back from the white man. You don't regard it as that futile or hopeless, getting these territories back from Israel?

A. No, and furthermore, I don't believe that even in Israel, and in Israel in particular, where people have in the past and in terms of history suffered a great deal, they would outrightly close the door to an opportunity to redress wrongs committed by them against others in that area.

Rosenfeld: Your Majesty, you spoke of Jerusalem as an open city, open to both nations. Would you extend that to the entire frontier running from Galilee down?

A. We are talking in terms of principles, in terms of possible solutions at this stage, nothing specific. No prior conditions, as I have mentioned.

195

Letter from Palestinian personalities in the East Bank repudiating King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan, sent to the extraordinary Tenth Session of the Palestine National Council (excerpts)³⁴

Amman, April 3, 1972

We do not regard the reorganization of relations between the two Banks, to replace unity by a federal union, as being the crucial point in this matter. Under normal circumstances, first and foremost with the West Bank not under Israeli occupation, this problem can be regarded as an internal issue. It can be examined, and either accepted or rejected depending on whether or not there are compelling reasons, in accordance with constitutional principles, and through a free popular referendum in both Banks, held in an appropriate atmosphere of freedom and democracy. However the situation being what it is at this stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, due regard must be paid to the actual situation at the official Arab level and to the fact that the whole of the Arab liberation movement is at its lowest ebb. In addition, there are the frenzied efforts being made by American imperialism and Israel to liquidate the Palestine problem and to impose surrender on the Arab nation in accordance with the Israeli-American concept of peace. Therefore

the submission and declaration of this proposal in the present circumstances involves matters of the greatest gravity, first and foremost of which are the following:

1. The final relinquishment, in the name of the Palestinian people, of the greater part of Palestine, and the greater part of Palestine being considered as *de facto* and *de jure* belonging to Israel. Also involved would be acceptance of the principle that Palestine at best consists of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the consequent annulment of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in the territory of their homeland, the abolition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and, in consequence of all this, the obligation to prevent Palestinian struggle from being continued both now and in the future.

2. We believe that Israel will not withdraw from what the plan calls the Palestinian Region unless America adopts the plan and this adoption is accompanied by Israeli approval. In this case withdrawal would be subject to preconditions, first and foremost of which would be the termination of the state of war between Jordan—the United Arab Kingdom—and Israel. Moreover Israel would impose her territorial and political conditions in the light of America's and Israel's concept of the question of secure frontiers and peace as set out in Security Council Resolution 242. However, Israel's conditions would go further than the ideas expressed in this Security Council resolution, since they would include the achievement of her plans to become an integral part of the area and the first practical steps towards the creation of a Middle Eastern common market. This would consist, at the first stage, of Israel and Jordan and then expand in the second stage to include other Arab areas. The aim of this would be to strengthen and perpetuate the permanent political and economic domination of the Arab area by Israel, world imperialism and, in particular, America.

3. The submission of the plan at the present juncture provides Israel with an opportunity to form a local government for the so-called Palestinian Region under the auspices of the occupation, and to conclude with that government an ostensible agreement on the political and territorial conditions for a final settlement, alleging that this is justified by the character of the elements of which that government is composed. It would be better to proceed with this to be rid of the Israeli occupation

³⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, P.L.O., *The Palestine People's Conference and National Council, Cairo, April 6-12, 1972* (report), p. 43.

and to save what can be saved. In this case the Palestinian people would bear the responsibility for the consequences. The experience of the municipal council elections and the circumstances, situations and pressures that accompanied them, increase our fears as regards that government.

[Signed] Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, Dr. Rifaat Awda, Dr. Salah al-Din al-Anabtawi, Hashim al-Juyushi, Abd al-Hamid al-Sayih, Ibrahim Bakr, Bahjat Abu Ghariba, Dr. Daud al-Husaini, Muhammad Adib al-Amiri, Abd al-Majid Shuman, Ruhi al-Khatib, Ismail Sayyid Ismail.

196

Press interview statements by General Secretary Hawatma of the P.D.F.L.P. discussing King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan and relations with Jordan in general³⁵

Beirut, early April, 1972

Q. The Resistance reacted to the Hussein plan with unusual solidarity. Fateh and the Executive Committee of the P.L.O. (dominated by Fateh and Saïqa) have condemned the plan in terms generally used by the "leftist" guerrilla groups. Fateh and the P.D.F.L.P. have announced that their underground fighters were again operating in the Irbid region against the Royalist forces.

A. The Resistance couldn't react otherwise, insofar as the aim of the Hussein plan is to liquidate the Palestine cause. It is clear to the whole of the Resistance that the Hussein plan came about through American-Israeli-Hashemite cooperation; it seeks to strengthen the Palestinian bourgeoisie in the West Bank, to give it a political legitimacy, allowing it to participate in signing a peace treaty with Israel. The aim of the elections is to "select" collaborators with a view to making them participate in future peace negotiations.

Q. Both supporters and opponents of the Hussein plan agree in thinking that this plan has been ready for over a year.

A. Of course. But even six months ago, Hussein couldn't make it public; he was still fighting with

the armed forces of the Resistance in Jordan. Besides, he hoped that the way would be opened for him by the Egyptians, who would come to an agreement with the Israelis over the reopening of the canal. Now he is afraid that the failure of negotiations on the canal may begin a "cold" period which would allow the Resistance to start up again in the West Bank and Jordan. For one shouldn't forget that if the Resistance is in a critical situation, the Arab regimes are in no better position with regard to their peoples. They are therefore obliged, for interior reasons, to treat the Resistance with caution. And then one must take account of Nixon's trip to Moscow. By presenting his plan today, Hussein is forcing Nixon to put pressure on the U.S.S.R. Finally, the Hussein plan makes nonsense of the plan for an Eastern Front coordinated with Egypt.

Q. Taking into account the reverses which it has suffered, can the Resistance prevent this plan from being carried out?

A. For the moment, the objective conditions in the region are not favourable to the Resistance. But in the long run we can put Hussein and his plan out of action. The Resistance can mobilize the Palestinian masses against the Hashemite monarchy. The upheavals which will not fail to occur in the Arab countries will facilitate such a mobilization. Remember, the Arab countries which accepted the Rogers plan wanted an arrangement which would put an end to the occupation of "all" the territories occupied in 1967. The Hussein plan opts for a "separate" peace; it breaks this common strategy and removes from those countries the argument by which they could justify negotiations.

Q. To what extent can one give credence to Fateh's declaration according to which it will struggle against the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan?

A. You should put that question to the leaders of Fateh. For our part, we think that the will to fight against Hussein's regime should be based on the unity of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples. This should come about through the creation, on democratic bases, of a new Jordanian-Palestinian liberation front which would direct the struggle of the two peoples against the monarchy.

Q. Can this objective be realized in the immediate

³⁵ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Abdullah Schläifer, *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), no. 588 (April 15, 1972), pp. 28-30.

future, if one takes into account the contradictions which came to light between the two peoples from September 1970, with the defeat of the Resistance, up to Ajlun-Jerash during the summer of 1971?

A. It's realistic if the Palestine Resistance and the Jordanian national movement manage to unite. Israel and imperialism, represented by the Hashemite throne, constitute a common enemy for the two peoples.

Q. But what remains of the Jordanian national movement which, between 1967 and 1970, has not been absorbed by the Palestine Resistance, struggling for specifically Palestinian aims? You yourself are Jordanian and you have identified yourself with the Palestinians?

A. The Palestine question and the occupation of the territories have been at the centre of the struggle of the two peoples. That is what explains the number of Jordanians in the ranks of the Resistance. But one must realize that an important section of the Jordanian national forces has until now remained outside the Resistance because we have not set ourselves objectives which reflected the aspirations of both peoples.

197

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt rejecting King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan and announcing the severance of all relations with Jordan, made at the opening session of the Palestine People's Conference (excerpt)³⁶

Cairo, April 6, 1972

I believe that this is the gravest problem that confronts us at this stage. I therefore welcome this opportunity to review with you what exactly is confronting us so that we may reassess the situation. With your permission I want to set the following points before you:

1. Let us all realize that we shall fight in defence of our rights and yours.

This country, for which I have the honour to speak, will fight; it will fight. It will fight on land, on the sea and in the air. It will fight on every front... from house to house, if necessary. It will pay the full price in blood and fire for the right to freedom out of respect for the honour of the land.

We shall fight... and you will fight, and let the whole world know this, let our friends and foes know it.

2. This Egyptian homeland will never allow anyone whosoever to squander the rights of the Palestinian people. There are two aspects of the rights of the people of Palestine: their historical right, and their present political right.

Palestine will never be lost, nor can there ever be bargaining over the present political right of the Palestinian people.

The historical right of the Palestinian people is their legal claim to self-determination; their present political right is the justification to eliminate the aggression from the territory occupied by the enemy since 1967 in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza.

3. The sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people that this homeland recognizes is the legitimate resistance—that is to say, you. The people of Palestine are represented today and will be represented tomorrow by those who bear arms in defence of their existence, their freedom, their life and their will.

4. You are truly and soundly representing the people of Palestine by the mere fact that you are continuing to carry arms. You need take no notice of those who try to belittle the importance of the mere presence of armed people of Palestine. This in itself, regardless of any activities you engage in, is a symbol that you must guard jealously, as must all of us.

All the same you are not bearing arms as a mere symbol; you are using them to fight. The whole Arab nation has recently been following your fighting on Lebanese territory and, while appreciating your stand, does not forget to praise the vigilance of Lebanon which has frustrated the enemy's attempts to cause a quarrel between the Lebanese people and you.

Brothers:

Challenges are being imposed on us and you every day, and we must not allow a seed of doubt to enter our hearts and minds. Recently we have

³⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 7, 1972. The Palestine People's Conference, held in Cairo, April 6–10, 1972, was an extraordinary meeting of 400 Palestinian representatives, called by the Palestine National Council.

all been confronted with the project that bears the name of King Hussein's plan, although in fact it was drawn up by General Allon. The object of this proposal is to destroy the Palestinian cause completely, but this arrow will miss its mark, as have other arrows aimed at the Arab nation by its enemies.

However, we must not stand idly by while these arrows are aimed at us. Your responsibility has increased—it has always been great, but today it is ten times greater, because you all must confront and defeat and impose your inalienable rights.

Your first responsibility today is to develop unity among yourselves and your greatest responsibility today is to strengthen your links with your people in the occupied territory.

Your most prominent responsibility today is to try to achieve greater harmony with unified Arab action.

Without unity among yourselves your enemies will continue to concentrate their game on superficial and insignificant differences.

Without an extensive and meaningful link with your people in the occupied territory, in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, for which the people of Egypt bear a special and definite responsibility, your voice will lose much of its strength.

Without harmony with unified Arab action, on condition that it is clearly committed to the pursuit of the goals of the struggle, you will be in danger of isolation.

Brothers:

Our Arab nation must adopt an unambiguous attitude to the so-called King Hussein plan.

We see this plan, the object of which is to deprive the Palestinian cause of all its meaning, as a departure from the Arab line which cannot be accepted. If we counter it with mere words it will mean that the most noble goals of our struggle can be bought and sold at the whim of our enemies.

As for the Arab Republic of Egypt, we are now engaged in extensive consultations with the object of establishing a unified attitude to this departure from the Arab line.

Until that is completed and we find the means we must adopt and the steps we must take to make a move, the Arab Republic of Egypt has decided to sever all relations with the Jordanian regime. This is not a measure against the Jordanian people, who are always our friends and brothers; it is directed first and foremost against an indubi-

table departure from the most basic guarantees and rights of Arab struggle.

198

Speech by President Assad of Syria warning of Israel's plans to liquidate the Palestine resistance movement, made on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Baath Party (excerpts)³⁷

Damascus, April 7, 1972

No sooner had the 1967 battle ended than Moshe Dayan, the enemy's war minister, asserted that the generation before his had won the 1948 frontiers, that his own generation had won what he called the 1967 frontiers and that the coming generation would win the frontiers of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Every day the Israeli leaders make arrogant and aggressive statements affirming their determination to swallow up the Arab territories occupied in 1967. This is clear not only from their statements but also from their constant actions to change the character of the land and build new settlements, from their flagrant defiance of the United Nations and world public opinion, and from the absolute support they receive from America for their aggression and ambitions.

First on the list of the things we mentioned was our attitude to the so-called United Arab Kingdom plan. From the first moment we regarded it as a plan deriving from the schemes of imperialism and Zionism and aimed at establishing a Palestinian entity subject to Israeli influence and calling on the people of Palestine to rally round this tiny entity. In this way, it was hoped, the cause of the Palestinian Arab people could be liquidated; the issue of the Arab-Zionist conflict could be turned into a mere problem of frontiers that could somehow be settled in such a way as to lead to the Arab homeland being torn apart and exposed to imperialist and Zionist influence, and to the

³⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), April 8, 1972.

Arab liberation being destroyed. Nothing new has happened to change our appraisal of this plan or our conviction that its object is to liquidate the problem. We can only regard any Arab individual or state that dares to make any proposal for an individual solution as going against the will and the goals of the Arab nation and carrying out the enemy's plan to divide the Arab front in any way possible.

The Palestine Resistance certainly constitutes an important aspect of the mobilization in our Arab homeland and is an integral part of the Arab revolution, a part that must be given every opportunity to grow and continue so that it may perform to the full its role in ensuring the victory of that revolution.

We affirm that this region, which has watched over and supported the Palestine Resistance and striven for the unity of its different sections, will ever remain its principal protector. We shall continue to assist it with all forms of support and we shall resolutely and inflexibly resist all attempts to liquidate it.

The forces of the Palestine revolution must grow and become stronger; to support it is one of the necessities of Arab struggle, and our understanding of this will be the basis of our dealings and solidarity with the sections of that revolution.

199

Press interview statements by Vice-Chairman Hussein of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council, reiterating Iraqi rejection of U.N. Resolution 242 and of King Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom³⁸

Baghdad, April 10, 1972

Q. The treaty [Iraq-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation] stresses the necessity for settling international conflicts by peaceful means. Would you concede,

Mr. President, that these principles are applicable to the Arab-Israeli problem?

A. We do not reject political solutions based on justice. We oppose Security Council Resolution 242 precisely because it is unjust, because it doesn't guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people to its land. For us, the problem is not limited to the Israeli aggression of June 5, 1967. It is a question of the occupation of a country, the ruin of a people, an expansionism which has not yet reached all its objectives.

Q. Should one then conclude that fundamental differences on this issue separate you from the Soviet Union, which recognizes the State of Israel within its June 5, 1967 frontiers and supports the implementation of Resolution 242?

A. A dialogue on this issue is being continuously pursued by our two governments. But the Palestine cause is the Arabs' affair, and our Soviet friends are not Arabs. In a general way, however, there is no basic contradiction between the positions of our two governments in what concerns the struggle led against imperialism and Zionism. Moscow supplies us with the means to confront the aggression, and we are grateful to her for this.

Q. What do you think of the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel?

A. We refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Q. You have denounced as strongly as Egypt King Hussein's plan concerning the future of Palestine. Do you intend, like Cairo, to break off diplomatic relations with Jordan?

A. The question is under consideration. However, each country expresses its disapproval in its own way. For our part, we have reacted by proposing the unity between Iraq, Egypt and Syria. We are waiting for an answer from our brothers.

³⁸ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde* (Paris), April 14, 1972, p.3

Programme for National Unity recommended by the National Unity Committee of the Palestine People's Conference³⁹

Cairo, April 10, 1972

The National Unity Committee established by the Palestine People's Conference, which met on April 8 and 9, 1972, chaired by Dr. Yousef Sayegh, believes that the present grave circumstances through which the Palestine problem and the Palestine revolution are passing make it more necessary than ever to devise an advanced formula for Palestinian national unity to be put into effect by stages immediately.

Having discussed the question of national unity at length, the Committee expresses its regret and dissatisfaction at the failure to implement most of the decisions of previous National Councils on national unity, and the failure to take any effective steps in this field.

In view of the sincere and serious intentions of all those who took part in its activities to achieve national unity and of the decisive affirmations by the representatives of the struggling Palestinian organizations of their commitment to take serious and immediate steps towards national unity, the Committee recommends the following:

1. To regard the fundamental steps contained in the draft organizational programme for the unification of the sections of the Palestine revolution drawn up by the Planning Centre, which was based on the political and organizational programme established by the eighth Palestine National Council and confirmed by the ninth National Council, as the basis for the drafting of a phased practical programme for the achievement of the unity of the sections of the revolution and the forces of the Palestinian people (their mass organizations and nationalist personalities) in the Palestine Liberation Organization.

a.) The constitution of the command organizations of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Executive Committee and the National Council [shall form] the basis of a front.

b.) The unification of all the armed forces of the commando, semi-regular and regular sectors of the Palestine revolution and the organizations

and activities connected with them in a single military institution. The same applies to regular or irregular military forces not under the supervision of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

c.) All sources of contribution and all fields of expenditure shall be fully unified within the framework and under the supervision of the Palestine National Fund, the Executive Committee altering the National Fund's financial schedules in such a way as to ensure harmony with the requirements of Palestinian revolutionary action.

d.) All organizations connected with the external relations of all the different organizations shall be unified and the quarters in the Palestine Liberation Organization concerned shall be responsible for the external relations of the Palestine revolution, including political representation in Arab, friendly and foreign countries.

e.) The Executive Committee shall set up a committee to study the organizational situation in the occupied homeland and Jordan in order to devise a suitable formula for unification in the light of the situation as regards struggle and security.

f.) Every sector shall retain its ideological and internal organizational independence within the framework of the political programme of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

2. The sectors of the Resistance shall immediately declare national unity in accordance with the above-mentioned general principles.

The National Council shall allot to the Executive Committee the task of deciding the practical details of the implementation of these principles within the framework of a clearly defined time schedule; it should be understood that the basic stages of this programme shall be completed within three months, after which a report thereon shall be submitted to the National Council at its next ordinary session as a basis for computing how much has been achieved.

3. The development of the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization so that they may be better able to achieve national unity and perform the tasks of the coming stage.

4. The formation of a preparatory committee to collaborate with the Executive Committee in expanding the National Council.

5. The Palestine People's Conference shall elect

³⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Fateh* (Damascus), no. 334, April 19, 1972, p. 9.

a committee from among its members to follow up the implementation of the resolutions on unity.

6. In the present stage the Executive Committee shall supervise the implementation of these resolutions from May 1, 1972, it being understood that their implementation shall be completed before the meeting of the expanded National Council in July, 1972.

7. A new Executive Committee shall be elected from the National Council at its July, 1972, session to act as a command for unified Palestinian action.

201

Political programme adopted by the Palestine National Council calling for the overthrow of Jordan's Hashemite regime (excerpts)⁴⁰

Cairo, April 10, 1972

These vanguards, and along with them and supporting them, our Palestinian people, all the Arab masses and all free men in the world, believed that armed struggle is the right, inevitable, principal and fundamental way to liberate Palestine, because our conflict with the Zionist enemy is of such a nature that it can only be dealt with through armed revolutionary violence.

The pursuit of the course of armed struggle by the vanguards of the Palestine revolution has awakened the Palestinian masses and inspired them with the will to fight. This has brought about a profound change in the Arab situation, now marked by insistence on rejecting defeat, and moves to offensive positions in fighting the Zionist enemy and in thwarting the American imperialist conspiracy. Jordan has become a base for the armed revolution and for the escalation and protection of armed struggle in the territory of Palestine. Long fighting fronts have been opened against the enemy, covering the Suez Canal and all the frontiers of Palestine with East Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Armed popular resistance has been stepped up in the West Bank and in the Palestinian territory occupied before June 1967.

while in the Gaza Strip, thanks to the many heroic feats of the armed resistance, sections of the town of Gaza itself have been practically liberated.

But the revolution is now facing an extremely dangerous situation thanks to American initiatives and the plans involved in them, such as the Rogers Plan, which was accompanied by a blockade of the revolution at the Arab level and the fostering of a spirit of surrender. This situation gave the anti-revolutionary forces in Jordan the chance to implement the American-Zionist-Hashemite plans aimed at striking a merciless blow at the Palestine revolution to pave the way for its liquidation and, at the same time, the liquidation of the Palestine problem.

Because of the blow directed against the Palestine revolution in Jordan in the middle of 1971, the intensification of the American imperialist and Zionist attacks on the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian masses both inside and outside the occupied areas, and the increasing trend towards surrender in official Arab circles, the Palestine revolution is confronted with a general crisis. It is also confronted with a series of conspiracies aimed at liquidating both the Palestine revolution and the unified national existence and cause of the Palestinian people. Those conspiracies include the Allon Plan, the project for a Palestinian statelet in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, annexation, Judaization and attempts to absorb the Palestinian people into the societies in which they live in the Diaspora.

The Jordanian arena differs from any other Arab arena as far as the Palestinian revolution and the problem of the liberation of Palestine are concerned since it consists of a Palestinian majority with national rights, in addition to their general rights, and this majority constitutes a principal part of the Palestinian people. Armed struggle against the Zionist enemy is inconceivable without this majority, not to mention the fact that its struggle is linked to the struggle of the people of Transjordan and has been organically linked to contemporary history, particularly during the last twenty-five years. Transjordan moreover constitutes the longest frontier with the Zionist enemy

⁴⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Damascus), June 28, 1972, p. 6.

and the frontier nearest to his lines of communication and his military, economic, political and strategic positions and population centres, hence the extreme danger of the conspiracy of King Hussein's regime in Jordan with imperialism and Zionism. As a result the Palestine revolution has suffered under massacres and has not been allowed to operate in Jordan. Any activity directed against the Zionist enemy and imperialism was prevented and Jordan was made into a military insulator for the Zionist entity and a channel for its policies and influence in all fields. This means that the liberation of Jordan (the overthrow of the subservient regime) will play a decisive role in breaking the grip of the crisis, and constitutes a strategic necessity in the liberation of Palestine.

The building of an Arab front participating in the Palestine revolution, based on the belief that our cause can only be successful within the framework of the general victory of the national liberation struggle of our nation, will play its part in protecting the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian cause and ensuring the continuation and escalation of armed struggle. It will also be of assistance in the struggle to establish a democratic national regime in Jordan, in addition to the general part it plays in breaking the grip of the crisis.

Relations of solidarity and common struggle between the Palestine revolution and Arab struggle on the one hand and the world liberation movement and progressive and anti-imperialist forces throughout the world on the other must be strengthened. This, which derives essentially from the belief that the Palestine revolution and Arab struggle are part of the world liberation struggle, will play its part in supporting and escalating our revolutionary struggle. It will also play a positive part in the common struggle of peoples against imperialism, Zionism, racialism and reaction.

Faced with this new and dangerous situation and with the responsibility laid on the shoulders of the Palestine revolution, all sections of the Liberation Organization have unanimously agreed to announce the political programme for the present stage, which is based on the following four fundamental points:

1. Continued mobilization of all the energies of our people, both inside and outside the homeland, in a long-term people's war for complete liberation, and the establishment of a democratic society and state within the framework of the

aspirations of the Arab nation to national liberation and comprehensive unity.

2. The fusion of the struggle of our people with the struggle of the Jordanian people in a Jordanian-Palestinian liberation front. This front, in addition to its tasks in the Palestinian arena, will engage in struggle to liberate Jordan from the subservient royalist regime which is a mask for the effective Zionist domination of the East Bank and acts as hired guardian of the Zionist occupation of Palestine.

3. The linking of Palestinian and Jordanian-Palestinian struggle with the general Arab struggle through a front including all nationalist and progressive forces opposed to imperialism, Zionism and neo-colonialism.

4. Fusion with the world movement of struggle against imperialism and Zionism on behalf of national liberation.

202

Resolutions of the Palestine People's Conference repudiating the United Arab Kingdom plan and condemning the West Bank municipal elections⁴¹

Cairo, April 10, 1972

The King Hussein-Allon Plan gives our usurping enemy new authority to Judaize our occupied homeland and to extend his domination over our people in the occupied homeland and the East Bank.

Resistance to the Hussein-Allon scheme requires a clear understanding of the tasks of struggle in the Palestinian-Jordanian arena, an understanding deriving from a clear analysis of the goals and schemes of imperialism and Zionism and their ally, the subservient regime in Jordan. We shall address ourselves to this task in the following ways:

1. By achieving real Palestinian national unity, increasing the strength of the resistance movement and escalating armed popular struggle.

2. By achieving a Palestinian-Jordanian front

⁴¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Fateh* (Damascus), no. 334 (April 19, 1972), p. 6.

with its own political and organizational programme, whose central task will be to overthrow the Hashemite regime and establish a nationalist democratic regime and provide a secure principle base for the Palestine revolution.

3. By establishing a progressive Arab front, including nationalist and progressive Arab parties and organizations, fused with the struggle of the Palestine revolution and the Jordanian National Front.

The Palestine People's Conference declares the following:

1. Complete rejection of the plan to establish a so-called United Arab Kingdom announced by King Hussein. This is in conformity with the absolute and repeated Palestinian rejection of any plan involving liquidation of the Palestine problem, relinquishment of any part of Palestinian territory or any of the rights of the Palestinian people or surrender to Zionist usurpation.

The Conference recommends that the Palestine National Council should direct all research and information organizations of the Palestine Liberation Organization to devote all necessary energies and resources to exposing the facts about this plan, its motives, its implications and consequences. The object of this is to increase Palestinian and Arab awareness of the dangers of the plan, to create greater powers of resistance in the Palestinian and Arab masses and to obtain the maximum possible understanding of and support for the Palestinian attitude to the plan on the part of the masses, governments and organizations in Arab countries and countries that are friendly to the Palestinian people and support their rights.

2. The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, expressing their aspirations and will. No one is entitled to take any decision on the land or the people of Palestine other than what is decided by the Palestinian people themselves, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in accordance with its Charter and its commitment to the complete liberation of Palestinian soil. Any measure, arrangement or agreement issuing from any other source is and will always be devoid of all legality whatsoever.

In view of this the Conference recommends that the Palestine National Council should make this declaration public by all available means and that it should be communicated to all national

and international organizations and bodies concerned.

The Conference also recommends that the Palestine National Council should communicate this declaration to the United Nations, at the same time drawing its attention to the resolutions adopted by its highest authority, the General Assembly, in December 1971.⁴² These resolutions, among other things, affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on a basis of equality with all other peoples, and their right to struggle for the exercise of this right and for liberation. They also called on all states to provide the Palestinian people with supplies for their struggle and condemned all who attempt to impede this struggle. At the same time they affirmed that there can never be a just and permanent peace in the Middle East area unless there is full respect for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

The Conference also recommends that the Palestine National Council should call on all the Arab states to declare their full commitment to these principles, their resistance to any infringement of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and their rejection of any measure, arrangement of agreement on Palestine or its people deriving from any other source, regarding it as devoid of legality.

3. Neither the announcement of the plan for the establishment of a so-called United Arab Kingdom announced by Hussein nor any attempt to implement it must go unpunished, since punishment for crime is in itself an act of justice and a duty. Punishment is deterrent, and failure to punish is encouragement.

In view of this the Conference recommends that the Palestine National Council adopt the following resolutions:

a.) To call on the Council of the Arab League to meet in emergency session at the highest possible level and, as soon as possible, to consider what harsh and decisive measures must be taken against the Hashemite regime.

b.) To call on the Council of the Arab League to expel the Hashemite regime from membership in the League, in harmony with the spirit of the Council's resolutions on the annexation of the West

⁴² Resolutions 2792 (XXVI), 2799 (XXVI) and 2851 (XXVI): printed as document nos. 428, 429 and 430 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

Bank to Transjordan as part of the Hashemite Kingdom, in conformity with the spirit of the resolutions of the successive summit conferences, and as a punishment for the Hashemite regime's defiance of Arab unanimity, its submission of a new Balfour Declaration and its renunciation of Arab territory in Palestine and of the national rights of the Palestinian people. It must, however, be made clear that the expulsion refers to the ruling regime in Jordan and not to the Jordanian people, who must retain membership in the League through the Jordanian National Front on equal terms with the Palestinian people, until such time as the ruling regime in Jordan falls, the Jordanian people recover their normal status and their anticipated national government recovers its seat in the League.

c.) To demand the cancellation of the resolution of the Khartoum Conference⁴³ concerning the provision of financial aid to the Jordanian regime to strengthen its ability to hold out, now that it has been disclosed that this regime has no intention of holding out. The aid allocated to the Jordanian regime should be diverted to the Jordanian National Front to strengthen its ability to overthrow the ruling regime in Jordan and to assist in resisting the Zionist occupation in the new conditions of struggle which Hussein's plan has made more complicated and difficult.

d.) To contact the Libyan Republic, the state of Kuwait and the other Arab Gulf Emirates, so that they may divert to the Jordanian National Front and the Palestine Liberation Organization the sums withdrawn from King Hussein and impose a comprehensive economic boycott against the Hashemite regime, just as with the Zionist enemy.

e.) To establish a special court, to be known as the Palestine People's Court, which will be a fully independent judicial body whose function will be to try such enemies of the Palestinian people as may be brought before it. Hussein should be brought before it on charges of infringing and conspiring against the rights of the Palestinian people and claiming to represent the will of the Palestinian people with the object of betraying that will. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization should be entrusted

with the task of mobilizing and recruiting Palestinian energies for the implementation of any judgement delivered by that court in full and as quickly as possible.

f.) To call on the Palestinian and Jordanian individuals in authority in the Hashemite regime to resign as an expression of their condemnation of King Hussein's plan, and to reject any form of military or political cooperation with the regime.

g.) To request the Arab states to authorize the establishment of offices of the Jordanian National Front to replace the Jordanian embassies that will be closed in the Arab capitals.

The Palestine People's Conference declares the following:

1. The Israeli authorities have started to hold elections for the municipal and local councils in the occupied West Bank with the objective of moving on to a higher stage in the perpetuation of the Zionist occupation. It is also an attempt to liquidate the problem of the people of Palestine and to subvert their historical rights.

This is one more link in the chain of reactionary, Zionist and imperialist plans aimed at splitting the unity of the Palestinian people and making them fight among themselves, with the object of destroying their unified identity, their national existence and their armed popular revolution.

2. The timing of the announcement of King Hussein's plan for the establishment of the United Arab Kingdom shows that the plan is connected with the Israeli scheme to hold alleged municipal elections, especially as the timing induces those who cooperate with, and those who have been deluded by, the occupation to take part in these elections. This proves that the Israeli scheme and King Hussein's plan are two aspects of a single operation.

3. Those taking part in the municipal elections do not amount to more than five per cent of the total population, as even Zionist enemy sources admit. Women, persons less than 21 years of age and those who do not pay at least 80 IL per year in taxes are disqualified. Thus the great majority of the people living under the occupation are disqualified from voting.

In spite of the small numbers taking part, the occupation authorities have been obliged to close the bridges between the West and East Banks and to resort to all kinds of police, economic and reprisal measures, including pressure and

⁴³ Held at Khartoum, August 29-September 1, 1967; see document nos. 411 and 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

terrorism in a comprehensive operation aimed at forcing this small group to take part in the elections.

The demonstrations of our people in Nablus in protest against these elections, and the measures taken in opposition to the candidates, have been a true expression of the attitude of our people in the West Bank to this conspiracy.

4. The presidents and members of the municipal and local councils are in no way politically representative. However, the Zionist occupation is paving the way to according them a representative status not only in excess of their powers, but even beyond the confines of the West Bank. The aim of this is to provide cover for those who cooperate with the occupation, to establish a bogus representation of the Palestinian people and to create a Palestinian puppet to push through plans for the liquidation of the Palestine problem and the historical rights of the people of Palestine.

5. No measures taken under occupation have any legality in international law; under occupation legality passes to the Resistance.

6. The Palestine People's Conference does not accept the results of the municipal elections in the West Bank. It reaffirms that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and that it expresses the will for armed struggle and the will to fight of the whole Arab nation. The Conference also affirms the unity and national identity of the Palestinian people and their right to resist and to thwart aggression and occupation on the whole of the soil of Palestine.

203

Statement by the Palestine People's Conference affirming the unity of the Arab and Palestine liberation movements and urging the Arab states to sever relations with Jordan⁴⁴

Cairo, April 10, 1972

The Palestine People's Conference, held April 6–10, 1972, was attended by 400 members, representing all national groups and classes of the Palestinian people and all their popular organizations and revolutionary armed forces. It is proud

of the support for the rights of the Palestinian people and their armed struggle for the total liberation of the soil of their homeland expressed by liberation movements throughout the world in the statements delivered to the Conference by their representatives and in the messages and cables addressed to the Conference by their leaders.

The Conference is also proud of the firm solidarity evinced by the Arab national and progressive parties, organizations and forces which took part. In a joint communiqué they unanimously declared their full and unreserved support for the struggle of the Palestinian people through their armed national revolution, for the total liberation of the soil of Palestine and the recovery of their usurped national rights. They also affirmed that the Palestine Resistance, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that no one can decide the destiny of Palestine or the Palestinian people without reference to them.

In reaffirming its belief in and full adherence to the Palestine National Charter,⁴⁵ the Palestine People's Conference likewise affirms that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, expressing their aspirations, defining their will and leading their armed struggle in all fields. The Conference also affirms that any attempt to decide the destiny of the Palestine homeland, people or cause, without reference to the Liberation Organization is a presumptuous violation of the rights of the Palestinian people. Any measure, arrangement or agreement in this respect deriving from any other quarter is devoid of legality. The Palestine People's Conference also welcomes the decision announced by the Arab nationalist and progressive parties, organizations and forces, to hold a conference, to be attended by all of them, for the unification of the struggle against colonialism, Zionism and reaction. It was decided to approve and adopt this call and to regard the Palestine Liberation Organization as a principal party to it. It was also decided to form a liaison committee of members of the Palestine Liberation Organization to discuss with the representatives of all these parties, organizations and forces, the implementation of this call and together form a

⁴⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *Fateh* (Damascus), no. 333 (April 12, 1972), p. 20.

⁴⁵ Printed as document no. 360 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

steering committee to prepare for the conference whose basic purpose will be to construct the progressive front at the Arab level.

All this is in affirmation of two interlinked facts which are really two aspects of the same fact. The first is that the Arab national and progressive movement regards Palestinian struggle as an indivisible part of itself, so that the protection of the one is the protection of the other, the security of the one is the security of the other, and the achievement of the one involves the achievement of the other. The second fact is that Palestinian armed struggle is the moving force and the meeting point of liberationist and progressive movements in all parts of the Arab world, bringing them together on common ground as an affirmation of the unity of their struggle.

In the same way, the Palestine People's Conference has taken a resolute step along the road to Palestinian national unity: in view of the serious and sincere intention to achieve this unity evinced by all who took part in the activities of the Conference and in view of decisive assurances received from the representatives of all the Palestinian combatant organizations of their commitment to take serious and immediate steps along the road to national unity, it was therefore agreed that all armed forces of all sections of the revolution should be unified in a single military establishment; all sources of contributions and all fields of expenditure should be completely unified within the framework of the Palestine National Fund.

It was also agreed that all information organizations and media should be unified in a single organization. All the external relations departments of all the organizations should be unified, although the command cadres of the Palestine Liberation Organization should continue to be formed on the basis of a front. It was further decided that this decision should be implemented within a specified period—the basic stages of its programme are to be carried out within three months. It was further decided to form a special committee to follow up the implementation of this decision.

The above is not only in response to the demands of all the Palestinian masses; it is also the best way of ensuring that the Palestinians are better able to answer all plans involving liquidation and to stand up to the surrender policies to which the Palestinian cause is being subjected at this difficult

stage in its history. The most recent of these plans is Hussein's proposal for the establishment of what he calls the United Arab Kingdom. The Palestinian people have already unequivocally rejected all these liquidation plans and policies involving surrender, and they now also voice their revolutionary, decisive and total rejection of the new Hashemite proposal. This proposal has also been condemned by all Arab national and progressive parties, organizations and forces, and by certain Arab governments.

Some of these governments have taken the first steps towards imposing a blockade on the Hashemite regime and frustrating the conspiracy plan. The Palestine People's Conference looks to the other Arab governments to lose no time in condemning this plan and in taking similar measures against it; for a start they should sever all relations with the Hashemite regime. The Conference also affirms that the following measures must be taken as soon as possible; economic relations of all kinds must be severed, Arab airspace, ports and communications must be closed to movement and transport to and from Jordan, and financial aid to the Hashemite regime must be cut off and diverted to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Jordanian National Movement. Moreover, recognition of official representatives of the Hashemite regime must be withdrawn, their letters of credence must not be accepted and the Hashemite regime must be expelled from the Arab League, while the Jordanian people will continue to enjoy membership. They will be represented by the Jordanian National Movement until such time as the subservient and conspiratorial regime collapses and is replaced by a national democratic regime, then Jordan will recover its normal status in the Arab League. The announcement of Hussein's plan comes at a time when municipal elections are being held in part of occupied Palestine. This is more than a matter of timing, and reveals the organic links between Hashemite and Zionist schemes within the framework of colonialist strategy.

There is no need to point out that these elections, like any other measures taken under the occupation, are in no way legal. Under occupation the only legality is that of resistance. Furthermore, the fact that the occupation authorities have been obliged to resort to the exercise of all kinds of pressure and intimidation in their efforts to force

the population to take part in the elections, deprives them of any political value sought by the Zionist enemy. In saluting the masses who have realized the facts about these elections and opposed them, demonstrated against them and refrained from taking part in them, the Palestine People's Conference calls on the Palestinian masses to continue to oppose the later stages of these elections and thereby to frustrate the occupying enemy in his attempts to accord them a political dimension.

The Palestine People's Conference affirms that no party and no generation of the people, however much circumstances may militate against it, is entitled to waive any of its national rights.

The unity of destiny of the Palestinian people, which is organically linked with the unity of Arab destiny, requires stronger and more closely interacting mass cohesion to confront the challenges of colonialism, Zionism and reaction which confront the advance of Palestinian national liberation in particular and the Arab liberation movement in general.

In the face of these challenges at the present stage, an organic relationship must be established with the Jordanian National Movement. The nature of this relationship must be defined and every effort must be made to establish it firmly and strengthen and develop it in order that the Jordanian people and the Palestinian people may continue on their course of struggle for the achievement of their national goals. Jordan is the principal arena and the main base of the Palestine revolution, not only because of the length of the cease-fire line. Another reason is that the two are linked by a common history and a common population and have vital common relations—national, economic, cultural and civilizational—including their common struggle against the subservient regime which is the advance defence line of the Zionist state. Since these two are organically linked it is necessary to make the Jordanian National Movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization a compact structure in which the struggle of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples are fused and the relationship between them, based on their common destiny, is defined. The present tasks of the Palestinian and Jordanian masses in both Banks are to be defined as the reestablishment of the unity of the two Banks, which was smashed by the subservient regime, and the embodiment of this unity in a democratic national regime based on the

following: complete regional equality of rights and obligations within the framework of a democratic national regime which will provide a secure main base for the revolution; the right of the Palestinian people to bear arms, mobilize and rally round the revolution for the continuation of their struggle for the total liberation of the soil of the homeland; the acquisition by the Palestinian and Jordanian masses of their full democratic, social and economic freedoms; and, finally, the right of the Jordanian masses to join the armed struggle of the Palestinian people for the recovery of their usurped rights.

The Palestine People's Conference calls on all the Arab countries, and in particular those which are adjacent to Palestine, to remove all obstacles and difficulties that impede the Palestine revolution and to regard their territory as a stepping point from which the revolution can move into the heart of the occupied homeland and as a rear base for armed struggle therein. This is the Palestine revolution's legitimate right, in addition to the fact that it is part of the common duty to confront the common enemy.

The Palestine revolution must continue and escalate. This is not only the way to liberate Palestine; it will also help to protect the other Arab territories which are the goals of the Zionist expansionist plan. The continuation of the Palestine revolution and its cooperation with the nationalist forces will also increase the national ability to stand up to the civilizational, economic and social invasion by the Jewish entity.

The Palestine People's Conference is aware that the Palestine national struggle is part of the struggle against world colonialism of peoples and revolutionary and nationalist forces throughout the world.

The world liberation movements and the socialist and Arab countries support the struggle of our people and their right to self-determination. The Conference therefore affirms that the relations of the Palestine national liberation movement with the world liberation movement and the forces of socialist progress must be developed and strengthened; it calls on these forces to increase their support for the just cause of our people. It also calls on them to stand resolutely by our people in their confrontation with the schemes of colonialism, Zionism and reaction which are aimed at destroying our people's movement of struggle and liquidating their national cause. In spite

of the fact that the authorities of the Israeli enemy and the Hashemite regime have prevented the real representatives of the people from attending this Conference, this Conference is an expression of the national aspirations and the struggle of our people wherever they are. In conclusion, the Conference takes this opportunity of reverently saluting the martyrs of the Palestine revolution and the determined strugglers in the prisons of the Zionist state and the Hashemite regime. It also salutes the struggle of the national liberation movements throughout the world and, in particular, the struggle of the people of Vietnam who are teaching American imperialism such an important lesson in Indo-China.

204

Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon emphasizing the importance of the approval of Lebanon's request to the U.N. Security Council to strengthen the U.N. observer force on the Lebanon-Israel border, based on the 1949 Armistice Agreement⁴⁶

Beirut, April 20, 1972

Following the recent Israeli aggressions against Lebanon, in reply to Israel's allegations that the Armistice Agreement concluded in 1949 has become invalid, and in reply to Israel's attempts to obstruct the observer force provided for in that agreement, Lebanon submitted a request to the United Nations to strengthen the observer force by increasing the number of observers, in accordance with paragraph six of Article seven of the Armistice Agreement.

In spite of Israel's vehement opposition to the Lebanese request, the Secretary-General of the United Nations complied with it, as did all the members of the Security Council without exception. Lebanon regards this international approval as extremely important for her.

In fact:

1. Lebanon has affirmed in the past and continues to affirm that the Armistice Agreement concluded in 1949 is still in existence and in force. Among the reasons for Lebanon's adherence to this agreement are the clear and unambiguous provisions it contains to the effect that the Armistice lines correspond exactly with Lebanon's international frontiers (Article five, paragraph one of the agreement) whereas, since June 1967, Israel has claimed that the Armistice Agreement has become null and void. It must be clear to everyone that what Israel is seeking by these allegations is to sabotage this agreement and to lure Lebanon into negotiations through which, and through the illegitimate means she always employs, Israel imagines she will be able to realize her well known expansionist ambitions.

The approval of all the members of the Security Council supports and affirms the soundness of Lebanon's position, for it amounts to a definitive confirmation of the continued validity of the Armistice Agreement.

In fact on March 29, 1972 Lebanon requested the President of the Security Council to increase the number of observers on her international frontier on the strength of the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. On April 4, 1972 the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his report, which contained his approval of the Lebanese request on the strength of the said Armistice Agreement. On April 19, 1972 official approval was given, by the unanimous vote of the members of the Security Council, for the adoption of the Lebanese request and the report of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was called on to act in accordance with his report and to consult with the Lebanese authorities on the manner in which what had been agreed on should be implemented.

It is perfectly clear from the above that the legal basis of this approval was the Armistice Agreement and nothing else; the observer force to be strengthened was the force mentioned in Article seven of the said agreement.

Thus the approval of the Lebanese request, based on the Armistice Agreement, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by all the members of the Security Council without exception has definitely and conclusively refuted all Israel's claims and terminated them once and for all by substantiating that agreement along with other

⁴⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, Lebanon National News Agency *Bulletin*, April 20, 1972, p. 19. The approval is contained in the U.N. Security Council Consensus printed as document no. 15 above.

legal principles involved therein, in particular as regards Lebanon's international frontiers (Article five of the agreement).

2. Moreover, it is clear that the fact that the observer force has been strengthened by the increase in number of observers makes it impossible for Israel to manufacture pretexts to justify her aggressions against Lebanon for the achievement of her expansionist ambitions.

Lebanon, which adheres to the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter, expresses her satisfaction with the attitude of the Secretary-General and with the approval of the Security Council, which supervised the conclusion of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and which continues in all circumstances to be the guarantor of that agreement.

In this connection Lebanon expresses her gratitude to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to all the members of the Security Council, for the interest they have taken in this matter and for their response to Lebanon's request, in spite of Israel's vehement opposition.

205

Speech by President Bourguiba of Tunisia criticizing the use of classical warfare in the Arab struggle with Israel, made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Boumedienne of Algeria (excerpt)⁴⁷

Carthage, April 20, 1972

I have already expressed this point of view at the Cairo Summit in 1964. At that time I stressed that the liberation of Palestine cannot be achieved by the methods of classical warfare between the Arab countries and Israel because, apart from the fact that it turns most of the peoples of the world against us, it cannot lead to positive results due to the disparity of the forces. What matters in such a war is not numbers but the technological standards of the Arab regular armies and the Israeli army respectively. As we know, too, the Israeli army is composed of elements most of whom are experts

in *blitzkrieg*, having engaged in it and become proficient in its methods before they came to Israel from both Western and Eastern countries.

It is the insistence of the Arab countries of the East on classical warfare that has led to their trials and setbacks; it has obliged them to ask for help from great powers who are less concerned with helping the Arabs to recover their legitimate rights than to further their own interests—political, economic and strategic.

206

Interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt defending U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations and France's Middle East policy and criticizing Jordan's actions on the "Eastern Front"⁴⁸

Cairo, April 24, 1972

Q. To what extent has the U.S.S.R. undertaken to provide Egypt with the necessary suitable arms in reply to America's supply of Phantoms and Skyhawks to Israel? In this context rumours are circulating expressing doubts as to the success of the President's visit to Moscow, suggesting that the U.S.S.R. has made certain conditions, such as that it should be allowed naval bases in Egypt, but that it has not supplied Egypt with MIG-23s or other planes of the same model.

A. To what extent has the U.S.S.R. undertaken to supply Egypt with the necessary suitable arms? It is supplying us, as I told you just now at the beginning of the session. What happens is that it says to me, I will give you this, then waits a bit before giving something else. Then a month later I ask again, saying I want something else. This is how the dealing goes. Nothing has happened between us and the U.S.S.R. Has the U.S.S.R. asked for bases? Certainly not. Certainly doubts have been expressed, as you said in your question—rumours expressing doubts—not only about my visit, but doubts about everything. The U.S.S.R. has asked us for bases. This operation

⁴⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Tunis), April 21, 1972.

⁴⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), April 26, 1972; President Sadat was answering questions from members of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union.

has nothing to do with a tactical operation! Certainly not! Here we come back to the basic principles of the revolution of July 23; we do not forget them. We will never give bases in our country to anyone. But I did state that I had given the U.S.S.R. facilities in the Mediterranean. I announced it to you and to the National Assembly and to the whole world. And I said it to Nixon in writing. I wrote to him saying, just as in the black days of 1967 it sent us an air bridge and a sea bridge of support so that we could stand on the first line of defence against the Jews after we had lost 80 per cent of our arms—in the same way I am giving it naval facilities. What do facilities mean? That they should come to Alexandria for water, that they should rest a little in Alexandria.

Q. Has the U.S.S.R. supplied us with the sophisticated arms, previously mentioned by Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadiq, to enable us to strike at Israel in depth, and has the President's visit to the U.S.S.R. been followed by positive results?

A. This is part of the smear campaign. I do not say what is going on between us and the U.S.S.R., never. The U.S.S.R. is supplying us, but with what? I don't say, and I shall never say what is going on between us and the U.S.S.R. For nearly 24 hours every day there is something going on between us, but we don't talk about it and we don't boast. I could have talked about everything, but I am looking after our interests, and I don't want to talk about it. So let us control ourselves for a bit—we are going ahead. But there is a matter of principle. If there is anything wrong between us and the U.S.S.R. I'll tell you about it, you shall know about it. I'll come and confront you with it, I'll confront all the people with it. And the U.S.S.R. certainly knows this too. Everything is normal, and we shall not announce it again; we shall not talk about it again.

Q. Has the U.S.S.R. refused to supply Egypt with aeroplane factories, and is it true that Libya bought some, during the visit paid by Major Abd al-Salam Jalloud, and gave them to Egypt?

A. I have one answer to this question. We decided, as I have told you, at the Presidential Council of the Federation, to manufacture everything in the Federated State with the vast technical and human resources that our three countries have at their disposal, with the immense economic

bases here in Egypt and with financing from Libya. And we are going on in this way. What has happened? Agreements have been concluded between Libya and the U.S.S.R. and agreements are now being concluded between Libya and certain countries in Western Europe. I shall not say more than that. But our decision is that we must manufacture, meaning that all we require we shall obtain from inside our country.

Q. Is not our reliance on the U.S.S.R. only a form of alignment, which means that we have abandoned the policy of non-alignment, the policy we ourselves pioneered?

A. More smears! What sort of alignment? No one in the world but the U.S.S.R. is willing to stand by us politically, militarily and economically. No one but the U.S.S.R. is ready to give me anything. Am I to say to it, no, I won't take them, lest I should be aligned? Am I to say to it, no, don't send me arms, lest I should leave the circle of the non-aligned countries? Alignment? Non-alignment? People who talk like that are ignoring the interests of the country. Are we to say "non-alignment" and abolish our relationship with the U.S.S.R. because of non-alignment and let Dayan occupy the country because of the slogan of non-alignment? Don't you understand? If America offered us anything should we say no? If anyone offered us anything should we say no? Well, what does all this mean? All this only started after October when I exposed America throughout the world, when I took my final decision, and I said that they were liars and swindlers, and related what I said to them and what they said to me throughout eight months. I exposed them at the highest levels and inside their own country; there was a British M.P. with me talking to me, telling me what had been published in *Newsweek* inside America. He said the government is still upset today because I said everything frankly, and revealed how they were behaving—twisting and lying and deceiving. I can assure you, I see nothing against it. I will accept any kind of help from anyone who wants to give it to me, whether it comes from the East or the West. But when there is no one that stands by us but the U.S.S.R., am I to say no, I won't take anything from you? Am I to shut the door?

Q. What is China's attitude to our cause? And what were the results of Mr. Mahmud Riyad's visit,⁴⁹ especially in view of the fact that America is trying to make trouble between China and the U.S.S.R.?

A. It is a frank and unambiguous attitude. They have refused to recognize Israel, and have condemned Israel. It is an unambiguous attitude, one hundred per cent with us. Mahmud Riyad's visit with them was excellent, and had excellent results.

Q. People are asking if it is true that France is supplying Israel with spare parts for its military planes through Belgium.

A. More smears—this time about France's attitude. France is the only country in Western Europe that has adopted a clear, honourable and challenging attitude of support for us. Some people want to cast suspicion on France, so they say that it is giving spare parts to Israel. Perhaps it is happening without the French government's knowledge, as the boats that were stolen from there. Belgium is manufacturing [arms], it has a licence to manufacture Mirages and other things. All right, I also get things from France, from England, from the West, from everywhere, although there is an embargo on everything. What I mean is, let's stop raising doubts, and only think of the country's official attitude. The attitude of Pompidou and his Foreign Minister Schumann is quite clear. We hope that [Foreign Minister] Murad Ghalib will see the French Foreign Minister. Dr. Hatim met Schumann recently, and Schumann made the strongest possible statement in our favour. So why should we be suspicious about France's attitude, when it was France that changed the attitude of all the countries of Western Europe and made them vote for us on the General Assembly resolution adopted last December?⁵⁰

Q. What will be the position of the Eastern Front should fighting start? Will it be possible to do anything on the Eastern Front, or to safeguard it?

A. What is the Eastern Front? The Eastern Front consists of Jordan, Iraq and the Palestine Resistance; for a long time the Eastern Front was

Jordan, Iraq and the Palestine Resistance. King Hussein, God forgive him, has finished off the Palestine Resistance. Iraq has withdrawn all its forces, and King Hussein has withdrawn his forces from the firing line to the previous frontiers; there are 500 kilometres of frontier between Hussein and Israel. Israel has stationed only two battalions of reserves there, and is quite happy about it, because there is nothing facing them. That is the situation on the Eastern Front, and not only on the Eastern Front. Hussein is now carrying out an American scheme in the area—King Hussein's plan to destroy the cause of Palestine completely, so that they may come and say, what are you quarrelling about? The problem is between you and Israel on the frontier! The whole world is saying that it is a problem of frontiers between Egypt and Israel that can be solved in ten years, in as long a time as they like. They will solve it and there will be an end to that. As for the basic problem of Palestine—those who run the country have solved it by making it a kingdom.

207

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the meeting of Presidents Boumedienne of Algeria, Sadat of Egypt and Qadhafi of Libya to discuss problems facing the Arab world (excerpts)⁵¹

Algeria, May 6, 1972

At the invitation of President Houari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Algerian Democratic Republic, His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and His Excellency President Muammar Qadhafi, President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic, paid an official visit to Algeria Rabi' al-Awwal 21–22, 1392 A.H. (May 4–5, 1972), in the context of strengthening the fraternal links between the peoples of their three countries, in compliance with their previously expressed wishes

⁴⁹ Mahmud Riyad, adviser to President Sadat, visited Peking March 22–27, 1972.

⁵⁰ Resolution 2799 (XXVI) of December 13, 1971; printed as document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁵¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 7, 1972.

and common aspirations, and in harmony with the policy of consultation and direct contacts among responsible Arab leaders, to study the situation in the Arab world, to unify efforts to confront the dangers that threaten the Arab nation and to coordinate attitudes to the various world issues and problems.

The Algerian people accorded their distinguished guests, His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar Sadat and His Excellency President Muammar Qadhafi, the warmest of welcomes, which reflected the strength of the fraternal, historical and cultural links between the three sister countries and evidenced their unity of sentiment, goals and destiny.

On the occasion of this visit, meetings at summit level were held among the three Presidents. During these meetings, at which a fraternal spirit of frankness and harmony prevailed, the three heads of state discussed and studied current Arab problems, most importantly the problem of the liberation of the territories of the Arab states and Palestine, and the fraternal relations existing among the three countries.

The three Presidents devoted particular attention to a study of the developments in the Arab cause at this stage in which the continued Zionist occupation of Arab territories, with the support of the United States of America, Israel's pursuit of a policy of expansion and domination, and the attempts that are being made to eliminate the resistance of the Palestinian people, constitute the gravest of the dangers threatening the future and the very existence of the Arab nation.

In this connection they agreed on the necessity to take practical steps and effective measures within the framework of a plan with clearly defined objectives. This plan should form the basis of coordinated Arab action to secure the recovery of the Arab territories to ensure that the Palestine revolution can continue its victorious struggle and to realize the aspirations of our people to a free and honourable life.

In view of the manifold colonialist challenges with which the Arab homeland is faced, it is essential that the whole Arab nation should engage in a long national battle comprising all forms of conflict. All their strength must be thrown into this battle, for which they must mobilize their energies and employ their resources, and press on with total popular mobilization. This will lead to

the realization of the lofty objectives of the Arab peoples in their march towards liberation and progress and towards comprehensive Arab unity. Such unity is indispensable if this nation is to be strong enough to foil the schemes of colonialism aimed at expanding foreign influence over the Arab homeland.

Inasmuch as, all attempts having failed to find a solution to the problem of the occupation of Palestine and of the other Arab territories, the Israeli enemy, with the support of Zionism and its allies throughout the world, is persisting in its occupation of the land and establishing settler colonialism in parts of it, the battle of liberation is an indispensable necessity and a sacred duty requiring sacrifices and the total coordination of all the resources of Arab strength.

In this connection the three Presidents decided that all energies and resources should be mobilized for the inevitable battle of destiny. They declared their conviction that, when intrinsic Arab strength is thrown into the battle with all its weight, it is capable of confronting its enemies, defeating their aggressive schemes and achieving victory for its peoples.

Regarding the struggle of the Palestinian people as a basic factor in the struggle of the Arab nation, the three Presidents expressed the belief that support for the Palestine Resistance, as represented by the Liberation Organization, is a national duty and a responsibility incumbent on all. In this connection they agreed to make available to the Arab nation everything necessary to strengthen its liberation struggle. They also affirmed their conviction that the unification of the Palestine Resistance organizations is essential to ensure its protection against the conspiracy of liquidation of which it is the object.

The three Presidents expressed their conviction that the efforts that are being made at the level of the Arab homeland, both in the Maghrib and the Arab East, in building, construction, cooperation and integration are basic steps towards the same goal—the achievement of the unity, welfare and prosperity of the Arab nation.

The three Presidents studied the present situation in the Mediterranean and affirmed their belief that continued Israeli aggression constitutes the greatest cause of tension in the Middle East and Mediterranean area and that the checking of this aggression against Arab territories will be one of the

most important factors in stabilizing the situation in the area.

They expressed their belief that the coastal states of this sea, and in particular those that are non-aligned and not attached to blocs, should engage in dialogue and consultations with the object of coping with political and local problems from an independent viewpoint, unaffected by outside influences, in an attempt to consolidate peace and security in the area and to create opportunities for genuine cooperation between the peoples of the whole area.

The three Presidents exchanged opinions on current initiatives in connection with holding a conference on European security, stressing the importance and the dimensions of these initiatives in view of the repercussions, both negative and positive, they could have on the situation of the Mediterranean countries. They believe that their own countries have a direct interest in these initiatives which, if they are to be effective and in the interests of cooperation, should take into account the will of the peoples of the area to achieve liberation, development and progress. They must, consequently, be seen in the context of the principles of respect for the sovereignty and independence of peoples, non-intervention in their internal affairs and the creation of opportunities for genuine cooperation between states on the basis of equality.

The three Presidents expressed their satisfaction at the results of the talks and affirmed their wish to continue these meetings with the object of creating new opportunities for cooperation between their countries, strengthening the bonds of brotherhood and solidarity between their peoples and reinforcing the struggle of the Arab nation and its march towards liberation.

In this connection the three Presidents agreed to conduct periodical consultations and contacts at summit level, and at all levels, with the object of following up all developments that take place in the Arab homeland and of coordinating attitudes and efforts as regards both the common struggle against Zionism and imperialism and as regards the various other international issues and problems.

208

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the United Arab Emirates of Foreign Minister Abd al-Baqi of Iraq (excerpt)⁵²

Abu Dhabi, May 7, 1972

His Excellency Murtada Said Abd al-Baqi, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Foreign Minister of the Iraqi Republic, visited the United Arab Emirates on May 6 and 7, 1972, at the invitation of His Excellency Ahmad Khalifa Suwaidi, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates. During his visit he met His Highness Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nuhayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, and a number of senior officials.

The two Foreign Ministers had frank and friendly discussions on the present Arab situation regarding the Palestine problem, the Arab Gulf, and bilateral relations between the two countries.

In discussing the Palestine problem the viewpoints of both parties were in agreement on the need for all Arab efforts and resources to be concerted for the confrontation with the Zionist enemy in order to safeguard the rights of the Arab people to the territory of Palestine.

The two sides affirmed their unconditional support for the Palestinian people in their legitimate armed struggle to recover their homeland and their right to self-determination. They also affirmed that it is the duty of the people and governments of the Arab nation to support them in this field and to oppose imperialist attempts to liquidate this problem.

⁵² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), May 8, 1972.

209

Communiqué issued after a meeting of representatives of various Arab political parties and organizations calling for an Arab people's conference for the support of the Palestine revolution⁵³

Beirut, May 11, 1972

In implementation of the resolution adopted by the Palestine People's Conference,⁵⁴ held in Cairo from April 6–10, 1972, on organizing the Arab nationalist and progressive forces' participation and support, by all available means, in the Palestine revolution, a preparatory meeting was held in Beirut from May 7–11, attended by representatives of the following parties and organizations:

The Arab Socialist Union of Egypt; the Arab Socialist Union of Libya; the National Front of the Democratic Republic of Yemen; the Moroccan National Bloc; the Baath Party in Syria; the Baath Party in Iraq; the Jordanian National Front; the Palestine Liberation Organization; the Progressive Socialist Party; the Lebanese Communist Party; the Baath Party in Lebanon; the Baath Party Organization of Lebanon; the Arab Socialist Labour Party; the Communist Labour Organization of Lebanon; the Lebanese Movement for the Support of Fateh; the Democratic Party; and the Union of Lebanese Communists.

The meeting called for an Arab people's conference for the support of the Palestine revolution to be held in Beirut in the second half of this year, where all Arab national and progressive forces would be represented, and where a number of Arab personalities, as well as a number of friendly parties and organizations throughout the world would be invited as observers. The preparatory meeting also decided in principle that an Arab Front Participating in the Struggle of the Palestinian People should be set up at the level of the Arab nation and in all the Arab regions, and that a permanent secretariat for the Front should be set up, though the final decision on this is to be left to the conference. The preparatory committee also established a secretariat to prepare for the conference.

⁵³ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 12, 1972.

⁵⁴ See document no. 203 above.

210

Memorandum issued by the P.L.O. regarding the Lod Airport incident⁵⁵

Early June, 1972

The Palestine Liberation Organization, the recognized representative of the Palestinian people, has the honour to draw your attention to the incident which took place at Lydda Airport on 30 May 1972, in order to place it in its proper historical context. Indeed, this incident must not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon but must be seen as part of a protracted conflict which has been going on in that part of the Middle East for most of this century. This conflict is the necessary outcome of the designs of modern political Zionism on Palestine, designs which have resulted in the denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the usurpation of the land of Palestine, part of which was placed under a colonizing military occupation in 1948, and the rest of which came under occupation in 1967. The violence which has been done to the people and land of Palestine by the Zionist movement and, later, the State of Israel is directly responsible for the continuing state of tension in the area.

The Palestinian response to this violence, since its inception, has been armed resistance. However, it must be borne in mind that the Palestinian resistance movement did not initiate the shooting of civilian passengers in aircraft—on 9 May 1972, the Israeli armed forces entered a hijacked Sabena airliner shooting indiscriminately at all passengers alike. That plane had been commandeered by Palestinian guerrillas with the intention of releasing a few of the thousands of their comrades who are currently in Israeli prisons. Furthermore, the Palestinians did not initiate shooting in airports—it was the Israeli armed forces who entered Beirut Airport on 28 December 1968 in an unprecedented act of destruction. Finally, the Palestinians did not initiate attacks on civilian targets—it was the Israeli armed forces who attacked Bahr al-Bakar Primary School in Egypt on 8 April 1970, killing 30 children and wounding 36 others, all of them under 12 years of age; who attacked a

⁵⁵ English text as transmitted to the Secretary-General of the U.N. on June 6, 1972, by the representative of Libya; issued on June 7, 1972, as U.N. doc. no. S/10684, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, pp. 102–103.

factory in Abu Zaabal, Egypt, on 12 February 1970, killing 70 workers and wounding 69 others; who have, on numerous occasions, attacked Palestinian refugee camps with artillery, bombs, and napalm, killing and maiming large numbers of our people. Thus, the use of terror has, in every case, been initiated by Israel.

Viewed from an historical perspective, we note that terrorism has been an integral part of Zionist thought and philosophy. The writings of early Zionist thinkers and leaders emphasize the important role of terror in the establishment of the State of Israel. From Herzl to Jabotinsky, from Weizmann to Meir, from Ben-Gurion to Dayan, terror and violence have been advocated as a means of achieving the establishment of the State and maintaining it. Influenced by the work of Nietzsche and Nazi and Fascist writers, those leaders have adopted terror as their instrument for occupying Palestine, dispossessing and displacing its indigenous population and forcing upon it an alien military rule and occupation.

To illustrate with a partial and very incomplete record: the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was partially destroyed on 22 July 1946 by a Zionist terrorist group, causing the deaths of 100 British, Jewish and Arab officials. On 9 April 1948, in the Palestinian village of Deir Yassin, 250 men, women and children were killed by a Zionist terrorist group. In July 1948, in the town of Lydda itself, the civilian population was forced into mosques and churches while the Zionist armed forces opened fire on them, forcing the civilian population to flee the town. Incidents such as these, as well as the bombing of crowded market-places in Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem before 1948, were not the isolated acts of independent terrorist organizations but were under the cognizance and direction of the Jewish Agency, the immediate forerunner of the State Government of Israel, thus demonstrating the official character of terrorism in early Zionist strategy. (This is clearly documented in British Government Command Paper 6873.)

Since the establishment of the State of Israel these acts of wanton terror have not ceased: the village of Qibya in Jordan was attacked by Israeli armed forces on 14 and 15 October 1953, causing 75 deaths. On 28 and 29 March 1954, 14 people were killed by an Israeli attack on Nahhalin, Jordan. In the city of Gaza on 5 April 1956, an Israeli attack killed 59 civilians, wounded 102 others and

damaged two of the city's hospitals. And in the village of Sammu, Jordan, on 13 November 1966, an Israeli attack resulted in 18 dead, 130 wounded and the destruction of the school, clinic and mosque, among other buildings. As the British Secretary of State for the Colonies said in Parliament on 12 April 1948, speaking about the massacre of Deir Yassin, it "added up to a long list of atrocities committed by the Zionists to this day."

The purpose of these barbaric attacks has always been to consolidate the spoils of earlier aggressions and to extend those aggressions still deeper into the Arab world. Thus, the frantic propaganda campaign launched by Israel against the Palestinian resistance and some of the Arab States since the Lydda Airport incident has had a twofold purpose: to prepare world public opinion for further aggression on Arab territory and to create dissent between the Palestinian resistance and those Arab States.

Let us be perfectly clear: no Arab State can be held responsible for the incident at Lydda Airport. The responsibility must lie with the Zionist movement and Israel, a responsibility born of Israel's denial of the right of national self-determination of the Palestinian people, the usurpation of the land of Palestine and Israel's history of aggression against the Arab people and States.

Finally, we regret the loss of innocent civilian lives, particularly those victims who were so misguided as to venture into a zone of conflict. We have always said that the Middle East is in a state of war; thus it must be understood that, as in any war zone, travellers enter at their own risk.

211

Statement by Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt commenting on the Lod Airport incident⁵⁶

Cairo, June 1, 1972

Today I wish to begin by talking to you about what happened to the fida'iyyin at Lod airport in Israel. In fact, I wish to talk about this subject

⁵⁶ Sidky's monthly statement broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4005/A/8; reprinted by permission.

in view of its significance. Only three persons with three machine-guns did what was done at Lod airport. This shows the facts about Israel. Where is the ingenuity, the cleverness, the organization which has no equal in the world and the extraordinary power which the imperialists have been talking about since the June war and the claims that we cannot fight Israel because it is a force which we cannot defeat? I only wanted to comment on the fida'i incident at Lod airport from this angle. Some people reiterate that Israel is an indomitable power. I think this incident indicates that we are capable with God's help of achieving victory in our battle against Israel. This is the only comment I wished to make on this incident.

212

Statement by President Franjeh of Lebanon deploring the Lod Airport incident but denying responsibility for it, and expressing sympathy for the Palestinian position⁵⁷

Beirut, June 2, 1972

Lebanon, the land of tolerance, liberty and humanism, cannot assume any responsibility for the acts of violence, and deplores the repetition and escalation of such acts.

Moreover, Lebanon cannot be held responsible for the presence of 300,000 Palestinians on its territory and for their growing despair. The Palestinian refugees are in Lebanon only because they were driven out of their homes by Israel which still refuses to allow them to go back.

Lebanon alone is unable to find the right solution for the Palestine Question; the whole international community can and must do so. The only solution is peace based on justice.

Unless such a peace, based on justice, is achieved, the Israeli reprisals against the Palestinian people and the host countries will only aggravate the problem and render the tragedy more inhuman.

When violence is aimed at a national resistance which is the result of foreign occupation, it enhances this resistance and leads it to extreme action. This is an unrelenting law verified by world history.

With particular regard to what happened at Lydda airport which came in the wake of what occurred at that airport twenty days earlier despite the intervention of the International Red Cross, how can Lebanon be held responsible for an act by foreigners who were transported to Israel on a foreign airline from a foreign capital?

The fact that a Palestinian Organisation, through a communique released in Beirut, has claimed responsibility for what happened, means nothing other than that Beirut is a world information center.

Nevertheless, and in order not to allow Israel to exploit this matter or to use it as a new false pretext to justify its aggressive designs before world public opinion, the Lebanese Government which has previously intervened in as much as it was possible to restrict the implementation of such acts, has taken new measures whereby Lebanon will not be the source of information activity for this organisation.

In addressing itself to world public opinion, Lebanon would like its voice to be well-heard despite the current Israeli campaign against it. Lebanon would like to be and to remain the voice of truth, justice and reason.

Lebanon's message is to ensure that the rule of law prevails. Lebanon had recently asked for and obtained more UN observers on its frontiers to avoid any false accusation. This is yet a further proof of Lebanon's goodwill.

How can Lebanon be held responsible for the chain reaction resulting from the tragic Palestinian problem when Lebanon is one of its principal victims?

Lebanon condemns and deplores violence. As Lebanon had in the past deplored the barbaric acts perpetrated by Zionism at the King David Hotel for example, and at Deir Yassin, Bahr El Baqar, and in Lebanon itself, not to cite more places, it is natural that Lebanon remains consistent with itself and deplores today the Lydda airport attack which resulted in the killing and injury of a large number of innocent civilians.

⁵⁷ English text, Lebanon National News Agency *Bulletin* (English edition), June 2, 1972, pp. 1-3.

213

Petition from the people of the Jiftlik District to the Israel occupation authorities protesting the seizure of their land and destruction of their property without compensation⁵⁸

Early June, 1972

On behalf of the owners of land in the closed and prohibited area, and of the owners of land adjacent to the Jiftlik District, we, the undersigned, submit the following:

A year after the June 1967 War the Israel Defence Army seized more than twenty thousand dunums of our land situated beside the Jordan River after destroying all houses, shops and everything else, including wells, motors, pumps and a system of irrigation pipes nearly thirty kilometres long.

Whereupon we made several representations to the authorities at all levels to explain how extensive the damage was and to protest against what had happened, requesting compensation for the losses we had incurred and for the unemployment, deprived of our sole source of a living. On March 31, 1970, we met General Dayan in Jericho for the same purpose, and his answer was that Israel's security requirements warranted any action, whatever the damage involved, and that it was no use applying for compensation by submitting a claim unless it was agreed by the Minister of Defence, except as regards two incidents involving the army, in which vegetable crops had been damaged and owners of an orchard had been told to leave. General Dayan also called for the formation of a committee, consisting of the Agricultural Officer of the West Bank, the Commander of the Jordan Valley District and two farmers from the area that had suffered damages, to consider the complaint. This committee was formed, held several meetings and submitted a list of the names of those who had suffered damages, the areas of land they owned, and demarcated the prohibited areas and those which, although not prohibited, could be exploited only by those holding permits and then only at certain times. With this the committee concluded its work, and there were no further contacts except those made by individuals.

In 1968 we submitted a claim for compensation for our losses to the appropriate courts. While the case was still pending before the courts under a law which authorizes compensation, the Commander of the West Bank District announced that on February 1, 1970, a law had been passed stipulating that no consideration could be given to any request or claim for damages incurred by any area of land which the Commander of the Military Area had declared to be a combat area. He added that the Commander of the Jordan Valley District had designated this a combat area to a depth of 14 kilometres inside the West Bank along the Jordan River, and that this law was retroactive as from June 5, 1967.

We regard this law as unjust and unconstitutional for the following reasons:

1. Because it deprives us of a legal right that is undisputed inasmuch as we are the owners of land seized by the army, which destroyed everything on it, inflicting losses and depriving us of our sole source of livelihood.

2. The legislators who passed this law have stripped us of our humanity and deprived us of the right to live on land which we have spent our lives improving and making the most productive and prosperous area in the West Bank.

3. The retroactive laws must not be allowed to prejudice the natural rights of individuals or to permit the seizure of land and the destruction of property without compensation.

We believe that the delay in deciding our case requesting compensation which was submitted to the courts in 1968, must be disconcerting to all who have a conscience where legal matters are concerned, for it is not easy to convince such persons that it is permissible for land to be seized and everything on it destroyed without compensation, whatever the reasons and motives.

Some of the signatories of this memorandum who are on the borders of the closed lands in the Jiftlik District are concerned with a problem that exists, the problem of [insufficient] labour from which agriculture in general is suffering; cultivation programmes have had to be cut down and production costs have risen, so much so that heavy losses are being incurred.

We have long discussed this problem with the authorities and complained that Israel is absorbing almost all the labour from the West Bank regardless of the West Bank's shortage of labour. The answer

⁵⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 8, 1972. The Jiftlik District is situated on the West Bank of the Jordan River southeast of Nablus.

has usually been that a labourer receives a higher wage in Israel and that he is free to move and work where he likes. In reply to this we say:

1. It is not a matter of overbidding, but of a grave threat to agriculture and industry in the West Bank.

2. Unilateral planning does not allow for the rights of the other side to be ignored or not to be given sufficient opportunities.

3. The worker in the West Bank is part of its very entity and its economy; the rights and requirements of the West Bank must be observed, before anything else, as long as the worker earns enough to enable him to enjoy the standard of living prevailing in the West Bank, no more and no less.

We feel that we are being forced to follow a course that we cannot accept, and that will make our life as farmers impossible whereas in fact we should be appreciated and encouraged, because agriculture is a factor of peace and prosperity.

Finally, the bad situation in which we find ourselves and the critical stage through which we are passing urge us to raise our voices to the authorities in the hope that we may find a way out and obtain the rights granted to us by every legal system.

214

Press interview statements by President Bourguiba of Tunisia suggesting that the Arab countries party to the 1967 war would abandon conflict with Israel after recovery of their occupied territories and expressing concern about increasing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean⁵⁹

Tunis, mid-June 1972

Q. The Near East conflict will naturally come up during your talks with President Pompidou. Does your position with regard to this differ noticeably from that of the French government?

A. Our positions are in fact very close to each other. Only you see, this question, it's a mysterious business. There is no solution in sight, since the

two main parties involved are unable to reach agreement. The main thing is that Israel and the Palestinians are fighting over the same piece of land. Now both sides are intransigent. They are not prepared to compromise, and yet these problems can only be solved by compromises.

In 1965, during my trip to the Near East, I put forward some ideas which seemed to be new, but I was almost murdered by the crowds when I spoke of the possibility of an agreement with Israel. After that came the war, which I didn't want. I cabled Nasser that it must be avoided. I knew it would be a disaster. Because although the Israeli army had already been in combat and were used to lightning operations, the Egyptian troops hadn't fought for centuries. However, Nasser fought the war. But instead of liberating Palestine, he allowed Israel to occupy part of Egypt. And then, as a final blow, he called on Russia! Then I thought that he'd never get out of it, once he'd entered into the cold war. Now the situation is static. But I am sure that the countries who have had part of their territory occupied would ask nothing better than to withdraw from the conflict if they could recover those territories. That would obviously be a complete bombshell for the Palestinians.

Q. In a general way, security in the Mediterranean is at present one of the major preoccupations of your government. What methods would you recommend to avoid the risks of tension which threaten the Mediterranean basin? Would you consider it useful to assemble a Mediterranean conference to promote agreement among the coastal countries and if so, which countries should, in your opinion, be invited to it?

A. One could begin with a conference of the West Mediterranean coastal countries and then, if this conference were successful, extend it to all the Mediterranean coastal countries without exception on condition, of course, that the Arab-Israeli conflict were settled. I am worried because I have noticed that the Russians are again adopting the old policies of the Tsars in the direction of warmer seas. Since Yalta, they haven't stopped advancing. They are not only in the Mediterranean, but also in the Bay of Bengal. They have bases in Egypt. They have signed an agreement with Iraq. They are also moving towards Syria. If the small Mediterranean countries don't come to an agreement to defend themselves, to have a common policy, a coordinated policy, there is a risk that one day it will be their turn.

⁵⁹ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Philippe Herremans on the eve of Bourguiba's official visit to France, *Le Monde* (Paris), June 24, 1972, p. 2.

I think that M. Pompidou shares my opinion. France has enough prestige to express her views, but she needs to have the support of the countries of the southern Mediterranean.

I am all the more worried since I notice that the U.S.S.R. is advancing and that the United States is withdrawing or holding discussions. However, it's fortunate that Libya isn't with the Russians! But she has economic relations with them. Besides, the Russians begin by doing favours, doing business, and then they sign agreements. They are on the look-out for problems so as to take over positions. This is how they are profiting by the Near East crisis. If they find no resistance in the Mediterranean, they will advance further still, with little risk [to themselves]. The Mediterranean countries can oppose them, but the main resistance can only come from America.

215

Press statement by Prime Minister Salam of Lebanon describing Lebanon-Palestinian relations following Israel's aggressions against Lebanon⁶⁰

Beirut, June 24, 1972

There is the problem of our Palestinian brethren. One of the goals of Israel's aggression is to incite the world against Lebanon but we are making every effort to give the true picture to the friendly world and to our Arab brethren. It is also one of Israel's goals to incite the Lebanese against their brethren and guests, the Palestinians. I state frankly that there are disagreements within Lebanon, but I am confident that every Lebanese citizen who zealously guards the interests of his country knows the facts and knows that there must be complete mutual understanding between us and our Palestinian brethren and their leaders. This is the object of our day and night vigil. I want to affirm to all that the mutual links and mutual confidence between us and our Palestinian brethren have had and are having excellent results. I do not say that they are the final results intended, but

they are satisfactory to us, to the interests of Lebanon and even to our Palestinian brethren.

What is it that some people want us to do? If some people—and I say some people since in my opinion there are only a few such in Lebanon—want a clash between Lebanon and the Palestinians, this shall not be. I declare it before all the world, to those who are in Lebanon and outside it, and let Israel hear me too. This shall not be. There shall be no clash, either on a popular, official or military level, between Lebanon and our Palestinian brethren. Let this be understood. If we announce this fact it is for many reasons, some of them purely human, some national and some practical; this is acknowledged by all who examine this matter.

Let us have nothing to do with excessive vehemence and exaggerations for there is enough of this on the other side. The exaggerated talk of some people takes the form: Hands off the Palestinians! This is a cheap exaggeration. No one in Lebanon is clashing with the Palestinians. Then there is another form of exaggerated talk: Do this, do that, and when we come to the test they admit that it is inconceivable that we or anyone else should think of clashing with our Palestinian brethren. Consequently, reason, Arab interests and fundamental Lebanese interests require that we continue to follow the line we have followed so far—the line of mutual confidence and cooperation to safeguard Lebanese interests.

I hope that these frank words may make every citizen of Lebanon aware of the situation. Let us all cooperate, in the interests of this country, with reason, wisdom and true patriotism.

Moreover, constant contacts between us and the leaders of our Palestinian brethren ensure that we will not give Israel any pretext for any aggression—although Israel required no pretext to lay the ambush, or to attack Hasbaya, Marjayoun and then Deir al-Ashayer, resulting in the heavy human and material losses which have cut us to the heart. But I say that at the international, Palestinian and internal domestic levels we are making every effort, day and night, to avoid giving Israel any pretext, and, if possible, to put an end to her aggression. We will take these precautions until we can sufficiently mobilize our military resources to stem aggression in more effective ways than the inadequate methods available to us at

⁶⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 25, 1972.

present, keeping in mind our present resources and our past heritage.

216

Statement by Minister of Information Babikian of Lebanon commenting on a call by Israel for a separate peace with Lebanon⁶¹

Beirut, June 30, 1972

Israel's call for a separate peace with Lebanon is no more than a futile manoeuvre to sow discord between Lebanon and her sister Arab countries with which she acts in full solidarity to achieve justice and the recovery of Arab rights and the usurped rights of the Palestinian people.

As regards Allon's call for what he calls respect for the ceasefire, we find it strange that Israel should use the ceasefire resolution⁶² as a pretext at a time when it is internationally accepted that the present situation as between Lebanon and Israel is governed by the Armistice Agreement which Lebanon has maintained and adhered to since 1949. Israel, on the other hand, has constantly violated it by her repeated attacks on Lebanese territory. Moreover, the Security Council decision increasing the numbers of the United Nations observers on the southern frontier⁶³ reaffirms the continued existence of this agreement and the need to respect it.

As for Allon's attempt to sow dissension between Lebanon and the Palestinians, he would have done better to advise his government, which is responsible for evicting the Palestinians, to implement the United Nations resolutions on the repatriation of the Palestinians and the protection of their legitimate rights.

Allon's call to the inhabitants of the South to influence the Lebanese government, coming after the Israeli aggressions of last week against peaceable inhabitants and women and children, has been

answered by the people of the South by their tenacity to their land and defence of their homeland. A noble band of them have lost their lives in heroic fighting with the forces of the enemy who constantly violate the southern frontier, regardless of the laws of humanity, innocent lives, international pacts or the repeated resolutions of the Security Council.

217

Speech by President Boumedienne of Algeria stressing the need for active struggle to recover Palestine and Palestinian rights (excerpt)⁶⁴

Algiers, July 5, 1972

Yesterday we announced that the only way to recover right and honour and to liberate Palestine is by struggle, and that peaceful solutions or so-called peaceful solutions are a waste of time. The passage of time has proved the truth of this, as evidenced by the failure of the repeated attempts to make peace in the area and by Israel's increasing obstinacy and arrogance. Every day that passes she tries to consolidate her colonization of the Arab areas occupied since the war of June 1967; her objective is not to establish secure and recognized frontiers, as she claims, but to expand and gain time to help her to do so. She has in fact expanded, and her ostensible attachment to peaceful solutions has so far allowed her to win five years. When we call for struggle it is because we know that there is no other solution. We believe the view that there should first be preparation, and then the battle, is mistaken.

The important thing is that we should choose and give shape to our choice by struggling on all fronts and by all means and in all fields, and clearly determine who is with us and who is against us, who are our friends and who our enemies. On this basis only can Arab energies be mobilized, not through summit meetings, even if there is a summit meeting every month. It is struggle that will set in motion the immense Arab energies

⁶¹ Translated from the Arabic text, Lebanon National News Agency *Bulletin*, June 30, 1972, p. 5; in an interview with *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), published June 30, 1972, Allon suggested a separate peace agreement with Lebanon.

⁶² U.N. Security Council Resolutions 233 and 234 (1967); printed as document nos. 242 and 243 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

⁶³ For the UN Security Council decision see document no. 15 above.

⁶⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies; the speech was made on the tenth anniversary of Algeria's independence.

which too often do not serve our vital interests. This is why, brothers, our attitude to this issue has not changed since 1967, nor has our attitude to the future changed, because the Arab countries today are at a historical turning point: either they choose to retrieve all their energy and vigour for the battle, accept all sacrifices and pay the price—in this case the outcome will be an Arab renaissance, a renaissance of the nation—or they remain humiliated, abject and prostrate beneath foreign domination—and this is the great danger to the Arab nation and its future. Many peoples, and especially the people of Vietnam, have taught us a great and valuable lesson in this field. The Vietnamese people fought long against French colonialism until they threw it out; they are now fighting against the armies of the greatest power in the world and are on the brink of victory, because the people of Vietnam have decided to struggle and are determined to triumph.

218

Statement by P.L.O. spokesman Nasir emphasizing the importance of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of a P.L.O. delegation⁶⁵

Beirut, July 17, 1972

The visit to Moscow of a delegation representing the Palestine revolution, during the critical stage through which the Palestine problem is now passing, indicates the following:

1. A desire for closer fusion between the Palestine revolution and the Soviet experience of socialism.
2. An affirmation that, in its appraisal of the international situation, the Palestine revolution regards the U.S.S.R. as a fundamental source of support for the Arab nation's confrontation of American imperialism.
3. An affirmation that the mobilization of the forces of the Arabs themselves is the principal means of ensuring that liberation is achieved. In order that the balance of forces may be redressed in favour of the battle, the Palestine revolution also affirms that the U.S.S.R., by virtue of its respect for the rights of the Arab peoples and the Palestinian people in particular, and of its view of the strategy

⁶⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), July 17, 1972.

and dimensions of the battle, supports this right with its economic, military and political resources, because this right is in harmony with the objectives of the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against imperialism and world Zionism.⁶⁶

4. The Palestine revolution is aware that, in spite of the differences within the socialist camp, it (the Palestine revolution), like the Vietnamese revolution and all other genuinely liberationist revolutions, is a field for meeting and interaction for all forces in the world that are opposed to colonialism, reaction and Zionism.

5. The visit of the Palestine revolution's delegation is being made to coordinate common efforts with zeal and a profound awareness of the various objective circumstances that surround all sections of the world revolution, the liberation movements and the socialist countries.

6. It is this realization that has induced all of us to resolve to intensify and strengthen our relations with the U.S.S.R. so that, by following up international developments in the area together, we may achieve greater clarity and greater real effectiveness against the common enemy—the imperialist-Zionist axis.

219

Communiqué reporting President Sadat of Egypt's speech before the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union announcing and explaining the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Egypt⁶⁷

Cairo, July 18, 1972

The Arab Socialist Union Central Committee held a meeting this morning under the chairmanship of President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat. At the beginning of the session the President announced that this meeting coincided with the 20th anniversary of the glorious July revolution, in the framework of which and for the continuity of which we were all working. He then called on the members to stand for a minute in memory

⁶⁶ Misprints in the original text made this sentence incomprehensible; it has been reconstructed as above.

⁶⁷ Communiqué broadcast on Cairo radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4045/A/1-4; reprinted by permission.

of the man who kindled that revolution, Jamal Abd an-Nasir, may God's peace be with him.

The President then made the important political statement, which lasted for about an hour and a half and in which he reviewed the political situation and developments in the Egyptian-Soviet relations of friendship. He also announced the important decisions which had been made within the framework of that friendship. The President began by defining the principled line pursued by our foreign policy. He ruled that it was the basic line pursued by the 23rd July revolution, which was kindled 20 years ago by the late President Jamal Abd an-Nasir. The result of this line was that all our decisions emanated from our will, were derived from the Egyptian personality and from Egypt's soil and served the interests of the Egyptian people, who had never agreed to enter into spheres of influence.

The President then announced that this principled policy had made the history of the revolution—since its emergence in 1952—a chain of battles. Next the President reviewed the details of the battles since the beginning of the struggle against British occupation, then ever since the United States tried to contain the patriotic and revolutionary tide in the imperialist Baghdad Pact in 1954, and up to the Israeli aggression in 1967, during which times the 23rd July revolution had always—and still did—accepted the challenge and replied to it. Its line had been—and would always be—a principled line governed by three things:

We are against imperialism and colonialism. We are building a socialist society in light of the factual conditions of our land here. We are moving within the framework of Arab nationalism (Arabic: qawmiyah), which links the people of Egypt to the peoples of the Arab countries through a link of history, interest and destiny. In all this we are interested in our people's interest.

In the course of all these battles we had a basic objective in our foreign policy, namely, that our relations with the Soviet Union, particularly after 1967, should be as complete and in the best form they could be at all levels. This was a basic line in our policy, because our main enemy was Israel—although it was fully backed by the United States. The Soviet Union had stood by our side in all fields—politically, economically and militarily. This had been the Soviet Union's attitude before the 1967 aggression. When the United

States warned us in 1965 under Johnson's Administration that it would cut aid and when the United States actually did cut this aid, we went to the Soviet Union. I was with President Jamal, may God have mercy on his soul. The Soviet Union stood with us at that time, when the open confrontation had begun between us and the United States. The Soviet Union adopted an attitude we could never forget, because it had signed a special agreement with us in accordance with which our indebtedness to the Soviet Union had been decreased to ease US pressure on us, especially since the United States was extending unlimited economic and military aid to Israel.

In 1967 the Soviet Union had supplied us with arms after we had lost 80 per cent of our arms. It had stood by us politically in international circles. The Soviet Union had also stood on our side economically, because the battle of construction was indivisible from the battle of liberation. It had helped us build the dam. It was now helping us achieve a project which was no less important than the dam, namely establishment of an iron and steel complex in which 25,000 workers were now employed.

Then came the 1970 period when we accepted the Rogers plan and the firing ceased. We then announced our initiative on 4th February 1971. You and the whole world know why I took that initiative. You also know its implications and the conditions we made in it, as I have explained before. Likewise, you know the reasons for which I offered this initiative.

The President then explained the details of the numerous discussions held with the leaders of the Soviet Union, discussions which had all taken place within the framework of friendship between the Egyptian and Soviet peoples. Most of these discussions had impinged on supplying our armed forces with the equipment and arms needed to wage the battle of liberation and remove the consequences of the aggression.

The President said: These discussions were not devoid of differences in point of view of times. However, I have always believed that these differences are natural and there is no harm in their occurrence, for the Soviet Union is a big state which has its world role which we cannot ignore. In this capacity it has a special strategy. As for us, part of our territory is occupied. Our basic objective on the Egyptian and Arab levels is

to remove the consequences of this aggression. We believe that this removal—bearing in mind Israel's obstinacy and the continued US support for this obstinacy—can only be effected by a battle to settle this state of affairs.

Then the Sudanese incidents took place in July 1971. These incidents temporarily affected our relations with the Soviet Union. In October I travelled to Moscow for the second time and explained to the Soviet leaders our principled attitude to the Sudanese incidents. Together with them—as friends—I removed the consequences of those incidents.

The statement then said that before that, and specifically on 1st and 2nd March 1971, the President had visited the Soviet Union. That had been the first visit made by His Excellency as President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. It had preceded the deadline of the cease-fire on 7th March.

HE the President had held discussions in total clarity with the Soviet leaders. Differences in points of view rose concerning the question of armament, the kind of armament and the timing of the arms deliveries. Such differences were regarded as a matter not surprising between friends, a matter which should continue to be discussed, frankly and clearly. The President reaffirmed his rejection of any restrictions being placed on the use of arms by Egypt, regardless of the type of these arms, in keeping with the basis from which we did not deviate, namely that the political decision in Egypt must inevitably remain the property of the political command in Egypt alone and of the people of Egypt alone, without asking the permission of any side whatsoever.

The President then said that after the conclusion of the treaty, it had been clear to him—as a result of the discussions which immediately followed the conclusion of the treaty—that the Soviet Union would deliver specific types of arms needed for the battle and also needed from the standpoint of the timetable which he had laid down on the grounds that 1971 was a decisive year. However, these arms had not arrived at the times agreed upon, and a basic change had taken place in the world, namely the Indian-Pakistan war, to which the Soviet Union was a party in a way. All this had happened in 1971, which, as he had already stated, made us calculate again, because the order which had been issued required a reassessment of the

situation.

The President also said: Then the date of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union and his meeting with the Soviet leaders approached and we had to review our calculations together and to review the methods of our work.

I then visited the Soviet Union for the third time in February 1972 to discuss the delivery of weapons. I visited the Soviet Union for the fourth time in April to define our political attitude to the Soviet leaders before Nixon's visit to Moscow. I told them clearly our rejection of three things: (1) Our rejection of the limitation of arms at this stage because it served Israel, which possessed stocks of weapons and which continued to occupy our territory. (2) Our rejection of any agreement for the continuation of the no peace, no war situation, because this meant Israel would gain in the long run. (3) Non-relinquishment of any Arab territory.

The President then said: After we received the Soviet explanation about Nixon's talks with the Soviet leaders I felt, in the light of all this, the need for a pause with the friend.

Here I wish to be clear, because this pause is an objective behaviour which is taking place within the framework of the friendship which binds us and should not be treated with hysteria. I attacked hysteria before and I shall always attack it because we make our decisions and determine our attitudes with our will and our full freedom. We make our decisions at the proper time. As for hysteria it is the behaviour of the powerless.

President Anwar as-Sadat said: After studying all the aspects of the situation and out of full appreciation of the Soviet Union's great assistance to us and full care for its friendship, I found it proper, while we were on the threshold of a new stage of this friendship, to make the following decisions:

(1) To terminate the mission of the Soviet military experts and advisers, who came at our request, as from 17th July, and to replace them with our sons in the Egyptian Armed Forces in all the tasks they were carrying out.

(2) All the military equipment and installations set up within Egyptian territory during the period following the aggression of June 1967 will be the sole property of the Arab Republic of Egypt and under the administration of its armed forces.

(3) To call, within the framework of the treaty of co-operation and friendship with the Soviet

Union, for an Egyptian-Soviet meeting, at a level to be agreed on, for consultations regarding the coming stage.

The first and second decisions were actually implemented in full yesterday. Continuous contacts are currently under way to determine a more effective method of co-operation in the future: The first decision was implemented in full yesterday.

The President then said that it had been necessary to put these decisions in their correct framework. They in no way affected the essence of Egyptian-Soviet friendship. Essentially, the issue was an objective pause with the friend during which we gave everyone what was due him and during which we might draw up together a method for the new stage of our friendship.

The President then said: There is nothing surprising in these decisions. I frequently declared to you before and I declared to the Soviet leaders at our four meetings that the battle is our battle and that we shall only fight with our soldiers and men and that, moreover, we do not seek a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. I considered these the main lines of our policy.

The President finally added that these decisions did not mean any postponement of the battle. Nobody wanted the friendly advisers to fight with us and it was unimaginable that any soldier other than ourselves should fight our battle for our land, right and dignity.

After concluding his statement, HE the President answered a number of questions forwarded by the members. He then spoke about the coming National Congress session on 23rd July and proposed that the only item on the Congress agenda should be the question of national unity during the forthcoming stage of work.

After the President's statement announcing these decisions, the members received it with complete support, which was clearly reflected in the speeches of a number of members of the committee. After the members' speeches, the committee adopted a motion supporting the President's decisions.

The Central Committee will hold another meeting at 1100 tomorrow.

220

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations, made on the twentieth anniversary of the July Revolution (excerpts)⁶⁸

Cairo, July 24, 1972

It has been admitted by a large number of American politicians who participated in defining the American attitude to the crisis, including Arthur Goldberg, the then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and a number of Israeli officials, including Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, that it is absolutely certain that the United States has undertaken the following commitments to Israel:

1. To prevent the Security Council from adopting a resolution obliging Israel to withdraw to the pre-June 4, 1967 frontiers.

2. Not to impose on Israel, nor permit others to impose on her, any settlement of the crisis not deriving from direct negotiations between her and the Arabs—that is to say, between Israel and the Arabs.

3. To maintain Israel's military superiority in all circumstances.

I now come to the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and what has happened between us.

In fact ever since I became president Soviet-Egyptian relations have been one of the problems that I have dealt with myself. Even at the time of the late Abdel Nasser I used to deal with this problem. I used to go to the U.S.S.R. and talk to them. I know every detail of the relations between us and the U.S.S.R.

After I became president I paid my first visit to the U.S.S.R. on March 1-2, 1971. It was a secret visit. I met the three Soviet leaders and I disagreed with them: There was a delegation with me which included some of the traitors who are now in prison. I came back here and called a meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Union and related to them the story of the disagreement. But at the time, in March 1971, a disagreement could certainly happen between friends. As I told you I have known all the details of our

⁶⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 25, 1972.

relations with the U.S.S.R. ever since the time of Abdel Nasser. They have stood by us politically, economically and militarily, but there is a difference of opinion between us as regards our estimates of situations. They are certainly a great power and have their own commitments and obligations and responsibilities and their own way of calculating situations and their own strategy and so on, while we have our problems and our strategy and ways of calculating. It may be that for them the Middle East problem is not the number one problem—certainly it is not. But for me the question of the occupation of my land and the Middle East are not only the primary problems but are for me as sleep and waking, as food and drink, as life.

Well, the disagreement happened in March 1971. I said, give them time. People must win confidence gradually. They have their own circumstances. They have been our friends and stood by us before 1967; they have stood by us since 1965, when Johnson, as I told you, launched the cold war. He turned this war into a battle. He cut off aid in 1965 and he sent a warning and said America is giving Israel arms. If you abuse us we shall give Israel more arms. He challenged us in this way. Yes, the Soviets have been standing by us since 1965; the details of their support for us do honour to the existing Egyptian-Soviet friendship. I gave the details to the Central Committee. Very well, we disagreed in March 1971 but I said the time would come when we would agree. Things happened in our country. There was the corrective movement in May. In May also President Podgorny, the President of the U.S.S.R., came and we concluded the Soviet treaty.⁶⁹ I raised some points of the disagreement between us with President Podgorny when he came here. Very well [he said], we concluded a treaty and I think that this treaty will give you confidence. I am giving you the opportunity just in case you do not have confidence in us. We have made the treaty and we have become friends as is obvious from the treaty. Perhaps at first you had doubts, you had your own situation and so on. Very well, now what is going to happen? He said, it's over, the main points in the disagreement we had in March 1971 will be solved four days after my

return to the U.S.S.R. He did return to the U.S.S.R., four days passed, four months passed, eight months passed, but it wasn't solved.

Very well, I said, never mind. There were the incidents in the Sudan about this time last year. The incidents reached their climax while the National Congress⁷⁰ was meeting. I said perhaps the people did not understand our attitude, so let's give them a chance to listen to our attitude. We continued until I went to the U.S.S.R. in October 1971 and met the Soviet leaders and we cleared up the position. If there was any misunderstanding it was because, as I told you at the National Congress on July 23 last year, three or four months had passed with my relations with the U.S.S.R. completely cut off, until about September 1971. Then I went in October and we agreed and cleared up the misunderstanding through the friendship that exists between us.⁷¹ In March 1971, three months into the year, I said that 1971 must be the year of decision, because neither our people, area, kinsmen nor nation could withstand any more. Moreover our training was proceeding as well and as thoroughly as it could. Admittedly we lacked certain things, but we had to decide things because our enemy had made his plan—just as he had repeatedly said—on the basis of, why are you in such a hurry? You are not going to solve the problem, why are you in such a hurry? Why don't you leave it for ten or fifteen years—ten or fifteen years meaning a *fait accompli*. They mean that every area the enemy is in would be lost—Sinai, Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza—would all be his. It would be a *fait accompli*; it would be all over. No. At the meeting in March 1971 I warned that this year must be decisive, in the interests of the cause and in the interests of the U.S.S.R. which also, as our friend, should make a special stand with us, especially since the American commitment to Israel was being carried out to a great extent and with more enthusiasm than the spirit of the commitment required.

I gave this warning in March, and I gave it again in October.

We reached a specific agreement in October after we had cleared up everything. According to this agreement before the end of 1971 a specific

⁷⁰ The Second National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union which opened on July 23, 1971.

⁷¹ See the joint communiqué, document no. 204 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁶⁹ Document no. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

agreement between us would be implemented. It was the Soviet leaders themselves who fixed the date, I did not ask them to, certainly not. I just told them my point of view and they said, all right, before the end of 1971 this specific agreement to such and such an effect will be implemented between us. I said, all right, thank you very much, and returned to Cairo. But 1971 went by without the agreement being implemented at all. In fact when the war broke out in India and Pakistan in December—October and November had passed and December had started—still the agreement between us had not been implemented. So I sent a message to the Soviet leaders on December 11 or 12 saying that I want to come and see you before the end of 1971. Why? Because it seemed to me that the date I fixed had passed. We were in December and my agreements with the U.S.S.R. had not been implemented. Even if they were implemented in the middle or at the end of December I was not going to be able to carry out what I promised to my people. So I said I would go to the U.S.S.R. and see the leaders there and we could talk and agree. That was on December 11. The reply came to me on December 27 that we should have a meeting on February 1 and 2. Never mind, I said, never mind, for the sake of my people, for the sake of my country and in the interests of friendship. I also said never mind because of another thing: the Soviets were going to have a meeting with Nixon in Moscow on May 20. Nevertheless, they are my friends and supporters and they have the right to ask me to wait until May 20 even though we were well into 1972 and America had stepped up the campaign. In spite of what happened here among the students—their patience was exhausted and the country's patience was exhausted after the end of 1971 and all that I had said about it—I was willing to face all that to make up with my friend, so that we might complete the next stage. What is the important thing? The important thing is that I should not be upset. Let us continue, and as long as things between us are going in the right direction and everything is all right, I will put up with it. I went there in February and later visited them in April 1972 before their meeting with America in May 1972. During my April visit I talked to the Soviet leaders, as you have read, and told them: listen, there are three points I want to tell you that we will not accept. The first is the limitation of

armaments in the area; don't agree with America on this before the consequences of aggression are removed, since that would mean that Israel will maintain her superiority and we shall be well behind her. The second point is the state of no war no peace we are in: you know very well what it is doing to the area and to the people and to Egypt. We can't accept it, we can't allow it to continue.

The third thing is: don't let them draw you into any discussion about Arab frontiers; we are not going to relinquish an inch of Arab frontiers.

.

After the Moscow meeting, I said, we must have a pause with our friend to speak frankly because we had been disagreeing since March 1971. We had been covering up the disagreement although it had perhaps caused me some difficulties here at home. But thank God our people and our armed forces had been sufficiently aware of this. I said there must be a pause, and I did in fact write to the Soviet leaders. When the Soviet leaders' answer to the message I had sent them after the Moscow meeting came I found there was no alternative for us but to take the decisions that I have taken and which all of you have read about.

Now let us see by contrast what America did for Israel to meet their three commitments. The first we said was finished. As for the second point—direct negotiations—as you see America is obstructing Jarring, obstructing the Big Four, obstructing the Two, obstructing the Security Council, obstructing everything for the sake of direct negotiations.

As for the third point, arms, let us see for contrast what America is doing for Israel.

In February 1968 there was a deal between Johnson and Eshkol for Phantoms and Skyhawks. At the same time Johnson announced that all Israel's losses in the war of attrition were to be made up. This was official and can be found in official American statements.

Nixon made the January 1972 deal. Recently the Israeli air force has been completely renewed or it will be in the next few months, with the most modern planes—this is what America is doing by contrast.

Now I have explained to you both their attitudes—the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and the attitude of the U.S.A. The Soviet attitude is the attitude of a friend, that is what I say. They are trying

to exploit it but I am not going to respond to this exploitation at all, in any form.

The American attitude is the attitude of one who does all it can to help my enemy and with crazy enthusiasm. When we made sure of this we were convinced; it does not need any new statement by us. We must conclude from this that our most urgent duty is to combat the American attitude; this is a national responsibility.

.

There were reasons, brothers and sisters, which led me to take my decision to terminate the tasks of the Soviet experts and advisers. One of the most important of these reasons was that I wanted our people to know and our nation to realize the fact that we shall fight in the open if circumstances require it of us, we shall not be afraid of fighting in the open. I would rather that your blood should be shed on the battlefield than that we should remain deluded in this state of no war no peace with our blood daily draining away, drop by drop. Neither I, nor our people, nor our Arab nation, nor our history, nor our future can accept that.

.

Brothers and sisters;

Our vigilance must sweep aside all this nonsense and cast it into the sea. All of us affirm to all of them that Egyptian patriotism and Arab patriotism will stand alone in the field if need be. This means that we must have an organized programme of action regarding Egyptian patriotism and safeguard it with national unity. God willing, in August I shall call the National Assembly to meet in emergency session to pass a law safeguarding national unity.

.

221

Press interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan reviewing his relations with other Arab states⁷²

Amman, August 15, 1972

Q. What is Jordan's situation amid the Arab blockade around it?

A. Jordan is enduring everything with aloofness and pride and at the same time with pain. The pain is caused by the attitudes taken towards this country which reflect the confused state of Arab thinking and the lack of clear vision and consequently the harm to common Arab interests and the Palestine question which is like a heart to Jordan. Under these circumstances, Jordan bears its responsibilities and continues to build its strength on the internal and external level despite the fact that it is being deprived of much of what it needs to serve the cause. Jordan is confident that attitudes towards it will change because these attitudes, we believe, are not sound. We also believe that these attitudes are not Arab and do not stem from care for the one common interest. Jordan's loss is a loss to all Arabs at a time when no compensation can be made in the work to build the power which Jordan and the Arab nation need to defend the nation's security and existence. Jordan's loss lies in the continuation of the policies and trends which originally led to the June 1967 catastrophe and, it seems, in insistence on the wrong course.

Jordan has achieved greater cohesion among its people thanks to their consciousness and greater firmness and determination to face the dangers which threaten the Arab nation as much as Jordan.

Internationally, I believe that Jordan has gained much as a result of its establishment of bridges and relations with the world. This has served the Arab cause and the Arab nation and was due to Jordan's adoption of clear plans.

Q. How would you describe relations between Jordan and the Palestinians at this time?

A. Jordan and the Palestinians are one and they have the same destiny, aim and goals. I firmly believe that this relationship has lately crystallized in a way which calls for pride and confidence in the future, both with regard to the majority of Palestinians who had to leave Palestine under difficult circumstances to live here on their Jordanian soil, and to our kinsmen in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to the many thinkers and wise men in the greater Arab homeland who are aware of our course. Our course is based on care for their interests and we are all agreed on the one course which we are following.

⁷² Published in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 24, 1972, and broadcast on Amman radio the same day in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4077/A/1-4; reprinted by permission.

Q. Delegations from the West Bank normally do not come to Amman and if they do they are usually smaller in number. Has there been any change in this respect with regard to Jordan?

A. I believe that the consciousness, vigilance, and clear vision of our brothers in the West Bank and our honest, sincere, and frank adherence to one firm course and our continued execution of our duty for the sake of our common cause have brought about a positive change among them. Furthermore, Jordan is their country and its destiny and theirs are bound together. Unity of ranks is a natural thing between the Jordanians and Palestinians.

Q. What about the Gaza delegation's arrival in Amman?

A. To us, the position of Gaza is like that of the West Bank. We hold nothing in our hearts but admiration and appreciation for the Gaza people who are living under well-known difficulties. We do not differentiate between Gaza and the West Bank or between the West Bank and the East Bank and we do our utmost to buttress the steadfastness of our kinsmen there.

Q. What are your views on Amwar al-Khatib as the head of a West Bank delegation and Rashad ash-Shawwa as the head of a Gaza delegation?

A. The Hashimite family and I personally have always felt under all circumstances throughout the past 20 years that everyone in Jordan, be he a Palestinian or a Jordanian, is a father and a brother and every woman a mother and a sister. In fact, they overwhelmed us with their feelings during our recent bereavement over the death of late King Talal. They have again endowed us with their overwhelming noble feelings and love. Perhaps these feelings coming in such a spontaneous manner are another indication of the ties that bind us together. It was a new opportunity for all of us to declare again that we will not deviate from the course we are following in serving their cause and aims, just as our forefathers have done. All this is significant under the conditions of occupation and cruel destiny.

Q. Has there been any new development regarding the stopping of Arab aid to Jordan?

A. There has been no development and no change is apparent.

Q. How far has the United Arab Kingdom plan gone?

A. The plan is the unchangeable and firm framework for the future relations among the sons of the same family. At present, it has given our kinsmen and brothers in our occupied land much of what they want. It has given them more strength and ability to stand firmly and fast. It has also placed things in their proper perspective since it dealt with the rights of the Palestinian people to Palestinian soil and consequently probably did away with the dangers, attempts and manoeuvres which sought to establish a new Palestinian home outside Palestine. This is the way the world looks upon this plan. This plan is strong thanks to the consciousness of the people of the [West] Bank and Jordan and their adherence to it. It has not reached its end and will not until we achieve our common aims.

Q. Is there any truth in the reports that the Gaza Strip might constitute the third country under the United Arab Kingdom plan?

A. This is a matter which concerns the people concerned and those who have the right to speak on the matter. The Gaza Strip and people are part of us. We work to serve them, and this is our duty. Quite often we work in this field on behalf of the Arab nation. Once the people and the land are saved, the people will become as one block.

Q. What is the present Arab position as Jordan sees it?

A. I still believe that the Arab position is bad and painful and lacks strength, long-term planning and sound mobilization to exploit our huge potentials in order to build our strength and safeguard our existence. It appears that there is insistence on continuing the course of error and obstacles. However, I hope the aware intelligentsia in the Arab homeland, which is the silent majority, will act sooner or later. I also hope responsible officials will act to redress things so that all may meet on one clear line and one course. Until something of this sort takes place, I shall concentrate on our existing conditions and the duty we can perform: To support our brothers and kinsmen in our occupied territory and in the outside world for the sake of our one cause of destiny.

Q. What are the results of Shaykh Zayid's visit to Amman, your visit to Shaykh Zayid and Sultan Qabus's visit to Jordan?

A. The results have been positive. We are most happy when we feel that our kinsmen and

brothers in the Gulf and the Arab world find that this country can render them unbiased service motivated only by the desire to help them develop and progress and also find in this country the means to prepare their men and youth. Neither we nor they have any complexes about serving the brothers, nor do we have any obstacles concerning the language or the one common interest which is indeed clear to all. Jordan is anxious to help our brothers in all fields and places and to offer everything possible to help their progress, continuation and the achievement of a better future. We are anxious to give them as many views as they want to help them solve any problems facing them. The relations between us and our brothers in the Gulf are developing on extremely positive lines. We hold these relations most dear.

Q. Military aid seems the most prominent aid you give to the Gulf.

A. Jordan offers military experience and the means of training and in this respect Jordan does all it is asked to do to help build Arab strength on a sound basis. Jordan also offers services in the military field through the efforts of professional men. It seems our brothers want us to provide them with more help and we are trying to meet their demands.

Q. It has been stated that the purpose of Jordanian aid to the Gulf is to check the Dhufar revolution.

A. We provide honest and sincere aid to all those who seek our assistance, experience and support. This has been our policy under all circumstances and conditions.

Q. What was the purpose of your recent visit to Iran?

A. It was a fraternal visit to a fraternal country and a great monarch who has been like an older brother to me throughout the years since I assumed responsibility in this country. The visit also reflects the new relations between both our countries in all fields.

Q. Was one of the objectives of the visit to mediate between Iran and certain Arabian Gulf states?

A. As regards our brothers in the Gulf, we seek to create an atmosphere of quiet dialogue and fruitful co-operation between them and our brothers and friends in Iran, for the good of all. There is nothing new in this. It has always been and will always be our policy under all circumstances.

Q. Do you have any new information about a possible change in US policy in this area?

A. There is no new information, but there is growing co-operation. There are clear and frank instructions, which officials in this country have expressed a desire for, to help our kinsmen in our occupied territory. Relations with the United States naturally become stronger under such circumstances.

Q. What will your attitude be if the USSR recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization?

A. I have no views on any stand adopted by any country. But I feel that the picture is clear for all in the Arab and the outside world to see. The Palestinian people are here in the East Bank as well as in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The overwhelming majority of them are here. Here is steadfastness. It is not in any other place.

Q. What is the state of Jordanian-Saudi and Jordanian-Syrian relations?

A. Relations with the Saudi Arabian Kingdom are fraternal, good and sound. Our relations are based on the bearing of responsibility. Saudi Arabia works steadily. It clings to its attitude and adheres to its vow to support this country—a vow it gave when the Arab leaders met at the highest level and promised to support steadfastness until the consequences of the aggression had been eliminated. Our relations with Syria are still the same but we hope they will improve. Our relations are not normal under the present circumstances and in the face of common danger. But we have pinned our hopes on improved relations in the future. Our relations with Syria lie in its being the link that connects us with Beirut. As regards the skies at present, the Soviet company is the only airline which has established a bridge between Amman and Beirut through the skies of a fraternal country alongside of whom we have fought battles of destiny. Regarding the land link, the situation is still the same—indeed, it is better than it was in the recent past. We hope it will improve. Our present relations with Syria conflict with all reason, logic and common interest. These relations completely contradict the views of ministerial level economists and their decisions at the Arab League. We hope the night will end and that things will return to normal.

Q. What is the present state of Jordanian-Egyptian relations?

A. The state of relations is the one chosen by our brothers in Egypt. There is nothing new in this respect either.

Q. What are Jordan's views on the question of the withdrawal of Soviet experts from Egypt?

A. In principle, the decision undoubtedly concerns our brother Egyptians and the Soviet friends. As regards the adoption of the decision and its consequences, we hope the decision has been the result of a study and correct assessment of the direct interests of the parties involved and of Arab interests. I probably have no right to comment any further on this matter.

Q. What are Jordan's views on the forthcoming unity between Egypt and Libya?

A. We are watching and we hope that our Arab brothers will work hard for the good of Arab interests.

Q. Is there anything new in regard to Dr. Jarring's mission now that conditions in the area have changed considerably from what they were when he began his mission? Will Jordan accept a partial solution after having rejected the idea in the past?

A. There is nothing new regarding Dr. Jarring's mission and I do not expect any new political move in the near future. But there might be some move early next year. As to Jordan's acceptance of a partial solution, I do not believe that Jordan will accept such a partial solution. Jordan still believes that its interests lie in a comprehensive and final solution. Naturally, we are anxious to see that the solution is honourable, just and acceptable to future generations and not based on present conditions or connected with the current balance of power. Any solution which fails to take the natural rights of our Palestinian brothers and kinsmen into consideration and which is not based on UN Security Council resolution No. 242, will definitely not be acceptable to future generations which will come after us and consequently it will not be a solution.

222

Press interview statements by government spokesman Zayyat of Egypt commenting on U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations⁷³

Cairo, September 5, 1972

Q. Could you tell me what Egyptian-Soviet relations are like now that forty-eight days have passed since President Sadat announced his decision to terminate the mission of the military experts and advisers?

A. Why are our relations with France so good? Is it not because France imposed an arms embargo on Israel? If our relations with France are good because she does not give Israel arms, what will the case be with the U.S.S.R. which has not merely imposed an embargo but has given us arms, which is a great deal.

The U.S.S.R. has not met some of our requirements, so there has been a change. In view of the new situation we believe that if we want to size things up we should not put the U.S.S.R. last on the list. If we did so we should be fighting against ourselves.

The services the Soviet advisers used to provide for us no longer exist. Requests for arms are still just requests for arms. We regret this, but there is a great difference between "regret" and "dislike."

Q. And what could restore the previous situation?

A. If the Soviets were convinced of Egyptian logic and understood our present circumstances.

Q. But you are asking for a summit meeting to be held in Cairo.

A. It is not essential that such a meeting should be held in Cairo.

Q. You are talking about the battle. How is this battle going to start when your relations with the U.S.S.R. are not good?

A. What has happened must be a lesson to the Arabs. They must use what weapons they have.

Q. And what are those weapons?

A. They have their determination to reject surrender, and that is very important. They can also make giving arms to Israel very expensive indeed, and when it becomes very expensive those

⁷³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 12, 1972,

who are giving the arms will certainly reconsider the situation. There is also the basic fact that the Israeli occupation has lasted for five years and the Arabs are unable to end it. Against that there is another basic fact: during these five years Israel has not been able to dictate her will to the Arab countries. War is the most violent way of convincing one's adversary, but in spite of that Israel has not been able to make the Arabs respond to her demands.

Q. But there is also the painful fact that we have so far not been able to end the occupation, and that is the over-ruling fact.

A. We may be unable to expel the occupiers, but the occupiers are unable to make the occupation worth anything.

Q. Israel believes that she is getting closer to her goal every day.

A. And we are getting closer to our goal every day.

.

223

Television interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan deploring the Munich incident⁷⁴

Amman, September 6, 1972

Q. Would Your Majesty comment on the incident which took place in Munich yesterday?

A. As a responsible person, I actually find it my duty to comment on what has happened. This is an abominable crime. No genuine Arab and none of the sons of the cause feel honoured to have any connection whatsoever with such incidents. Our entire battle for our existence as a nation is geared to upholding our ideals and noble and dear aims. The Arab has values, good attributes and a sense of justice, which we have learnt and grown up with. It is my opinion that manliness, gallantry, honour and bravery, as well as the athletes who were hit and fell, were the targets of the criminal act which took place before the entire world. Indeed, it appears that sick souls are planning

in the dark, as they planned in the past when they tried to torpedo the unity of this country, the unity of its sons, from within and hit all of them—old, young and soldiers—in their steadfastness and aspirations until we all managed to stand against the evil and criminal attempts. There are many examples of the sort. The crime in itself might not be connected with its perpetrators, inasmuch as it is connected with those who are planning in the dark to harm the reputation of the Arabs, the Arab cause and the Palestinian question in the entire world.

Q. Does this mean that they are not Arabs?

A. Although they are, or some of them are, Arabs, I do not actually believe that they belong to the Arabs in any way. There are some who hide behind them and others who encourage them to carry out more acts of sabotage and give the enemy the opportunity to benefit at the expense of the Arab cause and the Arab people.

Q. The Palestine Liberation Organization yesterday attacked the Munich incident. Would you comment on this?

A. I believe that the overwhelming majority of the sons of Palestine and the Arab homeland do not agree with or approve of such an act. I believe that it is the duty of all, and perhaps of the silent majority in our Arab homeland, to express their opinion frankly regarding their fate, reputation and place in this world.

Q. My Liege, you do not believe, then, that the Munich incident or similar acts are the sound course for the liberation of Palestine.

A. Actually, I have been thinking all the time since we heard the reports about what has taken place in Munich. I have been thinking what mind could conclude or contemplate that such an incident could possibly serve the Palestinian or the Arab cause. I regret to say that I reached the conclusion that only sick, degraded minds and souls could contemplate such a thought. Perhaps their main aim and concern was to harm the Arabs, Arabism, and Palestine and its sons.

Q. My Liege, you are the first responsible man in the Arab world to condemn this attack. What, in your view, is the reason the Arab leaders are late in doing so?

A. I believe that it is the duty of every responsible person in the Arab homeland to express his view frankly. It is our destiny to express our opinion

⁷⁴ Broadcast by Amman radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4087/A/9-10; reprinted by permission.

regardless of the consequences. It is our destiny to say a righteous and sincere word. I am confident and feel reassured that the overwhelming majority of the sons of the Arab homeland share this feeling with me.

224

Statement issued by the Black September organization explaining the Munich attack⁷⁵

September 7, 1972

At 0400 on Tuesday, the fighters of the Black September organization stormed the building housing the Zionist team in the Olympic Village in Munich. They immediately took control of the building. Our fighters had strict instructions not to harm the Zionist hostages unless in self-defence. Our fighters implemented their instructions precisely. Some members of the team tried to provoke and attack our fighters in order to wreck the operation. The fighters' reaction was violent and led to the killing or wounding of some members of the team. The remaining members surrendered. They were treated most humanely by our fighters. Security measures were adopted to ensure the safety of the operation and to face any treacherous counter-attacks. After full control was established over the building and the hostages, matters proceeded in the following manner:

1. The German police surrounded the building in a manner giving the impression that the police intended to attack the building. The fighters warned the police to withdraw immediately from around the building. The German police complied.

2. Our fighters then issued their first statement, which included clear demands upon the Zionist occupation Government. In essence, the demands called for the release of a group of Palestinian prisoners from the occupation prisons of coercion as well as Japanese commando Kozo Okamoto, the two heroines of the first Lod operation, Theresa Halsa and Rima Isa, the Syrian officers and the Lebanese officer who were abducted in the filthiest international piratical act, and a group of Egyptian captives. The fighters demanded that the German

Government release the following female members of the German organization (Tan Hubben): (Ivis Lanthal, Marlene, Nadia Prag, Libervat Dolly and Edith Burgunder).

The statement demanded direct or indirect negotiations with the German Government on the departure of the fighters from German territory and the handing over of the hostages in case the Zionist Government responded to the demands of our fighters.

3. The warning period expired but the Zionist Government failed to reply to the demands of our fighters. The matter was left in the hands of the German authorities, who requested the Doyen of the Arab Diplomatic Corps, Tunisian Ambassador, Mahmud Mistiri, to intervene in order to extend the period of the warning and in the presence of the German Interior Minister, Chief of Police and the Mayor of Munich they promised to meet the demands of the fighters but they asked for more time.

4. The deadline of the second warning expired. The authorities came back to offer an unlimited sum of money in return for the hostages and for providing safe conduct for the fighters. Our fighters replied that they were fighters. They said: We are not highwaymen or thieves. We are not killers or shedders of blood. We know that these hostages are soldiers in the Zionist army of occupation. It is quite likely that they have participated in killing our people and massacring our heroes. Despite this, we make a last offer in the face of the Israeli deceit and arrogance. This is our offer:

a.) That the German Government provide three civilian planes. Each aircraft will carry a group of hostages and a group of fighters to the place chosen by the fighters.

b.) The fighters promise to return the planes safely and keep the hostages in any country other than Germany until such time as the Zionist Government meets the demands of the fighters.

A two-hour deadline ending at 1000 Munich time was fixed. This deadline was not subject to extension. It was made clear to the German authorities that they would be responsible for any treacherous or deceptive act. It was also made clear that the Lod operation, in which the humanitarian approach of the fighters was exploited, would not be repeated this time.

5. In these two hours, the German authorities tried to renew their offers of money and of sugar-

⁷⁵ Broadcast by Voice of Palestine (Cairo) in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4088/A/3-5; reprinted by permission.

coated promises. But in view of the fighters' insistence on their demands, the authorities' representative contacted our fighters and proposed that they should move out in three helicopters together with the Minister of the Interior, Chief of Police and some German officials, provided that the fighters and the hostages should leave in one helicopter. The authorities made a definite promise that the object of all this was to facilitate the mission of the fighters and bring the issue to a conclusion all at one time. The fighters agreed and left in a helicopter together with the hostages and the German officials after having adopted the necessary security measures. They considered all the passengers of the three helicopters, including the Germans, as hostages and imposed the condition that no German official boarding the three helicopters should carry any arms.

6. The fighters felt that there was an act of treachery when the helicopters went beyond the civilian airport. The organization, which carried out secret contacts with the strugglers before the three helicopters took off, estimated that it took no longer than 15 minutes to travel between Olympic City and the airport by car. A helicopter should not have taken more than a few minutes to cover this distance. The fighters' instructions provided that they should carry out suicide battle in the event of any attempt at treachery or treason. Our fighters were up to the revolutionary standard and in the peak of glory when they implemented the instructions in full. On seeing the military airport belonging to NATO, our fighters were sure of the stupid trap laid for them. When two of the fighters went out to examine the Boeing aircraft belonging to Lufthansa to make sure that it contained no weapons or any other elements, the lights were switched off and the German ambush positions began firing from all directions. Our fighters' reaction was violent. A heroic and honourable battle was waged. Our fighters implemented the instructions given to them in a most manly and honourable manner. They defended the honour of the mission with which they were charged and made the German Government fully responsible for all the blood which was spilled on the soil of the NATO airport.

The preliminary information received from our special sources about what took place at the airport is as follows:

1. After the two fida'iyyin left the helicopter,

the lights were switched off, and fire was directed at our fighters from all the German ambush positions. Our fighters exploded the bombs in the helicopters. This led to their death and the death of the hostages and certain German airmen.

2. Another group of our fighters continued to resist the German police until their ammunition ran out. Some of the group were killed and the others wounded.

3. It is certain that the foolishness of the German authorities led to the destruction of the three helicopters. Some of their occupants were killed and others wounded. Though we have lost certain fighters and others have been wounded, we declare to all the world that those who have carried out the Kefar Bar'am and Iqrit operation in Munich are eight fighters who have made the world, all its presidents, states and governments live in a state of tension, fear and terror. The purpose of the operation has been achieved in full.

4. Our organization can only greet the wounded and the heroes for their heroism and courage. It also greets all the unknown soldiers, Palestinian and non-Palestinian, who took part in this successful operation and exposed the Zionist authorities' arrogance and conceit. These authorities pay no attention to human life or moral values. Our fighters have unmasked the West German Government and its foolish behaviour, which has made it responsible for the massacre, in which more than ten were killed or wounded.

The Black September organization will remove the blackout imposed by the German authorities on what happened at the airport. We shall issue a detailed statement as soon as we receive the information from our special sources about what happened. The organization asserts that a number of Germans and Zionists were killed as a result of this cheap trick organized by the German authorities.

5. Our organization will issue a clear warning to the German authorities to hand over the bodies of the martyrs and also the wounded men immediately. Otherwise, it will know how to act against the servants of American imperialism among the members of the German authorities, who have smeared the reputation of the great German people with mud.

Long live the heroic Black September martyrs. Long live the heroic Palestinian people. Long live the immortal, glorious Arab nation. Long live the

revolutionaries of the world who are fighting for freedom, justice and peace.

225

Statement by President Franjeh of Lebanon deploring the Munich incident and condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon⁷⁶

Beirut, September 11, 1972

Lebanon is once again exposed to an attack that violates the most elementary principles of civilization; peaceful citizens are attacked and bombed and innocent women and children fall, and the body of a mother is pulled out of the ruins that bury the bodies of her six children.

We are grieved over these atrocities, committed openly, before the eyes of the world, and utterly dismayed at the accompanying kidnappings of civilian and military personnel from various parts of Lebanon, particularly South Lebanon. In past weeks, this was the fate of Hasbaya and Deir Al-Ashayer and yesterday it was the fate of Rashaya Al-Wadi, Rafeed and Nahr Al-Bared. Along with what befell Syria, these seem to decree that the series of Deir Yassine, Bahr Al-Baqr and Abu Zu'bul, must continue.

Our grief and dismay are deepened when no voice is raised by the world conscience, whereas voices amplified by Zionist propaganda are raised every time a gesture in defence of rights or even life is made by members of the scattered and persecuted people.

Lebanon was quick to declare its regret over the Munich incident, and the consequent painful human casualties. However, we cannot understand how top officials of a great power would undertake to hastily level various accusations against a number of countries, including Lebanon, which are totally unrelated to the incident, without first checking the facts. Fortunately, the facts were soon brought to light, and it became clear that we were not connected with the matter; consequently, other officials of that same country then announced the full story, thankfully setting the record straight.

We understand the spirit of sports, and call for its observance and for the distinguishing between the atmosphere of sports and the atmosphere of politics. When people are kidnapped during an international sport contest, even though it be for the purpose of exchanging them for other persons who are suffering oppressive torture, unjustly, we can understand how some can react. However, we cannot understand how these same people can be so provoked over this, while they are silent over the sufferings of a whole people and in the face of oppression and tyranny that the Palestinians are suffering at the hands of Israel.

We can understand the world being aroused over an operation, even though those involved be a handful of non-official young men motivated by despair, generated by the very object of the operation. However, we cannot understand the world not caring for the continued and repeated barbaric bombarding of innocent civilians, women, elderly and children, without exception, by Israel, a member of the United Nations, in violation of the Charter of Human Rights and all the resolutions of the United Nations and of all human values.

We advocate, along with others, human values and appeal to human feelings in relations between people. However, we cannot understand the exploitation of humanitarianism for the benefit of one portion of people at the expense of another.

If we really want to come to grips with this problem in the right way, we must look at the roots and not merely take a casual glance. Before we think of putting an end to acts of violence carried out by people subjected to despair and permanent provocation, we should treat the underlying causes of this desperation and put an end to this provocation.

The time has come for conscience, justice and humanitarianism to speak out. I solemnly appeal to the heads of State of big and small countries alike, to apply without partiality against any specific party, the noble principles in which they believe, which are enshrined in the Charter of Human Rights they have pledged to foster and defend. Otherwise, there can be no sound basis for abiding peace, for peace is the fruit of right, justice and equity.

⁷⁶ English text, Lebanon National News Agency *Bulletin* (English edition), September 11, 1972, pp. 2-4.

226

Speech by President Bakr of Iraq expressing the need for stronger U.S.S.R.-Arab relations, made at a dinner on the occasion of his visit to the U.S.S.R. (excerpt)⁷⁷

Moscow, September 14, 1972

We are all certainly gratified by the high level reached by the relations between our countries, but the present difficult circumstances of the Arab area must also be taken into account. Imperialist and Zionist aggression is increasing, and attempts are being made by the forces of imperialism and Zionism to impose surrender on the Arabs and to liquidate the just cause of Palestine. Efforts are also being made to organize the counter-revolution against the progressive Arab regimes and forces, to violate the historical rights of the Arab nation in the Arab Gulf and to impose colonialist schemes on the Arab regions of that area. We believe that this situation requires greater cooperation and solidarity between our two countries and between the Arab countries and the U.S.S.R., at all levels and in all fields. We believe that this cooperation and solidarity should be made as effective as possible so that they may in all circumstances act as a deterrent to imperialist and Zionist aggression. This aggression is threatening the very existence of our Arab people, their rights and their legitimate aspirations to recover their usurped territory and to realize their goals of liberation, unity and progress. We are confident that your friendly country, which has stood by the Arab nation in its darkest hours and given it great assistance in economic, military and other fields, especially since the June 5 aggression, will spare no effort to this end. We are confident that Arab-Soviet friendship, which so many experiences have proved essential, will be strengthened, as we hope, through joint action and struggle, that it will bear more fruit in the future.

227

Statement by Prime Minister Lawzi of Jordan emphasizing the primacy of Jordan's security and sovereignty while reaffirming Jordan's commitment to the West Bank⁷⁸

Amman, September 14, 1972

A. Internal Affairs

There is a series of principles which constitute the base and general framework of this government's domestic policy. These principles are not new to you nor are they improvised. They derive from the public interest, that we all believe in, and they also express what is going on in the national conscience of this Assembly and the conscience of every member of the great Jordanian family.

These principles come under two main headings:

1. The country's security and sovereignty come before anything else. This is, of course, a true and sound principle for every country, but for us in this country it is a fundamental requirement which arose during a long and bitter experience from which everyone suffered.

It is thus more than a mere principle of action in domestic policy; rather it is a national demand felt by everyone and an inevitable necessity in which every mind and conscience believes.

Therefore this government will set the security and sovereignty of the country before and above everything else. It will never for a moment neglect this nor allow it to be jeopardized in any way.

I warn everyone—whether in the government, the Assembly or among the people—against tampering with our country's security for the benefit of any quarter. I also warn you of the danger of disregarding the foundations of our sovereignty under some pretext, for our country has suffered enough from such tampering in the past.

B. Foreign Affairs

1. Jordan is part of the Arab nation. For us the Palestine problem is not merely a political problem; it is a matter of life and death. We are the land of the problem, and it is our problem. We do not see it from the outside because we experience it,

⁷⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), September 16, 1972. The joint communiqué arising from the visit is printed as document no. 138 above.

⁷⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai* (Amman), September 15, 1972.

more than anyone else, from the inside, from the very heart, and for us it is a problem of existence or non-existence.

In our steadfast occupied land the people of Palestine live, work and act. Under our skies the aspirations of that people and their hopes of recovering their rights and returning to their homeland are developed and cherished. Our beloved people in our occupied territory have provided the most splendid example by rejecting the occupation and resisting the various methods and pressures the occupation employs to contain them and to weaken the sacred links that bind them to the steadfast East Bank and its people. They have also provided our brave people here in the East Bank with the most splendid example of steadfastness and sacrifice. Throughout the last five years they have singularly withstood suffering and tribulation.

In bearing its responsibility to the cause, the government will not renounce even a small part of the sacred rights of the people whose cause it is, the struggling and faithful people of this country. It will act and struggle by all available ways and means to recover those rights and to realize those aspirations.

228

Press interview statement by Prime Minister Husaini of South Yemen explaining his government's attitude to the Palestine problem⁷⁹

Aden, mid-September, 1972

The only way to liberate Palestine is to declare a people's war, to support the Palestine Resistance, and to have the liberated Arab countries and all progressive forces in the Arab arena stand beside the Palestinian people.

Talking about the repeated Israeli aggressions against Lebanon is useless; it is better to determine an attitude to Israel and the forces of imperialism and reaction.

Our attitude to this is clear as our documents and repeated statements can testify. We rejected

the plan of the American Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, and our rejection of it gave rise to certain problems that we shall have to face. We have adopted an attitude regardless of the other Arab countries, an attitude deriving from our conviction that the struggle must continue along with support for the Palestine Resistance. This attitude has given rise to coolness between us and certain Arab countries. We believe that the liberated Arab countries and all progressive forces in the Arab arena must unite in their support of the Palestinian people.

229

Speech by President Assad of Syria reaffirming Arab support for the Palestine revolution in the face of "Israel's arrogance," made at the opening session of the Seventeenth Conference of the General Federation of Workers' Unions (excerpt)⁸⁰

Damascus, September 21, 1972

It is now clear that Zionism and its base, Israel, have exceeded all limits by their arrogance. Talk of peace is no longer the merchandise she pushes, as she did until recently, to deceive public opinion throughout the world. Talk of anxiety for fear that the Arab countries should launch an aggression is not the wares she exports to the world, as she did in the past, firstly to mislead the world, secondly to obtain greater imperialist support and thirdly to justify her aggressions against the Arab nation. Her new stock-in-trade is talk of the responsibility of the Arab countries for Israel's security and for curbing the activities of the Palestinian people and their legitimate struggle against those who have usurped their rights. According to Zionist reasoning, it is now the duty of the Arabs to tie the hands of their brothers, the Palestinian Arab people, to hunt them down, exhaust them and curb their aspirations for the liberation of their homeland. It is, in fact, their duty to act as trusty watchmen for the

⁷⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 22, 1972.

⁸⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), September 22, 1972.

state of Israel and pliant instruments in the hands of world Zionism, implementing its plans and silently accepting the disasters and injuries it inflicts on our Arab people and all the peoples of the world.

Israel's boundless arrogance and attempts are doomed to failure because they clash with the firm will of our people which rejects and defies this arrogance.

Our great people, who are confident of themselves and believe in their heritage, their values and their ancient civilization have throughout history resisted all invasions and surmounted all obstacles in the way of their advance. They regard the setbacks they have suffered at the hands of Zionism and imperialism as the point of departure for real struggle in all fields of life to create the necessary instruments to replace what has gone, to remedy all shortcomings and to root out all defects, to strengthen all weak points, and thereby achieve victory and recover lost freedom.

We in this country know that our road is harsh and difficult, but it is the road of honour and dignity, and we shall never turn aside from it. Nor shall we be remiss in the defence of our people's freedom. We shall throw all our resources into the battle and we shall defend our principles with our blood and sweat.

We also know that the American war machine is far greater than the military equipment in our possession. But we are fully confident that, in the end, right is stronger than any war machine and that, in the end, victory will go to the people and their unconquerable will.

Brother workers:

We are now involved in the cruellest battle ever fought by the Arab nation, and we are making every effort to mobilize all the resources necessary to ensure victory. It is clear that the most important and strongest weapon for the confrontation of our enemies in this historical stage is that which throughout the history of our nation has been the strongest and most effective in winning victory—the weapon of Arab unity.

230

Statement by head of the Phalangist Party of Lebanon Gemayyel on Lebanon's commitment to the Palestine Resistance, made at the opening of the Party's fifteenth annual conference (excerpts)⁸¹

Chtoura, September 22, 1972

In any case, our attitude is unchanged. Lebanon's role in supporting the Palestinian struggle must stem from her integrity, and any other role imposed on Lebanon will injure her as much as it injures the Palestinian cause itself. The best proof of this are these battles that are being forced on Lebanon and which are causing so much destruction, while the cause remains unchanged, and perhaps has never been in a worse state!

The Resistance should accept the nature and extent of the aid provided to its just struggle out of conviction rather than surrender to a *fait accompli*. This is no less important than the fact that Lebanon's role in the battle must not be determined by reference to the requirements of the Resistance, which are much too great and too numerous to be met by Lebanon.

When, for example, the Resistance demands our frontiers as a base for its operations, it is imposing a sort of occupation on us and leading us into a battle—or rather into unequal battles—with Israel, which will result in the loss of the land, honour and the last refuge for the Resistance itself.

We really cannot understand this insistence on the right to do away with our frontiers. If the Resistance was capable of protecting the frontiers and protecting itself, or if we, along with the Resistance, or even along with all Arab forces, were capable of protecting them we might perhaps be willing to surrender this area to the Resistance.

But the fact that the Resistance should insist on the right to dispose of our frontiers, when all of us together are incapable of protecting them, is something very strange indeed.

This being the case it is our duty to our country and to the Resistance and its cause to resist this insistent demand, this error rather, with all means

⁸¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Beirut), September 23, 1972.

at our disposal. For we do not believe that the leaders of the Resistance are more loyal to Lebanon and to the cause of Palestine than our leaders and commanders—or that they are more conscious than our leaders of the two causes or of the Israeli peril.

No, they have absolutely no right to claim for themselves a monopoly on loyalty, truth, patriotism, courage and intelligence, allowing us nothing but hypocrisy, subservience, timidity and stupidity.

If they reject tutelage over them by any Arab country, we too are entitled to reject any tutelage and, in particular, the tutelage of those who require us to conspire against the future of the Palestinian cause and our own future.

What country in the world, what Arab country in particular, can accept to be lured into an actual war, which it has no say over, and expect it to fight without knowing when, how and why the fighting is to take place or what good it is going to do?

I hasten to emphasize that we do not want to become involved in any conflict with the Palestine Resistance.

If by her reprisals Israel hopes to draw us into that conflict her hopes are in vain, because we prefer these reprisals to a civil war in our country to which the Palestinians are a party. That would indeed be a great evil, but it would be the lesser of two evils. And it was precisely the pressure of this necessity, or this difficult choice, that led to the conclusion of the Cairo Agreement.⁸²

But we hope that the Resistance will not try to exploit this weak point in any way. We hope that it will not make our fear of civil war an instrument to get what it wants from us, because our concern for internal unity will be meaningless once it becomes the stepping stone to the acceptance of the destruction of Lebanon.

But these commitments or obligations must either be part of a comprehensive and integrated Arab plan which we assist in drawing up, or we must define them ourselves, by mutual agreement with the Resistance if, of course, such agreement is possible, and if the resistance itself wants it—or else we must seek inspiration in our conscience

and in our sentiments and in the energies, resources and safety of our country.

231

Letter from London P.L.O. representative Hammami to "The Times" explaining the background to Black September action⁸³

London, September 26, 1972

Sir, I should be grateful for a little space in your columns to correct a number of allegations being currently spread about the relation of Black September to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. These allegations, compounded of distortions and inventions, are being circulated in a concerted campaign to highlight terrorism as the main difficulty in the Middle East. This is surely a dangerous illusion.

The Black September group is not a member of the PLO and is not affiliated to any of the guerrilla bodies that belong to it nor is the group represented on the Palestine National Assembly. The PLO in the person of its chairman, Mr. Arafat, has stated on several occasions that our main fight must be on the soil of Palestine itself and against the foreign State that occupied our land and turned our people into a nation of refugees.

What is morally repugnant in political kidnapping and hijacking is that lives of innocent people are put in jeopardy for alleged wrongdoings of others. Yet this is precisely what the Israeli Government's policy of reprisals means. In the past 24 years Israel has used any action by some Palestinians as a pretext for retaliation against Arab villages and refugee camps, killing hundreds of innocent and peaceful people.

And the press and other news media have always used a double standard in both reporting and commenting on these events. I had a feeling of living in Kafka land when, in the aftermath of the Munich killings and the swift Israeli reprisal attacks, your Jerusalem correspondent Peter Hopkirk could write about Israel's image these words: "It is this image of not being a vengeful people—sullied perhaps in some people's minds at the time of the Eichmann execution—that Mrs. Meir's

⁸² For the unofficial text of the Cairo Agreement between Lebanon and the resistance movement see document no. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

⁸³ *The Times* (London), September 26, 1972, p. 13.

Government would like to keep intact. It is felt here that she is unlikely to surrender to any popular demand of blood for blood."

Can any fair-minded reader be surprised that a minority of Palestinians should resort to terrorism in the face of massive and prolonged injustice done to them, compounded by the cruel and heartless policies of Israel, the indifference of the world and the bias of the press?

The publicity campaign against the Palestine resistance now under way attempts to build up Black September as a powerful and sinister force, an "Arab Mafia" as one Israeli handout put it, with many embellishments of a lurid, sub-Bondian character. The actions of a small minority of Palestinians are being used to discredit the whole Palestinian movement and to spread alarm of a danger posed to the western world by the Fedayeen operations. In particular, they are being used as a cover for renewed demands for stifling the voice of the Palestine liberation in the West.

It would be a great danger if this campaign succeeded in deceiving western opinion about the Palestine national movement and in diverting public gaze from the root causes of the Middle East conflict to its symptoms. This would be like administering a new dose of the old medicine, the failure of which to cure has been repeatedly demonstrated in the past and which has, indeed, aggravated the patient's condition. This will not eradicate Black September but is likely to create new Black Septembers, perhaps of more extremist natures.

Yours faithfully,

SAID HAMMAMI
PLO Representative
c/o Arab League, 1-11 Hay Hill, W1.

232

Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon on the Middle East conflict and Israeli-Lebanese relations, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly⁸⁴

New York, September 26, 1972

However, we cannot help noticing that there is lesser interest in certain grave problems, in particular, the situation prevailing in the Middle East, which constantly threatens international peace and security. The interdependence of nations in our present world is such that it is quite obvious that no nation can remain indifferent to the crises which for many years have troubled that part of the world.

I need not recall facts which are known to all. I simply wish to draw the attention of the General Assembly to two points which, as I see it, are of particular interest.

The first is that the Assembly, as well as other United Nations organs, such as the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights, has already adopted clear-cut positions on the question of the Middle East in general and on some of its aspects in particular, for example the status of Jerusalem, the treatment of the occupied populations and the Israeli attacks against Lebanon and other Arab countries.

What I should like to say here—and I shall never tire of repeating it—is that none of these decisions, and I stress "none," has been implemented by Israel: Ambassador Jarring's mission under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) has been deliberately and methodically sabotaged, like the decision itself; General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), adopted at the last session, which, like the Security Council decision in resolution 242 (1967), was designed to seek a political solution to the conflict, has not even begun to be implemented.

In resolution 2253 (ES-V), which was adopted by an overwhelming majority on 4 July 1967 and confirmed by resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, the General Assembly declared that the annexation of Jerusalem to the State of Israel was invalid and called on Israel

⁸⁴ Excerpted from the English translation of Abu Hamad's speech in the general debate of the 27th session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV. 2041, pp. 7-20.

"to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem."

Other resolutions on the same lines have been adopted since 1967, confirming the above-mentioned resolutions. In spite of this, the process of Judaization is continuing implacably in the Holy City.

The populations of the occupied territories, which should have been protected by the Geneva Conventions and the general laws of war, are subjected by the occupier to a veritable régime of terror. Kept in a state of inferiority and subjection, their freedoms are violated and their goods despoiled. The commissions of inquiry established by the United Nations have never been able to carry out the mission entrusted to them. The Israeli authorities have always refused them access to the territories which Israel controls.

Even within the territories that since 1948 have been directly subjected to Israeli authority, the Arab populations have always been the subject of derision and discrimination. The treatment applied to them is the most arbitrary which can be imagined. By way of example, the Christian inhabitants of the villages of Kfar Baram and Ikrit, who were removed by force from their homes in 1948, have not been able to return to their villages and land in spite of a decree in their favour, a decree which this time was issued not by the Security Council but by the Supreme Court of Israel itself. What has happened at Ikrit and Kfar Baram is but an example. It illustrates the procedures used by the Israeli authorities in hundreds of similar cases.

In another field which is of more direct concern to my country, how many times has the Security Council condemned Israel for the attacks committed by its armed forces against Lebanon? How many times has it called upon Israel to put an end to its aggressions and threatened it with more effective measures if it did not change its attitude?

All these appeals, resolutions and injunctions have remained without any effect, as have those which defined the foundations for political solutions, and those intended to safeguard the real character of Jerusalem and protect the populations in the occupied territories, or to put an end to aggressions against neighbours. These resolutions, to quote Israel, are destined for the morgue of

history.

No further proof is needed. Israel does not intend to submit to any discipline or to implement any decision. Only the policy of force counts for Israel.

I consider that this permanent challenge to the international community by a country which owes everything—even its very existence—to the United Nations quite obviously raises a problem which should be considered and settled by the United Nations. The facts of the problem are clear, as I have just recalled. What is also clear are the elements of the solution. By this I mean the sanctions provided in Chapter VII of the Charter of our Organization.

The second point to which I should like to draw the attention of this Assembly is that the conflict in the Middle East is degenerating rapidly and becoming extremely dangerous. The acts of violence have become so frequent, so broad and so serious that they no longer threaten only the civilian populations, but even endanger international peace and security. Certain Palestinian elements on the one hand, and the regular Israeli forces on the other hand, are embarked on an infernal cycle of violence.

If measures were to be adopted to put an end to this state of affairs, it seems to us necessary if they are to be effective, that they should be studied in an impartial spirit inspired by the two following requirements.

First of all, the study must cover all the acts of violence. To circumscribe it to the acts committed by the Palestinians alone would be proof of partiality and injustice. One must not pretend to forget that it is the Zionists who inaugurated political terrorism and introduced it in the Near East. Today there is too great a tendency to wish to ignore the bloody exploits of the Haganah, Irgun, Stern and many other Zionist terrorist organizations. But how can one fail to recall—to those who, no doubt in order to give themselves a good conscience, forever accuse the Palestinians—the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator, the massacre of the inhabitants in the village of Deir Yassin, where the bodies of old people, women and children were thrown into a hole where they were discovered by the International Red Cross? How can we forget the attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which killed men, women and children?

Without going too far into the past, which is nevertheless still in our minds, let us recall to those who today show so much anger and indignation against the taking of hostages and the massacre which followed—a massacre which took place in confused conditions which no one seems to be in a hurry to elucidate—that however horrible the outrage which took place in Munich, that committed just recently by the Israeli forces within the territory of Lebanon was no less odious and condemnable.

On 21 June 1972 Israeli forces penetrated within our territory, killing 3 Lebanese soldiers and kidnapping 6 Lebanese and Syrian officers to be used as hostages in order to obtain the liberation of Israeli prisoners held in Egypt and Syria. Those who committed this aggression were not uncontrolled and practically uncontrollable elements; they were not men who were driven to despair and who alone were responsible for their acts. They were soldiers of a regular army, acting on behalf of their Government and on the order of their hierarchical superiors. This act of State terrorism was applauded by the Israeli leaders and presented by them as a glorious exploit.

On the morrow of the Lod outrage, of which Lebanon immediately disapproved and with which it was in no way associated, the Israeli air force on 21, 22 and 23 June launched an attack against the innocent civilian population of Hasbaya et Deir El-Achaer, killing and wounding men, women and children. The intention of Israel was to avenge, on the peaceful Lebanese villagers, the Puerto Rican and Israeli deaths which had taken place under the guns of foreign extremists who came to Israel from a foreign country. This massacre of Lebanese civilian populations, dictated by an apparent logic of terror—how can one but condemn it?

Only a few days ago, on the 8th of this month, the same Israeli air force bombarded three sites on the north and south of Lebanon. The glorious results of this heroic operation were that 9 children, one woman and 2 men were killed and 34 other civilians wounded, including 16 children aged from 8 to 15 years.

Even more recently, on the 16th of this month, an armoured Israeli division, with air force support, invaded the south of Lebanon under cover of “suppressing” the fedayeen. Actually, it destroyed or damaged 435 houses and two bridges, killed

or wounded 143 military and civilian Lebanese, as well as approximately a score of Palestinian refugees, and itself suffering severe losses inflicted by the Lebanese army. I believe that the least that can be said about this new deliberate aggression is that it has resulted in a setback for Israel on the political level and on the military level.

Is it the desire to take measures against terrorism? They can be effective only if they are based on objectivity without using two weights and two measures.

Secondly, if there is really a desire to do away with acts of violence, one must attack honestly and courageously the real causes and discover means of eradicating them. It is not sufficient to consider certain episodic manifestations. In this connexion, certain truths should be said and said without any concealment, even though they might disturb the moral and intellectual comfort of those who are complacently desirous of having a good conscience and who themselves undertake redoubtable responsibility, either because they have persecuted the Jews or because they have tolerated the atrocious treatment given to the innocent people to which they themselves were subjected.

The creation of the State of Israel was accompanied by the mass exodus of the inhabitants of Palestine, provoked by threats, intimidation and terror. Today there is a new diaspora of wandering Palestinians and displaced Arabs, who cannot and do not want to be assimilated in any other country.

This people of almost two million human beings lives in a state of growing despair which explains certain passionate reactions and certain desperate acts. This people is convinced, quite rightly, that it is the victim of Zionist terror.

Scorning all the principles on which our civilization is based, never has this people been given the opportunity to be consulted as to its fate and to exercise its natural right to self-determination. True, the international community had decided 23 years ago that the Palestinians who were chased away could choose between returning to their homes and receiving just compensation. But for 23 years never has there been a beginning of the application of this decision because of the intransigence of Israel. Nor has the international community, in 23 years, ever decided to apply the decision which it itself had freely adopted. The Palestinians—and who can blame them?—feel

themselves to be totally abandoned and betrayed. If it is really desired to do away with the sources of violence, it is to this source that one must go in the first place. It will solve nothing to repress. It will avail nothing to punish one group of persons or another or any given country which one considers—unjustly furthermore—to be responsible for any given attempt. Violence has never suppressed violence. On the contrary, it rekindles and exacerbates it and gives it increased vigour, audacity and intensity. What does one expect, what can one expect from repression? That it will physically repress the elements of the Palestinian resistance? Suppose that this objective could be attained and that the world were to tolerate such genocide. Can one not foresee that the resistance of the Palestinian people will rise from the ashes and give it a vigour and aggressiveness which it has never known so far? Zionist terrorism cannot suppress the entire Palestinian people. And as long as justice is not done and these legitimate aspirations are not satisfied, one must expect these feelings of despair and frustration to increase in intensity and seriousness.

Before I conclude, it is my duty to draw the attention of the Assembly most particularly to the aggressive attitude of Israel in regard to my country. Israel has been committing aggression against Lebanon for four years, whereas the Armistice Agreement of 1949, which remains in force and was once again confirmed by the Security Council on 19 April 1972,⁸⁵ formally forbids Israel to do so. Israel first sought to justify these aggressions by alleging that there had been mortar fire from Lebanese territory directed against the territories under Israel's control. Lebanon adopted certain measures to put an end to these allegations. Being short of arguments, Israel then claimed that Palestinian resistance fighters were undertaking acts of violence within the occupied territories and it deduced from this that they had infiltrated through the Lebanese frontier. Lebanon then requested of the Security Council, and obtained on 19 April 1972, an increase in the number of observers on its international frontier. The reports of these international observers presented to the Council prove not only that the allegations of Israel are unfounded, but further, that it is Israel itself which constantly violates the Lebanese frontier.

⁸⁵ See document no. 15 above.

At the end of 1968, the Israeli commandos destroyed 13 Lebanese civil aircraft at the airport in Beirut, under the pretext that Palestinian commandos which had attacked an Israeli aircraft at Athens had passed by way of Lebanon in transit. Even more recently, after the Lod attack, the Israeli army organized a genuine massacre of the Lebanese civilian population under the pretext that the extremists from Japan had passed by way of Lebanon in transit. On the morrow of Munich three deadly raids were carried out against the Lebanese civilian population, and this time Israel felt no need to seek the slightest justification.

Need I say how fallacious these pretexts seem to us? That there are Palestinians in Lebanon and that they feel that they are the victims of Israel nobody denies. Israel knows it better than anyone since it has forced them by terror to take refuge in Lebanon and is against their repatriation.

In the meantime Palestinians find themselves implanted in a large number of countries, Arab and non-Arab. If Israel were to follow all their displacements, suspect and implicate all the countries where they reside or through which they may have gone in transit, then it would be not only toward Lebanon but toward most of the countries of the world that it should launch its bomber squads. How can one accept that Israel should unflinchingly attack Lebanon and Lebanon alone whenever any action is undertaken against its interest or its nationals in any part of the world? If the intransigence of the leaders of Israel was the cause of the Munich massacre, by what aberration can one maintain that this would justify the attacks on Lebanon and the massacre of women and children? Furthermore, the Federal Government of Germany itself officially declared that Lebanon could not in any way be held responsible.

Actually Israel is pursuing quite different objectives. If Lebanon is the target it is not to avenge Athens, nor Lod, nor Munich. I repeat, Lebanon—and Israel knows it—is in no way implicated in these affairs. What Israel is doing is seeking a pretext to destroy it. Lebanon in its present structure, where Jews, Christians and Moslems coexist freely, harmoniously and democratically, this Lebanon disturbs Israel because it is a categorical and living denial of Israel's racist concepts and policy of ostracism. Furthermore, Israel covets a part of our territory. It is an expansionist State by nature and by vocation and

cannot be satisfied with fixed, immovable and recognized frontiers. All the maps drawn up by the Zionist movement and the statements made by authoritative Israeli leaders confirm these objectives. Zionist propaganda, which has available to it means unknown in the history of the world, has succeeded in making international public opinion believe in the image of a peaceful and threatened Israel. The facts, particularly since 1967, categorically refute these assertions. Today, when the same propaganda claims that the security of Israel is threatened by Lebanon, and that to defend its security it is forced to carry out military actions against Lebanon, no one can any longer believe it.

Lebanon does not threaten Israel. It is Israel which threatens Israel [*sic*]. It threatens Lebanon in its harmonious, human structures; in its integrity and its independence. The international community, which has so often condemned Israel for its aggressions against my country, knows this full well. In expressing my gratitude, as well as that of Lebanon, to this community, and especially to friendly countries that have so often taken the initiative of giving support to the cause of Lebanon, in particular by demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, I appeal once again to their friendship and vigilance to prevent any new aggression.

It is not the Israelis nor the Palestinians nor the allies of one or the other that are directly engaged in the conflict who can put an end to that conflict and thereby to acts of violence. It is only the international community which is capable of taking that responsibility. For my part, I refuse to make a definite finding of failure or bankruptcy. The founders of our Organization wished it to be powerful and effective, capable of ensuring the new international order to which mankind aspired after the ravages of the war—a new order based on law and justice, solidarity, peace and collective security. Toward that end they vested the Security Council—which bears the prime responsibility for the task of maintaining that new international order—with powerful means. The Charter also provides for adequate measures to deal with the persistent violation of its principles by a Member of the Organization.

233

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt commenting on the Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and calling for a Palestine government-in-exile, made to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (excerpts)⁸⁶

Cairo, September 28, 1972

But let us consider what has happened. I am speaking now so that all our Arab brothers may hear me when I ask: Who is responsible for what has happened in Lebanon? In my estimate, it is primarily the responsibility of all of us Arabs, for what has happened in Lebanon. We are all responsible, but I can speak about the Federation [of Arab Republics].

In Egypt we have so far spent 4,000,000 LE and we are continuing to strengthen our forces for the decisive hour. Syria is spending 60 per cent of her budget on her army—I do not think that there is any country in the world that can spend 60 per cent of its total budget on its armed forces—and she is standing firm in the face of the Israeli enemy.

Libya has placed all her resources at the disposal of the battle. Yes, I can speak about the Federation. But all of us as Arabs are responsible in the first place for what has happened in Lebanon and we must not shirk this responsibility. What has happened in Lebanon is an insult to every Arab, and this must be clear to all, both rulers and people.

America gave the sign to Israel and encouraged her by the American veto.⁸⁷ Israel declared frankly that America knew in advance what was going to happen and understood the justifications for this action—justifications for killing women and children with napalm bombs and eliminating the Palestinian people.

When I say that we as Arabs are responsible, I say so because it was America who gave the sign, who showed the green light by the veto and who understood the justifications and approved of everything that has happened. America today has its interests protected by the Arabs and is

⁸⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 29, 1972. President Sadat's speech was given on the occasion of the second anniversary of Nasser's death.

⁸⁷ On September 10, 1972, in the U.N. Security Council the U.S. vetoed a draft resolution calling for a cessation of military activities; see note to document no. 131 above.

making fantastic profits out of them. That is why I say that we as Arabs are primarily responsible, and we should never lay the blame on anyone else.

As Arabs we have unlimited resources—political, economic and military. In the present situation we have immense resources. I hope they will be the key to a [unified] Arab attitude, as I told the Arab foreign ministers, no matter what it is. When I felt, while we were in the thick of the battle, that we must have a pause for reflection with our friend (the U.S.S.R.) because the matter is connected with the battle, I did not hesitate to make this pause. Very well, since we as Arabs and our women and children in the camps and the Palestinian people are being eliminated—by America and American arms and support—why don't we take a stand towards it? The plan is well known. Why do I say that it is not anything new? I have been speaking about it since 1971. The plan is well known. Every time King Hussein has visited the United States since the aggression, whether he was going to see Johnson or Nixon, he has come back with a plan for the elimination of Palestinian action, and the elimination of the Palestinian people themselves. It was not destined that he should begin to do this until September 1970 when he began the massacre. Then the summit conference met here and King Hussein returned and completed the plan that had been drawn up for him—the plan that he is implementing today, the same plan that Israel is completing. What Hussein started Israel is completing, that is, the elimination of the Palestinian people on the pretext of attacking the Resistance, and then, of course, the elimination of the Palestinian people, the elimination of the Resistance and everything.

However, the basic objective is the elimination of the Palestinian people so that the Palestine problem and the Palestine identity may be obliterated once and for all. As Mrs. Meir says, there is no such thing as a Palestinian people, there is no such thing as a Palestinian entity. Very well, if that's the plan, and if today America and Israel make the Munich incident a pretext and they launch a war of nerves and intimidation against the whole world and especially the Arab world, they do so in the hope of achieving one result—to crush the Palestinian people, to eradicate

the Palestine problem at its very foundations and then to blow up the whole situation in the Middle East at its very foundations. If this is the plan there is no need for us to be upset and emotional. Let us think properly. Our brothers, the Algerians, were in the same situation at one time. The slogan was that Algeria was French—that was that. Since 1830 Algeria was French, to the whole world. There were half a million soldiers from the Fourth French Republic in Algeria supported by the arms of Guy Mollet's NATO. And our Algerian brothers continued on their course, and in response to the slogan that Algeria was French set up their provisional government. Similarly, in response to what Mrs. Meir says—that there is no such thing as Palestine—and in response to the American plan which King Hussein started and which Israel is completing today so arrogantly and insolently—saying wherever I find them I shall strike them, with American support and American money, and with American napalm—I think that the time has come for our Palestinian brothers to form their [official] entity. I want to announce in your presence that we here in Egypt will welcome and recognize that entity when the people of Palestine and the resistance take the necessary measures to establish their provisional government. Exactly what happened in Algeria has happened, is happening, today to Palestine. They are trying to eliminate everything to do with Palestine, just as it was said that Algeria was French, there was no such thing as an Algerian Algeria.

There is another point. We must not give incidents more weight than they deserve. In particular, we must not expect too much of Lebanon. We all know Lebanon's strength, we are all of us as Arabs responsible for it.

234

Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Zaid of Jordan blaming Israel for the lack of progress towards peace, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly⁸⁸

New York, October 4, 1972

One of the issues raised during the current session of the General Assembly is the item on international terrorism. Jordan is opposed to violence, whatever its source or methods. Jordan is ready to participate effectively in any international measures to protect innocent civilians against violence. At the same time Jordan and, I am sure, all peoples of the world support the right of an occupied people—every occupied people—effectively to resist occupation and colonialism.

As I speak on behalf of Jordan and against a background of the problems which my country has been compelled to endure in consequence of the 1967 war, my remarks on the role of the United Nations in resolving conflicts assume a stark and deadly reality. And let me declare in the strongest terms that, with only the tragic exception of Indo-China, the Middle East remains the only area outside the shade of justice, peace and security. In Jordan human beings like you are daily faced with tribulations violating every principle, concept or ideal to which the United Nations addresses itself. My address, therefore, to this distinguished gathering is far from being an academic exercise and, still less, a sermon on the virtues of virtuous behaviour.

What are the basic ingredients in the situation which is commonly referred to as the Middle East crisis? I fully realize that the case has been stated and restated so often, year in and year out; and yet it must be done, if only because no progress whatsoever has been achieved towards its just and peaceful solution. On the contrary, the passage of years is compounding an already desperate situation and making it intolerable. The basic facts of the case, as of today, are as follows.

First, as a result of the 1967 war in the Middle East, nearly half of the citizens of Jordan have been, for more than five years, suffering the

bondage and enslavement of Israeli occupation. A similar fate has befallen substantial parts of the territories of Egypt and Syria. Occupation, like slavery, is a curse, regardless of its nature or duration; it is doubly so when the victims are a whole population and when deliverance seems to be receding into an unknown abyss.

To us the issues at stake are fundamental: they are nothing less than a mortal threat to the very survival of Jordan as a State and as a people. Israel makes no pretence about its determination to swallow up at least those substantial parts of Jordan which it already occupies. Peace, to the Israelis, seems no longer anything but an empty expression which is conveniently used in forums such as the United Nations—a use of language to conceal the aim.

Experience tells us that the people under Israeli occupation are not looked upon as a community of human beings with a birthright expectation of continuity in their homeland; rather, they are looked upon as things or obstacles, to be removed at the appropriate moment of Israel's choosing; hence the urgency of collective world action to bring about the speediest termination of occupation and the salvation of the multitudes in Israel's bondage.

Second, the traumatic consequences of 1948, which resulted in the physical dispersal of well over 1 million Palestinian refugees, have been increased by the events of 1967—a repeat of those of 1948. An additional half a million victims were added to the ranks of the uprooted. They are referred to as "displaced persons" to differentiate them from their own compatriots, the 1948 refugees. But even this differentiation is becoming blurred as occupation continues unchecked. The United Nations resolutions pertaining to the immediate repatriation of the displaced population are being added to the stockpile of United Nations resolutions which Israel consistently ignores.

Third, the United Nations and its Member States have, since 1967, made every effort to bring about a peaceful and just solution to the conflict. On 22 November 1967, the Security Council adopted resolution 242 (1967); its points were clear, its intent specific. It reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. It provided guarantees for a just and lasting peace. Both

⁸⁸ Excerpted from the text of Abu Zaid's speech in the general debate of the 27th session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2052, pp. 3-17.

Jordan and Egypt accepted that resolution and all the obligations devolving upon them under its terms. Not only did they express their acceptance by every possible means and on every conceivable occasion but they also registered their unqualified acceptance in writing. That was done in the course of replying to specific questions by the most able and dedicated Ambassador Gunnar Jarring in the spring of 1969.

The Israeli response to Mr. Jarring's earnest mission was not only negative but also misleading and hostile. Israel continues to give such a response to this very day. The Israelis, in effect, have opted for territorial expansion in preference to the long-cherished goal of a just and lasting peace.

The United Nations and the world at large are fully justified in asking: Why is it that peace seems so remote and elusive in the Middle East? What stands in the way of a solution of the problem which has kept the world on edge for almost 25 years?

We are convinced that there will be no solution to the Palestine problem until the problem of Israel is solved. What is the Israeli problem? Simply stated, here is a country created by this very body, the United Nations, when its membership still consisted of only a minority of mankind. From the date of its birth in the heart of Palestine, over the protest of the Palestinian people themselves and their Arab neighbours and brethren, Israel has been the centre of never-ending conflict. Although a creation of the United Nations, Israel's outspoken defiance of this body and of its resolutions has weakened the power of the United Nations to the point of impotency.

Veterans of debates in this Assembly recall only too well the hope for peace that followed the truce of 1948; they recall only too well the subsequent resolution that guaranteed to Palestinians who had been driven from their homes the right to return to them or be compensated for their losses. Never did this body feel surer of its wisdom or more confident of its power: within months peace would return to the Middle East.

But that was the day that the power of the United Nations was first challenged and began to crumble. That was the day that Israel first defied the United Nations. It refused to allow one uprooted Palestinian to return to his home or to pay one penny of his loss. And for 25 years hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have lived in exile.

Today, of course—except when the UNRWA budget is passed—we have forgotten all about them. Today our concern is with Israel's defiance of another resolution, the Security Council resolution of November 1967. Called on to withdraw from the Arab territories seized during the June war, in return for a lasting peace, Israel has simply refused. Confident that its defiance will meet with no more than mild rebukes, it continues to occupy Arab land, and challenges the United Nations and the Arabs to do anything about it. So I submit that we must bring the Israel question before the General Assembly.

What is to become of Israel? Is it to go on from conquest to conquest, fulfilling at last the Zionist dream of a land extending from the Nile to the Euphrates? Despite Israel's past successes, this hardly seems a realizable goal while all the world is watching. Yet in the mind of many a Zionist zealot this is the only way to ingather the 12 million Jews from all over the world. Or will Israel content itself with holding on firmly to the Arab lands it already has: Sinai, the West Bank of Jordan, including Jerusalem; and the Syrian Golan Heights? Five years have passed since those lands were occupied and nothing on the horizon indicates Israel's intention to do anything else but continue to occupy them.

Obviously, either expansion or continuation of Israel's present course will lead to perpetual conflict. The former, I imagine, would bring others into the conflict. The latter—and this is much more likely to happen—would be the war into which both sides seem regrettably to be drifting. If such a war were fought, it would be to the end. It would lead to the devastation of the whole area.

For the moment Israel has rejected the right choice, the one offered in the 1967 resolution. It may well be that it will continue to reject it, year after year, as the years pass. The mentality of Israel's present leadership should change to one less conditioned by fixed dogma and prejudice, one which will agree with the rest of the world that in the 1967 resolution lies the one best hope for a political settlement. It came as no surprise at all that the Israeli Foreign Minister, in his misleading speech before the Assembly, chose to ignore the resolution altogether in a calculated affront to those who adopted it.

There are innumerable issues which can be

intelligently explained only within the context of Israeli ideology and practices. First, there are the undisguised declarations of intent permanently to annex occupied territories of three Member States under the flimsy pretext of security. Does security, in the dwarfed spaces of the modern age, depend on a hilltop here or a little town there? Then, there are the attacks against the adjacent Arab countries, resulting in considerable loss of life and property, mainly amongst innocent civilians. We might add the negative attitude of Israel towards each and every attempt to resolve the conflict in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and the scores of other related resolutions. Then there are the flagrant violations of the Geneva Conventions governing the rights of civilian inhabitants under occupation; the wanton destruction of villages and towns; and, last but not least, the dispersal of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants from the territories which fell victim to occupation.

No discussion of the crisis in the Middle East would be meaningful without emphasis in the strongest terms on the fate and future of Jerusalem, a city hallowed by hundreds of millions of believers—Moslems, Christians and Jews—all over the world. The Israeli claims to an exclusive hold on that great historic city and the systematic efforts since the occupation to transform its unique identity are not only a violation of its sanctity, but also a deep wound inflicted upon the conscience of humanity.

It was in recognition of this fact that both the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted specific resolutions for the reservation of Jerusalem. These were in addition to the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, including the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem.

The Israelis describe their annexation as unification, ignoring the fact that there can be no unification in bondage, where one community tramples upon the soul, the human dignity, the land and the accumulated culture of other communities.

As we declare that we hold on to our rights in Jerusalem, let me emphasize in the name of Jordan and of all peoples of goodwill that believe in the unique sanctity of Jerusalem, that it will always remain the key to a just and lasting solution in the Middle East.

One of the most crucial developments that stemmed from the June war of 1967 has been an awareness throughout the world of the magnitude of the injustice that has befallen the people of Palestine. The people of Jordan and Palestine are one and the same. The people on both banks of the Kingdom have shared a common national life over the past quarter-century. The aspirations of the Palestinian people to restore their national identity, which was brutally shattered in 1948, has inspired Jordan to seek ways and means of promoting the constructive expression of a Palestinian identity without destroying the basic unity that binds the East and West Banks together. It is sometimes overlooked that almost every family on the West Bank of Jordan has sons, daughters, mothers and in-laws on the East side of the Kingdom and vice versa.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank has resulted in one of the most massive and shattering cases of family separation that history has ever known. The temporary visits to the next-of-kin on the occupied West Bank, to which the Israeli Foreign Minister gave a distorted meaning, merely serve to highlight the magnitude of this human tragedy.

Inspired by the imperative need to preserve the basic unity of our country without forfeiting the regional identities of the two components of the Kingdom, Jordan has put forward a plan for the creation of a federal State—the United Arab Kingdom.

The United Arab Kingdom would comprise two autonomous regions: the Jordanian and the Palestinian. The Palestinian region within the federation would be open as a homeland to every Palestinian wherever he might be. He would then be a citizen as of right and not on sufferance. It is an effort towards the gathering in of the Palestinian people after their inhuman diaspora. It would be open to unity with any Palestinian territory so choosing. Its capital would naturally be Arab Jerusalem.

The plan would not only ensure the gathering of the Palestinians into a territory which is theirs but would also maintain the essential link of that Palestinian identity with the rest of the Arab world, of which the Palestinians are an integral part, through its association with the eastern part of the kingdom.

I should like to stress that the plan would only

become feasible and capable of implementation after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Arab lands. What stands in its way? It is the problem of Israel.

Israel has more than once achieved its military objectives in its conflicts with the Arabs, but not once has it succeeded in achieving the fruits of its successes, or peace. All wars and struggles, no matter how intense or brutal, end in peace. The war which Zionism has waged and continues to wage against the Arab nation is an exception. The reason is what I have called the Israeli problem.

Let it free itself of the militaristic obsession. Let it free itself of Zionist euphoria and genuinely reach for peace.

Already there are internal rumblings that will grow louder in the coming years if only given a proper and just chance. Among those rumblings are: the present openly expressed realization among Israelis that an injustice has been done to Palestinians; strikes and demonstrations against racial discrimination; the steady increase in the emigration of skilled western Israelis back to western countries; the restlessness caused by the second-class status of eastern-born Jews as compared with European-born Israelis; the growing fear that with no new crisis western dollars will no longer flow in such a steady stream.

These and other signs of inner discontent are troubling the Israeli leadership. But they are giving encouragement to the rest of the world, or at least to part of it, that a new world can emerge in the Middle East.

In the struggle to reach such a new world in the Middle East Jordan intends to play no small or insignificant role. It has set its course for a vigorous march to a happy and prosperous future. With wise and courageous leadership, the good will of its people and the support of its friends everywhere, Jordan intends to contribute its share to the future of this world.

235

Statement by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria discussing Israeli actions in the Middle East and drawing attention to the causes of terrorism, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly⁸⁹

New York, October 9, 1972

The Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab people of Palestine and three Arab countries which are Members of the United Nations is becoming more fierce and more flagrant, more fraught with grave danger to the peace and security of the Middle East region and of the world.

The five years that have passed since the Israeli aggression of 5 June 1967 have revealed to United Nations Members and to all the peoples of the world the real nature of the aggression with which we are confronted.

The Middle East question, which is in fact an extension of the Palestine question, represents the gravest challenge to the United Nations and a most serious threat to world peace and security. The fate of the world Organization as a means of deterring the aggressor and eliminating aggression depends on its ability to ensure due respect for its resolutions and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Although recent years have witnessed a greater realization by United Nations Members of the danger to the international community as a whole resulting from Israel's expansionist policy and repeated acts of aggression, the gulf separating the wishes of the United Nations as manifested in United Nations resolutions, on the one hand, and the ensuring of the requisite respect for and actual implementation of those resolutions, on the other, has become wider than ever, with the result that small nations no longer consider the world Organization capable of furnishing an adequate guarantee of their independence and security and the integrity of their national territory.

This challenge to the authority of the United Nations and contemptuous flouting of United Nations resolutions relating to matters of peace and security not only constitute a threat to the

⁸⁹ Excerpted from the English translation of Khaddam's speech in the general debate of the 27th session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2058, pp. 53-70.

authority of the world Organization but also provide encouragement to covetous expansion and aggression in all parts of the world, as long as the aggressor may be permitted to enjoy the fruits of aggression without fear of either punishment or deterrence.

Far from abiding by United Nations resolutions that condemn the use of force and the acquisition of territory through the use of force, Israel boasts arrogantly of retaining the fruits of its aggression of 1967, as it retained the fruits of its aggression of 1948.

Last June, five years after the perpetration of the 1967 aggression, Israel announced the number, type and names of the Israeli settlements established in the occupied Arab territories and produced maps showing the location of those settlements. Seventeen settlements have been established in the Syrian Golan Heights, as Israel itself has admitted, 17 on the West Bank of the Jordan and 16 in the Gaza sector and the Sinai and Araba district. Israel, of course, did not announce the names and number of the Arab villages which have been bulldozed to make way for the establishment of those settlements; and no information has been given concerning the lands from which Arab inhabitants have been evicted so that those lands can be given to immigrants coming from the four corners of the earth, after having been misled and deceived by the Zionist propaganda machine.

Israel is interested, not in implementing United Nations resolutions, but rather in implementing resolutions of the World Zionist Congresses, of which every clause involves a violation of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and resolutions of the various United Nations organs relating to the Palestine question.

Resolutions of the twenty-eighth Zionist Congress, which was held in occupied Jerusalem early this year, were more covetous and aggressive than those of former Congresses. They approved Israeli aggression and expansion, sanctioned denial of the human and national existence of the Arabs, mobilized Zionist resources for the colonization of Arab lands, and, with a spirit of racial and religious fanaticism, called on all Jews, wherever they happen to be and regardless of their political affiliations and of the régimes under which they happen to live, to emigrate to Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, and thereby participate

in the crime of expelling the native inhabitants and obliterating the Arab heritage and civilization—all this in order to help fulfil the mad dream of a "Greater Israel" extending from the Nile to the Euphrates.

At a time when Israel refuses to repatriate the Arab refugees and displaced persons to the lands from which they were expelled, and which stand so close to their place of exile, the Zionist Congress expressed deep gratification at the accelerated rate of immigrants that pour into Israel from all parts of the world, called for a continued effort to stimulate the emigration of Jews from all countries and régimes, and declared that the right of the Jewish people to *Eretz Israel* is beyond dispute.

This attitude, which derives from arrogance, selfishness and defiance, shows the true nature of Zionism and its offshoot, Israel. Between 1949 and 1971 the United Nations General Assembly adopted 24 resolutions confirming the Palestinian refugees' right to repatriation. Also, since 1967 United Nations resolutions have been adopted confirming Security Council resolution 237 (1967), which was adopted unanimously on 14 June 1967, calling on Israel to repatriate the refugees displaced since 5 June 1967. Notwithstanding all these United Nations resolutions clearly upholding Arab rights over Arab lands, the Zionist newcomers persist in claiming that their right to these lands is indisputable.

Such is the logic of brute force which has again exposed to this Assembly and to the whole world the nature of the Zionist-Israeli aggressors, against whom our people, who aspire to liberation and peace, are obliged to struggle.

Israel's record abounds in war crimes and crimes committed against humanity—crimes which were defined by the Nuremberg principles, that definition being later adopted by the United Nations. It is, indeed, ironical that Israel has violated every principle and article of the Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to the protection of civilians in war time—a convention originally drafted to prevent a repetition of the crimes committed by Nazi brutality against the peoples of Europe, and particularly against Jews.

The destruction of Arab towns and villages, the changing of the Arab character of the occupied territories, the expulsion of their inhabitants, the imposition of collective punishments, the confiscation of Arab property, and the collective

transfer of the Arab inhabitants to distant areas or to areas outside the occupied territories, in order to have them replaced by new Jewish immigrants who are avowedly settler colonialists—all this constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and of the most elementary human rights and principles. The entire matter has been summed up by Moshe Dayan, an acknowledged expert in violence and terrorism, in his comment that “no Jewish settlement has been built on land other than that on which an Arab village had stood.” That was reported in *Ha-Aretz* on 19 March 1969. Confronted with these Israeli crimes, the Commission on Human Rights declared at its last session that Israeli acts in the occupied territories constitute war crimes and a challenge to humanity.

Israel has raised much clamour in the world concerning the alleged inhuman treatment of Syrian Jews by Syria. Israel seems to believe that the world is deaf, dumb and blind, and therefore cannot see or hear of the racial discrimination to which the Arabs in Palestine and other occupied territories are subjected, and which is also being practised against coloured and Oriental Jews. But Syria, with a good conscience, has always welcomed representatives of the world press, who have reported on the perfect equality which all Syrians enjoy, without any form of discrimination.

As a result of United States support—reaching the point of abdication by the United States of its own personality—the Israelis have assumed a degree of arrogance that makes them maintain an attitude of complete indifference to the world-wide condemnation of Nazi-like methods and mentality, to which the Jews fell victim in the past and which are now applied by Israel, not only against the Arabs, but also against categories of Jews, who are treated as second-class citizens.

The entire world has heard of the desecration by Israel of churches and mosques in occupied Palestine. The attempt to burn down the Aqsa Mosque in 1969 was not the work of a mentally deranged person, as claimed by Israel. The attempt was repeated this year, but a strict blackout has been imposed by the Israeli authorities on reports relating to it. The whole world has heard, also, of the attempts to desecrate religious places and to plunder antiquities in the occupied Arab territories. Most recently, the conscience of humanity was shocked at the action of the

Israeli authorities when the inhabitants of the Arab villages of Ikrit and Kafr Birim were prevented by force of arms from returning to their lands and villages, 24 years after they had been expelled from them by the Israelis.

The whole world, moreover, has heard of the destruction, demolishing and bulldozing of Arab villages in the Jerusalem and Hebron districts under one pretext or another. Israel's policy of terrorizing the peaceful Arab inhabitants, which began with the massacres of Deir Yassin and Qibya—1948 and 1953—has been continued because the Israelis find it effective and are, furthermore, indifferent to its repercussions on world public opinion, as they believe they can deal with such repercussions through their deceitful propaganda machine and through resort to the blackmailing trick of accusing any State which fails to be deceived or misled by this machine of the heinous crime of anti-Semitism. Thus the anti-Semitic slander has been turned by Israel and Zionism into a blackmailing device with which to stifle all criticism of their policies and objective and to victimize any individual, State or institution that does not acquiesce in their plans and manoeuvres.

To justify their 1967 war of aggression, Israel's leaders used to pretend that the war was launched by them because the Arabs were threatening the very existence of Israel. A few weeks ago, however, Israeli generals declared that neither in 1967 nor at any earlier time was the existence of Israel in danger, and that the pretence of the existence of such a danger had been resorted to in order to provide a pretext for a prearranged and carefully planned war of aggression against the Arab countries. To such limits have Israel's addiction to force and violence and its contempt for world public opinion reached.

The Syrian Arab Republic wishes to draw the attention of the General Assembly to Israel's refusal to respond to provisions of Security Council resolutions 316 (1972) and 317 (1972), adopted in June and July 1972, calling on Israel to release the Syrian and Lebanese military personnel kidnapped inside Lebanese territory. This kidnapping crime by Israel not only is an act of piracy, but also constitutes a violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which bar the holding of hostages. Israel is clearly holding the kidnapped Syrian officers as hostages, as is evident from the

Israeli proposal that they be exchanged for Israeli prisoners of war captured while taking part in military operations against the Arab countries.

Israel's failure to abide by provisions of those Security Council resolutions violates the United Nations Charter. The General Assembly should therefore take measures leading to the unconditional release of the Syrian and Lebanese officers and military personnel.

The worsening situation in the Middle East and the threat to world peace and security involved therein are entirely Israel's responsibility. For Israel persists in carrying out expansionist plans and in depriving the Arab people of Palestine of their national rights. The United States, which has used its material, military, political, scientific and technical potential to protect the Israeli aggressor against the Arab countries, shares in the responsibility.

The veto resorted to by the United States Government, for the second time in its history at the United Nations, against a Security Council resolution aimed at stopping Israeli aggression against Syria and Lebanon, furnishes proof of United States backing for aggression. It also indicates that this great Power has abandoned its commitments under the United Nations Charter. The United States veto, which rendered the Security Council helpless against aggression, encouraged the aggressors to continue their challenge to the will of the world community and to launch a more extensive invasion of Lebanese territory on 16 and 17 September last. Following this, Israel further escalated its aggression by another against the Syrian Arab Republic.

In fact, the Middle East conflict is basically one between world Zionism, which invaded Palestine with imperialist and colonialist help, on the one hand, and the Arab people of Palestine, who were the victims of this invasion and who, having been driven out of their homeland, have been forced for over 25 years to lead a life of dispersion and deprivation, on the other hand. The United Nations General Assembly recognized this fact in resolutions adopted after the June 1967 Israeli aggression. In particular, these resolutions recognized that "the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (*General Assembly resolution 2535 B*

(*XXIV*)). They also affirmed that "the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination", (*General Assembly resolution 2672 C (XXV)*), expressed "grave concern that the people of Palestine have not been permitted to enjoy their inalienable rights and to exercise their right to self-determination", and declared that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East" (*General Assembly resolution 2792 D (XXVI)*).

The Middle East conflict acquired new dimensions following the Israeli aggression against three Arab countries in 1967—an aggression that represented a new phase in the Zionist-Israeli expansionist plans and constituted a grave threat to world peace and security.

I affirm here that the attitude of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Palestine question and to the Zionist-imperialist aggression against our lands is firm and based on principle as well as on the provisions of the United Nations Charter, rules of international law, and the dictates of justice and equity. Also, that there are two prerequisites for the establishment of peace in the Middle East: first, recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their land and homeland and to the free exercise of the right of self-determination and, secondly, the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories.

Peace in which the aggressor is rewarded is not real peace. It is submission to the will of the aggressor and a yielding to conditions dictated through force. Contemporary European history has shown that peace which is not based on law and justice is a "respite between two wars". Rewarding the aggressor in order to secure peace is an invitation to war. We therefore strongly reject what are termed "partial solutions". These are deceptive efforts that confirm and perpetuate the consequences of aggression through a false hope of achieving a formal peace.

Israel and the imperialists who give Israeli aggression full support and backing are deluded if they believe that a policy of imposing *faits accomplis* through dint of force can result in stability and permanent peace. These will result not from force and aggression, but from freedom and justice.

Certain well-known manoeuvres and pressures

have, in a particular set of circumstances, succeeded in getting inscribed on the agenda of this session an item concerning measures to prevent terrorism. It has been obvious from the start that the sources of these manoeuvres and pressures wanted to provoke a debate in order to achieve certain political ends. The result was that opinion inclined to the necessity of investigating the causes behind the acts of violence. We welcome this outcome, and express the hope that the discussion will elicit conclusions consonant with the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter—first and foremost among them the right of peoples to liberty, self-determination and the preservation of human dignity.

The Syrian Arab Republic has always taken a stand against terrorism, whether by individuals or groups or States. Syria has not failed to record the principles it stands for in this connexion in documents of the United Nations, and has never ceased to strive for these principles and for the establishment of an international society ordered by law and governed by justice, under a standard of peace.

The question confronting us is: What is terrorism? Who are the terrorists? To answer this question, we must go back to the Articles of the world Organization's Charter and there obtain guidance, for the most extreme forms of terror against which the world is protesting have been occasioned by the repudiation of this Charter and the principles of international law by certain international forces.

The United Nations Charter condemns colonialism and aggression, the use of force and the threat of force. Along with this we find that the imperialist forces and the States to which they pertain practice colonialism and aggression and intimidation, and that their language is the language of bombing, slaughter, and genocide.

The world Organization's Charter confirms to all peoples the right of self-determination. Yet this principle is scorned by the forces of aggression, which pursue a course of domination and oppression to the point of divesting entire peoples of their lands and homeland.

The United Nations Charter postulates equality of all peoples, regardless of colour, race or religion. Yet forces hostile to humanity and to principles of justice and equality practice racial discrimination, elevating it to the rank of a policy and a

philosophy.

What, then, is real terrorism? Who are the real terrorists? Is the struggle of a people for freedom and sovereignty real terrorism? Or does terrorism really lie in acts of aggression and occupation? Are the actual terrorists those who are struggling to regain a freedom denied them and a homeland from which they have been driven? Or are they those who denied peoples their freedom and expelled them from their homeland?

Until recently many of the heads of delegations and the representatives now gathered in this Assembly were being described by imperialists as "terrorists". The voices which define and exploit the term terrorism today are the same voices which but lately labelled the freedom leaders in Africa, Asia and Latin America "terrorists".

As we move back in history, we ask ourselves, were not Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin and George Washington in their time the leaders and commanders of terrorism in the view of the ruling colonial Power? Were not the heroes resisting Nazi and Fascist occupation in Europe "terrorists" in the eyes of the Nazi and Fascist leaders?

It is a highly strange and dubious occasion on which we see the representative of Israel stand before this General Assembly to discuss terrorism and measures to prevent it. How very incongruous that the representative of those institutions of murder and terrorism, the Hagana, the Stern Gang, and Irgun Zvai Leumi—another name for Israel—should speak of terrorism. Who was it who murdered Count Bernadotte? Who perpetrated the massacres at Deir Yassin, at Qibya, Qalqiliyah, and Tul Karam? Who were the ones who blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, burying innocent old people, women and children? Who was it who organized and executed the campaign of parcels containing explosives sent by post to Egypt, causing the death of scores of people? Who were the heroes of the Lavon scandal? And who was Lavon, the main protagonist of this episode?

Was not Lavon the Israeli Minister of Defence at that time, the Israeli Government's deputy in the crime, arranged by that Government, of slaughtering innocent people? The Lavon affair took place in 1954 in Egypt. It occasioned the death of many innocent good people, the burning of the American library and the bombing of the American and British Embassies, in order to

sabotage Egypt's relations with Britain and the United States. The Israeli newspapers at the time described this crime as savage and barbarous, before Lavon's agents, Dayan and Peres, were unmasked.

What do the Israeli leaders want, then, from this feverish campaign which has led them to say that the goal of peace now occupies second place in their concern? Do they not desire to prejudice public opinion against the Palestinian Arab entity and to gain the approval, even the participation, of a number of States in their conspiracy to put down the Palestinian resistance, preliminary to effective operations against that entity? What they want, furthermore, is to divert the attention of world opinion from Israeli activity in occupied Palestine and other occupied Arab lands each day, every hour, minute by minute, actions of savagery and brutality, affronts to humanity, the extreme of terrorism.

We would alert and warn against this manoeuvre all those who abide by truth and the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. It is not aimed at the Palestinian liberation movement alone, it also threatens every national liberation movement in the world.

We are opposed to acts of violence which do not fall within the context of a legitimate struggle for liberating conquered territory, restoring dignity and liberty of peoples, or protecting basic human rights. We do not believe patriotism is served by violence which destroys innocent souls. Yet we shall not be a party to exploiting an emotional act of desperation in order to block patriotic activity for liberation and suffocate in its cradle the legitimate struggle of peoples. We are firmly opposed to the massive terrorism for which States Members of this United Nations are responsible, as they practise oppression against peoples who are struggling for their freedom, sovereignty, national dignity, and recovery of their lands.

The experience of the peoples of the world in the struggle for liberty and human dignity has taught them that injustice imposed on an oppressed people constitutes a serious threat to the dignity and security of all peoples.

Aggression and occupation—maintained through killing, destruction, and religious and racial discrimination—cannot suppress the aspirations of our peoples to freedom and liberation. Rather, they would strengthen their faith in man

and in the dignity of man and their belief that a people's struggle—even when confronted with destruction, occupation, and the concepts of racial and religious discrimination which the imperialists uphold—will ultimately prevail. Those who are proud and intoxicated with their power to kill and destroy and with their success in aggression and occupation should remember that Nazism, whose slogans and methods they imitate, has been crushed and destroyed, and that Nazi leaders, at one time the gods of war and annihilation, ended up as criminals of war and the enemies of man.

Those who persist in aggression, in flouting international laws and conventions and in violating human rights would do well to remember that history proves that right will ultimately be vindicated, and that the will of peoples is invincible.

236

Statement by Foreign Minister Zayyat of Egypt on the Middle East situation, made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly⁹⁰

New York, October 11, 1972

In his speech before this Assembly in this general debate the Foreign Minister of Israel criticized the techniques, procedures and atmosphere of this Organization as having "clearly not been congenial to the craftsmanship of peace" (2045th meeting, page 21). The Assembly was told that all the

"...successes of diplomacy in the past year... had to take place outside the United Nations framework." (*ibid.*)

Our Organization was then admonished by the same speaker to:

"...act with consistent purpose within the real limits of its capacity and strength." (*ibid.*, pp. 44-45)

What are these "real limits" that the Foreign Minister of Israel wishes to place on the capacity and strength of the United Nations, mankind's highest achievement? They are a bold attempt to strip this Organization of its most fundamental

⁹⁰ Excerpted from the text of the speech given in the general debate of the 27th session of the General Assembly, U.N. doc. no. A/PV.2062, pp. 58-76.

mandate, of its role in safeguarding peace and security and of its duty to bring them into being "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law," as the Charter says. According to his thesis the United Nations, set up to ensure that war and injustice would be no more, does not have it in its capacity to deal with such issues. In his concluding paragraph the Israeli Minister suggested that were the United Nations to temper ambition with restraint it might perhaps be able to play an enlarged humanitarian role. I remember our colleague Ambassador Castro, saying that we would then be a branch of the Red Cross.

The simple, regrettable fact is that political Zionism, having used this Organization to realize its ambition of partitioning Palestine, cannot now suffer the nations of the world looking over its shoulders, trying to arrest its preconceived and preplanned expansionism.

Instead of charting a mere humanitarian role for the United Nations, the Foreign Minister of Israel was certainly expected to tell this Assembly, to which he is answerable, what his country has or has not done with regard to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly especially with regard to the last Assembly resolution, resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971,⁹¹ which clearly called on his Government to respond favourably to the principles of peace advanced in February 1971 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring.

That, as we all recall, was done in conformity with the mandate unanimously given to the Representative of the Secretary-General by the Security Council in November 1967 and later supported by this Assembly.

But not once did the Foreign Minister of Israel mention those resolutions. Not once did he mention any resolution adopted by the General Assembly or the Security Council concerning the Middle East—not on the question of the Palestinians; not on Jerusalem; not on the occupied lands of Egypt, Syria and Jordan; not on the barbaric attacks against Syria and Lebanon; not on the mistreatment of the population under the military rule of his Government—not once. He has, however, obliquely warned us in Egypt, in the Arab world and in the United Nations not to entertain

any hope that Israel will ever be subjected to any adjudication or coercion by the United Nations or anyone else.

Israel instead invites the conquered countries to meet their conqueror and to discuss the size of the fruits of conquest. Israel warns that any talk about any United Nations resolutions, about any African initiative, about any possible European initiative or about any other initiative will only be met with its displeasure. Today Israel is obviously confident of the military support of the United States of America, by which it can sustain its occupation of our lands, and confident of the political support of the United States, which would protect it against any United Nations action. The question Tel Aviv asks is: who is going to get us to do this or get us to do that? The pertinent question it does not ask and which no power-drunk people has ever asked is: Where are the conquerors of yesteryear? Where are the phantoms of the past? Any suggestion other than to accept Israeli demands is and, we are told, always will be, rejected with disdain.

What is it that the Israelis so disdainfully reject? It is not a secret that they reject the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is not a secret that they reject Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.⁹² It is not a secret that Israel demands that the aide-mémoire be dropped and forgotten completely.

If Ambassador Jarring were ever to withdraw his aide-mémoire—although that would mean that the Assembly would also have to withdraw its resolution 2799 (XXVI) of last year—then, of course, our reply accepting the suggestions contained in that aide-mémoire would not exist. That is why I feel I am bound, as a responsible person not only before this Assembly but also before history, to bring to the attention of this Assembly what it was that Egypt agreed to, and up to this very minute still agrees to, in its search for an honourable peace, in its battle to win peace. Please excuse my taking a few minutes to do so. We here keep referring to documents by numbers and by dates, and in the end we do not really know what those documents contain. On 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring handed his aide-mémoire to me, and he presented it to Israel on the same day. He stated the following in that aide-mémoire:

⁹¹ Document no. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁹² Printed as Annex I to document no. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

...I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the [Palestinian] refugee problem:

Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

- (a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
- (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran; and
- (c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

The *United Arab Republic* would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects:

- (a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
- (b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- (c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
- (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. (*A/8541, pp. 9 and 10*)

Ambassador Jarring added:

"In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step." (*Ibid.*, p. 10)

He also said that by "security measures in Sharm el-Sheikh" he meant the presence of United Nations forces in the area.

Egypt's answer was "yes." What was Israel's answer? All those who are of my age know that for 25 years every newspaper, every Zionist leader, every partisan and defender of Israel, has repeatedly said that this is exactly what Israel is thirsty for, that this is why it is fighting and struggling, that this is why it is collecting all the money it can from anyone and everyone, and that this

is why it is exacting taxes from every Jew in the world. And that was given by our answer of "yes." However, Israel's answer—however obliquely it was given—was "no."

How can the international community stand idly by when faced with Israel's defiance? "No" was the answer to the General Assembly resolutions. "No" was the answer to the Secretary-General. The Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, got the same answer: "no." "No" was the reaction to the effort of the four permanent members of the Security Council to draw up guidelines for Ambassador Jarring. "No" was the answer even to the continuation of these consultations. "No" was the answer to the attempts of the ten distinguished leaders of Africa last year. "No" was the response to the considered views of the non-aligned countries. Western European views are similarly confronted by this ominous "no." In short, Israel says "no" to everyone and everything that will not bring about submission to its will. This is a cold, calculated policy seeking to assert that in the Middle East Israel's word as the dominating power will henceforth be the law.

As has been repeatedly stated in previous years, the history of Palestine in the past half century reveals that political Zionism is bent on expansion in an endeavour to dominate as much of the Middle East as it possibly can. It never lacked pretexts for expansion. It does not lack them now. It will not lack them in future. Following the Second World War, humanitarian considerations were used to plead for the partition of Palestine. At that time Israel's leaders did not preach the irrelevance of the United Nations. They considered the United Nations General Assembly the most suitable and legal vehicle they could use to achieve their objectives. Talk about the necessity of direct negotiations between the parties and of the inadmissibility of adjudication and coercion was not yet fashionable in those days. Considering the United Nations General Assembly as the vehicle which would give them partition, the Zionists fought for partition and declared themselves content with the Partition Plan of 29 November 1947.

Political Zionism was not really satisfied with the boundaries allotted to the Jewish State in that resolution. Further expansion to usurp other parts was needed to satisfy the Zionist dream of dominating the totality of Palestine. This was brought

about by terrorizing the Palestinians. Women and children were massacred, houses dynamited, villages razed. These actions were perpetrated by specially organized terror groups directed by some of the better-known Israeli leaders of today.

Terror and violence—organized and premeditated—were thus introduced by the Zionists into peaceful Palestine. On 8 February this year—exactly one year after Israel was offered peace and refused to commit itself to it—at an open meeting in Tel Aviv under the sponsorship of one of Israel's former cabinet ministers, the two men who blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, killing 95 residents, were publicly identified. They gave a press conference, under the chairmanship of one of the ex-ministers in the Israeli Cabinet. Describing their action in detail at that press conference, the two Israelis revealed how they had disguised themselves as Arabs, wearing Arab dress, in order to carry out this operation. Despite their open confession, the Israeli Government took no action against them and did not even criticize their public glorification. That was in February 1972.

There will always be a pretext for Zionist expansionism and the Israeli reluctance to face the possibilities of real peace. This year the pretext brought to this Assembly is terrorism—a terrifying word. But who is using it? Who is complaining? Is it the State of Israel, a State by terrorists and of terrorists which is encouraged and protected in order to terrorize the nations around it lest they should ever decide to live for themselves, independent of colonial States. As time goes on, other pretexts are sure to be found as and when needed.

The Palestinian people, some two and a half million of the Middle East's most civilized and energetic people, are all now either living as third-rate subjects under Israeli domination or in sordid camps that can hardly protect them from the wrath of the Phantom jets in the hands of Israel, or else in a diaspora, promising themselves and their children never to forget or forgive, looking with bitterness and scepticism—and who can blame them?—at this world and at the United Nations, and at our resolutions adopted annually during the past quarter of a century.

Having occupied all of Palestine, the Israelis invaded the international borders of the neighbouring Arab States in June 1967. This time the pretext for the invasion and the following occupa-

tion was Israel's so-called security requirements. For Israel, security obviously means the perpetuation of a state of superiority in armaments that should ensure that the Arabs will never be able to regain anything that Israel may decide it needs or likes. Under this superiority in armaments, and in pursuance of its expansionist designs, Israel has had an open-ended opportunity to effect all the changes it wishes to bring about in the occupied territories.

The increasingly deteriorating situation in the occupied Palestinian territory of Gaza is evidence of this Israeli policy. Gaza has been subjected to a premeditated policy of depopulation and change of demographic structure and geographic composition in a manner fitting Israeli expansionist plans, but certainly contravening the 1949 Geneva Convention which strictly prohibits the establishment of settlements in occupied territories, the forcible deportation of the civilian population, the destruction of houses and villages and changes in the geographic structure and demographic composition of the occupied territories.

Similar acts have been and are now being committed by Israel in Egyptian Sinai, in the Syrian Golan Heights, in Jerusalem and on the West Bank. The reports of the Red Cross, the United Nations committees of investigation, the various articles published in the world press and the statements issued by many international humanitarian organizations—all attest that the situation in those territories is intolerable. Consequently, the measures undertaken by Israel in the occupied territories have been considered war crimes and an affront to humanity by the Commission of Human Rights. The Foreign Minister of Israel calmly tells us, however, in his speech in this debate, that Israel applies humanitarian principles. Israel has, according to him, increased the number of television sets in the hands of the people under its occupation.

Yet we in Egypt are for peace. We are for the full implementation of all United Nations resolutions on the Middle East. To achieve this objective and in pursuance of our determination to support the United Nations efforts, we have co-operated with the United Nations and its Secretary-General, we have extended unreserved co-operation to his Special Representative. In order further to facilitate the realization of a just peace, the President of Egypt proposed on 4 February 1971 an initiative

providing for the evacuation of Israeli occupation forces in two stages. The President declared that upon Israel's withdrawal to the lines of the first stage, Egypt would be willing to accept a ceasefire for a specific period, during which the Secretary-General's Special Representative would prepare a time-table for the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution. During that stage Egypt would start clearing the Suez Canal with a view to opening it to international navigation. Egyptian forces would cross the Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the Eastern Bank and protect the Canal and the Egyptian cities along its side. The second stage would then follow. The Israeli occupation forces would evacuate the territories they occupied after 5 June 1967, and all the other provisions of the Security Council resolution would be fully carried out in conformity with the aforementioned time-table. The evacuation of Egyptian territory can only mean the withdrawal of Israeli forces of occupation to the Egyptian, internationally recognized, borders with Palestine under the British Mandate.

United States Secretary of State Rogers once alluded to these international borders as being "some 50 years old"—that is twice the life of the Israeli presence in the area. This may be its age according to modern history, but anyone who has learned his history from a French or an Arabic book—I do not know about English books—knows that these boundaries are exactly 4,250 years old, these internationally recognized borders between Egypt and Palestine, all of Palestine, which was partitioned in 1947.

It is relevant to recall here what two Presidents, the President of the last session of the Assembly and you yourself, Sir, said at the opening of this session.

Mr. Adam Malik said:

I remain steadfast in my belief, however, that the only road to a peaceful settlement will have to go by way of strict compliance, by all concerned, with all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions adopted with regard to this problem. (2032nd meeting, p. 6)

As for you, Sir, you said:

In the Middle East region too there are still no signs of a lasting peace on the horizon. The United Nations has committed its authority to help settle this long-standing dispute. We have a right to demand that the

will and the decisions of our Organization be respected, decisions which, if fully complied with, should bring about the solution so earnestly desired, and not only by the population of that region. (*Ibid.*, p. 21)

Israel's utter disregard for the United Nations and its resolutions has already been exposed by many speakers. For example, this morning the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Janos Peter, has given us a short, precise exposé on the question. Most of the speakers have gained our gratitude for all they have said on the matter. However, the question will be examined later by this Assembly when the items on the Middle East and Palestine are considered. We shall have more to say at that time. At this stage, it seems only proper to stress that merely extending views and advancing proposals would not be adequate. It also seems important to declare that to hope that the mere passage of time will bring Israel more and more concessions, other than those made to it in February 1971—and to wait for that—is an idle hope. That will never happen.

237

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing Egypt's foreign relations, made at the opening of the new session of the National Assembly (excerpt)⁹³

Cairo, October 15, 1972

If you will permit me, brothers and sisters, I will now discuss certain important aspects of our struggle, starting with Egyptian-Soviet relations.

I want to put the following before you:

1. We have the highest appreciation of the value of Arab-Soviet friendship. We have not failed in caring for it nor in protecting it from the savage attacks directed against it.

We cannot deny good turns, nor can we be ungrateful to those who do them. Indeed, we have never regarded it as a matter of courtesy or favour; we have always understood Arab-Soviet relations as being a matter of strategic friendship and we have not changed in this respect.

⁹³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 16, 1972.

2. We have been obliged against our will to have an objective pause for reflection with our friend, and I explained the reasons for it to you at a parliamentary meeting here, during the extraordinary session, to which you were called last August.⁹⁴

I also explained the reasons for it at meetings of the Central Committee and at other levels of our organization and our political departments.

I do not think it necessary to return to these reasons on the present occasion, but I will say that we have never had and shall never have two policies but one policy only. We have never had and shall never have two faces but one face only. We have been sincere and straightforward in what we have said and in the attitudes we have adopted.

3. We have made and shall continue to make every effort to overcome this temporary situation in our relations with the U.S.S.R. We shall always be guided by our principles, which we will never disregard, and the goals of our struggle, for which we find no alternative, especially as these goals are related to our land, our destiny and our honour.

As you know, the Prime Minister is going to Moscow tomorrow with a large delegation⁹⁵ and, as every one knows, he has been entrusted with a task which I hope will be successful and to which I give my full support, as a matter both of principle and of necessity.

I promise to come to this honourable Assembly, at a secret session if necessary, to inform you of details and developments. When I do so I hope that I may be able to give you something to satisfy your hearts and consciences.

Brother and sister members of the National Assembly;

Let me quickly review with you certain other aspects. Let me refer to the attitude of the United States toward us which regrettably, I am bound to say, is a hostile attitude.

In our coming battle we shall be faced with an Israeli air force that has been completely renewed by the United States. The present American support for Israel has been turned into something

similar to a pipeline which pumps day and night, while the American politicians' race to please Israel has become a farce or a tragedy, unprecedented in international relations.

The United States has frustrated every attempt and blocked every road in order to force us to accept the *fait accompli*—which is something that will never happen.

Although our attitude needs no reaffirmation, I want to say as emphatically as possible, for their benefit and not yours:

— We shall not relinquish a single inch of Arab territory.

— There will be no negotiations with Israel.

— There will not be anyone in this land of Egypt—and we shall not permit it in any Arab land—who would waive the rights of the people of Palestine.

But the time when we could be content with words alone has passed. The time has come for us to make the United States pay the price of its crazy support for Israel, and pay dearly.

If there are those who say that what we now see on the American political scene—whether it be comedy or tragedy—is the result of the American election game, we say that their analysis is incorrect. The time has come for us to strike and to strike at the heart, unless the United States can rapidly and resolutely extricate itself from this almost colonialist subservience to Israel. It did this once, when the now President was Vice-president in the government of General Eisenhower who chose to stand by principles rather than friendships, during our glorious and victorious Suez battle in 1956.

Let me now turn to the attitude of Western Europe, which is one of great interest to us because of our appreciation of the cultural, strategic and economic links across the Mediterranean.

Western Europe means in the first place France, Britain and West Germany. Our relations with France have been good since de Gaulle, together with Abdel Nasser, succeeded in building a bridge between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

Our relations with Britain are improving and we hope that they will continue to improve.

Unfortunately we cannot say the same thing about West Germany which is today practising Nazi terrorism against the Arabs.

I now turn to the non-aligned countries. It

⁹⁴ President Sadat had discussed the expulsion of Soviet advisers at a closed session of the National Assembly on August 17, 1972; cf. *Le Monde* (Paris), August 19 and August 23, 1972. See also document no. 220 above.

⁹⁵ For the joint communiqué see document no. 151 above.

may not be irrelevant to point out that the policy of non-alignment was not exclusively linked to the cold war age, so that it would collapse when that era came to an end.

The policy of non-alignment is the policy of national independence, of peace based on justice, of sharing the world's prosperity. Otherwise, through polarization of political blocs with different ideologies, the world might end up in an acute and bloody world-wide class struggle between the rich and the poor.

We believe in the policy of non-alignment and regard it as a constant policy.

May I add that I intend shortly to initiate contacts with our friend Josip Broz Tito and Mrs. Indira Gandhi so that we may together renew the vitality of that role whose banner was raised by Nehru, Abdel Nasser and Tito.

I now turn to Africa and, if you will permit me, I will, from this tribune in your honourable Assembly, address the following message to our brothers in Africa:

Remember that there are those who seek to split the solidarity of the African continent.

The Arab north of the continent is the companion in struggle of its heart, its west, east and south.

Colonialism still exists in the centre of the continent. It has not yet departed.

Those who want to dominate the continent are now changing their tactics. Instead of imposing their direct bloody domination, they are imposing their indirect bloody domination on it through local and civil wars.

Israel is the tool of colonialism.

It was the first group of leaders of national liberation in Africa who branded Israel as a model of settler colonialism.

As for Israel's ability to provide technical and economic aid in Africa, I would ask you to listen to the testimony of General Idi Amin of Uganda.

Brother and sister members of the National Assembly;

It is clear to me that duty requires of us, now that we are about to arrive at a point in our struggle where every one of us must shoulder his responsibility, that we have the most extensive possible links with others, so that they may know how they stand with us and that we may know where we stand with them.

With this end in view we shall have extensive contacts with the parties and governments of the

countries of the socialist bloc.

We shall strengthen our relations with China which has become the first Asian power to reach the level of the super-powers, which makes us all very proud.

We shall build wide bridges with Asia and Latin America.

We know that our struggle is part of the world struggle of national liberation movements in their social and progressive trend. We know that our battle is the battle of all these forces, and we believe that, in what lies ahead of us, we cannot dispense with anyone or relieve him of his responsibility for the common human struggle and for peace based on justice.

238

Speech by Emir Sabah of Kuwait to the Kuwaiti National Assembly reaffirming Kuwait's support of the Palestine revolution, made on the occasion of the opening of the new session (excerpt)⁹⁶

Kuwait, October 24, 1972

Honourable Members:

Although more than five years have passed since the 1967 aggression, the Zionist occupation of Arab territory still continues, as a challenge to all the Arab nation's resources and capacities which have not yet been able to take their proper place in the battle of liberation. The Zionist enemy continues to implement his plans for settlement and expansion in the occupied areas with all the means at his disposal, with the object of confronting the whole world with a *fait accompli* imposed by force and the passage of time. From time to time he repeats his aggressions against the Arab countries, persisting in his error and his contempt for all international values and principles. He is encouraged to do this by the unlimited aid and support he receives from the United States of America and elsewhere. He is also encouraged by the disunity he sees in the front that surrounds him, which leads him to conclude that there is no

⁹⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai al-Amm* (Kuwait), October 25, 1972.

common plan or coordination among the parties in this front. Kuwait has constantly drawn attention to the dangers of this situation and to the need to mobilize Arab energies within the framework of a unified plan which clearly defines both means and obligations, with the aim of liberating the occupied territory, and recovering the full rights of the Palestinian people. Kuwait has always expressed her readiness to play her part in all that is required of her in this field. In welcoming the meeting of the Committee of Foreign and Defence Ministers to be held next month⁹⁷ Kuwait hopes that the results of this meeting will be a step in the right direction.

Kuwait has clearly affirmed her attitude to the Palestine problem in all her international contacts and warned against the dangerous consequences of continuing to disregard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

On numerous occasions Kuwait has explained that so-called terrorism cannot be eliminated by dealing with its superficial manifestations, but only by dealing seriously with the basic problems that have led to it and by making efforts to reach a radical and just solution to these problems.

Kuwait has also pursued her policy of consolidating and strengthening her good relations with the other Arab countries and consolidating the foundations of her cooperation with them in all fields.

239

Statement by Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt on U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations made at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union and the Parliamentary Committee of the National Assembly⁹⁸

Cairo, October 25, 1972

The decisions taken by the President were the following:⁹⁹

1. That the mission of the Soviet military

⁹⁷ A meeting of foreign and defence ministers of Arab League states was held in Kuwait, November 15-18, 1972.

⁹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 26, 1972.

⁹⁹ See document no. 219 above.

advisers and experts is terminated as of last July 17.

2. That no equipment or persons not subject to Egyptian command should remain in Egyptian territory.

3. That all aspects of the situation should be examined by us and the U.S.S.R. at a summit meeting to be held in Cairo. This meeting should be preceded by comprehensive preparatory talks in which all aspects of relations with the U.S.S.R. would be discussed; the proposed summit meeting will be held in the light of the results of these talks.

The first and second decisions have been fully implemented and conform to the time schedule decided upon. It is only fair to recall that the U.S.S.R. made no objections and did not hesitate for a moment to carry out what the President had decided regarding this.

It was also agreed to implement the third decision, and the U.S.S.R. invited a delegation, which I had the honour of heading, to visit the U.S.S.R. on October 16 for the comprehensive talks mentioned in the decision.

Here it is my duty to mention that the task entrusted to the delegation was, basically, to discuss the relations between the two countries in the light of the developments resulting from the implementation of the decisions taken by the President.

I made a point of ensuring that the talks be extremely frank. I did not conceal anything, because the objective of the talks, if they were successful, was to lay sound foundations for our dealings from the present moment, in particular in light of the recent developments.

I explained to the Soviet side that the relations between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. derived from the understanding that there are certain basic principles of which both Egypt and the U.S.S.R. are convinced, and that this is the basis of sound friendship between peoples—basic principles such as the combating of colonialism, socialism, the right of peoples to liberation—all of which are principles we agree on. We were convinced of these principles before our relations established with the U.S.S.R. became strong. Indeed it was our implementation of these principles that perhaps confirmed our relationship.

Then I talked about some of the things that have happened recently, especially since the death of President Abdel Nasser. I spoke with extreme frankness and I had no intention of concealing a single fact in these talks. If we want our relations to be established on strong and solid foundations nothing must be concealed.

4. In 1971 some people began to allege that there had been a change in the policy followed by the Egyptian leadership. This allegation was later accepted by some in the U.S.S.R. But in fact there had been no change of line. There is something basic that governs all the moves of the Egyptian leadership—and, indeed, of all the people. It is the battle. After five years of occupation of Egyptian territory it was natural that we should try to do something to liberate our territories. As I have mentioned President Sadat had been to the U.S.S.R. several times to discuss what could be done on behalf of the battle.

Why did President Sadat go to the U.S.S.R.? Because we are fighting a battle against colonialism. The United States was supporting Israel with all its resources, and the friend who could support us was the U.S.S.R. It had stood by us honourably. So it was natural that we should look to it to support us in the battle for the liberation of our territory. President Sadat went there to discuss what steps should be taken to help in this.

Reference to the minutes of the meetings held in Moscow shows that our friends in the U.S.S.R. advised that, while continuing to strengthen our armed forces, we should make every effort for a peaceful solution of the problem. Indeed, it was always said that the way for Egypt to force Israel to accept a peaceful solution was to acquire unmistakable military strength. I have also mentioned that in these talks we were advised to contact the United States if this would help in reaching a peaceful solution.

We followed all these courses. We strengthened our armed forces and at the same time we tried by all ways and means to reach a peaceful settlement.

When the Americans produced the so-called Rogers Plan we agreed that Rogers should come to Cairo to discuss it. At the time some people thought that this meant that we were turning to the United States. In view of their actions it was natural that measures should be taken against them. Some of them said that they were friends

of the U.S.S.R., but this had nothing to do with the measures that were taken against them.¹⁰⁰ These measures were exploited as evidence that the Egyptian leadership was eliminating those who advocated friendship with the U.S.S.R. because it wanted to follow a new course; but all this was untrue.

My intention in making this analysis and review was to show that the policy followed by the regime in Egypt is the same as that which was initiated years ago under the leadership of Abdel Nasser. Indeed, President Sadat was trying to strengthen our relations with the U.S.S.R. to ensure greater cooperation in all fields.

I then mentioned that the steps taken between us and the U.S.S.R. after the death of Abdel Nasser conformed to the course we had followed to strengthen our relations to the greatest possible extent. As regards socialist application, the steps taken towards this in the last two years have led us along the road to socialism in this country.

We have applied socialist decisions to the workers in the private sector, to whom they had not previously been applied.

All the decisions taken in the last two years were aimed first and foremost at securing the interests of the working class.

This is our policy regarding our relations with the U.S.S.R., our struggle against colonialism and our application of socialism—a clear and unchanging line.

I should like to mention that, when we believed in these principles, we did not do so to please anyone.

When some people maintain that the application of socialism is linked to friendship with the U.S.S.R., that is something we cannot accept.

For if we did accept this it would mean that our socialism is not so much a matter of principle as it is the result of the approval of the friend who supports us, and that we cannot accept.

We are socialists because we believe in socialism. I also said that there is no one who can abolish socialism in Egypt. Socialism is now a matter of

¹⁰⁰ In early May, 1971, President Sadat made major changes in the government and armed forces. Prominent among those to lose their positions were Vice-president Ali Sabry who was reputed to have close relations with the Soviet leadership (*The Times* (London), May 5, 1971, p. 6). He was later tried and found guilty of treason. For Rogers' visit to Egypt in May, 1971, see document nos. 114 and 116 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

rights enjoyed by the peasants, the workers and the working class, and no one can resist these forces in Egypt.

When people talk of the "right," or reaction, and say that they are growing stronger and changing the direction of things, I think they do so because they do not understand the state of affairs in Egypt.

There may be some people who have been and will continue to be enemies of socialism, but what do they matter when 98 per cent of our people are toilers and workers who will never give up socialism?

Since socialism is firmly rooted in the classes that benefit from it there is nothing to fear. Of course we must keep our eye on some people but we must not exaggerate their importance or say that their existence will change the socialist line.

I told the Soviet side that this was the background I wanted to start from, and that our brethren in the U.S.S.R. should realize that one thing governed all our attitudes—by that I mean, the liberation of our territory.

It was on this subject that the differences that have arisen recently began. I want to interpret these differences in this context only: Our basic goal is the liberation of our territory, and we are exercising our right to freedom of movement to the full. We contact whomsoever we wish, and we obtain all that is required for the battle from wherever we can. The U.S.S.R. is a friend whose friendship we desire now and always, on the basis of these principles from which we shall never deviate. But we tell the U.S.S.R. that colonialism is occupying part of our territory and that this has absolute priority over everything else as far as we are concerned. We want to clarify with our friend what we must do to liberate our territory.

We tell them that now that more than five years have passed since Israel's aggression and our territory is still occupied, we give priority to the battle over everything else. Our relations with everyone are governed by what help they give to enable us to liberate our territory and eliminate the consequences of aggression.

Israel has been able to achieve her present position, of occupier of our territory and trouble-maker for the whole area according to her wishes, because of the full support she receives from the United States. The U.S. declares that it will

guarantee Israel's military superiority and her security and bestows unlimited armaments on her, while at the same time preventing the international community from taking action to achieve that which all have agreed is essential—a just solution to the problem, including the evacuation of Israeli forces from the territories she occupied in the 1967 aggression: The U.S. goes beyond that, and uses the veto to prevent the adoption of any resolution condemning Israel.

As long as this is the attitude of the United States in its support of Israel, we want our friend who supports us to give us the means to enable us to be on an equal footing as regards the capability for the battle. We do not want anyone to fight our battle for us; we do not want anyone but our own soldiers to fight to liberate our territory. All we ask is that our friend should give us sufficient support for us to be on an equal footing with our enemy.

We cannot allow our territory to be occupied any longer. Our pause in our relationship with our friend was so that we might work out clearly what steps must be taken to that end.

It is only fair to say that the Soviet side never raised any objection to the termination of the mission of the advisers and experts. The only question was the manner in which the decision was to be implemented. We answered the question and they were convinced.

More than once during the talks President Kosygin declared the following:

1. The U.S.S.R. has supported, is supporting and will continue to support Egypt and the Arab countries in their struggle to liberate their territory and also supports the rights of the Palestinian people.

2. Some people were trying to spread the rumour that the U.S.S.R. has come to an agreement with the U.S.A. at the expense of our cause. He said that it was the agents of colonialism who were promulgating this hoping to cause a quarrel between the U.S.S.R. and the Arab countries.

He affirmed that this was not true—the expression he used was "it would be naive to believe it." He even said that the United States would never help in finding a just solution because it is helping Israel in her aggression.

3. The U.S.S.R. is implementing and will continue to implement its pledges to strengthen our capabilities for the battle, and I should like to

mention that practical steps have been started and are being implemented accordingly.

4. Regarding military support, he said that the U.S.S.R. thoroughly appreciated the position and that it would do its duty to the best of its ability.

I hope that my colleagues understand that I cannot give any details about this subject.

Mr. President and colleagues:

I have perhaps spoken rather too long, but I wanted to give a full picture of the task I had to perform in the U.S.S.R. and if I may give my own personal impressions of the visit, I should like to say that the talks succeeded in melting the ice that had recently formed in our relations with the U.S.S.R., and that our relations will now be normal.

On behalf of President Sadat I invited the Soviet leaders to meet us in Cairo, and they accepted the invitation with thanks. The date of their visit will be fixed later.

Thus the three decisions taken by the President have been implemented fully, and I think that this pause in our relations with a friend has successfully achieved its goal.

240

Speech by King Hussein of Jordan defending Jordan's role and actions in settling the Palestine problem, made at the opening of the new session of the National Assembly (excerpt)¹⁰¹

Amman, November 1, 1972

Therefore, also, to talk of partial settlements and individual deals is mere nonsense; we say this for all to hear. We shall not waive one small part of Palestinian rights because they are our rights, and we shall not bargain over the Palestinian cause because it is our cause. If we have called for and advocated peace, accepted the Security Council resolution and expressed our readiness to implement it, it is because we are convinced that peace is the goal of the whole Arab nation. When the Security Council resolution is implemented

it will provide a sound basis for peace based on justice and right, a peace that will be acceptable to generations coming after us. This year our Foreign Minister submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twenty-seventh session, the details about this attitude of ours for all the world to hear. He expounded the principles on which this attitude is based and explained the real obstacles in the way of achieving peace in the area. And if his review established which quarters were responsible for frustrating the efforts that have been made to achieve peace, he also expressed Jordan's optimism and confidence that a new world can arise in the area, a world whose foundation is justice, whose mainstay is right and whose goal is prosperity. Jordan is determined to play no small or insignificant role in building that world, the instrument it can employ being the inflexible will and immovable resolution of its people.

Honourable Senators and Deputies:

Inspired by the interests of the cause that is ever in our hearts; in order to preserve the basic premise of the unity of our people and country; from concern for the Palestinian identity which has been tossed to and fro by conflicting currents; out of loyalty to the ambitions and aspirations of the Palestinian individual and with a view to meeting all requirements for building the state on firm modern foundations and to eliminating all errors and faults liable to impair the country's advance in a single rank, we announced our plan last March for the establishment of the United Arab Kingdom.¹⁰² We said at the time that this Kingdom would consist of two regions, one Palestinian and one Jordanian. The Palestinian region would consist of the West Bank and any Palestinian territory that might be liberated and whose inhabitants might choose of their own free will to join it, while the Jordanian region would consist of the East Bank.

We said at the time and we say again: The Palestinian region will be the real homeland of every Palestinian in the world who chooses to be joined to his people and to take part in their advance, honestly and sincerely, until such time as all members of the people who have been made homeless by the tragedy and have lived all these years a life of homelessness and deprivation, can be reunited.

¹⁰¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), November 2, 1972.

¹⁰² See document no. 187 above.

241

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Kikhya of Libya emphasizing Libya's full support for Palestinian commando activities¹⁰³

Tripoli, early November, 1972

Q. Minister, the German Federal Government has demanded that the Palestinians in Libya be called to account.

A. I cannot imagine that the Federal Government seriously meant that. The fedayeen have applied to us for political asylum and have been granted it. Naturally they will not be sent before a court. So far as we are concerned the Munich affair has ended.

Q. Do you think that the affair has ended for Israel too, so long as the freed fedayeen are in Libya?

A. Israel says that she will attack us. Please do, we look forward to that. We welcome it. We are not afraid of Israel. We say openly: Yes, there are training camps for Palestinian fedayeen in Libya. Yes, volunteers from eighteen countries are in Libya preparing for the struggle against Israel. The stagnation in the Arab world has been overcome by the Libyan revolution. We are now at the stage when we can radicalize the war. In this phase Libya will naturally support every Palestinian commando action. I emphasize: every action.

242

Interview statement by Shaikh Jabir, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, criticizing the Arab acceptance of the status quo and urging collective Arab confrontation with Israel¹⁰⁴

Kuwait, mid-November, 1972

Q. Do you think it is essential that the battle should be an all-Arab one?

A. We fully support the idea that the battle should be an all-Arab one. We support it with deeds and pledges, not only with words and statements. Indeed, I regard anyone who renounces or withdraws from the concept of the all-Arab character of the battle as a traitor to his cause and his homeland. We have recorded our commitment to this concept of the all-Arab character of the battle in writing in a letter to our brother, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, the President of the Libyan Revolutionary Council. We believe that every Arab State and every Arab resource, however insignificant, has a duty to perform in the battle with our enemy. But what I ask now is, where are we going?

Are the Arab states going to stay as they are now? Is their role to remain restricted to keeping a record of all Israel's misdemeanours? Is their confrontation with the enemy to amount to no more than keeping a detailed account of every Israeli aggression against our territories? What has happened to us? What is missing in us that has led us to this pass? There are people who benefit from the situation between the Arabs and Israel remaining the way it is now, primarily the great powers, who are interested in the situation continuing as it is. We must exclude from our reasoning those who desire for us only what they desire for themselves.

It would be shameful for us and our reputation as Arabs if the means under our control should be lost to us. Yes, Arab energies, Arab resources and Arab arms capable of playing their role efficiently do exist. If the air force of Egypt, which is stationed face to face with the enemy, and hundreds of thousands of her men under arms in confrontation with the enemy cannot penetrate Israeli depth in reply to Israel's violations of Arab air space—so frequent that it is hardly too much to say that she controls it—the collective confrontation of the enemy requires that our military strength be integrated. Jordan is on the frontiers of Israel, and Syria, too.

It is thus possible to remedy the failure to penetrate Israel in depth.

¹⁰³ Excerpted and translated from the German text of the interview conducted by Randolph Braumann, *Stern*, no. 47 (November 12, 1972), pp. 266–267.

¹⁰⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 17, 1972.

243

Address by member of the Central Committee of Fateh Najjar (Abu Yusif), made at a ceremony on the occasion of the second anniversary of President Assad of Syria's presidency (excerpt)¹⁰⁵

Beirut, November 19, 1972

It knows its objective; the Palestine revolution will not be impeded or weakened by circumstances which may from time to time make it appear weak. This is in the nature of revolutions, and the modern experiences to which contemporary revolutions are exposed stress this, as happened in Algeria, Vietnam and elsewhere. But the great question is: shall we surrender? Shall we bow down as a revolution, as they want us to do? Shall we abandon our pledges to our martyrs? Shall we sell the revolutionary heritage we have accumulated since 1965? This is what I want to stress on behalf of our combatant brothers, that we shall never commit this crime. Those who have borne arms for seven years will not lay them down because Tel Aviv, Washington and certain escapists and laggards want them to do so. The blood of any martyr that has been spilt on the soil of the beloved homeland will ever remain a thousand times more honourable than those leaders who are willing to renounce and betray [us]. What the whole world, both Arab and foreign, must understand is this: Concerning the recent attempts to represent our revolution as being a number of desperate terrorist groups, to them we say wherever they may be, the world will never know security, quiet and stability as long as our struggle is not respected and our right to live is not recognized. Nor shall we allow this world, which opens its arms to our enemy and gives him everything he needs to frustrate our revolution and to establish himself firmly on our soil, to do this over the dismembered body of our people and the blood of our martyrs. As long as we have no homeland in which to enjoy stability and peace, and as long as we do not have the right to struggle, we regard every part of the world as our property in which to engage in activity that will affirm our existence and achieve our goals. We hope we may be forgiven by some

of our brothers if we mention the fact that they refused to welcome the remains of our martyrs when they fell far from their homeland, finding only a few who were ready to receive them, for fear of Israel.

We shall continue to thwart every effort to prejudice our right to struggle, disregarding all considerations of what they call the protection of security and international laws.

At a time when we realize that attempts are being made to liquidate the issue or to create partial solutions in the area, there is something we want to make quite clear: We are with Syria because she stands by the revolution, with Syria because she rejects liquidation solutions, and with Syria because she believes in the people's war and because she believes in and practises confrontation.

244

Speech by P.L.O. spokesman Nasir affirming the unity of the Palestine and Arab liberation movements and rejecting any means of liberation other than armed struggle (excerpts)¹⁰⁶

Beirut, November 27, 1972

The links between the Palestine revolution and the Arab national liberation movement are more profound than a mere alliance or a revolutionary comradeship between two parallel movements. They are in fact an organic interaction within the body of the single Arab revolution. Such links do not arise from transient emotions or temporary and superficial interests; they are the natural result of the corresponding views of the Palestine and Arab liberation movements—views of the real character of the Zionist invasion, its dimensions and significance for the Arab peoples, and of the logic imposed by this invasion, the logic of conflict and struggle until victory is won. This Zionist invasion, which sprang from the decay of imperialism, is directed against the whole of the Arab

¹⁰⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 19, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 27, 1972; Nasir's speech was given at the Arab People's Conference for the Support of the Palestine Revolution.

homeland, although it has been carried out by stages and has spread inch by inch and city by city. Its aim, in fact, is to subjugate the whole Arab area, from the Gulf to the Atlantic, or, as one of our struggling Palestinian comrades put it, to establish a "Pax Hebraica" to replace the "Pax Romana," the "Pax Britannica" and the "Pax Americana" in the area, by controlling its resources and deciding not only our political and economic, but also our cultural and civilizational destiny, for many generations to come.

Once, therefore, there is a profound realization of the nature of this peril, its significance and its dimensions, there will also be a profound realization of the essential nature of the unity of Arab struggle against imperialism, Israel and reaction. They are all dimensions of the same invasion; they have the same goals and the same strategy although they employ a variety of tactical means and emphasize one method or another in their attacks and manoeuvres.

It is our duty to stress that the object of the Zionist occupation and liquidation schemes, imperialism's strong support of Zionism and reaction's collusion with it, is not only to oppress the Palestinian people and destroy their ability to exercise their national and political rights in the whole of their territory. Nor is it to control the Palestinian national and political will outside Palestine, and thereby paralyse and frustrate it. It is also aimed at impeding the growth and the profound and comprehensive social and economic progress of the whole of the Arab nation so that Arab capabilities may be weakened. Its reality may then be dwarfed in comparison with its potential so that it may be unable to provide the material foundations for the political and national capacity for armed struggle; this capacity must be developed and escalated if the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction are to be routed.

The best proof that this is the goal is the way in which control is exercised over our principal resources, the most important of which is oil. The brainwashing practised by the imperialist forces aimed at turning oil from a deterrent, if not a decisive, weapon in the hands of the Arabs into a deterrent weapon in the hands of imperialism itself. By using the oil against Arab interests it may tighten the chain around Arab will and ability to move and struggle, thereby checking if not strangling them entirely.

Thus the Arab liberation movement is not a mere ally or supporter of the Palestine revolution, and the two are not mere partners whose interests coincide somewhere within the framework of some horizon in time. No, they are a single entity. The Palestine revolution is the Palestinian aspect of the Arab national liberation movement, just as the Arab national liberation movement is the Arab aspect of the Palestine revolution. They are both fighting in the same trench and confronting the same enemy who has many faces and aspects. They share the same destiny and the same future, and their responsibilities are the same even though the details of their tactics and the positions from which they operate differ. For the requirements of the battle demand that the Palestine revolution should be the spearhead and the advance position, while the Arab national liberation movement, along with the Arab masses, should provide the strategic depth of the Palestine revolution. Its moral, human and material resources ensure that the revolution will go on, continue and escalate until victory is won. Therefore any notion of the Palestine revolution being a purely regional affair can be ruled out once and for all.

To sum up, what we are being subjected to is a dynamic expansionist process of colonization, occupation and liquidation that is continuing to spread, even though later it may assume forms other than geographical occupation, such as the spread of political influence, economic exploitation and the extension of civilizational domination throughout the whole of the Arab region. Again, in summary, the answer to occupation and colonization and liquidation and all the forms in which this operation presents itself, is liberation through armed struggle deriving from a radical change in Arab society capable of transforming Arab energies into an active and dynamic fact.

If the only answer open to us is armed struggle for the comprehensive liberation of every inch of the territory of Palestine and the liberation of the Arab will from the forces that shackle it, all liquidation and surrender solutions, whether comprehensive or partial, are baseless. Their logic collapses the intentions lying behind them and their despicable goals are disclosed. All the forces that accept them, directly or indirectly, collapse, their masks fall and their anti-nationalist intentions are re-

vealed. Such sound, logical and honest clear-sightedness on the part of the Arabs means that Arab delusions collapse. For when there is clear-sightedness delusions collapse—those delusions which all share the same character though they go by different names. Whether the proposed liquidation is Security Council Resolution 242, or the Hussein-Allon plan, called the United Arab Kingdom plan, or any of a whole series of withdrawals and solutions, the facts remain unchanged: the object of all these plans, in the long run, is surrender, the liquidation of the Palestinian revolution and the curbing of the Arab national liberation movement by making it feel that it is sterile and impotent. Similarly, the examination of all the liquidation and surrender formulas that deviate from the course and content of armed struggle for liberation and that employ logic and instruments other than the logic and instruments of armed struggle, makes it clear that, in the final analysis, none of these formulas mean anything but surrender and total submission to the will of the Zionist imperialist enemy and the complete and final liquidation of the Palestinian cause.

Similarly the facts of the last few years, which have witnessed so many tragic Arab concessions, have proved that all these concessions to the enemy have failed to make him return any of his gains. These concessions, indeed, have been exactly like the efforts of a man trying to catch his own shadow—the closer he gets to it the farther away it moves, so that he can never catch it, however fast he runs after it. Indeed, the dialectic of this fruitless operation shows that when an enemy is strong concessions only make him insist on further concessions.

The Palestine Resistance's conviction and complete awareness of this fact, supported as it is by the insistence of the Palestinian people on a clear view of the truth, makes the Resistance and the Palestinian people, wherever they are able to express themselves, affirm that they reject all surrender and liquidation plans generally and particularly, whatever their source and whatever their dimensions. The Resistance and the Palestinian people affirm their insistence on the complete liberation of all Palestinian soil through a people's war and the complete liberation of Arab society within the framework of a long-term conflict, however great the sacrifices and however much

the manoeuvres of the three-headed enemy increase in malice and ferocity.

245

Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya emphasizing the anti-colonialist role of the Arab struggle and denouncing the idea of a Jewish "nation" (excerpts)¹⁰⁷

Tripoli, December 4, 1972

Brothers, when we push forcefully ahead along the road to Arab unity it is not to satisfy emotional demands, nor is it to advocate patriotism simply because we crave for unity, but because Arab unity protects freedom. Arab unity is the strong armour that protects the independence of the Arab homeland and the impregnable fortress in which the Arab nation finds its protection. Arab unity is the only refuge against colonialism and against the covetous.

The people of the Libyan Arab Republic today must understand these grave problems and say to the Arab nation: We are the friends of those who are friendly to us and the enemies of those who are hostile to us. We have no hostility to either East or West. We want to deal with them on the basis of respect and mutual benefits. We want our dealings to be based on human values and respect for the values of peoples.

We reject any relationship at the expense of Arab nationalism. We reject any relationship at the expense of religion. We reject any relationship at the expense of the resolutions of our people. We reject any relationship at the expense of freedom and independence. But at the same time we are ready to grasp the hand that is offered us in friendship and to open our doors to friends. But these doors will be closed and locked to those who are now trying to delude the peoples of the world and to deceive them with the same specious lies

¹⁰⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), December 5, 1972; speech made on the anniversary of al-Hani, a battle in the Libyan war against the Italian colonialists in 1911.

that colonialism used in the nineteenth century, when Libya was one of the areas which was subject to odious colonialism.

We want to ask the Arab nation to take the battle of al-Hani as an example in its struggle today, and to take the holy war of the Libyan people as an example to guide it. It must be armed with faith and seeking martyrdom [in order to confront] the enemy who is now on the banks of the Arab Suez Canal, in Arab Quneitra, on the Jordan River and in South Lebanon and who is today wreaking havoc in the Aqsa Mosque.

This enemy is not united either by nationality or creed; those who are occupying Palestine and the surrounding territories are groups of men who come every day from every part of the world. They do not know each other's languages and are not derived from a single stock; they are not linked by a single nationality and do not believe in the true religion. They are invaders whom the whole world, from East to West, has agreed shall be allowed to emigrate to Palestine.

To this day, Shawwal 29, 1392 A.H., there are new immigrants who know neither Palestine nor its language nor its history, but all the same they go to Palestine from Russia, America and Europe. Others will arrive there tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, next month and next year, just as they arrived yesterday, last month and last year. These are facts that not even the most contentious person in the world can deny or disavow.

246

Cable from the National Assembly of Egypt to the Chamber of Deputies of Lebanon appealing to Lebanon to protect commando action¹⁰⁸

Cairo, December 10, 1972

The members of the National Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt pay their respects to their brothers and colleagues, the members of the

Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, and express their profound concern at the recurrent reports of clashes between units of the Lebanese army and the Palestinian commandos. The National Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt stresses that protection of commando action is a sacred duty required of every Arab citizen of every Arab country, and that in fighting the battle for Palestine the Palestinian commandos are in fact also fighting the battle for Lebanon. For the Zionist enemy daily repeats his aggressions against South Lebanon in implementation of Zionist expansionist ambitions there.

In the critical situation through which the Arab nation is now passing, the National Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt calls on its Lebanese brothers to ensure that factors of unity triumph over factors of dissension and to prevent Lebanon from becoming the stage on which a plan to liquidate the commandos is enacted.

Lebanon's army is in fact fighting in the same trench as the struggling Palestinian revolutionaries, and we are confident that the people and armed forces of Lebanon will frustrate the imperialist-Zionist plan.

We are also confident that your honourable Chamber will make every effort to ensure that the situation between the forces of the Lebanese army and the forces of the Palestine Resistance returns to normal.

247

Speech by President Assad of Syria criticizing Israel's expansion on the "pretext of security" and urging the Arab states to form a united front (excerpt)¹⁰⁹

Damascus, December 14, 1972

We are now hearing, as we have so often heard in the past, the same old tune from the enemy—the tune of security, Israel's security, which justifies all aggression, invasion and expansion.

On the pretext of security the enemy crossed the armistice lines in June 1967, occupied new parts

¹⁰⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 11, 1972.

¹⁰⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), December 15, 1972; this speech was given on the eighth anniversary of Syrian Peasants' Day.

of Arab territory and proceeded to establish in them settlements which are military fortresses housing settlers trained in the use of arms.

On the pretext of security Israel has held on to the occupied Arab territory and employed every means to prevent the Palestinians and other Arab displaced persons from returning to their homes.

On the pretext of security Israel is now striking at the front line and at the Arab countries in depth.

On the pretext of security Israel will try sooner or later to launch one aggression after another until she succeeds, as she believes she will, in realizing her objective of Greater Israel.

Never before in the history of the world has any country employed this pretext of security in the way Israel and the Zionists are doing.

On the pretext of security she attacks civilians in the interior, and drops time-bombs with the aim of killing as many people as possible—old people, children and women. This is confirmation to us and to the world that these bombing operations have absolutely no connection with security requirements. If these bombing operations indicate anything it is Israel's flagrant hatred of our people and her inclination to aggression and terrorism with the object of exterminating and evicting our people, so that the enemy may do what he likes with our homeland once it is emptied of its sons.

On the pretext of security Israel says: We must retain new territories which were not under our control in 1967 to safeguard the Israeli settlements. Supposing this to be true, why have new settlements recently been built in the occupied territories near the cease-fire line?

Will not these new settlements soon need new territories to separate them from the firing line and from the Arab soldiers? Yes, settlements require new territories for their security, the new territories require settlements for their security, then the new settlements require more territory, and so on, until the state of Greater Israel is achieved, the state that will be the culmination of Zionist expansion and domination.

Security is one thing, but Israel's aim is something else. By the repeated employment of misleading premises she hopes to cover up and justify one act of expansion after another. Our people are aware of this fact, and the day will surely come when the world is also aware of it.

If Israel seeks security why should not the Arabs seek their own security in the face of an enemy

who so blatantly and constantly threatens their security—an enemy who has shown how dangerous he is, revealed his intentions and disclosed his aggressive and expansionist aims?

Faced with this danger we have no choice but to protect our right and defend our land, with manliness, dignity and honour. We know that our enemy receives much aid and support, but at the same time we are confident that in the end it is just causes and struggling peoples that triumph.

The enemy's greed for our land only makes us more firmly attached to it, more resolute to liberate what the enemy has occupied and more determined to make every sacrifice to that end. The heroic and honourable actions of our armed forces have confirmed this fact and indicate that the will of our people will triumph in the end. We shall continue to follow this course, our hearts filled with faith in the Arab nation, its territory and its rights, and with the faith that martyrdom for the homeland is the highest of honours.

The terrible danger that threatens us must induce all of us, in every part of the Arab homeland, despite the difficulties and obstacles, to exert greater efforts, mobilize all Arab resources and reach a unified and coherent Arab attitude. This unified Arab attitude will be reflected in an effective military, political and economic strength that will do its work efficiently in confrontation with this danger.

This danger must be the prime interest of all Arabs, because all other differences and battles are secondary as compared with the principal battle with the enemy. Throughout history all nations confronted with dangers have shelved their secondary differences and battles, directing their principal attention to the gravest and most important conflict. Is the present of the Arab nation to be different from its glorious past and from the past of other nations, bearing in mind that the danger it faces is greater than that faced by any other nation before?

If we realize the extreme necessity of mobilizing all Arab resources and act in accordance with this realization, we shall have set our feet on the right road.

.

Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya explaining the basis of Arab unity and the Arab policy of non-alignment, made on the occasion of his visit to Tunisia (excerpts)¹¹⁰

Tunis, December 16, 1972

At the present stage we believe that there are things to be taken into consideration concerning Egypt, and very many things to be taken into consideration concerning unity with Egypt. Why is it that the Arab nation is not afraid of the challenge, or at least that there are people present here who are not afraid of the challenge?

When a country's territory has been occupied we must never forget; we must support it and withhold nothing, so that it may not remain under occupation. We believe that it is our land that has been occupied, and anyone who disregards this fact does not realize that the land which Israel has occupied is not Palestinian or Egyptian, but Arab.

When Israel occupied Palestine, did the occupation stop with Palestine and was it only the people of Palestine who bore the consequences? Certainly not. After all this time colonialism is still expanding and collecting other Arab territories from other Arab countries that share in the tribulations of the people of Palestine. If we bury our heads in the sand like ostriches, before much longer we shall find ourselves confronted with occupation face to face.

What does this mean? It means that any piece of Arab territory is the property of all Arabs and that any occupation of any part of the territory is the occupation of all Arab territories, that any curtailment of the freedom of any Arab is the curtailment of the whole of Arab freedom, and that any challenge to any Arab region is a challenge to the whole Arab nation. This is what we know, this is what we believe, this is the real state of affairs.

But America alone has continued in its wilful error, not respecting its interests, not respecting this nation, and not even respecting international

law.

An aggressor occupying the land rejects and minimizes United Nations resolutions, but for all this America persists in its course of action and announces that it must keep on giving him arms.

The gravest challenge confronting the Arab nation today is from America, and it must be confronted with challenge. As to whether it is or is not militarily stronger than us does not concern us, for we are in the right and we must meet challenge with challenge and give our lives at the end, regardless of America's strength or lack of strength.

On the other hand, we Arabs do not want another friend to come and exploit this bad situation, which is so unenviable. He has exploited us and wants his aid for us to be conditional or that neo-colonialism should bring another kind of colonialism.

We in the Libyan Arab Republic have said, if this is your way of thinking, we reject it, whether it comes from the East or the West; let whoever wants to befriend us befriend us honourably.

We do not want anyone's sympathy, nor do we beg from the world. We want friendship that is at least honest. Those who want to befriend us must appraise the gains to be derived from friendship with us, and we must appraise the gains to be derived from friendship with them. It must be friendship between equals. Any friendship in which there is poison concealed in the honey we reject, because it means that the friend would be rejoicing over the misfortunes of the Arab nation, finding it involved in a bad situation and pretending to want to help it. But help of this kind, although it appears to be offered out of compassion, really brings suffering.

We have said if this is the way they think, we reject cooperation with people who follow this course.

We still say that our enemies in the East and the West are those who adopt hostile attitudes to us, and we have said that we befriend those who befriend us and are hostile to those who are hostile to us. Russia, for example—we buy arms from her—there are major commercial dealings between us. We said to her, if it is a question of mutual interests we shall not hesitate to cooperate to the utmost, on condition that you respect us, that you respect our religion and our ideals because our nation is a nation exactly like you.

¹¹⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), December 17, 1972.

249

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt stressing the need to prepare for a renewed outbreak of fighting (excerpts)¹¹¹**Cairo, December 28, 1972**

We have been confronted with waves of doubt and anxiety. This was, as I have said, because of the character of the circumstances:

— A ferocious enemy who does not conceal his expansionist ambitions.

— A great power, the United States, that goes to all lengths in colluding with the enemy, helping him turn the land he is occupying into an arsenal of advanced and sophisticated arms.

— The circumstances under which we get the arms we need are governed in a manner that is known both to me and to you. But we have never hesitated to knock at any door where we thought there was what we needed.

— The Arab nation has been tossed this way and that by trends and considerations that have obstructed the full mobilization of its vast and immense resources—resources that are capable of redressing the balance.

— The world around us is preoccupied as it passes through an era unprecedented for the rapidity with which changes follow each other.

— We must be decisive in our determination to carry out the confrontation.

Our ferocious enemy will never understand anything but the language of force, and those who are in collusion with him will never be convinced by logic and persuasion.

Our first priority must be to obtain the arms we want: the Arab nation must awake.

The whole world cannot disregard or shirk its responsibility. But how is this to come about? It will never come about except through us and our preparedness for struggle and sacrifice.

Whatever the reasons, this moment must be decisive.

In all circumstances we must remember:

1. We are not facing Israel alone, we are facing Israel supported by continuous American supplies,

because the United States, as experience has taught us, employs Israel as a bridgehead for terrorism against our Arab nation, as a barrier to sever our unity and as a means of draining away our energies.

2. We have adhered to and still adhere to Arab-Soviet friendship. We believe that it has played and is playing a great role in assisting us to confront our struggle against colonialism and imperialism. However, we must appreciate the circumstances and limits of all our friends.

3. We are not facing the danger alone; the whole Arab nation is facing it with us. Since Arab unity is a historical and fateful fact which is indisputable, we cannot ignore Arab reality and its present circumstances. It is our duty not to despair nor to desist from continuing action aimed at reactivating, remobilizing and guiding at the national level.

4. The principal strength in the battle is the intrinsic strength of the Egyptian people; this is their destiny and a source of pride to them.

5. The Egyptian people, in facing their destiny, enjoy the support of the Federation to which they belong, which includes the Syrian Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab Republic.

6. This support will assume another dimension when full union between Egypt and Libya is achieved. This union is not only required by the battle, but also by the historical logic and circumstances of Arab unity.

7. The battle and the battle alone will be the real test in all we are fighting to thwart and in all we are fighting to defend.

This is why, brothers and sisters, I say to you at the top of my voice and with full responsibility that the door of the battle is the door of the future. There is no other way.

Let me take this opportunity to specify to you some of our future plans:

1. I have asked the cabinet to be prepared for an outbreak of fighting, not merely to prepare for war. The cabinet has informed you here that the plan for preparing the state for war has been completed and is now ready.

2. This will require measures for the channelling of everything into the battle. I have asked that the state should begin with itself, and take the steps necessary to this goal first and to set an example of any sacrifice that may be required of the people.

¹¹¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 29, 1972.

3. I shall immediately set up in each governorate of the Republic a Higher Committee for War Affairs consisting of the Governor, the Secretary of the Governor, the Secretary of the Socialist Union, the Chairman of the regional parliamentary group, the Military Adviser of the governorate and its Director of Security.

In this way the executive, political and popular authorities, the military and the internal security quarters concerned will all be represented on this Higher Committee.

4. There will be a committee at the level of the Republic, for which I shall myself be responsible; it will include all the authorities and ensure that they take part. I shall exercise my authority from the Socialist Union, as being the headquarters of the working forces of the people.

5. This general committee will have a permanent committee that will be in permanent session.

6. We shall submit a plan of action at the level of the Federated State to ensure the fighting line,

depth, efficiency and effectiveness to enable us to sustain a long-term conflict.

7. We shall adopt new initiatives which we hope will ensure that the battle is an all-Arab one as far as possible.

8. We have drawn up a plan for international movement to confront the world, including the Great Powers, with responsibilities it is no longer able to disregard or forget.

Brother and sister members of the National Assembly:

The moment has come when we say to ourselves and to others: No obstacle shall block our way, no force shall frighten us and no enemy shall vanquish us.

We shall forge ahead through fire and tempest; we shall redeem our freedom with sweat, we shall redeem our honour with blood and, God willing, we shall raise our flags where they ought to be flying.

Peace be upon you and God's blessing.

Appendices

A. Egypt's Cabinet in 1972

<i>Head of State</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mahmud Fawzi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Mahmud Riyad
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Industry</i>	Aziz Sidky
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Information and Culture</i>	Muhammad Hatim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Agriculture and Land Reclamation</i>	Sayyid Mar'i
<i>War</i>	Muhammad Sadiq
<i>Interior</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Treasury</i>	Abd al-Aziz Hijazi
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Marzuban
<i>Planning</i>	Sayyid Sayyid
<i>Education</i>	Muhammad Ghanim
<i>Waqfs and Azhar Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Kamil
<i>Presidential Affairs</i>	Muhammad Muhammad
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Ahmad Abd al-Majid
<i>Health and Social Affairs</i>	Ahmad Darwish
<i>Manpower</i>	Abd al-Latif Bultiya
<i>Civil Aviation</i>	Ahmad Nuh
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Ahmad
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Housing</i>	Ibrahim Najib (from January 4)
<i>Transport and Communications</i>	Sulayman Abd al-Hayy
<i>Irrigation</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Raqib
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Ali Wali
<i>Tourism</i>	Ibrahim Najib
<i>Justice</i>	Muhammad Salama
<i>War Production</i>	Muhammad Salim
<i>Marine Transport</i>	Mahmud Hamdi
<i>State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Muhammad Ghalib

NEW CABINET: JANUARY 17

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Aziz Sidky
<i>Deputy Prime Minister</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Salam Zayyat
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Information</i>	Muhammad Hatim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Marzuban
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, War</i>	Muhammad Sadiq
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Interior</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Muhammad Ghalib
<i>Treasury</i>	Abd al-Aziz Hijazi
<i>Planning</i>	Sayyid Sayyid
<i>Education</i>	Ali Abd al-Raziq
<i>Waqfs and Azhar Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Mahmud
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Yunis Imara
<i>Health</i>	Mahmud Mahfuz
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Manpower</i>	Salah al-Din Gharib
<i>Civil Aviation</i>	Ahmad Nuh
<i>Higher Education</i>	Shams al-Din Wakil
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Housing</i>	Abd al-Aziz Muhammad
<i>Transport</i>	Hasan Humayda
<i>Communications</i>	Mahmud Riyad
<i>Irrigation</i>	Aziz Saad
<i>Industry, Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Yahya Mulla
<i>Tourism</i>	Zaki Hashim
<i>Justice</i>	Muhammad Salama
<i>Production</i>	Muhammad Salim
<i>Marine Transport</i>	Ahmad Iffat
<i>Agriculture</i>	Mustafa Jaabali
<i>Land Reclamation</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Fuad Mursi
<i>State for Planning</i>	Ismail Abdallah
<i>State for Information</i>	Muhammad Hasan Zayyat

CHANGES: SEPTEMBER 8

<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Muhammad Hasan Zayyat
------------------------	-----------------------

OCTOBER 26

<i>War</i>	Ahmad Ismail Ali
------------	------------------

B. Israel's Cabinet in 1972

<i>Head of State</i>	Zalman Shazar
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Golda Meir (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Education and Culture</i>	Yigal Allon (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Abba Eban (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Defence</i>	Moshe Dayan (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Labour</i>	Joseph Almogi (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	Haim Bar-Lev (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Interior</i>	Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)
<i>Social Welfare</i>	Michael Chasani (National Religious Party)
<i>Police</i>	Shlomo Hillel (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Tourism</i>	Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	Natan Peled (Mapam)
<i>Communications and Transport</i>	Shimon Peres (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Finance</i>	Pinhas Sapir (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Justice</i>	Ya'acov Shapiro (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Housing</i>	Ze'ev Sharef (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Health</i>	Victor Shemtov (Mapam)
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Zerah Warhaftig (National Religious Party)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Israel Galili (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Haim Gvati (Labour-Mapai)

CHANGES

Ya'acov Shapiro resigned June 11 and was reappointed September 3; during this period Golda Meir was Acting Minister of Justice.

C. Jordan's Cabinet in 1972

<i>Head of State</i>	King Hussein ibn Talal
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Ahmad Lawzi
<i>Defence</i>	Ahmad Lawzi
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Abdallah Salah
<i>Development and Reconstruction</i>	Subhi Amin Amr
<i>Justice</i>	Fawwaz Rousan
<i>Interior</i>	Ibrahim Habashina
<i>Economy</i>	Umar Nabulsi
<i>Communications</i>	Muhammad Khalaf
<i>Tourism and Antiquities</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Finance</i>	Anis Muashshir
<i>Transport</i>	Anis Muashshir
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Mustafa Judin
<i>Public Works</i>	Muhammad Farhan
<i>Agriculture</i>	Umar Abdallah
<i>Health</i>	Muhammad Bashir
<i>Education and Religious Affairs</i>	Ishaq Farhan
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Yaqub Abu Ghawsh
<i>Prime Ministerial Affairs</i>	Mazin Ajjlouni
<i>State</i>	Emile Ghawri

CHANGES: FEBRUARY 9

<i>Justice</i>	Salim Mas'ada
<i>Economy</i>	Said Nabulsi
<i>Communications</i>	Ali Hasan Awda
<i>Transport</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Tourism and Antiquities</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Ali Inad Khurays
<i>Public Works</i>	Ahmad Shawbaki

NEW CABINET: AUGUST 21

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Ahmad Lawzi
<i>Defence</i>	Ahmad Lawzi
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Salah Abu Zaid
<i>Development and Reconstruction</i>	Subhi Amin Amr
<i>Justice</i>	Salim Mas'ada
<i>Interior</i>	Ahmad Tarawna
<i>Economy</i>	Said Nabulsi
<i>Communications</i>	Muhammad Bashir
<i>Tourism and Antiquities</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Finance</i>	Farid Saad
<i>Transport</i>	Nadim Zaru
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Ali Inad Khurays
<i>Public Works</i>	Ahmad Shawbaki
<i>Agriculture</i>	Khalid al-Hajj Hasan
<i>Health</i>	Farid Akshah
<i>Education and Religious Affairs</i>	Ishaq Farhan
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Yaqub Abu Ghawsh
<i>Prime Ministerial Affairs</i>	Rashad Khatib

CHANGES: OCTOBER 14

<i>Information and Culture</i>	Maan Abu Nuwwar
--------------------------------	-----------------

D. Syria's Cabinet in 1972

Head of State

Hafiz Assad

Prime Minister

Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi

Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs

Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Deputy Prime Minister, Industry

Muhammad Hilal

Defence

Mutib Shanan

Interior

Ali Zaza

Agriculture

Muhammad Haydar

Supply and Internal Trade

Abd al-Karim Adi

Public Works and Water

Abd al-Ghani Qannut

Planning

Sami Sutan

Education

Adnan Baghajati

Higher Education

Shakir Fahham

Oil, Power and Mineral Resources

Mustafa Haddad

Finance

Nurallah Nurallah

Culture, Tourism and National Guidance

Fawzi Kayyali

Municipal and Village Affairs

Mahmud Qumbaz

Economy and Foreign Trade

Mustafa Hallaj

Justice

Adib Nahawi

Communications

Umar Siba'i

Euphrates Dam

Munir Wannus

Waqfs

Abd al-Sattar Sayyid

Health

Mahmud Saada

Information

Fayiz Nasir

Social Affairs and Labour

Marwan Sabbagh

Local Administration

Jabir Kafri

State

Daoud Ridawi

State

Ghalib Abdun

State

Fayiz Ismail

State

Yusuf Faysal

State

Ahmad Qablan

NEW CABINET: MARCH 23

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi (Baath)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Khaddam (Baath)
<i>Defence</i>	Mustafa Tlas (Baath)
<i>Interior</i>	Ali Zaza (Baath)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Muhammad Haydar (Baath)
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Abd al-Karim Adi (AS)
<i>Public Works and Water</i>	Abd al-Ghani Qannut (AS)
<i>Planning</i>	Muhammad Imadi (Independent)
<i>Education</i>	Hasan Khatib (Baath)
<i>Higher Education</i>	Shakir Fahham (Baath)
<i>Oil, Power and Mineral Resources</i>	Ahmad Abbara (Independent)
<i>Finance</i>	Nurallah Nurallah (Independent)
<i>Culture and National Guidance</i>	Fawzi Kayyali (ASU)
<i>Tourism</i>	Ahmad Shaykh Said (Independent)
<i>Industry</i>	Mutib Shanan (Baath)
<i>Municipal and Village Affairs</i>	Mahmud Qumbaz (SU)
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Mustafa Hallaj (SU)
<i>Justice</i>	Adib Nahawi (ASU)
<i>Communications</i>	Umar Siba'i (Communist)
<i>Euphrates Dam</i>	Munir Wannus (Baath)
<i>Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Sattar Sayyid (Independent)
<i>Health</i>	Mahmud Sada (Baath) ¹
<i>Information</i>	Ahmad Hasan Asaad (Baath)
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Marwan Sabbagh (Baath)
<i>Local Administration</i>	Jabir Kafri (Baath)
<i>Frontline Village Affairs</i>	Ahmad Qablan (Baath)
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Fayiz Nasir (Baath)
<i>State</i>	Abd al-Majid Manjuna (ASU)
<i>State</i>	Fayiz Ismail (SU)
<i>State</i>	Yusuf Faysal (Communist)

¹ Killed in a traffic accident in Malaysia, November 11; he was not replaced.

CHANGES : DECEMBER 24

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mahmud Ayyubi (Baath)
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Ahmad Qablan (Baath)
<i>Planning</i>	Mustafa Hallaj (SU)
<i>Education</i>	Hafiz Jamali (Baath)
<i>Oil Power and Mineral Resources</i>	Fayiz Nasir (Baath)
<i>Industry</i>	Hasan Khatib (Baath)
<i>Tourism</i>	Abdallah Khani (Independent)
<i>Municipal and Village Affairs</i>	Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi (SU)
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Imadi (Independent)
<i>Health</i>	Madani Khiyami (Independent)
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Husayn Kuwaydir (Baath)
<i>Local Administration</i>	Adib Milhim (Baath)
<i>Frontline Village Affairs</i>	Muayyad Jazzan (Baath)
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Marwan Sabbagh (Baath)
<i>State</i>	Ali Hashim (SU)
<i>State</i>	Zuhayr Abd al-Samad (Communist)

Abbreviations: ASU: Arab Socialist Union
AS: Arab Socialist
SU: Socialist Unionist

**E. Palestine Liberation Organization
Executive Committee in 1972**

Yasser Arafat (Fateh)—Chairman
Khalid Hasan (Fateh)
Faruq Qaddumi (Fateh)
Muhammad Najjar (Fateh)
Taysir Qubaa (PFLP)
Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)
Sami Attari (Saiqa)
Salih Ra'fat (PDFLP)
Ahmad Maraashli (Arab Liberation Front)
Kamal Nasir (Independent)
Salah Salah (Independent)
Yousef Sayegh (Independent)

F. Voting on U.N. General Assembly resolutions, 27th session

Y = Yes N = No A = Abstention NP = Not Present

RESOLUTION	2949	2963						2964	3005
		A	B	C	D	E	F		
Afghanistan	Y	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	Y	Y	Y	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	Y
Albania	A			Y	Y	Y			Y
Algeria	NP			Y	Y	Y			Y
Argentina	Y			A	A	A			A
Australia	A			A	Y	A			A
Austria	Y			Y	Y	A			A
Bahrain	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Barbados	A			N	A	N			N
Belgium	Y			Y	Y	N			A
Bhutan	Y			A	A	A			A
Bolivia	N			N	A	N			N
Botswana	Y			Y	Y	A			A
Brazil	A			A	A	A			A
Bulgaria	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Burma	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Burundi	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Byelorussian S.S.R.	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Cameroon	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Canada	A			A	Y	N			N
Central African Rep.	A			A	A	A			A
Chad	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Chile	Y			Y	Y	Y			NP
China	A			Y	Y	Y			Y
Columbia	N			A	A	A			A
Congo	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Costa Rica	N			N	N	N			N
Cuba	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Cyprus	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Czechoslovakia	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Dahomey	Y			A	A	A			A
Democratic Yemen	NP			Y	Y	Y			Y
Denmark	A			Y	Y	N			A
Dominican Republic	N			N	N	N			N
Ecuador	Y			NP	NP	NP			NP
Egypt	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
El Salvador	A			Y	A	N			A
Equatorial Guinea	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Ethiopia	Y			Y	Y	A			A
Fiji	A			NP	NP	NP			NP
Finland	Y			Y	Y	A			A
France	Y			Y	Y	A			A
Gabon	A			Y	A	A			A
Gambia	Y			NP	NP	NP			Y
Ghana	A			A	A	A			A
Greece	Y			Y	Y	A			Y
Guatemala	A			N	N	N			A

RESOLUTION	2949	2963						2964	3005
		A	B	C	D	E	F		
Guinea	Y	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	Y	Y	Y	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	Y
Guyana	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Haiti	A			Y	A	N			A
Honduras	Y			Y	Y	N			Y
Hungary	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Iceland	A			Y	Y	N			A
India	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Indonesia	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Iran	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Iraq	NP			Y	Y	Y			Y
Ireland	Y	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	Y	Y	A	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	A
Israel	N			N	N	N			N
Italy	Y			Y	Y	N			A
Ivory Coast	A			A	A	A			A
Jamaica	Y			A	A	A			A
Japan	Y			Y	Y	Y			A
Jordan	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Kenya	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Khmer Republic	NP			NP	NP	NP			NP
Kuwait	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Laos	A	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	A	A	A	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	A
Lebanon	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Lesotho	A			Y	Y	N			A
Liberia	A			Y	Y	N			N
Libya	NP			Y	Y	Y			Y
Luxemburg	Y			Y	Y	N			A
Madagascar	Y			Y	Y	Y			NP
Malawi	A			A	A	A			A
Malaysia	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Maldives Islands	Y			Y	Y	Y			NP
Mali	Y	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	Y	Y	Y	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	Y
Malta	Y			Y	Y	A			A
Mauritania	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Mauritius	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Mexico	Y			Y	Y	A			A
Mongolia	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Morocco	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Nepal	Y			A	A	A			A
Netherlands	Y			Y	Y	N			A
New Zealand	A			A	A	N			A
Nicaragua	N	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	A	N	N	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	N
Niger	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Nigeria	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Norway	A			Y	Y	A			A
Oman	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Pakistan	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y
Panama	A			NP	NP	NP			A
Paraguay	A			A	A	A			A

RESOLUTION	1949	1963						1964	3005	
		A	B	C	D	E	F			
Peru	Y	Voting not recorded	Voting not recorded	Y	Y	Y	Adopted without objection	Voting not recorded	Y	
Philippines	A			A	A	A			A	A
Poland	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Portugal	NP			A	A	A			A	A
Qatar	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Rumania	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Rwanda	Y			Y	Y	Y			A	A
Saudi Arabia	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Senegal	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Sierra Leone	Y			Y	NP	Y			Adopted without objection	Y
Singapore	A	A	A	A	Y	A				
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
South Africa	A	NP	NP	NP	Y	NP				
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Swaziland	NP	Y	Y	Y*	Y	NP				
Sweden	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A				
Syria	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Thailand	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A				
Togo	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A				
Trinidad and Tobago	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A				
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Uganda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Ukrainian S.S.R.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP*				
U.S.S.R.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
United Kingdom	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A				
United Rep. of Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
United States	A	A	A	N	Y	N				
Upper Volta	Y	A	A	A	Y	A				
Uruguay	N	A	A	A	Y	N				
Venezuela	A	NP	NP	NP	Y	A				
Yemen (North)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Zaire	Y	A	A	A	Y	A				
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				

* This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to vote "Yes."

INDEX

- Abby Farah, Abdulrahim: 52
- Abd al-Baqi, Murtada Said: visits of, to India (communiqué), 221, and United Arab Emirates (communiqué), 322
- Abdallah, King: 290. Meeting with Meir described, 248
- Abraham: 303
- Abu Ammar: *see* Arafat, Yasser
- Abu Ghariba, Bahjat: signatory of letter sent to Palestine National Council repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Abu Hamad, Khalil: statement by, on Security Council decision to strengthen U.N. observer force on Lebanon-Israel border, 317f. Speech at U.N., 348–352
- Abu Ras, Mr.: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
- Abu Rodeis: 266
- Abu Rumeile, Mr.: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
- Abu Yusif: *see* Muhammad Yusif Najjar
- Abu Zaabal (Egypt): 343. Attacked by Israel, 324
- Abu Zaid, Salah: speech at U.N., 354–357
- Addis Ababa (Ethiopia): 19, 39. *See also* Organization of African Unity
- al-Affula: Jewish settlement in, 255
- Afghanistan: sponsors U.N. resolution, 6. Letter from Foreign Minister of, condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon, 198
- Ain Furtaqa: 266
- Air France: 40
- Ajlun (Jordan): area involved in Palestinian-Jordanian clashes, 306
- Akraba: 58. Destruction of crops in, by Israeli forces, 59
- Alami, Musa: 70
- Alexandria: used by U.S.S.R. navy, 319
- Algeria: 42. Position of, outlined by U.N. representative, 6. Support for, from Kosygin, 244. Visits to, by Qadhafi and Sadat (communiqué), 320ff. Speech by President Boumedienne of, 329f. Revolution in, compared to Palestine, 353, 374
- Allenby Bridge (Jordan): 264
- Allon, Yigal: supported by Eban, 197. Hussein denies meeting with, 302. Attacked by Lebanese Information Minister, 329. Statements by: on possible partial settlement, 132f, 148f; on deteriorating relations with Uganda, 149; on plans for West Bank, 149f; in support of Israeli action in South Lebanon, 151; on future border demarcation, 183; on strength of Israeli position, 211f
- “Allon plan”: support for, by Galili, 174. Compared to Hussein’s plan, 307, 311, 376. Denounced by Palestine National Council, 310
- Amerasinghe, H.S.: 52, 75. *See also* United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices...
- American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA): 49
- American Technion Society: praised by Senator Humphrey, 137
- American University of Beirut: 53
- Amin Dada, Idi: 368. Anti-Israeli statement of, regretted by Allon, 149
- Amir, Rehavam: praised³ by Eban, 262
- Al-Amiri, Muhammad Adib: signatory of letter sent to Palestine National Council repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Amman: 53, 149f, 211, 248, 269, 337. Proposed as capital of United Arab Kingdom, 292
- Amman Training Centre: 48
- Amnesty International: 53
- al-Anabtawi, Salah al-Din: signatory of letter sent to Palestine National Council repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- ANERA (American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc.): 49
- Anglo-Israel Chamber of Commerce: speech by Douglas-Home at dinner of, 161
- Angola: 165
- anti-Semitism: 19, 33, 229, 359. Compared to anti-Zionism by 28th Zionist Congress, 119
- Aqaba: 268f
- al-Aqsa mosque: 34, 377. Burning of, claimed deliberate by Khaddam, 359
- Arab Development Society: Israelis seize land of, 70
- Arab League: *see* League of Arab States
- Arab Socialist Labour Party: 323
- Arab Socialist Renaissance Party: *see* Baath party (Iraq); Baath party (Syria)
- Arab Socialist Union (Egypt): 204, 323, 381. Statements by Sadat at, 330–333, 352f. Resolutions adopted by, 280ff. Statement by Sidky at, 369–372
- Arab Socialist Union (Libya): 323

- Arab Socialist Union Party (Syria): 286n
 Arab Socialists' Movement (Syria): 286n
 Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO):
 49. Statement by ex-chairman Brougham of,
 190f
 Arabs in Israel: position of, described: by Syria,
 19, 33, by Eban, 237ff. Equal rights demanded
 for, by Communist Party of Israel (MAKI),
 175f. Discrimination against, alleged by Syria,
 359. *See also* Palestinian people
 Arabs in occupied territories: discrimination
 against, condemned by U.S.S.R. and Libya,
 154f. Israel's treatment of, praised by Sen.
 McGovern, 179. Future of, outlined by Eban,
 237ff. Discrimination against, alleged by Syria,
 359. *See also* Gaza; Jordan; West Bank; Palestin-
 ian people; Jerusalem; Palestine refugees; U.N.
 Special Committee...
 Arafat, Yasser (Abu Ammar): 347. Visits of, to
 Yugoslavia (communiqué), 165; to the U.S.S.R.
 (communiqué), 208. Message from Chou En-lai
 to, 167f
 ARAMCO: 49. Statement by ex-chairman
 Brougham of, 190f
 Argentina: 17, 38, 89n. Statements by U.N.
 representative of, 26, 28, 35f
 El Arish (Sinai): 61, 266. Israeli transfer of Gaza
 families to, 47, 62, 78
 Armistice Agreement, 1949: *see* Lebanon-Israel
 Armistice Agreement
 Armitage, John: statement by, on U.S. support
 for UNRWA, 174f
 Ashdod: 266. Jewish settlement in, 255
 Askalon: Jewish settlement in, 255
 al-Assad, Hafez: 201, 275, 374. Statements on
 Palestine resistance movement, Arab unity and
 Israeli expansionism, 307f, 345f, 377f
 Assembly of African Heads of State and Govern-
 ment: 18f
 Athens: 351
 Australian Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE): 49
 Avneri, Uri: addresses question to Meir in Knesset,
 249
 Awda, Rifaat: signatory of letter sent to Palestine
 National Council repudiating United Arab
 Kingdom plan, 305
 Aytarun: area attacked by Israelis, 9
 ment by, rejecting United Arab Kingdom plan,
 296f
 Baath Party Organization of Lebanon: 323
 Babikian, Khatchik: statement by, opposing
 Allon's call for a separate peace between
 Lebanon and Israel, 329
 Baghdad: 170, 191
 Baghdad Pact: 331
 Bahrain: 42, 262
 Bahr al-Bakar Primary School: attacked by Israeli
 armed forces, 323, 325, 343
 El-Bahsh, Moayyad Othman: ill-treatment of,
 in Israeli custody, 68
 El-Bakna: 266
 al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan: 228. Signs Iraq-U.S.S.R.
 treaty, 168ff. Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (com-
 muniqué), 233f. Statement on proposed Syria-
 Egypt union, 299f. Speech in favour of stronger
 U.S.S.R.-Arab relations, 344
 Bakr, Ibrahim: signatory of letter sent to Palestine
 National Council repudiating United Arab
 Kingdom plan, 305
 Balfour Declaration, 1917: 289, 313
 Bangkok: statement by Eban on incident in, 261f
 Barbados: 8
 Basle Conference, 1897 (1st Zionist Congress): 275
 Bay of Bengal: 327
 Beach Refugee Camp (Gaza): 46
 Bedouins: deprived by Israelis of lands near
 Dead Sea, 62, 268, at Rafah, 63, 160, 267.
 Restitution to, demanded by Mapam, 260
 Beersheba: 163. Jewish settlement in, 255
 Beirut: 9, 30, 46, 53, 151, 176, 229, 239, 323, 338.
 Lebanon denies city is base for Palestinian
 guerrillas, 20, 40, 325. Israel claims city is
 "terror" base, 21, 40f
 Beirut Airport: Israeli attack on, 21f, 25, 41, 323
 Beit Nuba (occupied territory): Jewish settlement
 in, 59
 Belgium: 6, 16, 20, 39, 89n, 320. Sponsor of U.N.
 draft resolution, 11, 27. Statements by U.N.
 representative of, 26, 35
 Benghazi: 212n
 Ben-Gurion, David: 324
 Ben-Horin, Eliashiv: 224f
 Ben Natan, Asher: 189. Criticizes French policy
 on Middle East, 212f
 Bernadotte, Folke: assassination of, recalled, 349,
 361
 Bethlehem: 266. Transfer of Bedouin tribe to,
 62, 268
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali: 161

- Bint Jbail: 29, 80, 90. Israeli attack on, 9
- Bir el Hissi: 266
- el Bireh: 67
- Bir'im: MAKI demands return of villagers to, 210. Israel refuses to allow return to, 249, 349, 359
- Black September Organization: hijacking of Sabena airliner by, 20, 39. Munich operation by, condemned by U.S. House of Representatives, 223. Statement by, explaining Munich operation, 341ff. Letter from PLO representative explaining relation of, to Palestinian movement, 347f
- Bohte, Borut: 52, 75. *See also* U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices...
- Bonn (West Germany): relations with Arab countries, 147, 279
- Boumedienne, Houari: 318. Joint communiqué with Qadhafi and Sadat, 320ff. Speech in support of liberation of Palestine, 329f
- Bourguiba, Habib: speech criticizing Arab war tactics, 318. Statement regretting Soviet influence in Mediterranean, 327f
- Brandt, Willy: 226, 284. Statements outlining relations with Israel, 147f, and discussing desirability of joint European policy on Middle East, 155f
- Brezhnev, Leonid: 203. Statements in support of Arabs, 160, 256
- Britain: *see* United Kingdom
- British Petroleum: 190, 279
- Brougham, Robert: statement by, on use of oil as political weapon, 190f
- Bucharest: 196
- Bulgaria: statement by President Zhivkov of, supporting Palestine cause, 133
- Burg, Yosef: 276n
- Burgunder, Edith: 341
- Burundi: statement by U.N. representative of, on future of Jerusalem, 37
- Cairo: 53, 81, 139f, 148, 150, 162, 186, 192, 218, 222f, 225, 238, 248f, 265f, 308, 323, 335, 339, 369f, 372. Statement by Allon on student unrest in, 132
- "Cairo Agreement" (Lebanon): 9, 347
- Cambodia: 165
- Cameroon: sponsors draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Canada: 230
- Canadian Save the Children Fund: 49
- CARE: 269
- Castro, Heriberto de: 363
- Catholic Relief Services: 49
- ceasefire (Egyptian-Israeli): 105, 131, 142, 171, 174, 179, 194, 207, 220. Need to strengthen, seen by Israel, 3f. Statement by U.S. leaders on: McGovern, 180; Sisco, 192, 217; Rogers, 216, 236. Allon on importance of, 211f. Eban on maintenance of, 237f
- ceasefire (Lebanese-Israeli): Israel alleges Lebanese responsibility for violations of, 8f, 23
- Ceausescu, Nicolae: 196. Statement by, on Middle East, 203f
- CENTO Council of Ministers: communiqué issued at meeting of, 187
- Cheshire Home orthopaedic centre for the disabled (Amman): 269
- Chiao Kuan-hua: statement by, expressing support for Arabs, 240
- China: 11, 28, 89n, 254, 368. Statement by U.N. representative of, expressing support for Arabs and denouncing Israel, 4f, 10, 12, 26f. Support for Palestinian cause expressed by leaders of, 99, 160f, 164, 167f, 253. Statement by Sadat on attitude of, 320
- Chi Peng-fei: statement by, in support of Palestinians, 164
- Chou En-lai: message from, to Arafat in support of Palestinians, 167f
- Christians/Christianity: 18, 137, 145, 303, 356. Rights of, in Jerusalem, stressed by Sierra Leone, 37, by Mapam, 259. Condition of, in Lebanon, compared favourably with that in Israel, 351
- Churchill, Winston: 283
- Commission on Human Rights: *see* U.N. Commission on Human Rights
- Committee of Heads of African States: 7f
- Communist Labour Organization of Lebanon: 323
- Communist Party of Bulgaria: 133
- Communist Party of Israel (MAKI): resolutions of: rejecting annexation of occupied territory, 175f; demanding equal rights for Israeli Arabs, 176; calling for comprehensive political initiatives, 208ff; demanding return of villagers to Bir'im and Ikrit, 210f
- Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH): statement of, denying historical rights of Jews to Palestine, 159f. Deplores Israeli action in Gaza, 257f
- Communist Party of Lebanon: 323. Resolution in support of Palestinian struggle, 273
- Communist Party of Rumania: 203
- Communist Party of Syria: 286n
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.):

- 146, 151, 170, 176, 201, 233, 256. Supports Arab struggle, 244
- Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 2nd Session, Geneva, 1972: 55, 263
- Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, 1st, Jidda, 1970: 153
- Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, 2nd, Karachi, 1970: 153
- Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, 3rd, Jidda, 1972: resolution of, condemning Israel, 153. Speech by King Faisal at, 285, and by Saqqaf, 285f
- Conference of Islamic Kings and Heads of State and Government, 1st, Rabat, 1969: 153
- Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, 3rd, Lusaka, 1970: 213
- Conference of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers, Georgetown, 1972: declaration of, 213f, and resolution of, expressing support for Palestinian struggle, 214f
- Congo: sponsor of U.N. draft resolution, 6
- Congress of the Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R., 15th: speech by Brezhnev at, 160
- Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954): 94f
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1971: 246
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 1970: 246f
- Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 1963: 246
- Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N.: 15, 80
- Costa Rica: submission of draft resolution by, at U.N., 7
- Council of Europe: recommendations of, aimed at improving situation of UNRWA, 106, and calling for action against terrorism, 246
- Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO) of New Zealand: 49
- C.P.S.U.: *see* Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Cyprus: 140, 215. Sponsors draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Daddah, Mokhtar Ould: 81
- Daghily, Jalal Muhammad: West German protest to, 246
- Damascus: 19, 39, 53, 222f. Dayan on dangers to, 139
- Damascus University: 266
- Davis, S. Clinton: question by, in British Parliament, 200
- Dayan, Moshe: 174, 219, 307, 319, 324, 359, 362. Mentioned in report of U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices..., 57–61 *pass.*, 66f, 72. Statements by: on reduced defence budget, 106f; on future borders, 139f, 216f; on conditions in West Bank, 188f; on Jewish settlement in occupied territories, 189. Representations made to, by population of Jiftlik, 326. Implicated in Lavon Affair, 362
- Dead Sea: Bedouin tribe expelled from lands near, 62, 268
- Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: 86
- Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: 86
- Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945): invoked by Israeli Government, 66f
- De Gaulle, Charles: 284, 367
- Deir al-Ashayer: Israeli attacks on, 328, 343, 350
- Deir Yassin: massacre of inhabitants of, by Israelis, 324f, 343, 349, 359, 361
- Democratic Party (U.S.): platform adopted by National Convention of, 202
- Derbas, Mohammed: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68f
- Dhofar: 338
- Dikla: 61
- Dolly, Libervat: 341
- Dome of the Rock: 34
- Douglas-Home, Alec: statements by: on ways towards peace, 161; on importance of Resolution 242, 232f, 255f
- East Germany: *see* German Democratic Republic
- Eban, Abba: 147, 161, 166, 333. Mentioned in report of U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices..., 58. Statements by: on Egyptian attitude to peace, 153; expressing dissatisfaction with Jarring, 190; on Security Council resolution 316, 197; on Israel's foreign policy, 230f; on Palestinians' right to self-determination, 234f; on maintenance of the ceasefire, 237f; on conditions of Palestinians, 238ff; on Resolution 242, 251f; on the Bangkok incident, 261f

The Economist: 70f

EEC: *see* European Economic Community

Egypt: 7f, 15, 19, 22, 34f, 42, 53f, 67f, 81, 87, 130ff, 137, 142, 144f, 155, 164, 170, 174, 179, 182, 185, 191, 212f, 220, 224, 235f, 251, 294, 308, 323, 350, 354f, 361, 373. Criticism of Israeli policy at U.N., 3, 14, 21, 32f, 63f. Israeli view on policy of, at U.N., 4, 21, 40, 63, and by leaders: Galili, 103; Meir, 104f, 247; Dayan, 139f; Allon, 148; Eban, 154, 230, 238, 261f; MAKI, 209. Policy of: assessed by Senegal, 5, Iraq, 299f; praised by World Peace Council, 184, by France, 190, by O.A.U., 195, by Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, 214. Letter from, to U.N. Secretary-General in support of Jarring initiative and Resolution 242, 43. Arms supply to, from U.S.S.R. commented on: by Nixon, 99, 140, 143; by Galili, 100; by Rogers, 101; by 28th Zionist Congress, 109; by Noyes, 134; by Humphrey, 138; by Meir, 197. President Sadat of, visits U.S.S.R. (communiqués), 135, 176f, and Yugoslavia (communiqué), 136. Visits of Grechko to (communiqués), 150f, 181. Statements on policy of: by Douglas-Home, 162, by Sisco, 219. France denies transfer of Libyan jets to, 189. Statements by Sisco on U.S. relations with, 193f, and on policy of, 199. Statements of support for, by Soviet leaders: by Podgorny 201, by Kosygin 243f, by Brezhnev 256. Prime Minister Sidky of, visits U.S.S.R. (communiqués), 203, 244f. Soviet announcement of withdrawal of military advisers from, 204, and reactions of Meir, 204–208, Rogers, 215, Dayan, 217, Sisco, 218f, Eban, 237. Blamed by Weizman for Munich incident, 222f. Meir on possibility of peace with, 242. Statement of support for, by China, 253. Mapam's views on peace with, 259f. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 263–266. Statements by President Sadat of: on general policy, peace negotiations, American attitudes etc., 274ff, 282–285, 366f, 380f; on Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan, 306f; on relations with U.S.S.R., 318f, 333–336; on France's Middle East policy, 320; on withdrawal of Soviet advisers from, 330–333. Government statement on U.S.-Israel arms agreement, 277f. Resolutions adopted by Arab Socialist Union of, 279ff. Hussein on relations with, 301, 339. Statements by Prime Minister Sidky of, on Lod Airport incident, 324f, and on relations with U.S.S.R., 369–372. Statement by Bourguiba on Nasser's policy

in, 327. Statements by Foreign Minister Zayyat of, on relations with U.S.S.R., 339f, and on policy of, 362–366. Statements by National Assembly of, 377. *See also* Suez Canal; Sharm al-Shaikh; Sadat, Anwar; Sinai

Egyptian Red Crescent: 265ff

Eilat: 163, 209

El Al: 19, 39, 187

Elazar, David: statement defining “secure borders”, 163

El Salvador: submission of draft resolution by, at U.N., 7

Emwas: 59

Equatorial Guinea: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6

Eshkol, Levi: 335

Ethiopia: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6

Euphrates: seen as a boundary for “Greater” Israel, 307, 355, 358

European Economic Community: 44, 230, 250. Gifts of food from, to Jordan, 266, 269

Eye Hospital (Gaza Strip): 266

Faisal, King: 250. Statement in support of Palestinians, 285

al-Fateh (PNLM): 196, 230, 305, 374. *See also* Palestine Resistance Movement

Fawzi, Mahmud: 276

fedayeen: *see* Palestine Resistance Movement

Federation of Arab Republics: 152, 273f, 282, 286, 352. Constitution of, 19. Statement by Presidential Council of, 297ff

Federation of Business and Professional Women: 49

Feinberg Graduate School of the Weizmann Institute: 58

Finland: 107

Finnish Refugee Council: 49

Foxbat aircraft: supplied by U.S.S.R. to Egypt, 143

France: 6, 11, 17, 27, 37, 45, 87, 89n, 142, 278, 328, 367. Statements by U.N. representative of, 10, 25, 35. Statements by leaders of: Schumann, 166f, 250; by de Lipkowski, 189; by Pompidou, 235. Statement by Ben Natan on policy of, 212f. Policy of, praised by Sadat, 276, 320, by Arab Socialist Union, 281, and by Zayyat, 339. Fourth Republic of, mentioned by Sadat, 353

Franjeh, Sulayman: 343. Statement expressing sympathy with Palestinians, 325

Frank, Paul: 246

Franklin, Benjamin: 361

French Red Cross: 49

- Fukunaga, Kenji: 188
- Gahal Party (Israel): 159, 175
- Galilee: 151, 249, 259, 304
- Galili, Israel: mentioned in report of U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices... 57f, 62. Statements by: on U.S. supply of military aircraft, 99; on Sadat speech, 103; on settlements in occupied territories, 162f, 172ff, 211
- Gaza: 71f, 145, 183, 189, 209, 239, 279f, 289, 294, 296, 304, 310, 334. Israeli practices in, reported and deplored: in Arab speeches and communications to U.N., 14, 32; in UNRWA reports, 43f, 46f; in reports to U.N. Special Committee, 58, 61ff, 68; by U.N. General Assembly, 85; by RAKAH, 160, 257; by MAKI, 175; by Zayyat, 365. Report by U.N. Secretary General on refugees in, 76–79. Galili on settlements in, and future of, 163, 172f. Dayan on situation in, 188. Mapam on future of, 259ff. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 265ff. Sadat on Palestinian rights in, 306f. Hussein on future of, 336ff
- Gaza, Tawfiq: 69
- Gemayyel, Pierre: statement by, in support of Palestinian Resistance, 346f
- General Federation of Workers' Unions (Syria): speech by Assad at conference of, 345
- General Union of Palestinian Students: prohibited by West Germany, 241
- General Union of Palestinian Workers: prohibited by West Germany, 241
- Geneva: 53–56, 81f, 267
- Geneva Conventions: 52, 56f, 63, 69, 75, 87, 92, 262ff. Cited as being violated by Israel: by Arab states at U.N., 14, 32f; by Belgium, 35; by Italy, 36; by U.N. Special Committee, 59, 61, 64ff, 73f; in U.N. resolutions, 83, 85f, 88, 96; by Abu Hamad, 349; by Khaddam, 358f; by Zayyat, 365. Israeli denial of violation of, 15, 33. Israel urged to comply with, by U.N. General Assembly, 53ff, by Commission on Human Rights, 93. Israel does not admit applicability of, 265
- Geneva Protocol, 1925: Israeli violation of, alleged by Lebanon, 269
- German Democratic Republic: condemnation of Israel by, at U.N., 29. Statement by Foreign Minister of, 251
- German Red Cross: 266
- Germany, Federal Republic of: 266, 341, 351, 373. Urged to increase reparations by 28th Zionist Congress, 109. Statements by Brandt on relations with Israel, 147f, and on European policy towards Middle East, 155f. Statement by Scheel on terrorism, 223f. Role of, in the Munich incident, commented on by Israeli cabinet, 222, 224f. Policy of, welcomed by Eban, 230. Statement by Ministry of Internal Affairs of, 241. Protest of, to Libya, 246f. Qadhafi on relations with, 279. Sadat on relations with, 367
- Ghalib, Murad: 136, 320
- Ghana: 8
- Ghanim, Iskandar: 80
- Ghannam, Munir Abdallah: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
- Giraud, Pierre: 189n, 190
- Godber, Joseph: statement on Middle East by, 200
- Golan Heights: 67, 131, 259, 355, 365. Israeli settlements in: criticized by Syria, 19, 32; confirmed by Galili, 58, 211, and by *The Jerusalem Post*, 60f. Israeli position on, reiterated by Galili, 173, and by Dayan, 189. Mapam on future of, 259. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 265, 269
- Goldberg, Arthur: 333
- Gréčko, Andrei: visits to Egypt of (communiqué), 150, 181
- Guinea: 27f, 42, 89n. Statement by U.N. representative of, 26
- Guinea-Bissao: 165
- Gulbenkian Foundation: 49
- Gvati, Haim: 59
- Haaretz*: 60, 65, 359
- Habbariya: bombarded by Israelis, 9
- Habash, George: statement on policy of P.F.L.P., 287ff
- Hadassah hospital: 16, 34
- Haganah: 349, 361
- Hague Conventions on the Laws of War: cited as being violated by Israel, 35
- Haifa: 324
- Haiti: submission of draft resolution at U.N. by, 7
- al-Halabi, Muhammad Ali: 240n
- Halsa, Theresa: 341
- Hamilton, Lee: questions by, at U.S. Congressional hearing, 133. Statement on ways towards peace in Middle East, 144ff
- Hammami, Said: letter to *The Times*, 347f
- al-Hani, battle of, 1911: 376n. Cited as an example

- for the Arabs, by Qadhafi, 377
- al-Haram al-Sharif: 34
- Harrogate: 233
- Hasbaya: Israeli attacks against, 328, 343, 350
- Hashomer Hatzair: 175
- Hatim, Abd al-Qadir: 320
- Hawatma, Nayif: statement on relations with Jordan, 305
- Hebrew University: 16, 34
- Hebron: 266, 289, 359. Jewish settlement in, 60. Deportation of inhabitants of, alleged by Ja'abari, 65
- Herat: 159, 255
- Herzl, Theodor: 119, 324
- Hillel, Shlomo: 276
- Histadrut: 176
- Hitler, Adolph: 283
- Hocké, Jean-Pierre: 262
- Holy City: *see* Jerusalem
- Holy Places/Holy Land: 16, 18, 33f, 38, 109, 250, 285
- Hopkirk, Peter: 347
- Huang Hua: statements by, on Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement, 167, and confirming China's support for the Arabs, 253
- Humphrey, Hubert: speech to the American Technion Society, 137ff
- al-Husaini, Ali Nasir Muhammad: statement on the Palestinian problem, 345
- al-Husaini, Daud: signatory of letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Hussein, Abd al-Aziz: statement by, rejecting United Arab Kingdom plan, 300
- Hussein, King: 149, 174, 182, 196, 274f, 376. Position of, viewed by Rogers, 102. Seen as willing to make peace with Israel, 139, 150, 242, 247. United Arab Kingdom plan of, rejected: by Zadok, 156; by Meir, 157ff, 248; by Knesset, 159; by China, 160f; by Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, 163f; by Iraq, 293f, 308, by P.L.O., 294ff; by Syria, 296f; by Federation of Arab Republics, 297ff; by Kuwait, 300; by Palestinian personalities, 304f; by Hawatma, 305f; by Sadat, 306f; by Palestine People's Conference, 311-315. Eban on stability of, 234. Statements by: announcing United Arab Kingdom plan, 289-293; commenting on plan, 301-304; on relations with Arab states, 336-339; deploring Munich incident, 340f; on role of Jordan, 372. Criticism, by Sadat, 320, 353
- Hussein, Saddam: 170. Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 146f. Statement by, rejecting Resolution 242, 308
- Ikrit: demands that villagers be allowed to return to, by MAKI, 210, and by Avneri, 249. Statements on position of villagers of, by Abu Hamad, 349, and by Khaddam, 359
- India: 28, 89n, 284, 335. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6. Statement by U.N. representative of, 27. Visit to, by Abd al-Baqi (communiqué), 221. Statement by Foreign Minister Singh of, 254
- India-Pakistan war: 100, 130, 332
- Indo-China: 178, 214, 317, 354
- Indonesia: 42. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Institute for Palestine Studies: 53
- International Association of Democratic Lawyers: 53
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: decision of, criticized by Syria, 19, 39
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): 19f, 39
- International Committee of the Red Cross: *see* Red Cross
- International Conference on Human Rights, 1968: 52
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 71. Jordan alleges Israeli disregard of, 15
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 71
- International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Charter of: 93
- Inter-Parliamentary Conference, 60th, Rome: resolution on Middle East adopted by, 241
- Iran: 42, 134, 191, 338. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Iraq: 48, 99, 139, 164, 185, 191, 256, 265, 320, 327. Activities of, at U.N., 6, 14, 31f. Visits of leaders to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 146f, 233f, and to India (communiqué), 221. Treaty with U.S.S.R., 168ff. Support for, expressed by Kosygin, 244. Policy statements by leaders of, 299f, 308, 344
- Iraq Revolutionary Command Council: 308. Statement by, 293f
- Irbid (Jordan): 305
- Irbid Prison: 268
- Irgun Zvai Leumi: 349, 361
- Isa, Rima: 341
- Islam: 18, 286

- Islamic Foreign Ministers, Conference: *see* Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers
- Islamic Summit Conference, 1st, Rabat, 1969: 153
- Ismail, Ismail Sayyid: Signatory of letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Israel: for statements on policy of, by leaders of, *see*: Allon; Avneri; Communist Party of Israel; Dayan; Eban; Galili; Meir; Peled; Peres; Rabin. For policy *see also* Israeli Government; Knesset. *See also* Arabs in Israel; Arabs in occupied territories; U.N. Special Committee ..., U.N. Resolutions
- Israel Defence Forces: 105, 227, 258, 326. Behaviour in Gaza described, 62. Statement by Dayan on reduced budget of, 107, and importance of, 216. Role of, in Jordan valley stressed by Allon, 149. Importance of strength of, stressed by Mapam, 259. Seizure of Arab land by, 326
- Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission: number of U.N. observers increased at, 12, 29, 81, 90
- Israel Radio Overseas Service (Kol Zion Lagola): 119
- Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission: 30
- Israel Zionist Council: 116, 121, 126, 128
- Israeli Air Force: 134
- Israeli Communist Parties: *see* Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) and Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH)
- Israeli Government: 93, 100, 103, 171, 189, 205, 209, 222f, 225, 238, 261, 263, 267, 361. Letters and statements at U.N. by representative of: on peace negotiations and Jarring aide-mémoire, 3f; on raids into Lebanon, 8-11, 23-27; on violations on Syrian border, 13; on Israeli action in Gaza, 14, 32f; on Jerusalem, 15f, 34, 38; on hijacking of aircraft, 19f, 39f; on guerrillas in Lebanon, 21; on administration of occupied territories, 75f. Mentioned in recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 110ff, 121f, 126. Seen as wanting to make peace, by Meir, 104f, and by Allon, 148f. Criticized: by MAKI, 175; by U.S.S.R., 231; by RAKAH, 257f; by Mapam, 260; by Hammami, 347; by Zayyat, 365. Applauded by Senator McGovern, 178, and by Scheel, 224. Denies applicability of Fourth Geneva Convention, 264. For report on administration of occupied territories *see* U.N. Special Committee...; *see also* Knesset; names of leaders (*see* entry for Israel); U.N. Resolutions
- Israeli Olympic team: 223
- Israeli United Labour Party (Mapam): criticism of, by RAKAH, 159. Principles for peace negotiations, adopted by, 258-261
- Italy: 6, 17, 27, 37f, 89n. Statement by U.N. representative of, 11, 26, 28, 36
- Ja'abari, Shaikh Muhammad Ali: 60, 65, 289
- Jabalia refugee camp: 46, 62, 257
- Jabir, Prince: statement criticizing Arab acceptance of status quo, 373
- Jabotinsky, Vladimir: 324
- Jaffa: 324
- Jalloud, Abd al-Salam: 319. Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 154
- Japan: 16, 87, 89n, 187, 283, 302, 351. Statements by U.N. representative of, 25, 37, 237. Apology by Prime Minister of, to Israel, 188
- Jaramana refugee camp: 46
- Jarring, Gunnar: 10, 19, 25f, 31, 43, 84, 101, 103, 132, 141f, 156, 174, 198, 218f, 232, 236, 240, 250, 283f, 302, 335, 339, 366. Debate in U.N. General Assembly on activities of, 3-8. Israel blamed for failure of mission of: by U.S.S.R., 5; by U.N. General Assembly, 83; by World Peace Council, 184; by Organization of African Unity, 195; by Abu Hamad, 348; by Abu Zaid, 355; by Zayyat, 363f. Support for mission of: by France, 6; by Organization of African Unity, 39; by Rogers, 155; by U.S. and U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 185; by Nordic Foreign Ministers, 221; by Iran and U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 245; by Sadat, 276. Egyptian acceptance of mission of, 43, 190, 365. Criticized by Meir, 105, 131. Renewal of mission urged: by Egypt and U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 135; by Egypt and Yugoslavia (communiqué), 136; by Nixon, 144
- Jefferson, Thomas: 361
- Jenin: 266, 289
- Jerash: 46, 306
- Jerash refugee camp: 46
- Jericho: 70, 266, 289, 326
- Jerusalem: 29, 46, 81, 91, 109, 132, 140, 145, 148, 173, 256, 285f, 289, 292, 295, 301, 304, 307, 324, 334, 348f, 355, 358f, 361, 363, 365. U.N. reports on situation in, 15-18, 33-38, 54. Mentioned in U.N. Special Committee..., 58-61, 71. Mentioned in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3005 (XXVII), 88. UNESCO Executive Board Decisions on, 93f. UNESCO General Conference Resolution on,

- 94f. Claimed as capital of Israel: by 28th Zionist Congress, 108; by Meir, 131, 158; by Senator Humphrey, 137f; by Zadok, 156; by U.S. Democratic Party, 203; by Mapam, 259. Israeli measures in, condemned by Jordan, 196, 356. Hussein on future of, 302f. Sadat on rights of Palestinians in, 306
- Jerusalem Post*: quoted in U.N. Special Committee... , 57–72
- Jerusalem Programme: Mentioned in Recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 114, 116, 119
- Jesus Christ: 303
- Jewish Agency: 324. Activities of Settlement Department of, 59. Mentioned in Recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 112, 119, 121f, 124, 130
- Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet Le Israel): 61. Mentioned in Recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 117, 124ff
- Jewish Telegraphic Agency: 32
- Jewish War Veterans: 217
- Jews: 18, 145, 148, 186, 194, 227, 229, 249, 255, 286, 308, 351, 356, 358. In Syria, condition of described, 19, 33, 109, 359. Israeli leaders on rights of, 31, 159. Jerusalem sacred to, 137. Senator Humphrey on Russian, 138. Both sides of Jordan River considered homeland of, Jordan River considered homeland of, 258. *See also* Zionist Congress, 28th
- Jidda: 19
- Jiftlik: petition from people of, 326f
- Johnson, Lyndon: 206, 331, 334f, 353
- Jordan: 22, 42, 44, 46, 48, 78n, 87, 102, 130f, 142, 145, 150f, 163, 178, 182, 209, 214, 234, 238f, 251, 260, 274, 324, 363, 373. Letters and statements at U.N., by representative of, 14ff, 18, 32–39. Mentioned in U.N. Special Committee..., 53f, 60, 65ff, 70. Statements by Israeli leaders on: by Dayan, 139; by Zadok, 156f; by Meir, 157f, 247f; by Galili, 174. Statement by U.S. Department of State on moderation of, 171f. Visit to, of Lopez Bravo (communiqué), 196. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 262–268. Statements by Hussein, 289–293, 301–304, 336–339, 340f, 372. United Arab Kingdom plan rejected by Arab leaders, 293–300, 304–308, 311–315. Overthrow of regime in, called for by Palestine National Council, 310. Policy of, criticized by Sadat, 320. Statement by Prime Minister Lawzi of, 344f. Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Zaid of, 354–357
- Jordan, West Bank: 43f, 47f, 65, 71, 102, 157f, 163, 172, 183, 238, 294ff, 298, 304–307, 334, 336, 338, 355, 365. Work of UNRWA in, 46. Settlements in, mentioned in U.N. Special Committee report, 58f. Transfer of families from Gaza to, 62, 78. Dayan quoted on refusal to allow return of refugees from, 66f. *The Economist* quoted on conditions in, 70. Statements on future of: by Congressman Hamilton, 145; by Allon, 149f; by Galili, 174; by Dayan, 188f; by Mapam, 260f; by Hussein 289–293, 301–303, 337, 372; by Abu Zaid, 356. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 265–268. Statements on elections in: by Popular Resistance Front, 276f; by P.L.O. leader, 279f; by Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, 282; by Palestine People's Conference, 311–314. Palestinian state in, rejected by Palestine National Council, 310. Complaints to Israel, by inhabitants of, 326f. *See also* Arabs in occupied territories: U.N. Special Committee
- Jordan River: 59, 149, 163, 211, 260, 289, 326, 377. Considered by Galili as future border with Jordan, 174. Land on both sides of, considered as Jewish homeland, by Mapam, 258
- Jordan Valley: 46, 58, 259. Seen as part of state of Israel by Allon, 149, and by Galili, 173
- Jordanian Army: 46
- Jordanian National Front: 312f, 315, 323
- Jordanian National Movement: 316
- Jordanian National Red Crescent Society: 268f
- Judaism: 18, 110, 119, 121, 123f, 229
- Judea: 158, 174, 188, 239
- al-Juyushi, Hashim: letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Kabul: 198
- Kafra (Lebanon): attacked by Israelis, 23
- Kalandia Vocational Training Centre: 46, 48
- Kamal, Saladdin: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68f
- Karak: 268
- Karameh: 46
- Karmel: 255
- Katyusha rockets: 8
- Kfar Bir'im: *see* Bir'im
- Kfar Darom: 163
- Khaddam, Abd al-Halim: statement on Middle East situation, 357–362
- Khan Younis: 62, 257
- Khan Younis Hospital: 266
- Khartoum: 172, 313n. Statement by Numairi, 273

- Khartoum Conference: 313
 Khassam: 266
 al-Khatib, Anwar: 337
 al-Khatib, Ruhi: signatory of letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
 al-Khattab, Majeb Mohammed Issa: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
 al-Khiyam: 29, 80
 Kiev: 185
 Kikhya, Mansour Rashid: statement in support of Palestinians, 373
 King David Hotel: blowing up of, by Zionists, 324f, 349, 361, 365
 Kiryat Arba: Jewish settlement in, 60
 Kiryat Gath: Jewish settlement in, 255
 Kissinger, Henry: 185, 284
 Knesset: 14, 32, 40, 57-60, 62, 72, 105, 172ff, 188f, 197. Statements of Israeli policy to: by Eban, 153f; by Meir, 157ff, 186f, 204-208, 224-227, 249; by Galili, 162f. Criticism of, by RAKAH, 159f. Resolution on Munich incident passed by, 228
 Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee: 225
 Kol Zion Lagola (Israel Radio Overseas Service): 119
 Kosygin, Alexei: 170, 203. Statement expressing support for Egypt, 243f. Quoted by Sidky, 371f
 Kuneitra: 69, 265f, 377
 Kusseima: 267
 Kuwait: 42, 172, 191, 238, 262, 313. Rejection of United Arab Kingdom by, 300. Statement in support of Palestine revolution by Emir Sabah of, 368f. Statement by Shaikh Jabir of, 373
 Lahore: 161
 Laird, Melvin: statement on Soviet military involvement in Syria, 235f
 Lanthal, Iris: 341
 Laos: 165
 Latakia: 269
 Latin America: 119, 129, 361, 368
 Latrun (West Bank): 59
 Latvia: 255
 Lavon, Pinhas: 361f
 "Lavon Affair": 361
 Lawzi, Ahmad: 196. Statement on Jordan's commitment to West Bank, 344f
 League of Arab States: 273, 312, 315, 338
 Lebanese Movement for the support of Fateh: 323
 Lebanese Red Cross: 269
 Lebanon: 11f, 15, 34f, 42, 67, 87, 183, 199f, 209, 215, 228, 232f, 238, 241, 245, 250f, 253, 285, 306, 310, 353, 360, 363. Letters and statements at U.N. by representative of, 8ff, 20f, 23f, 28, 30, 40f. Claimed by Israel to be base for terror groups, 9f, 20-25, 27f, 40f, 197, 249. Supported: by France, 10, 25; by Saudi Arabia, 25; by China, 26, 167; by Somalia, 26; by Afghanistan, 198; by U.S.S.R., 231. Requests increase in U.N. observers on Israeli border, 28f. Mentioned in UNRWA report, 44, 46ff. Statement by U.N. Secretary-General on increase in observer force on Israeli border, 80. Security Council grants increase, 89ff. Texts of Security Council Resolutions 313 demanding Israeli withdrawal from, 89; 316 condemning Israeli attacks on, 91, and 317 deploring Israel's failure to implement 316, 91f. Statements by Israeli leaders justifying action against, by Allon, 151, and by Meir, 196. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 262f, 265f, 269. Statements by leaders of: by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad, 317f, 348-352; by President Franjieh of, 325, 343; by Prime Minister Salam of, 328f; by Gemayyel, 346f. Appeal from Egyptian National Assembly to Chamber of Deputies of, 377
 Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement 1949: 11, 26, 28, 90f. Israeli violations of, 8, 23, 329, 351. Opinion of U.N. representative of China on, 12. Validity of, stressed by Lebanese Foreign Minister, 317f
 Lebanon-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission: 23, 89
 Leningrad: 185
 Libya: 19, 39, 42, 149, 172, 183, 313, 319, 328, 339, 352, 380. Letters and statements at U.N. by representative of, 22, 41. Visit of delegation from, to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 154f. Nationalization of BP by, commented on, 190f. Israeli statement on proposed merger with Egypt, 212f. West German protest to, 246f. Statement by Meir on policy of, 249. Statements by President Qadhafi of, 278f, 376f, 379. Visit of President Qadhafi of, to Algeria (communiqué), 320ff. Statement by Foreign Minister Kikhya of, 373
 Li Hsien-nien: statements by, expressing support for Arabs, 99, 160f
 Lipmann, Walter: 283
 de Lipkowski, Jean: denies transfer of Mirage jets from Libya to Egypt, 189
 Lod (Lydda): 324
 Lod Airport: 199, 222, 350f. Statements at U.N.

- on incident in, 20f, 39ff. Statements on incident in: by Meir, 186; by Sato, 188; by Godber, 200; by Red Cross, 268; by P.L.O., 323f; by Sidky, 324f; by Franjeh, 325
- Lok Sabha: statement by Singh to, 254
- Longden, Gilbert: question in House of Commons, 200
- López Bravo, Gregorio: visit to Jordan of (communiqué), 196
- Lufthansa Airlines: 246, 342
- Lusaka Declaration: 213
- Lutheran World Federation: 49
- Luxembourg: 6
- Lydda: 324
- Lydda Airport: *see* Lod Airport
- Ma'an: 268
- Ma'an prison: 267
- Maariv*: mentioned in U.N. Special Committee report, 58f, 63, 71
- Maccabi World Union: 116
- McGovern, George: statement expressing support for Israel, 178
- Magen David Adom: 266
- Mahatta prison (Amman): 65, 267f
- Malaysia: 42. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Mali: 15, 34, 42. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6. Statement by U.N. representative of, 35
- Malik, Adam: quoted by Zayyat, 366
- Malik, Yakov: statement at U.N. in favour of sanctions against Israel, 253
- Malta: 100, 278
- Mapam: *see* Israeli United Labour Party
- Marjayoun: 29, 80, 90, 328
- Marlene: 341
- Maroun el-Ras: 29, 80
- Massoura: 266f
- Maunoir, Jean-Pierre: 262
- Maurer, Ion: statement expressing support for Resolution 242, 178
- Mauritania: 42. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Mauritius: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Mayaleh, Ismael Abu: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
- Mazurov, Kiril: 151
- Mecca: 303
- Meir, Golda: 139, 147f, 178, 199, 219, 232, 302f, 324, 347, 353. Statements by: on negotiations with Egypt, 104f, and with other Arab states, 130ff; rejecting United Arab Kingdom plan, 157ff; on Lod Airport incident, 186f; on military action in Lebanon, 196f; on expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt, 204–208; on Munich incident, 224–227; on small likelihood of peace, 242; on attitude to Arab states, 247ff; rejecting proposal to allow villagers to return to Ikrit and Bir'im, 249. Letter to, from Sato, 188. Called a liar by Sadat, 283
- Mendes-France, Pierre: 284
- Michelmores, Lawrence: 175
- Middle East News Agency: 204
- MIG aircraft: 205, 318. Supplied by U.S.S.R. to Egypt, 143
- Mijdal Ha'im: Jewish settlement in, 255
- Ministerial Committee for the Settlement of the Occupied Territories: 58
- Ministerial Consultative Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, New York, 1971: 213
- Mirage aircraft: 166, 183, 218, 320. Denial by France of transfer of, from Libya to Egypt, 189
- Mistiri, Mahmud: 341
- Mixed Armistice Commission: 9, 11, 24ff, 81
- Mollet, Guy: 353
- Moroccan National Bloc: 323
- Morocco: 15, 34f, 42, 195. Statement by U.N. representative of, 16
- Mozambique: 165
- Muhammad (the Prophet): 303
- Munich: 236, 241, 247, 249, 262, 350f, 353, 373. Statements on incident in: by Israeli cabinet, 221f; by Weizmann, 222f; by U.S. House of Representatives, 223; by Scheel, 224f; by Meir, 224–227; by Knesset, 228; by Podgorny, 228; by Eban, 230; by Douglas-Home, 232; by Pompidou, 235; by Council of Europe, 246; by Hussein, 340f; by Black September, 341ff; by P.L.O. leader, 347f
- Municipal Council of Hebron: 58
- Muslims: 18, 137, 145, 285, 303, 351, 356. Israel alleged to have disregarded feelings of, 37. Mapam in favour of control of holy places for, 259
- Nablus: 266, 289, 314
- al-Nabulsi, Sulaiman: signatory of letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Nahal Dikla: 61, 163
- Nahal Golan: 60
- Nahal Natshrim: 163
- Nahal Sinai: 61, 63, 163
- Nahhalin: Israeli attack on, 324

- Nahr al-Barid refugee camp: 46
- Najjar, Muhammad Yusif (Abu Yusif): statement on the Palestine Revolution, 374
- Nakagawa, Toru: statement at U.N. on Resolution 242, 237
- Namibia: 165
- al-Naqoura: 29, 80f, 90, 265
- Nasir, Kamal: 374. Statements by: on West Bank elections, 279f; on importance of P.L.O. visit to Moscow, 330; on importance of armed struggle, 244f
- Nasser, Gamal: 207, 234, 327, 331, 333f, 367f, 370. Statements by Meir on lack of courage of, 242, 247
- Nasser Hospital: 266
- National Council of the Churches of Christ, U.S.A.: 53
- National Front of the Democratic Republic of Yemen: 323
- National Progressive Front of the Syrian Arab Republic: 286
- NATO: *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Nazareth: Jewish settlement in, 255
- Near East Emergency Donations (NEED): 48
- Negev: 122
- Nehru, Jawaharlal: 368
- Nessler, Edmond: 182
- Netherlands (Holland): 6
- Nicaragua: 37
- Nietzsche, Friedrich: work alleged to influence Zionists, 324
- Niger: 42
- Nigeria: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Nile/Valley: 139. Considered as ultimate Israeli border, 307, 355f
- Nixon, Richard: 100, 132, 136, 161, 191, 194, 216, 220, 256, 284, 305, 319, 332, 335, 353. Confirms principle of Phantom aircraft sales to Israel, 99. Reports on the Middle East situation to Congress, 140–144. Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 185
- Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting: communiqué of, 221
- North American Jewish Student Appeal: 128
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 134, 353
- North Korea: 220, 236
- North Vietnam: 284
- Norwegian Refugee Council: 49
- Noyes, James: outlines military balance in the Middle East, 133f
- Numairi, Jaafar Muhammad: statement on Sudan's commitment to Arab cause, 273
- Nur-Elmi, Hussein: 52, 75. *See also* United Nations Special Committee...
- Nuremberg, Charter of International Military Tribunal of: 93
- Nusaiba, Anwar: 289
- O.A.U.: *see* Organization of African Unity
- Okamoto, Kozo: 341
- Olympic Games: 226
- Oman: 42, 262
- Ondoga, Michael: statement on Middle East, 200
- Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.): 18, 39, 42f, 250, 281. U.N. comments on mission of, 4ff. Resolution adopted by, 195
- Organization of Unionist Socialists (Syria): 286n
- OXFAM: 49
- Pakistan: 42, 130, 254, 335. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Palestine: 142, 157f, 209, 238, 279, 285, 289, 291, 294ff, 301, 304, 306, 308, 312, 315, 318, 320, 322f, 327, 336f, 340, 344, 347, 350, 353, 355, 358, 360, 363, 366, 374, 377, 379. Seizure of Arab property in, by Israel, 19, 39. Occupied by Zionists, 22, 41, 324, 364f, 379. Zionist right to, denied by RAKAH, 159f. Liberation of, called for, 161, 287, 299f, 310f, 314, 316, 321, 329, 345, 375. Creation of secular democratic state in, called for, 229. Hussein on future of, 292f
- Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.): 230, 300, 304, 311, 313, 315f, 321, 323, 338, 340. Memorandum from, quoted by Libya at U.N., 22, 41. Visits of delegations from, to China (communiqué), 164, Yugoslavia, 165, and to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 208. Statements by spokesmen of, 279f, 330, 374ff. Programme for, announced by Palestine People's Conference, 309. Claimed as role representative of Palestinian people, 312, 314. Affiliation to Black September denied, 347
- Palestine Liberation Organization, Executive Committee: 305, 309f, 313. Telegram from, transmitted by Egypt at U.N., 32. Statements by, condemning West Bank elections, 279f, and rejecting United Arab Kingdom plan, 294ff
- Palestine National Assembly: 347
- Palestine National Charter: 314
- Palestine National Council: 167, 304, 309, 312. Political programme adopted by, 310

- Palestine National Fund: 309, 315
- Palestine People's Conference: 323. Speech by Sadat at, 306f. Programme for National Unity recommended at, 309f. Resolutions of, repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 311–314. Statement by, urging Arab states to sever relations with Jordan, 314–317
- Palestine problem: 21, 250, 287, 298, 304, 314, 353. Statements on: by Pompidou, 235; by Lebanese Communist Party, 273f; by P.L.O. spokesman, 279–330; by Habash, 289; by Syrian Baath Party, 296f; by Federation of Arab Republics, 299; by Palestine National Council, 310; by United Arab Emirates and Iraq (communiqué), 322; by Franjieh, 325; by Lawzi, 344; by Hussaini, 345; by Abu Zaid, 355; by Kuwait, 369; by Hussein, 372
- Palestine refugees: 76, 141, 144, 231, 237, 297, 325, 354, 364. Bombardment of camps of, by Israelis, 10, 324, 350. Israeli defiance of U.N. resolutions concerning, 21. UNRWA's definition of, 43n. UNRWA report on, 43–50. U.N. Resolutions renewing UNRWA mandate for, 84–87. Recommendation on, from Council of Europe, 106. Just settlement to problem of, called for by: Socialist Party of France, 156; U.S. Department of State, 174f; MAKI, 209f
- Palestine Research Centre: 53
- Palestine Resistance: 26, 46, 102, 172, 208, 229f, 285, 295, 305ff, 309f, 314, 323f, 348, 350f, 362, 376f. Lebanon said to be controlling activities of, 10, 25. Statements on, by U.N. representative of Israel, 8ff, 20f, 24f, 27, 40. Support for, expressed by: President Zhivkov of Bulgaria, 133; delegation from U.S.S.R., 152, 155; Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, 164; Assad, 202, 308; Podgorny, 228; Bakr, 233; Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, 282; National Progressive Front of Syria, 287; Federation of Arab Republics, 299; Boumedienne, Sadat and Qadhafi, 321; Prime Minister Husaini of South Yemen, 345; Gemayyel, 346f. Red Cross statements on Sabena hijacking incident, 177f, 268. Statement by Popular Resistance Front in West Bank, 276f. Rejection of Jordanian regime by, 296. Liquidation of, attempted by Hussein, 320, 353. Libya admits training camps for, 373
- Palestinian people: 14, 25f, 67, 102, 130, 185, 237, 240, 258, 260, 279f, 289, 291, 295, 297, 300f, 305, 310, 315f, 325, 327f, 330, 342, 347, 350f, 355, 357, 363, 375f, 378f. Israeli aggression against, alleged, 21, 40, 184, 323f, 343, 352, 360. Israeli leaders' commentary on: Galili, 103; Allon, 149f; Meir, 157; Eban, 234, 238f. Nixon on problems of, 140f. Hussein accused of surrendering rights of, 293, 296, 298f, 304, 307, 312f, 353. P.L.O. claimed as legal representative of, 294, 314. Jordan leaders on similarity between Jordanians and, 336ff, 356. Statements on plight of and/or support for rights of, made by spokesmen for the following countries or organizations: Algeria, 6, 321; Bulgaria, 133; China, 5, 99, 161, 167f, 241, 253; Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, 214; Egypt, 32, 35f, 177, 203, 245, 276, 281f, 305, 321, 365, 367, 371; Federation of Arab Republics, 299; German Democratic Republic, 251; India, 221; Iran, 245; Iraq, 146, 170, 221, 228, 233, 308, 322; Israeli Communist Parties, (RAKAH), 159f, and (MAKI), 209f; Jordan, 196, 292; Kuwait, 369; Lebanon, 329; Lebanese Communist Party, 273f; Libya, 22, 41f, 155, 321; National Progressive Front of Syria, 287; Pope Paul VI, 257; Rumania, 178, 204; Socialist Party of France, 156; Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, 164; Spain, 196; Syria, 152, 202; Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, 153; U.N. General Assembly, 84, 86; United Arab Emirates, 322; U.S., 145, 192; U.S.S.R., 135, 146, 152, 155, 170, 177, 201ff, 208, 233, 244f; World Conference of Christians for Palestine, 229; Yemen (South), 345; Yugoslavia, 136, 165
- Palestinian Red Crescent: 269
- Panama: 89n
- Partition of Palestine Plan, 1947 (Plan of Partition with Economic Union): 364. Recommended in G.A. Resolution 181 (II), 72
- P.D.F.L.P. (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine): statement by General Secretary of, 305f
- Pearl Harbour: 283
- Peled, Natan: 60. Statement on Jewish immigration, 253
- Peres, Shimon: statement on Soviet intentions in Middle East, 107; implicated in Lavon affair, 362
- Persian Gulf/Arabian Gulf: 191
- Peter, Janos: 366
- Petit-Pierre, Max: 262
- P.F.L.P. *see* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
- Phalangist Party (Lebanon): statement by leader

- of, 346f
- Phantom aircraft: 134, 193, 199, 275, 284, 318, 335, 365. Statements on sale of, to Israel: by Nixon, 99; by Galili, 100; by Meir, 130; by Rogers, 136f. Said to represent U.S. support of Israeli aggression, 277f
- P.L.O.: *see* Palestine Liberation Organization
- Plofsky, Ralph: 217
- Podgorny, Nikolai: 334. Expresses support for Arabs, 201, 228f
- Poland: 37. Statement by U.N. representative of, 36
- Pompidou, Georges: 250, 320, 327f. Statement on Palestine problem, 235
- Pontifical Mission for Palestine: 49
- Pope Paul VI: statement on Middle East situation, 256
- Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.D.F.L.P.): statement by General Secretary of, 305f
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.): role of, in Lod Airport incident, mentioned by Israel, 20, 40. Statement on Conference of, by Habash, 287f
- Popular Resistance Front: condemns West Bank elections, 276f
- Prag, Nadia: 341
- Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon): 323
- Qabus, Sultan: 337
- Qadhafi, Muammar: 212n, 275, 373. Quoted by Aramco chairman, 190. Regarded as destroyer, 249. Warns of possible use of oil as a political weapon, 278f. Visit of, to Algeria (communiqué), 320ff. Denounces idea of Jewish "nation", 376f. Explains basis of Arab unity, 379
- Qalqilyah: 67, 361
- Qantara: 263, 266
- Qasim, Abd al-Karim: 234
- Qatar: 42, 262
- Qibya: massacre of inhabitants of, by Israelis, 324, 359, 361
- Quai d'Orsay: 212
- Quneitra (Golan Heights): *see* Kuneitra
- Rabin, Yitzhak: 105. Statement on Israel's attitude to U.S. Presidential candidates, 194
- Rafah: 189, 267. Land in, expropriated and homes demolished by Israelis, 14, 32, 257. Transfer of population from, 63, 160, 267. Jewish settlement in, criticized by MAKI, 175, and supported by Mapam, 260
- Rafah refugee camp: 46, 62
- Ramallah: 266
- Ramat Golan: 69
- Ramia: Israeli attack on, 8
- Rashidieh refugee camp: 46
- Red Cross: 15, 33, 66f, 75, 88, 325, 349, 363, 365. Letters to and from U.N. Special Committee, 54ff. 1971 report quoted by U.N. Special Committee, 62, 64f. Statements by, on Sabena hijacking incident, 177f, 268. Report on services to Arabs and Israelis, 262-269
- Republican Party (U.S.): excerpts from party platform of, 220f
- Reza Pahlavi, Shah Muhammad: visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communiqué), 245
- Riyadh, Mahmud: 320
- Rogers, William: 105, 131, 185, 275, 366. Statements by: on role of U.S. in Middle East, 100ff; on prospects for negotiations, 136f, 254; on U.S. foreign policy, 155; on U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit meeting, 181f; on expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt, 215f; on ways towards a solution of the Middle East conflict, 236f; on U.S. moves to combat "terrorism", 242f
- "Rogers Plan/Initiative": 293, 305, 310, 331, 345, 370
- Roosevelt, Franklin: 283
- Rosh Hanikra: 81
- Rumania: 196. Statements by Prime Minister Maurer of, 178, and President Ceausescu of, 203
- Rusk, Dean: 274
- Sabah, Emir: statement in support of Palestine revolution, 368f
- Sabena Airlines: hijacking incident concerning, 20, 39, 177f, 187, 323
- Sabri, Ali: 370n
- Sadat, Anwar: 100, 137, 139, 189, 192, 199, 204, 212n, 213, 226, 236, 339, 370, 372. Statement by and policy of, viewed by Israeli leaders: Galili, 103; Meir, 104f, 131, 196, 206, 242, 247f; Allon, 132. Joint communiqués with U.S.S.R., 135, 150, 176f, 181; Yugoslavia, 136; Boumedienne and Qadhafi, 320ff. Activities of, commented on by: Senator Humphrey, 138; Senator McGovern, 180; Rogers, 215f, 254; Sisco, 218f; Hussein, 302. Statements by: on negotiations, 274ff; on U.S. policy, 282ff; on relations with U.S.S.R., 284, 318f, 333-336; rejecting United Arab Kingdom plan, 306f; criticizing Jordan, 320; calling for a Palestine

- government-in-exile, 352f. on Egypt's foreign relations, 366ff; on need to prepare for war, 380f. Report of speech explaining withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Egypt 330–333
- Sadiq, Muhammad Ahmad: 150, 181, 275, 319
- Sadot: 163
- Said, Nuri: 234
- Saigon: 178
- St. Catherine: 266
- Saiqa: 305
- Salahat, Youssef: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
- Salam, Saeb: letter from Afghanistan Foreign Minister to, 198. Statement by, on relations between Lebanese and Palestinians, 328f
- Salih, Abd al-Jawad: 67
- Samaria: 158, 174, 188, 239
- SAM missiles: 143, 205
- Sammu: massacre by Israelis in, recalled, 324
- Saqqaf, Umar: statement by, on Israeli expansionism, 285f
- Sato, Eisaku: letter to Meir from, apologizing for Lod incident, 188
- Saudi Arabia: 9, 15, 24, 34, 42, 191, 238, 262. Statements at U.N. by representative of, 25, 35. Statement by King Faisal of, 285. Hussein on relations with, 338
- Sayegh, Youssef: 309
- al-Sayih, Abd al-Hamid: signatory of letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Scheel, Walter: comments on responsibility for "terrorism", 223
- Schumann, Maurice: statement by, explaining French attitude to Middle East, and deploring Israel's annexationist policy, 166f. Emphasises Resolution 242 as basis for Middle East peace, 250. Sadat on attitude of, 320
- Second World War: 255, 364
- Senegal: statement at U.N. by Foreign Minister of, 4. Amendments submitted to U.N. General Assembly by, 8. Statement by President Senghor of, 250
- Senghor, Leopold: 81. Expresses support for Resolution 242, 250f
- Sephardic Community: 121
- Shafiq, Muhammad Musa: letter to Salam from, condemning Israeli raids in Lebanon, 198
- Sharef, Ze'ev: mentioned in report of U.N. Special Committee . . . , 60f
- Sharm el-Shaikh: 7, 145, 266, 364. Egyptian position on, stated in U.N., 43. Israeli position on and settlement in, 58, 61, 131, 190. MAKI suggestion on solution for, 209
- Shawwa, Rashad: 289, 337
- Sheikh-Eid, Suleiman M.: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68f
- Shaikh Zwayed (Sinai): 266f
- Shifa Hospital: 266
- Shishakli, Adib: 234
- Shuman, Abd al-Majid: signatory of letter repudiating United Arab Kingdom plan, 305
- Sidky, Aziz: 150, 243. Visits of, to U.S.S.R. (communiqués), 203, 244f. Criticized by Meir, 226. Statements by, on Lod Airport incident, 324f, and on U.S.S.R.-Egypt relations, 369–372
- Sierra Leone: 17, 38, 42. Statement at U.N. by representative of, 37
- Siilasvuo, Ensio: 80f, 90
- Sinai Peninsula: 47, 61, 209, 219, 334, 355, 365. Partial Israeli withdrawals in, discussed by: U.N. representative of U.S., 5; Representative Hamilton, 145; Dayan, 216f; Douglas-Home, 232. Transfer of population in, by Israel, 14, 32, 63, 267. Israeli settlements in, 58. Demolition of houses in, by Israel, 64. Demilitarization of, demanded by Mapam, 259, and refused by Sadat, 283
- Singh, Sardar Swaran: 221. Expresses support for Resolution 242, 254
- Siordet, Frederic: 262
- Sisco, Joseph: 175, 284. Discusses American attitudes to a Middle East settlement, 191–194. Statements by, on prospects for peace negotiations, 198f, and on the step-by-step approach to peace, 217–220
- Skyhawk aircraft: 10, 318, 335
- Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia: joint communiqué with Arafat, 165
- Socialist Party of France: statement on Middle East policy of, 156
- Somalia (Somali Democratic Republic): 17, 37, 42, 52, 89n. Sponsor of draft resolutions at U.N., 6, 16. Statements by U.N. representative of, 26, 28, 36
- South Africa: 165
- South Korea: 220, 236
- Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee: statement by, rejecting United Arab Kingdom plan, 163f. Joint communiqué with Arafat, 208
- Spain: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6. Visit of Foreign Minister of, to Jordan, 196
- Sri Lanka: 52
- Stern Gang: activities of, recalled, 349, 361

- Straits of Tiran: *see* Tiran Straits
- Sudan, Democratic Republic of the: 42, 48, 89n, 334. Statement at U.N. by representative of, 28. Statement by President Numairi of, 273
- Suez, battle of, 1956: 367
- Suez Canal: 7, 12, 22, 29f, 143, 156, 180, 182, 189, 211, 218, 242, 260, 266, 275n, 301, 310, 364, 366, 377. Israeli views on interim settlement in, 4, 43, 103, 105, 131f, 139, 148f, 153f, 207, 209, 252, 259. U.S. policy on possible settlement in, 5, 42, 101, 138, 142, 155, 174, 179, 192, 194, 198, 219f, 236. Egyptian position on, criticized by Eban, 238. Sadat's views on interim settlement in, 274
- Supreme Court of Israel: 349
- El Sura: 266
- Suwaidi, Ahmad Khalifa: 322
- Swedish Free Church Aid: 49
- Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen): 49
- Swiss Aid Caritas: 49
- Syria: 15, 24, 34, 42, 87, 91f, 164, 170, 209, 232, 243, 249, 251, 256, 274, 294, 308, 310, 327, 350, 354, 363, 373, 380. Ceasefire violations on borders reported, 13, 30f. Amendments, letters and statements by U.N. representative of, 16f, 19, 32f, 35ff, 39. Report of UNRWA activities in, 43–50. Mentioned in report of U.N. Special Committee, 53f, 58, 61, 67, 69. Support for, expressed by: President of Bulgaria, 133; Podgorny, 201; Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, 214f; U.S.S.R., 244; China, 253; al-Fateh, 374. Visit to, of U.S.S.R. delegation (*communiqué*), 151f. Visit of President Assad of, to U.S.S.R. (*communiqué*), 201f. Regarded as extremist by Galili, 211. Blamed by Ezer Weizman for Munich incident, 222f. Israeli air raids against, condemned, 228, 231, 233, 241, 245. Exonerated of responsibility for Munich incident by U.S.S.R., 231. Soviet military involvement in, commented on by U.S. Defence Secretary, 235f. Seen by Eban as unwilling to make peace, 238. Mapam on border demarcation in Golan Heights, 259. Red Cross services in, 262–269 *pass*. President of Iraq on proposed union of, with Egypt and Iraq, 299f. Hussein on relations with, 338. Statements by President Assad of, 345f, 377f. Praised by Sadat, 352. Statement by Foreign Minister Khaddam of, 357–362
- Syrian Red Crescent: 269
- Tahla, Aba: ill-treatment of, in Israeli custody, 68
- Tamad: 266
- Tan Hubben: 341
- Tanzania, United Republic of: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
- Tapline pipeline: 288
- Taref: 266
- TASS: 204
- Tel Aviv-Haifa highway: 163
- Tel Hashomer hospital: 187
- Témoignage Chrétien*: 13, 31
- Tepavač, Mirko: 136
- Thailand: government of, praised by Eban, 261
- Third Islamic Conference: 19, 42
- The Times* (London): 303. Letter from P.L.O. representative to, 347f
- Tiran Straits: 7, 209, 364. Navigation through, required by Israel, 43, 260. Israel's right of navigation through, supported by Socialist Party of France, 156
- Tito, Josip Broz: 368
- Tour Vaalek Programme: 111
- Transjordan: 310, 313
- Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and Iraq (1972): 193, 308. Text of, 168ff
- Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. (1971): 193, 204, 243f, 284
- Tripoli Charter: Statement by Numairi on Sudan's commitment to, 273
- Trucial States: *see* United Arab Emirates
- Tsur, Y: 61
- TU-16 bombers: 134, 143
- Tulkarm: 174, 266. Massacre at, recalled, 361
- Tunisia: 15, 34f, 42. Statements by President Bourguiba of, 318, 327f. Visit by Qadhafi (speech), 379
- Turkey: 87
- Uganda: statement by President of, regretted by Allon, 149. Statement by Ambassador Ondoga of, 200
- Umbricht, Victor: 65. Mentioned in Red Cross report, 262–265
- UNESCO: 45. Text of Board decisions and General Conference Resolution deploring Israeli excavations in Jerusalem, 93ff
- UNESCO Executive Board Decision 89 EX/4.4.1: 95. Text of, 93f
- UNESCO Executive Board Decision 90 EX/4.3.1: 95. Text of, 94

- UNESCO Executive Board Decisions: cited in other decisions: 82 EX/4.4.2, 93ff; 83 EX/4.4.1, 93ff; 88 EX/4.3.1, 93ff
- UNESCO General Conference Resolution 17C/3.422: text of, 94f
- UNESCO General Conference Resolutions: cited in other resolutions and decisions: 15C/3.342, 93ff; 15C/3.343, 93ff
- UNICEF: 48f
- Union of Lebanese Communists: 323
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.): 11, 16f, 37, 60, 89n, 119, 125, 133, 141, 144f, 164, 171, 182, 191, 194, 196, 198f, 210, 212, 217, 237, 254, 281f, 301f, 305, 308, 320, 338, 353, 377, 379. Statements by U.N. representative of, 5, 10, 25, 27f, 35, 253. Supply of arms from, to Egypt, commented on: by Nixon, 99, 140, 143; by Galili, 100; by Rogers, 101; by 28th Zionist Congress, 109; by Noyes, 134; by Humphrey, 138; by McGovern, 180; by Meir, 197, 205. Policy of, viewed by: Peres, 107f, Allon, 132, Rogers, 137, Dayan, 139, Nixon, 142f, Sisco, 192f, Meir, 197, Laird, 235, Bourguiba, 327f. Discrimination against Jewish inhabitants of, alleged, 110, 138. Communiqués issued during visits to, by leaders: of Egypt, 135, 176f, 203, 244f; of Irāq, 146f, 233f; of Libya, 154f; of U.S., 185; of Syria, 201f; of P.L.O., 208; of Iran, 245. Delegations from, visit Egypt (communiqué), 150f, 181; Syria (communiqué), 151f; Iraq (communiqué), 170. Statements by leaders of, on policy of, and support for Arab countries: Brezhnev, 160, 256; Podgorny, 201, 228f; Kosygin, 243f. Text of Treaty of Friendship with Iraq, 168ff. Withdrawal of advisers of, from Egypt: announced, 204; commented on by Meir, 204-208; explained by Sadat, 330-333. Government statement of, on Israeli raids into Arab countries, 231. Statement by Israeli Absorption Minister on immigration from: 255. Statements on relations with: by Egyptian leaders, 275, 284, 318f, 330-336, 339f, 367, 369-372; by P.L.O. spokesman, 330; by President of Iraq, 344
- Unitarian Service Committee of Canada: 49
- United Arab Emirates: 42, 262. Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister to (communiqué), 322
- United Arab Kingdom Plan: announcement of, by Hussein, 289-293. Rejected by Zadok, 156f; Meir, 157ff; Iraq 293f, 308; P.L.O., 294ff, 377; Syria, 296f; Federation of Arab Republics, 297ff; Kuwait, 300; Palestinian personalities in East Bank, 304f; P.D.F.L.P., 305; Egypt, 306f; Palestine People's Conference, 311-315. Statements by Hussein on, 301-304, 337, 372, and by Abu Zaid, 356
- United Arab Republic: *see* Egypt
- United Israel Appeal (Keren Hayesod): 125, 129f
- United Jewish Appeal: 125
- United Kingdom: 11, 17, 27, 87, 89n, 140, 142, 183, 230, 276, 283, 320, 362. Statements by U.N. representative of, 5, 25, 37. Attitude of, during negotiations over Resolution 242, recalled by Eban, 190. Statement by Minister of State of, 200. Speech by Foreign Secretary of, 232f. Sadat on relations with, 367
- United Nations: 6, 15f, 19, 39, 44, 74, 83, 92, 100f, 106, 154, 156, 166f, 180, 231, 237, 240, 242, 245f, 250, 257, 312, 317, 354, 357f, 360. Palestinian rights ignored by, 5. Called upon by Lebanon, to increase number of U.N. observers on Israeli border, 11f. Urged to take firm position on Israel, 14, 32, 214, 349. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of, 33. Palestinians not represented in, 102. Israel's defiance of, 135, 244, 251, 285, 307, 343, 355, 366. Decline of, referred to by U.S. leader, 144f. Expulsion of Israel from, called for by U.S.S.R., 253. Efforts of, undermined by U.S., 278. Role of, discussed in speech by Zayyat, 362-366
- U.N. Board of Auditors: 49
- U.N. Charter: 3, 5, 7, 17, 52, 83, 87, 92, 168, 187, 195f, 213, 244f, 318, 357, 361ff. Calls for action under, to be taken against Israel, 9f, 16, 24f, 28, 32-35, 37, 253. Israeli violation of, 18, 23, 26f, 29, 32, 39, 42, 57, 86, 91, 152f, 155, 159, 231, 251, 358, 360. Israel claims joint Egyptian-Libyan-Syrian declaration violates, 19
- U.N. Commission on Human Rights: 13, 31, 75, 166, 348, 359, 365. Text of Resolution 3 (XXVIII), 92f
- U.N. Commission on Human Rights: 13, 31, 75, 166, 348, 359, 365. Text of Resolution 3 (XXVIII), 92f
- U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution 6 (XXIV): 52
- U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution 5B (XXVI): 93
- U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution 3 (XXVIII): text of, 92f
- U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine: 50, 84
- U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 34
- U.N. Declaration of Human Rights: *see* Universal

- Declaration of Human Rights
- U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples: 168
- U.N. Development Programme (U.N.D.P.): 48f
- U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1336 (XLIV): 52
- U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization: *see* UNESCO
- U.N. General Assembly: 7f, 44f, 47, 50, 162, 166, 185, 195, 214, 219, 230, 250, 257, 276, 312, 372. Called upon to take firm position on Israel, 5f. Resolutions of, recalled, 13, 33, 35, 135, 320. Israel's disregard for resolutions of, 16, 31. Criticized by Israel, 34, 251f. Special documents submitted to: U.N. Special Committee report to, 51–75; reports of the Secretary-General to, 75–79. Texts of resolutions of, 83–89. Speeches at meetings of, 236f, 240f, 253, 348–352, 354–366. Telegram from East Germany to, 251
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2792 C (XXVI): 47, 85: Report on implementation of, 76f
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2792 E (XXVI): 77, 86. Report on implementation of, 75f
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI): 10, 81, 83, 135n, 136n, 184n, 195, 312n, 320n, 348, 363. Voting record of, 8
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2949 (XXVII): text of, 83
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2963 (XXVII): text of, 84–87
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2964 (XXVII): text of, 87
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3005 (XXVII): text of, 87ff
- U.N. General Assembly resolutions: cited in speeches and other resolutions: No. 181 (II), 72; No. 194 (III), 14, 32, 45, 50, 84; No. 302 (V), 87; No. 513 (VI), 84; No. 720 B (VIII), 87; No. 2052 (XX), 50; No. 2154 (XXI), 50; No. 2252 (ES-V), 43, 52, 85f; No. 2253 (ES-V), 36, 93ff, 348; No. 2254 (ES-V), 15, 33, 36, 93ff, 348; No. 2341 B (XXII), 52, 85; No. 2443 (XXIII), 52f; No. 2452 A (XXIII), 86; No. 2452 C (XXIII), 85; No. 2535 B (XXIV), 86, 360; No. 2535 C (XXIV), 85; No. 2546 (XXIV), 52f; No. 2628 (XXV), 5; No. 2649 (XXV), 86; No. 2656 (XXV), 87; No. 2672 B (XXV), 85; No. 2672 C (XXV), 86, 360; No. 2672 D (XXV), 86; No. 2675 (XXV), 85; No. 2727 (XXV), 53; No. 2728 (XXV), 87; No. 2734 (XXV), 5; No. 2787 (XXVI), 86; No. 2791 (XXVI), 45, 87; No. 2792 (XXVI), 312n; No. 2792 A (XXVI), 50, 84; No. 2792 B (XXVI), 85; No. 2792 D (XXVI), 72, 360; No. 2851 (XXVI), 54ff, 312n
- UNRWA (U.N. Relief and Works Agency): 96, 237. Text of annual report of, 43–50. Quoted by U.N. Special Committee, 78f. U.N. General Assembly resolutions on operations and finances of, 84–87. Recommendation of Council of Europe to improve situation of, 106. Statement by U.S. State Department on support for, 174f. Communiqué by Nordic Foreign Ministers on difficulties of, 221
- UNRWA Advisory Commission: 45, 86f
- UNRWA Commissioner-General: report to U.N., 43–50. Quoted in report of Secretary-General, 76–79. Mentioned in U.N. General Assembly resolutions, 84–87
- UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education: 48f
- U.N. Secretary-General: 25, 29f, 32, 34–37, 44f, 47, 101, 155f, 195n, 221, 232, 250, 317f, 323n, 364f. Reports of: on work of U.N., 3–22; on Jerusalem, 33, 38; on activities of Special Representative of, 42, 81f; on implementation of U.N. General Assembly resolutions: 2792 E (XXVI), 15f, and 2792 C (XXVI), 76–79; on implementation of U.S. Security Council consensus, 80f. Letters and memoranda to, 39, 41ff. Mentioned in report of U.N. Special Committee..., 52–75, in General Assembly resolutions, 83–89, and in Security Council resolutions, 89–92
- U.N. Security Council: 3, 5, 7, 13f, 57, 71f, 84, 166f, 185, 195, 200, 214f, 217f, 230, 237, 250, 253, 263, 275n, 333, 335, 348f, 351, 352n, 356, 360, 363. Debates in, 8–11, 15ff. Consensus of, 11f, 89. Matters brought before, 18–22. Report of, 22–43. Reports of U.N. Secretary-General on consensus of, 80f, and on activities of Special Representative, 81f. Texts of resolutions of, 89–92. Criticized by Meir, 130, and by Eban, 197. Draft resolution of, vetoed by U.S., 226. Decisions of, defied by Israel, 244f, 329. U.S. said to be not discharging its obligations as member of, 278. Praised by Lebanon, 317f
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967): 7, 10, 13, 19, 39, 42, 81, 135, 147, 191, 194, 240, 304, 376. Israeli acceptance of, 4. Syrian rejection of, 31. Israel criticized for not implementing: by U.S.S.R. 35, 164; by Egypt, 176; by Israeli Communist Party, 257; by

- Lebanon, 348; by Jordan, 355. Cited in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2949 (XXVII), 83f. Egypt's acceptance of, praised by World Peace Council, 184. Israeli interpretation of, explained by Eban, 190, 252, and supported by Wilson, 258. Rejected by Iraq, 308. Statements on, by officials of following countries and organizations: CENTO Council of Ministers, 187; Egypt, 3, 43, 177, 274; France, 6, 166, 250; German Democratic Republic, 251; India, 27; Iran, 145; Israeli Communist Party, 160; Jordan, 196, 301f, 339, 354ff; Mapam, 259; Nordic Foreign Ministers, 221; Organization of African Unity, 195; Rumania, 178, 203; Sierra Leone, 37; Socialist Party of France, 156; Spain, 196; United Kingdom, 25, 162, 232f, 255; U.S.S.R., 5, 35, 177, 185, 245, 253; U.S., 42, 145, 155, 174f, 182, 185, 193, 198f, 215, 218f, 236f, 254; Western European Union, 183; World Peace Council, 184
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 313 (1972): 91. Debate and voting record of, 11, 28. Text of, 89
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 316 (1972): 215, 263, 359. Text and voting record of, 91. Criticized by Eban, 197, and by British Labour M.P., 200
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 317 (1972): 215, 359. Text and voting record of, 91f
- U.N. Security Council resolutions: cited in speeches and other U.N. resolutions: No. 233 (1967), 329; No. 234 (1967), 329; No. 237 (1967), 14, 32, 43, 52, 57, 75, 77, 86f, 358; No. 252 (1968), 15f, 33–36, 93ff; No. 259 (1968), 52, 88; No. 262 (1968), 91; No. 267 (1969), 15f, 33–37, 93ff; No. 270 (1969), 91; No. 271 (1969), 15, 33f; No. 280 (1970), 91; No. 285 (1970), 91; No. 298 (1971), 17, 37f, 71, 93ff
- U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories: criticized by Israel, 14, 31f. Report of, 51–75. General Assembly resolution requesting continuation of work of, 87ff. For contents breakdown of report, *see* 51
- U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East: *see* Jarring, Gunnar
- U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO): 22f, 30f. Increase of observers of, on Lebanese-Israeli border, 11–13, 29, 80f, 90
- United Press International News Agency: 58
- United States: 4, 17, 19, 39, 42, 45f, 48, 87, 89n, 103, 107, 132, 148, 153, 164, 190, 197, 206, 210, 228, 230, 252, 255, 273, 282, 302ff, 307, 319ff, 328, 331, 333f, 338, 353, 362f, 368, 370, 377, 380. Middle East policy of: seen as obstacle to peace, 3, 5f; criticized by leaders of following countries or organizations; Bulgaria, 133; Egypt, 135, 274f, 277f, 283ff, 335, 352, 367, 371; Iraq, 146; U.S.S.R., 160; China, 161, 240; World Peace Council, 184f; Arab Socialist Union (Egypt), 280f; Syrian Baath Party, 297; Federation of Arab Republics, 298; Syria, 359f; Libya, 379. Criticized in joint communiqués by: Egypt-U.S.S.R., 151, 176, 181; Syria-U.S.S.R., 152, 202; Libya-U.S.S.R., 154; Iraq-U.S.S.R., 233. Statements by U.N. representative of, 27f, 37. Statements by leaders of: Nixon, 99, 140–144; Rogers, 100ff, 136f, 155, 181f, 215f, 236f, 242f, 254; Noyes, 133f; Humphrey, 137ff; Hamilton, 144f; McGovern, 178–181; Sisco, 191–194, 198f, 217–220; Laird, 235f. Israeli friendship with, viewed by Meir, 105, 130. Statements by State Department of, justifying assistance to Israel, 170f, to Jordan, 171f, and to UNRWA, 174f. Israel's attitude to Presidential candidates of, viewed by Rabin, 194. Sections from platforms of Democratic and Republican parties, 202f, 220f. Condemnation of Munich incident by House of Representatives of, 223. Government of, praised by Meir, 226
- U.S. Congress: report by Nixon to, 140–144. Statement by Rogers to, 155. Resolution of, condemning Black September action at Munich, 223
- U.S. Department of State: 277. Statements by, justifying support for Israel, 170f, for Jordan, 171f, and for UNRWA, 174f
- U.S. Sixth Fleet: 298
- U.S.S.R.: *see* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 86f, 92, 138, 240, 358, 360, 362. Israel called upon to respect, 52f
- Uruguay: submits draft resolution at U.N., 7
- Vatican City: 132
- Viet Cong: 220
- Vietnam: 165, 178, 215, 254, 277, 283, 317, 330, 374

- Wadi Firan: 266
 Waldheim, Kurt: *see* U.N. Secretary-General
 Waldorf Astoria Hotel: 199
 Washington, George: 361
 Wasset: 266
 Weinberg, Moshe: 224
 Weizman, Ezer: places blame for Munich incident on Egypt and Syria, 222f
 Weizmann, Chaim: 324
 West Bank: *see* Jordan, West Bank
 Western European Union Assembly, 18th: section from report of, on Arab-Israeli conflict, 182f
 West Germany: *see* Germany, Federal Republic of
 Wilson, Harold: expresses support for Israeli interpretation of Resolution 242, 258
 Winzer, Otto: statement by, on German Democratic Republic's attitude to Middle East crisis, 251
 World Conference of Christians for Palestine, 1st, Beirut, 1970: 229
 World Conference of Christians for Palestine, 2nd, Canterbury, 1972: statement in support of Palestinian cause, 229
 World Federation of Sephardic Communities: 116
 World Health Assembly (25th Meeting): 48
 World Health Assembly Resolution 25.54 (1972): 48. Text of, 95f
 World Health Organization (WHO): 45, 48f, 95
 World Hebrew Union: 124
 World Jewish Congress: 118
 World Peace Council: 191. Message in support of Palestinian cause, 184f
 World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS): 128f
 World Zionist Organization: mentioned in recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 108–130
 World Zionist Organization, Executive of: 61. Mentioned in recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 108–130
 World Zionist Organization, Youth and Hechalutz Department: mentioned in recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 126–130
 Yalta: 327
 Yalu: 59
 Yamuna: Jewish settlement in, 255
 Yavneh: 129
 Yemen, North (Yemen Arab Republic): 42, 48, 256, 262
 Yemen, South (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen): 6, 48. Statement by Prime Minister Husaini of, 345
 Yeshivot Gevohot: 129
 Yugoslavia: 11, 52, 89n. Sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6. Statement by U.N. representative of, 25, 28. Visits of Sadat to (communiqué), 136, and Arafat (communiqué), 165
 Zadok, Haim: rejects United Arab Kingdom plan, 156f
 Zambia: sponsor of draft resolution at U.N., 6
 Zayid, Shaikh, bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan: 322, 337
 Zayyat, Muhammed Hasan: 231, 252. Statement by, on relations with U.S.S.R., 339f. Speech by, in U.N. General Assembly, 362–366
 Zerka military camp: 264, 267f
 Zhivkov, Todor: statement by, in support of Syria and Palestine Resistance, 133
 Zimbabwe: 165
 Zionism: 108, 111, 119ff, 124, 127f, 135, 155, 168, 170, 202, 208, 228, 240, 245, 253, 260, 280, 286, 288, 294f, 296, 298f, 307f, 311, 314, 316, 321, 323, 325, 330, 345f, 358ff, 363f, 375. Criticized, 21, 133, 146, 161, 273. Jews who denounce, praised by World Conference of Christians for Palestine, 229
 Zionist Action Committee: 125
 Zionist Congress, 28th: 61, 358. Recommendations to, by Committees of, 108–130
 Zionist General Council: mentioned in recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 113–129
 Zionist movement: 22, 41, 260, 323. Mentioned in recommendations to 28th Zionist Congress, 110–128
 Zionist Organization of Paraguay: 116
 Zionist terror organizations: 21
 Zionist Youth and Pioneer Movement (Tnua't Hanoa'r Viha-Halutz): 128
 Zonta International: 49
 Zu'bi, Abd al-Aziz: statement by, on West Bank elections, 102
 Zurich: 222